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CLERGY MALPRACTICE REVISITED: LIABILITY FOR




Clergy' counseling2 clients3 today face challenges in several spheres,
including the spiritual, the moral, and the secular. As the clergy face these
challenges, blurred boundaries result in some clergy engaging in prohibited
sexual contact with vulnerable parishioners.4
Although this behavior is not a late twentieth century phenomenon,5 the
* Associate Professor, St. John's University School of Law. B.A., Pace University, 1975;
M.A., New York University, 1979; J.D., Columbia University, 1989. The views expressed are
solely those of the author and do not reflect those of any entities or organizations. The author
wishes to thank Margaret V. Turano and Philip' Weinberg for their helpful comments and sugges-
tions. Special thanks to Rick Kim, Alison Kelly, Maydia Luben, and Mary Sheridan for their
valuable research assistance.
1. The term "clergy" is used to denote religious leaders. There are 166 separate religious
groups in the United States. Census of Religious Groups in the U.S., in THE WORLD ALMANAC
AND BOOK OF FACTS 644, at 644-45 (1996). Each denomination may be subdivided further into
thousands of churches, the parishioners of which hold common views, and hundreds of different
ecclesiastical offices (e.g. nuns, mothers superior, brothers, fathers, priests, bishops, cardinals,
evangelists, pastors, elders, apostles, prophets, rabbis, vicars, seers, etc.). Samuel E. Ericsson,
Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U. L. REv. 163, 170 (1981)
[hereinafter Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice]. A functional definition given by one commentator
is "those persons ordained, licensed, or otherwise empowered by a church or a sect, following
training prescribed by that organization, to provide spiritual or pastoral counseling to members and
others requesting such guidance." C. Eric Funston, Made out of Whole Cloth? A Constitutional
Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W. L. REv. 507, 508 n.12 (1983).
2. "Counseling," as used in this article, refers to a pastoral relationship between a member
of the clergy and any person to whom that cleric provides counseling, pastoral care, spiritual
guidance, or direction. This includes the hearing of a confession, or confidential or privileged
information from a congregant.
3. "Clients," in the context of the counseling relationship with a member c the clergy, is
used to denote parishioners or followers, and is used interchangeably with those '.erms in this
article. This article also uses the term "women" to refer to clients, because cases of sexual abuse
of male clients by female clerics are rare. See infra note 87.
4. Sexual relationships between clergy and adult parishioners are not necessarily voluntary
consensual relationships. Consent on the part of the parishioner may be illusory, because the
power relationship is disproportionate, and the clergy's role as emotional and spiritual counselors
adds to the power imbalance as the sharing of intimate details in the counseling relationship
increases a woman's vulnerability. See Eduardo Cruz, When the Shepherd Preys on the Flock:
Clergy Sexual Exploitation and the Search for Solutions, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 499, 502 (1991).
The psychological phenomenon of transference compounds the inability of the woman undergoing
counseling to consent. Id.
5. See MARIE M. FORTUNE, Is NOTMNG SACRED? xii (1989) [hereinafter FORTUNE, IS
NOTHING SACRED]. Reverend Fortune relates the story of Henry Ward Beecher, a leader in the
abolition and suffrage movements and pastor of Plymouth Congregation Church, who in 1872 was
accused of a sexual liaison with Elizabeth Tilton, a married parishioner. The congregation
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current litigious climate increases the potential liability of churches and their
clergy. Despite the heightened awareness of the extent of clergy malpractice,
the subject is still discussed in hushed tones, as taboo as incest, within
congregations where such behavior occurs.6 Recently, clergy accused of
pedophilia have garnered considerable press attention and the ire of the
general public.7 Many of the more notorious cases have involved juveniles,8
but this article limits itself to actions brought by female adult victims of clergy
sexual misconduct, and views these cases as reflective of a larger
problem-the role of women in society and in the church.' Women plaintiffs
are generally viewed less sympathetically. Frequently, women who are abused
by clergy find little refuge in the courts, because clergy malpractice'0 is not
recognized as a viable cause of action." Courts dismiss the clergy
malpractice cases for various reasons, with constitutional prohibitions
defended the charismatic church leader despite the presence of other accusers, and he publicly
denied any wrongdoing, while privately admitting to the sexual misconduct. Id. "[T]he scandal as
it was viewed then was Beecher's disregard for Victorian morality and his hypocrisy. Questions
were never raised about his professional ethics as a pastor in relation to his parishioners." Id. at
xi-xii. In her book, the Rev. Fortune also relates the story of the Rev. Peter Donovan, a modem-
day Henry Beecher. Id. at xiii. Donovan, a charismatic young preacher, developed a loyal follow-
ing and despite the testimony of many women who were abused by him, the congregation sup-
ported him until his resignation. Donovan's victims became disillusioned by the hierarchical
church and the parishioners' lack of support for them. Id.
6. The church as family is a metaphor which aids to build "intimate, caring relationships"
within the church, and the church reacts like family members to the revelation of incest. Id. at xiv-
xv; see Kenneth L. Woodward & Patricia King, When a Pastor Turns Seducer, NEWSWEEK, Aug.
28, 1989, at 48; Ann-Janine Morey, Blaming Women for the Sexually Abusive Male Pastor, CHRI-
STIAN CENTURY, Oct. 5, 1988, at 866. Morey states:
Sexual abuse by pastors exhibits the same dynamic as incestuous abuse, which takes
place within the context of an intimate relationship (family, church, counseling) between
an authoritative and powerful person (a relative or minister) and a person who is
vulnerable to and trusting of that power (a child or counselee). Victims often feel
responsible for the abuser's activity and so are bound in secrecy by a double burden of
guilt and shame. Even if the victim does speak up, she or he may not be believed.
Id.
7. E.g., Martha Sawyer Allen, She Wanted Support; Pastor Wanted More, STAR TRIBUNE,
Feb. 21, 1993, at 18A.
8. See id. Gary Schoener of Minneapolis, a national expert on sexual misconduct by
professionals, reports that although the cases involving Roman Catholic priests who abuse children
have received greater media coverage, the vast majority of cases involve adults, and a large
number occur within the Protestant denominations. Id. Catholic priests, because of their vow of
celibacy, may be media targets when cases involving sexual misconduct are reported. It may be
also that the prurient interest of the public contributes to the sensationalism of cases involving
pedophilia.
9. No national statistics are available on sexuil misconduct by clergy. A three-year survey
of religious and secular counselors conducted by the Wisconsin Coalition on Sexual Misconduct
found that 11% of the perpetrators were clerics, and 89% of the victims were women. Woodward
& King, supra note 6, at 48.
10. Although liability for malpractice has been imposed on those who practice in the areas
of psychiatry, psychology, and even in social work, there has been an insurmountable stumbling
block in imposing similar liability on clergy. See infra note 133 and accompanying text. In
referring to clergy malpractice, I am limiting my discussion to sexual misconduct by a member of
the clergy in his or her capacity as counselor or advisor to a parishioner. It is essentially a claim
that the clergy has failed to use due care while counseling. See generally Constance Frisby Fain,
Clergy Malpractice: Liability for Negligent Counseling and Sexual Misconduct, 12 MisS. C. L.
REv. 97, 98 (1991) (advocating imposition of liability when clergy fail to use due care).
1I. See Carl H. Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First
Amendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1986).
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regarding the free exercise of religion being the one most frequently cited. 2
By dismissing these cases, the courts have resurrected the concept of
charitable immunity-long discarded in most states by either judicial decision
or legislative fiat. 3
The Right Reverend Orris G. Walker, Episcopal Bishop of Long Island,
states in a foreword to a diocesan publication on procedures for handling
reports of sexual misconduct:
To be a minister in the Church is to be entrusted with sacred
responsibilities. As ministers, we become important symbols of moral
and spiritual integrity, and people expect us to act in their best
interests. Sexual harassment or abuse is a betrayal of the sacred trust
placed in the one who ministers and is a damaging experience for all
parties involved. Exploitative sexual behavior, because it is focused
on one's personal gratification at the expense of the humanity of
another person, is contrary to what the Gospel teaches. Therefore,
those who sexually abuse or sexually harass someone who is in a
ministerial relationship with them, exhibit unethical as well as
unprofessional behavior.4
This article proposes that sexual misconduct of clergy with a counselee
amounts to malpractice. During an emotional or psychological crisis, many
parishioners seek counseling from a local pastor. If such outreach for help
results in abuse, it is especially contemptible because the perpetrator's power
and authority are perceived as derived from God. 5 However, blaming the
victim--often engaged in even by the victim-is a common response.' 6 The
woman is viewed as a seductive temptress, leading the righteous clergy
astray. 7 Even in the face of overwhelming evidence of clergy misdeeds,
12. Id. Esbeck posits that despite the civil courts' neutral role in deciding a case initiated by
one of the parties, the mere holding that a claim is justiciable raises serious issues concerning
"interference with church affairs and ... religious liberty." Id. He describes many tort claims,
including claims of clergy malpractice, as being incompatible with the separation of church and
state. Id. at 6.
13. Annotation, Immunity of Nongovernmental Charity from Liability for Damages in Tort,
25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895E (1979). Section 895E states:
"One engaged in a charitable, educational, religious or benevolent enterprise or activity is not for
that reason immune from tort liability." Id. Some states, such as Massachusetts, place strict limits
of $20,000 on liability of non-profit organizations. Alison Bass, Law Limits Church Liability to
$20,000, BOSTON GLOBE, May 13, 1992, at 8. South Carolina, Maryland and Texas impose
similar limits, and Arkansas gives nonprofit institutions complete immunity from all legal
damages. Id.
14. The Diocesan Pastoral Concerns Committee, Policies and Procedures for Preventing and
Responding to Allegations of Sexual Misconduct in the Ministerial Relationship Within the
Diocese of Long Island, Apr. 1993.
15. See Woodward & King, supra note 6, at 48; see also FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED,
supra note 5, at 102 (describing the power as derived from training, credentials, gifts, and the
employment contract between the laity and the clergy). "The minister is a physical representation
of the whole community of faith, of the tradition, of a way of viewing the meaning of life ... and
of God." Id. (quoting DAVID K. SwrrzER, PASTOR, PREACHER, PERSON: DEVELOPING A PASTORAL
MINISTRY IN DEPTH 17 (1979)).
16. See FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 105, 122; Morey, supra note 6, at
866, 869.
17. See infra note 26, and accompanying text.
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many parishioners still support the pastor and denounce the female victim. 8
Afterwards, the victim seldom feels safe in the church. She feels betrayed,
hurt, and angry, primarily because of a lack of responsiveness to her plight
within the church hierarchy. 9 Professionals, whether they serve in the secular
world or the church, should be liable when they fail to meet a certain standard
of care toward their clients. Interestingly, some courts, while refusing to
recognize a cause of action for malpractice, have applied fiduciary law to
impose liability upon clergy. Other courts have refused to apply either theory
to allow recovery for women who have been sexually abused by clergy. 0
The doctrine of separation of church and state does not relieve the state of
its responsibility to protect its citizens from harm when clergy are engaged in
nonreligious activities. If women do not get redress for these wrongs, they are
victimized repeatedly, first by the clergy and then by the legal system. To
correct this manifest injustice, the courts must acknowledge the balance
envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution, where an equally powerful state
and church coexist. This balance is-not upset by recognition of the clergy
malpractice action.2 '
Churches often respond to allegations of transgressions by clergy with
silence, and occasional denials-from both the clergy's superiors and the
congregations. Forcing clergy and their churches to accept secular legal
liability and responsibility for their tortious wrongs should have a deterrent
18. The Rev. Thomas Streitferdt was convicted of one count of rape and three counts of
sexual abuse. The attack on three female members of his congregation took place during
counseling sessions in the basement of the East Harlem Church. After his conviction, his
congregation welcomed him back with open arms and told him not to resign as pastor. Dan
Andrews, Convicted Pastor Welcomed Back by Flock, UNITED PRESS INT'L, May 28, 1989. Often'
the pastors are charismatic and weave a web of betrayal which is not easily penetrated. This
"web" and the collar protect pastors from the accusations of the women, and the pastors are
cognizant of the fact that they are more credible than the less influential female accusers. See
FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 65, 81-87, 104-05 (reporting that during the
investigation of a clergyman's misdeeds, the parishioners concluded that "the women were the
source of the problem," resulting in stigmatization, isolation, and silencing of the female accusers).
19. See Allen, supra note 7, at 18A; FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 110-
11, 127-29; see also Gayle White, When Men of the Cloth Fall from Grace, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., July 27, 1991, at E6 (describing the feeling of betrayal experienced by women, often
resulting in leaving organized religion and a loss of faith in God, the latter having been termed the
"God factor"-where victims are left blaming God for violating their sacred trust). There are some
instances when, even among "consenting adults," the effect of the liaison can be post-traumatic
stress disorder, characterized by flashbacks, which is usually seen in veterans of war. Post-
traumatic stress disorder occurs when a "person has experienced an event that is outside the range
of usual human experiences and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone."
DIAGNOSTIC AND STAT. MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 250 (3rd ed. rev. 1987). It has been
identified in victims of battering. See Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater,
Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African American Woman and the Battered Woman Syn-
drome, 1995 WIs. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (1995). Women who are sexually abused by their therapists
have also manifested the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Ronald J. Maurer, Ohio
Psychotherapists' Civil Liability for Sexual Relations with Former Patients, 26 U. TOL. L. REV.
547, 558 (1995).
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. Other commentators have suggested that only tort claims that address compelling societal
interests of health, safety, or public peace should be permitted. See Esbeck, supra note 11, at 6, 8
(suggesting that in order to maintain the balance envisioned by the Framers, religious
organizations must be afforded a high level of immunity from governmental interference). This is
described as the price one pays for living in a free and plural society. Id.
[Vol. 74:1
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effect on such behavior. It would also force churches to begin the painstaking
process of self-evaluation and development of policies and procedures to assist
in reporting and treatment-to benefit the victim and the clergy.22 On rare
occasions, churches become hypersensitive because of fear of litigation and
penalize the cleric accused of sexual misconduct without due process.
Part II of this article views the response to clergy sexual misconduct as
systemic-an issue deeply rooted in women's role in society as well as their
role in a patriarchal church. Part III discusses the problem of clergy sexual
misconduct, explores the churches' delayed recognition of a need for internal
monitoring, and critiques the judiciary's inadequate response to the problem.
Part IV discusses solutions, including the approaches taken by legislatures to
curb abuses by clergy engaged in counseling relationships and potential
solutions in the courts employing a fiduciary duty or professional malpractice
paradigm. The conclusion summarizes viable solutions to this problem,
fashioning narrow remedies which will address the problem without creating
additional difficulties in their wake.
II. CLERGY MALPRACTICE AS A WOMEN'S ISSUE
The patriarchal organizational structure of the church plays a key role in
the problem of the failure to recognize clergy misconduct as a viable cause
action, because patriarchal views are integrated in the legal process, to the
detriment of women.23 If women do not have a voice, the church and the
courts will not believe their accusations and take official corrective action.'
The unresolved and most divisive questions in many denominations involve
"[q]uestions of women's ordination, women's employment as pastors,
22. Many churches have no policies or procedures in place for the resolution of the problem
of sexual misconduct of clergy. Rev. Fortune attributes this to the myopia of the institutional
church: "Conservative churches deny the existence of the problem as long as possible. When they
cannot deny it any longer, they deal with it as a matter of the pastor's adultery, ignoring the issue
of professional ethics. ... [In addition, due to lack of affiliation,] there is no denominational
structure to monitor or discipline clergy." FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 100.
More liberal churches, in an attempt to increase employment opportunities for gay and lesbian
clergy, have removed all references to clerical sexual conduct. Id. "[Tihese well-motivated actions,
which sought not to prescribe sexual behavior for clergy's private lives, left the District with no
standards of professional conduct." Id. at 101.
23. Angela L. Padilla & Jennifer J. Winrich, Christianity, Feminism, and the Law, 1 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 67, 73, 87-102 (1991); Michael McAteer, A Voice for Catholic Feminists,
TORONTO STAR, Dec. 10, 1994, at H24. Maria Riley (a member of the Dominican order of nuns
as well as a research staff member and coordinator of the Women's Project at Washington's
Center for Concern) stated that the women's movement "is impacting on the Church because one
of the fundamental issues is patriarchy or the subordination of women by men .... [T]he fact that
these are women's voices that are now being raised is particularly problematic to some of the
male leaders of the church." Id.; see also Joan Leonard, Women Challenge Church for Equality,
CAPITAL TIMES, Feb. 12, 1994, at 9A (postulating that the current and traditional patriarchy
"excludes the presence, insights and experience of women ... [and] rob[s] women of their full
personhood," while encouraging "men to be domineering, aggressive and selfish").
24. It is extremely difficult to understand why women bringing these charges are often not
believed, since "very rarely do victims falsely report an offense. If they have the courage to tell
someone about their situation, they almost always have been harmed by someone." Marie M.
Fortune, Reporting Child Abuse: An Ethical Mandate for Ministry, in ABUSE AND RELIGION:
WHEN PRAYING ISN'T ENOUGH 193 (Anne L. Horton & Judith A. Williamson eds., 1988)
[hereinafter Fortune, Child Abuse].
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contraception, inclusive language, abortion, sexuality, and so forth . ".."25
Most churches still maintain a structure under which men have the power of
authority on the altar, while women fill the pews-outnumbering men in most
congregations. This patriarchal structure facilitates manipulative abusers and
increases their access to vulnerable parishioners.
Women's experiences receive scant attention in the "theology, ethics,
doctrine, or pastoral care. If considered at all, women's experiences carry an
overlay of the image of woman as temptress, source of evil, and 'gateway to
hell. . ,"" The most striking exception in Christian theology is the elevated
status of Mary-revered for her role as the virginal mother of the son of
God-a paradoxical and unattainable image for women." Thus, the church is
merely a mirror of society's view of women, albeit a distorted mirror,
reflecting more of the past than the present or the future. While this inequality
exists in society, and is reflected in the church, it will be difficult to address
25. FORTUNE, IS NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 123.
26. Id.; see also Padilla & Winrich, supra note 23, at 73-87 (describing the view of woman
as guilty and deserving of punishment based on Eve's role in the creation story and in mankind's
fall from grace and as seductive and wily based on the story of Lot's daughters' role in seducing
their father in order to preserve their father's blood line). In Genesis 19:32-36, Lot's daughters
conspire to ply their father with wine and share his bed without his knowledge. "This highly
unlikely scenario sets the stage for a 'blame the victim' attitude about female victims of sexual
offenses, and it allows the true aggressor to escape guilt." Id at 79. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism
Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA
L. REV. 1135, 1154-55 (1990) describes medieval views of women as an afterthought, discussed
only in terms of their differences from men: "Feminine nature was conceived as being the oppo-
site of male nature [which was defined by the feudal society and the loyalty and love of a vassal
to his lord]: individualistic, selfish, cunning, and sexually voracious." Id. at 1155. Professor Schro-
eder describes one medieval interpretation of original sin where Eve ate the fruit of the Garden of
Eden in an effort to be autonomous (God-like). Adam viewed this as an impossible and unwel-
come aspiration, but realized that Eve would be damned, and out of love and loyalty for her,
abandoned his duty to God. Id. It was the rare woman who could control her natural individualis-
tic and selfish desires and remember the honor of the family and community, which was the natu-
ral desire of men. Women, by their nature, were a constant threat to the order of society and to
the purity and holiness of men. Id. at 1156. See also Pa6la Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduc-
tion, 37 Auz. L. REv. 453, 464-70 (1995) (discussing biblical and rabbinical ambivalence towards
women and misogynist views of women). Women are repeatedly depicted as temptresses, incapa-
ble of rational thought or moral decisions, particularly in matters of sexuality. Women needed to
be controlled, not only to protect them from falling victim to their own passions, but also to pro-
tect men from being led from the righteous path of virtue and intellect. Id. at 470.
27. Padilla and Winrich contrast the "bad" woman, epitomized by Eve, with the "good"
woman, epitomized by Mary:
For both men who judge women and women who judge themselves, the polarities are
clear. "[Woman's] 'Eve nature' justifies punishment .... [Slhe can be raped, battered,
dominated, exiled. When she is seen as 'Mary,' she is honored and patronized, protected
but excluded from decision making, seen as pure but without passion." Either way
women are victims of patriarchal morality. And in practice, they can never be "good"
because the inimicability of the virgin-mother model (literally understood) has left all
women essentially identified with Eve.
Padilla & Winrich, supra note 23, at 84 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 74:1
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this problem adequately." The subordination of women-encompassed in the
biblical view of women-is ultimately evidenced in the legal system.
29
"Theology and law share much in common, including a long history of
justifying violence against women .... [Each institution is] mired in a
patriarchal history that renders them obsolete, and apparently unable to offer
any significant justice for young women victims of abuse."30 The parallels
between women's treatment in the judicial system and in the church are
striking, particularly with respect to the women's lack of voice as they rail
against these patriarchal systems. The women's movement has amplified the
voice of women demanding equal justice in the church and in society.
Feminists may disagree on the sources of women's oppression and the means
and strategies of empowerment, but many believe that "female subordination is
rooted in a set of customary and legal constraints that blocks women's
28. Men in pastoral roles are aided by the patriarchal structure. FORTUNE, IS NOTHING SA-
CRED, supra note 5, at 124. Rev. Fortune's case study of Peter Donovan describes a minister who
engaged in numerous sexual liaisons with female parishioners, including the rape of two women,
and promised marriage to others. Donovan's activities continued for years before he was forced to
resign. Id. at 46-47, 124. Fortune comments:
[lf Donovan had been engaging in the same conduct with men that he did with women
in the church, he would have been relieved of his pastoral privilege long ago. But the
fact that the victims were women, the acceptance of the adage that "boys will be boys,"
and the hesitancy of some men to confront other men's behavior all meant that the
women had to look initially outside of the church for a sympathetic ear and a person
willing to act. The patriarchy prevented the women from getting justice within the
church.
Id. at 124.
29. Padilla and Winrich suggest that religion and the law cooperate in this destructive
patriarchal view:
Because violence against women functions in a patriarchal society as a form of social
control, the legal system, by failing to take violence against women seriously, aids and
abets the continued existence of patriarchy. By blaming, disbelieving, and allowing the
female victim of domestic violence, incest and rape to blame herself for her
victimization, the legal system reproduces and legitimizes women's inferior status as
constructed in the traditional Christian world view. In turn, the religious system
"sacralizes" women's subordinate legal position and elevates social norms into divinely
mandated moral paradigms. Thus, religion and law, each in turn, legitimizes the other's
patriarchal construction of woman.
Padilla and Winrich, supra note 23, at 87-88. First published at the turn of the century, Matilda
Joslyn Gage's feminist work, WOMAN, CHURCH AND STATE, attributed many of the injustices
toward women in the United States to the influence that Christianity has had on the state. She
claimed that under "Usus," a form of Roman law prevalent before Christianity, women enjoyed
greater freedom and could maintain their own property during marriage. MATILDA JOSLYN GAGE,
WOMAN, CHURCH AND STATE: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE STATUS OF WOMEN THROUGH
THE CHRISTIAN AGES 295-99 (1893).
In contrast, Christianity was synonymous with subordination of women:
From Moses to Paul, the Bible everywhere speaks of her as a being made for man,
secondary to man, and under his authority by direct command of the Almighty; the state
as coadjutor and servant of the church, basing her codes of law upon its teachings.
Under these codes woman has not only been looked upon as naturally unchaste, but also
regarded as a liar, the state demanding the testimony of two or three, and in some
instances of seven women to invalidate that of one man; clearing himself by his single
oath. Condemned as having brought evil into the world, woman's every step was looked
upon with suspicion, and short of her just desserts.
Id. at 305-06 (citation omitted).
30. Joyce A. Mercer, Legal and Theological Justice for Abused Adolescent Girls, 9 J.L. &
RELIGION 451, 451 (1992).
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entrance and/or success in the so-called public world."'" The lessons gleaned
from the difficulty women face in obtaining justice in the areas of incest,
domestic violence and sexual harassment can shed some light on the struggle
to obtain justice for abuse within the church. 2
A. Incest
Female victims of incest,33 like other female victims in a patriarchal
society, frequently have their harms discounted. 4 Incest occurs in the private
confines of the home, usually between a father or stepfather and a daughter.33
With the family serving as the model for interaction, as it does in the
church,36 incest thus arises within the same contexts, and creates the same
tensions, as clergy sexual abuse.37 While the feminist movement has been in
the forefront in seeking judicial redress for the victims of incest, its success
has been limited.3"
As is now the case with most victims of clergy malpractice, the harm to
female incest victims is ignored,39 or the focus of the inquiry is shifted to the
nature of the family's dysfunction, even when criminal penalties are
necessary.' Undoubtedly, the current criminal sanctions against defendants in
incest cases provide some deterrent.4' The literature shows, however, that
criminal proceedings are not often initiated, and that the defendants are rarely
31. ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 2, 8 (1989)
(surveying the strengths and weaknesses of feminist theories).
32. ROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW 2 (1984) [hereinafter TONG, WOMEN].
"[T]he law has frequently chosen to trivialize these harms [or] [w]here harm has resisted such
facile trivialization, the law has frequently sought to blame the victim for her plight." Id.; see also
FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 122.
33. Incest is defined as the crime of sexual intercourse or cohabitation between a man and
woman whose familial relationship would, at law, preclude marriage. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
761 (6th ed. 1990). The vast majority of incest victims are female, while the perpetrators are
almost invariably male. JUDITH L. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 3-4 (1981).
34. Joyce McCell, Incest as Conundrum: Judicial Discourse on Private Wrong and Public
Harm, 1 TEx. J. WOMEN & L 143, 145 (1992).
35. id. at 143. The overwhelming majority-94.6%, to be precise-of the reported incest
cases involve father figures and daughters; less than 3% of the cases involve either father-son or
mother-son relationships. Id. There are no reported cases of mother-daughter incest Id.
36. FORTUNE, IS NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 99. "The church is frequently referred
to as the family of God." Id. This creates an unbalanced setting where the congregants place
unconditional trust in a pastor, not unlike that of children in their fathers. Id. at 103.
37. Just as members of the religious family are often more preoccupied with protecting the
image of the institution or the reputation of the clerics, so, too, are the parents concerned about
scandal, preserving the family unit, or keeping the male breadwinner in the home. Frequently
these concerns override the child's best interests. McConnell, supra note 34, at 172 nn.23-24
(quoting Diane H. Browning & Bonny Boatman, Incest: Children at Risk, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
69 (1977)).
38. McConnell, supra note 34, at 149.
39. The literature on incest victims, who are overwhelmingly female, is overly preoccupied
with the victims' complicity. Charlotte L. Mitra, Judicial Discourse in Father-Daughter Incest
Appeal Cases, 15 INT'L J. Soc. L. 121, 123 (1987); Padilla & Winrich, supra note 23, at 90-92
(suggesting that mothers, as well as daughters, are frequently blamed).
40. Padilla & Winrich, supra note 23, at 90-92.
41. Incestuous behavior is a felony in every state, and most states are making serious
attempts to prosecute child sexual abuse cases. Carol W. Napier, Note, Civil Incest Suits: Getting
Beyond the Statute of Limitations, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 995, 998 (1990).
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successfully prosecuted.42 Because of the inadequate redress obtained through
the routine channels in criminal or family law, an increasing number of adult
incest victims bring tort suits against close family members."3
Not surprisingly, incest claims seem to merit little consideration within the
tort system." Undaunted, incest victims have pursued compensatory damages
for their emotional and physical injuries, expensive psychological treatment,
and lost wages directly attributable to the serious debilitating impact of incest
on their lives.'5 Victims of clergy malpractice deserve no less for the proven
harms done to them. Trust in a clergy member makes the parishioner more
vulnerable and less likely to report the wrongdoer. A parallel exists to the
incest victim who remains silent for years after the abuse.' Once that trust is
betrayed, the victim loses not only trust in the cleric, but her faith in God and
the Church.47 The problem often is tied to the silencing of the victim that
occurs in the church and in society in general. The victim will often fear
reprisals, not only from the church and her fellow parishioners, but possibly
even divine retribution.' Those who oppose liability for clergy malpractice
state that if liability attaches for this behavior clergy will be at the mercy of
their female parishioners, who could misconstrue a simple show of concern, or
a fatherly touch, and ruin the reputation and career of innocent clergy.49
42. Joycelyn B. Lamm, Note, Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Victims: Toward an
Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 YALE L.J. 2189, 2189 (1991). Some
commentators suggest two main reasons for the lack of enforcement of statutes which prohibit
domestic violence and incest: "[flirst, the lawyers, police, judges, and juries charged with carrying
out the law are impaired by patriarchal attitudes about a woman's subordinate status in
society;... [slecond, the female victims themselves, having internalized this debilitating
definition of their role, often do not seek legal remedies for their injuries." Padilla & Winrich,
supra note 23, at 90.
43. Lamm, supra note 42, at 2189.
44. Id. at 2190.
45. Id.
46. See Morey, supra note 6, at 866; see also FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5,
at xiv-xv, 103-106 (describing parishioner assumption of trust in the clergy).
47. Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 318 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. CL
2153 (1994). After the married victim engaged in the sexual relationship with the priest, who was
also married, she experienced a loss of faith in God and the Church. Id. at 312-18. When she
reported the sexual relationship to the Bishop, he advised her that if "she loved Father Robinson
she should not talk to anyone about her relationship with him, never go near the church, and never
talk to Father Robinson again." Id. at 318. Her loss of faith was aggravated when Bishop Frey
made her believe she was primarily at fault, never asked for her version of the story, never in-
quired as to her feelings about the relationship or her plans, and demanded secrecy from her. Id. at
318 n.9.
48. In order to engage in sexual relations with the women, the clerics often invoke God's
approval of the relationship, in the ultimate act of manipulation and selfishness. FORTUNE, Is
NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 65, 120-21 (discussing the alienation suffered by women who
report abuse within the church).
49. Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ohio 1991). Where a heightened standard of
pleading was introduced in negligent hiring claims, the court stated that "the goal of protecting the
reputations of upstanding members of the community is important enough to require that facts be
pled with particularity in order for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss." Id. Undoubtedly,
there is some merit in the concern about damaged reputations. For instance, Joseph Cardinal
Bernardin was accused of sexual misconduct on the basis of a "repressed memory," and the
accusation was later retracted. Margaret Carlson, Full of Grace, TIME, Mar. 14, 1994, at 37.
Ironically, when his accuser died, Cardinal Bernardin stated that the incident, although regrettable
and painful, had positive effects, including improving his standing with the local Catholics.
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Certainly internal boards of review should be able to determine whether the
contact was sexual in nature and, if not, courts are able to discern sexual
touching." However, because the injuries claimed are often psychological or
emotional, some courts express a fear of fraud, especially when the claim is
made years after the alleged abuse?' This rationale for denying abused
women their voice in the churches and the courts seems to be based less on
concern for the clergy than on lack of concern for the women. The slow
response of the courts in providing remedies for women is a sign of societal
indifference to their plight. While everyone sympathizes with men wrongly
accused of rape, no one has suggested that the civil cause of action for sexual
battery should be abolished. Besides, concerns about fraud have not prevented
the imposition of liability on secular counselors.52 To deny all clergy
malpractice claims on this basis is thus unjust.
B. Domestic Violence
Most states prohibited wife-beating by 1870." Although it is
questionable whether a "rule of thumb" ever existed--giving men permission to
beat their wives, provided the stick used in the beating was no thicker than a
thumb 54-- many women, even at the beginning of this century, did not enjoy
a daily existence confident that they would be free from physical violence.5
Unfortunately, wife-beating has been "sanctioned and controlled through
culture, religious beliefs, law, and most importantly, the norms of friendship,
kinship and neighborhood groups."56
Andrew Herrmann, Bernardin Accuser Dies: Cook Charge May Have United Local Catholics,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Sept. 24, 1995, at 9. A survey reported that 83% described him as a good
or excellent leader, and Cardinal Bernardin attributed this to his openness in handling the Cook
case. Id.; see also Scott Fornek, "He Will Accept God's Will and Move On From There":
Admirers Cite His Deep Faith and Work Ethic, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, June 11, 1995, at 16
("'I ... have a great faith-a faith in God, a faith in the people I serve. In the final analysis, that
kind of faith and a willingness and indeed a determination to make your best effort, that will carry
the day."'); Andrew Herrmann, Bernardin Achieves "Closure" With Accuser, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, Jan. 5, 1995, at 3 ("[Tlhe meeting [between Bernardin and the man who had accused him
of sexual abuse] 'brought closure and peace to both of us."'). Cardinal Bernardin said, "'If there's
an accusation of sexual abuse against anyone, priest or otherwise, I think that that accusation has
to be taken seriously.... [l]n the final analysis, truth will win out."' Ohio Man Drops Cardinal
Bernardin from Suit Claiming Abuse, LIABILITY WK., March 7, 1994, at 1, available in 1994 WL
2541644.
50. See State v. Ohrtman, 466 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that pastor's
hug of a female parishioner during a counseling session which compressed her breasts against his
chest was not "touching" within the meaning of a statute which prohibited sexual contact with a
psychotherapist).
51. Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 788 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied
116 S. Ct. 920 (1996) (denying.extension of a judicially created discovery rule on public policy
grounds).
52. See infra note 367 and accompanying text.
53. See generally SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, IN PURSUIT OF EQUALITY: WOMEN, PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (1992).
54. Henry A. Kelly, Rule of Thumb and the Folklaw of the Husband's Stick, 44 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 341, 341 (1994) (chronicling the dubious origin and frequent misuse of the term); see also
Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A Proposal for Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ.
J. 401 (1995) (asserting the relevance of family violence to family property policy).
55. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888-93 (1992).
56. "[U]nlike male victims of violent crime, women are prone to blame themselves for their
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In striving for an illusion of peaceful family life, society has traditionally
denied and suppressed the evidence of family violence." Only since the
1960s have the reality and depth of the problem of family
violence-particularly child abuse and wife-beating--earned widespread public
attention as a problem that knows no boundaries of class or color."
Frequently, women who report incidents of abuse in the home are not believed
because the men who beat them seem to epitomize respectability." Despite
the perception of marital abuse as a lower or working-class, people-of-color
problem, studies show that wife beating crosses all social classes and racial
lines.'
By the 1940s gender-neutral expressions such as "marital discord" and
"marital disharmony" surfaced, evidencing society's attempts to forge a
woman-blaming response to the problem.6 To many, marital violence
became a sign of wifely dysfunction. Often, battered wives would also blame
themselves by believing that they somehow deserved to be beaten. Frequently
after the authorities became involved, the man "bec[ame] contrite and
tender .... or the victim exhibit[ed] compassion or concern for the abuser." '62
Historically, the mostly-male authorities then retreated, treating the problem as
own victimization." TONG, WOMEN, supra note 32, at 195. Religious and family support groups
often focus on preserving the family unit and emphasize wifely submission when encouraging
women to remain in abusive homes. Fortune, Child Abuse, supra note 24, at 165.
57. Casey, 505 U.S. at 889.
58. Id.; see also Maria L. Ganga & Elizabeth Mehren, Simpson Case Compels Nation to
Look at Domestic Violence, L.A. TIMEs, June 20, 1994, at 1 (noting the celebrity of the domestic
violence case of O.J. Simpson). The nation also confronted the reality that domestic abuse cuts
across color and socioeconomic barriers when live-in-companions, Joel Steinberg, a lawyer, and
Hedda Nussbaum, an editor, were in the media spotlight for the traumatic death of their adopted
daughter at Steinberg's hands. People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845, 846 (N.Y. 1992). The courts
found that Hedda Nussbaum was also severely abused, and media attention focused momentarily
on both child and spousal abuse. Id. at 846-47.
59. See LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OwN LIvEs, 18-19 (1988) (describing an early
case history of the Amato family-a mother, father and six young children). Mrs. Amato sought
help from many social agencies and often reported that her husband was a "drunkard, a gambler, a
non-supporter, and a wife-beater." Id. at 18. Social workers doubted Mrs. Amato because Mr.
Amato appeared to be a "good and sober man" who blamed family problems on his wife's
inability to manage the wages he brought home to her. Id. Only the corroboration by her
husband's own father and physical evidence of abuse convinced the agencies. Id. at 19. Although
Mr. Amato was convicted of abuse and sentenced to six months in prison, he returned to the home
more violent and abusive than before, continuing to abuse his wife and children. Id. The case was
eventually closed with no resolution. Id.
60. Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Family Lawyers: The Need for an Identification
Protocol, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1027, 1027-135 (1995) (explaining that as one realizes battering occurs
in all socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic groups, it becomes clear that corporate lawyers will
encounter battered women.); see also Diane Patton, "He Never Hit Me"-The Need for Expert
Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases, Aiz. ATrr'Y, Jan. 30, 1994, at 10 (stating that wife
battering is a serious and prevalent problem which affects all socio-economic and religious
groups). The defense of battered woman's syndrome has been successful in cases where women
kill their batterer. Ammons, supra note 19 at 1015. However, some object to describing a
syndrome which will result in stereotyping and conviction for those who do not fit the stereotype.
Id. The battered woman stereotype is a "white, middle class, passive, weak woman who in a
moment of terror, lost control and committed a crime because she was being abused." Id. at 1016.
61. GORDON, supra note 59, at 284.
62. MARY J. FRUG, WOMEN AND THE LAW 555 (1992).
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a private family matter and less than serious.63 When battered women aligned
themselves with the feminist movement, the struggle was no longer an
individual one, but became both political and ideological. '
Women sexually abused by clergy share characteristics with physically
abused women-most notably the phenomenon of blaming the victim, and the
public reluctance to believe the women because the men seem highly credible
and respectable.' Like women in physically abusive relationships, women
who become engaged in sexual relationships during the course of counseling
are often living out a pattern of psychological abuse.' A cleric who
participates in such activity with a vulnerable parishioner is manipulative and,
like the wife beater, needs assistance. Often the men indulge in abusive acts
because they view it as low-risk; the women's self-esteem is so low that they
are unlikely to reveal the secret and, if they do, they are unlikely to be taken
seriously.67 The shame the women experience also silences them. Society
often views the female victim with incredulity. Women fear that speaking up
will lead others to believe that they are merely experiencing "buyers'
remorse"-belated regrets over unwise choices freely made by both parties.
By silencing the abused woman, society facilitates the abuser.
C. Sexual Harassment
Men inside and outside of the church complain about the labelling of
innocent behavior as sexual harassment.' These complaints frequently
demonstrate ignorance about the subject. The term "sexual harassment" is used
to identify "those kinds of sexual coercion and exploitation that occur neither
between complete strangers nor between purely social acquaintances or family
members, but between men and women in a formal structured relationship in
which women have an expectation that the basis of the relationship has
nothing to do with sex." Incidents of sexual harassment range from outright
demands for sexual services, vulgar advances, pinching, fondling, sexual
63. Id.
64. Id. at 288.
65. Linda Jorgenson & Rebecca Randles, Time Out: The Statue of Limitations and Fiduciary
Theory in Psychotherapist Sexual Misconduct Cases, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 181, 200 (1991)
(suggesting that a double standard is working against women claiming sexual misconduct, because
their claims would be taken seriously if they complained of physical violence by their therapists).
Elijah Muhammad, 67 year-old leader of the Black Muslim Movement, allegedly "had intimacies"
with a "succession of personal secretaries" who became pregnant. MALCOLM X, AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF MALCOM X 299 (1964). The women were charged with adultery in Muslim courts and
received sentences of isolation, forbidden to have any contact with other Muslims. Id. When this
news was about to become public knowledge, the leaders of the movement "desperately wanted to
find some ... bridge-over which ... the Nation of Islam could be saved from self-destruction."
Id. at 302. Following a recurring theme, the reputation of the minister and the survival of the
religious group took precedence over the women and their children.
66. GORDON, supra note 59, at 285-86.
67. Id. at 284-86.
68. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 820-23 (1991).
69. Jill Goodman, Sexual Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance Travelled and the
Distance Yet to Go. 10 CAP. U. L. REV. 445, 445-46 (1981).
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remarks or jokes made in women's presence, to sexual assault.7" The
gravamen of a sexual harassment claim is a power imbalance.7
Frequently, incidents of sexual harassment occur in the workplace, with
the most notorious examples being the claims made by Professor Anita Hill
and others against Justice Clarence Thomas during his nomination hearing,"
and the mary accusations which culminated in the resignation of Senator
Packwood." Recent studies indicate that occupations of harassed women and
their harassers vary greatly and cross socioeconomic lines. Male harassers are
found among the ranks of doctors, lawyers, social workers, clergy persons,
salespersons, construction workers, auto mechanics, and librarians.74 Again
the voices of women were silenced when they sought remedies in the court.7"
Instead of disciplining men for such behavior, women were expected to
leave employment where they experienced such treatment.76 The women were
expendable, because their jobs were less important to the survival of the
companies.77 Few women complained, preferring to suffer in silence than
face the reprisals which would inevitably include loss of employment for the
victim rather than the harasser, or increased harassment." Some were told to
consider it a compliment or to stop the provocative dress or immoral behavior
that had encouraged the treatment by their male counterparts.79
The legislature, rather than the common law, finally provided a vehicle for
victims of harassment through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.80
Under Title VII, women who lost their jobs for resisting sexual demands
began to sue their former employers. Although early plaintiffs' cases were
unsuccessful in the district courts, the Third, Ninth, and District of Columbia
Circuits upheld the right of a woman to sue for such employment
discrimination under this Act."' Finally, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson82
70. Id. at 448-55.
71. Estrich, supra note 68, at 820.
72. Adrienne D. Davis & Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legacy of Doubt: Treatment of Sex
and Race in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1367, 1367-68 (1992).
73. Harvey Berkman, With a Little Help from His Supporters: Senator Packwood's Allies
Contribute More Than $1 Million for His Defense, NAT'L L.J., June 12, 1995, at A6 (reporting
that Sen. Bob Packwood's "20 years worth of sexual harassment allegations" cost his political
supporters $1.1 million, and counting).
74. Goodman, supra note 69, at 453.
75. Ultimately Senator Packwood resigned from the Senate, the charges were dismissed by
the authorities, and the women harmed by Packwood were arguably harmed a second time when
he departed the Senate with emotional commendations from his colleagues, yet without any hint
of an apology to the injured women. See 141 CONG. REc. S12, 796-97 (1995).
76. See Goodman, supra note 69, at 456.
77. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 12-13 (1979).
78. Id. at 48-49 (discussing ongoing intimidations suffered by women during the
development of sexual harassment law).
79. Id.
80. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against
any individual ... because of ... sex .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
81. See Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1979); Barnes v. Costle,
561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044,
1045 (3d Cir. 1977).
82. 477 U.S. 57, 65-68 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII, and that the victim could not submit voluntarily to unlawful sex
discrimination).
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the Supreme Court put its imprimatur on a woman's right to sue under Title
VII for sexual harassment. Ironically, within the institution that passed Title
VII legislation, the voice of women crying out against sexual harassment in
the workplace was ignored. 3
Moreover, in a practical sense, women who sue have a substantial burden
to overcome by establishing that the sexual harassment they experience is
closely linked to their employment. Employers who can show that the
advances were of a "personal" nature and unrelated to the workplace will
prevail.84 Women who complain of sexual harassment also bear the burden of
not being believed.85 Women who claim that clergy have engaged in sexual
misconduct bear a similar burden. The women bringing claims of clergy
malpractice often lack credibility; the clergy, in contrast, has enormous
credibility. This imbalance frequently prevents victims from coming
forward.
86
Each of these examples of injustice against women serves as a backdrop
for another example of women receiving short shrift in the churches and
courts: the reluctance to recognize the problem of clergy sexual misconduct as
one worthy of a remedy.
III. CLERGY SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
A. Churches Respond to Problem
The magnitude of the clergy sexual abuse epidemic is no secret in the
public press or in recent surveys of clergy. Surveys consistently show that
between ten and thirty-eight percent of clerical respondents report some level
of sexual contact with a congregant8 7 The pervasiveness of the problem is
83. In the case of Senator Packwood, the first charges were made three years before his
resignation. See Christine Gonzalez & Roger 0. Crockett, Gender in the Workplace After
Packwood, Companies Relocate with Awareness, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Sept. 9, 1995, at C7.
Senator Packwood had vowed to fight the charges and only after pressure from within the
Republican party, for reasons which had little to do with the clear merits of the women's case,
was he forced to resign. Id.
84. See MAcKINNON, supra note 77, at 83-90.
85. See id.
86. FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 82, 104-05.
87. Surveys of 300 clergy from four U.S. Christian denominations (Assemblies of God,
Episcopal Church U.S.A., Presbyterian Church U.S.A., and United Methodist), reported that 38%
admitted to some form of sexual contact with a member of their congregation, and 12% admitted
to having sexual intercourse with a congregant. An astonishing 76% said they knew of another
clergy member who had engaged in sexual intercourse with a congregant. Alison Mayes, Crossing
the Line, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 19, 1992, at 14; see also Eric Frazier, Churches are Seeking
Ways to Curb Clerical Misconduct, POST & COURIER, Dec. 11, 1994, at F9; Mike Wilson, The
Wrong Kind of Relationship, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 17, 1995, at ID. A mail survey of 80
pastors, conducted by the Center for Ethics and Social Policy of the Graduate Theological Union
in Berkeley, revealed that approximately 10% of the respondents admitted to having a sexual
relationship with a church member. David Briggs, Churches Become More Aware of Sexual
Misconduct by Clergy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1990, at F14. Furthermore, according to another
Christian magazine survey, one in ten pastors (12%) admitted to having sexual affairs outside their
marriages; one in five (18%) admitted to some form of sexual contact with someone other than
spouses. Id. The majority (69%) became involved with congregants, church staff or counselees. Id.
Although the high-profile cases have involved children, the majority of cases reported to the
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just being recognized by the church hierarchy.8" Reports from other countries
confirm that this problem is not unique to the United States or to Christianity
but, rather, transcends denominational and geographic boundaries. 9
Reports of sexual improprieties and litigation have had a severe financial
impact on churches, and have led to questioning of their moral authority." In
response, many churches have begun to develop policies to deal with sex
abuse by clergy." This contrasts with the initial response of churches--one
Baptist Union of Western Canada, in Calgary, involve adults. Kim Lunman, Adults Suffering Bulk
of Sexual Abuse, CALGARY HERALD, Sept. 24, 1994, at A8. Sexual involvement by female
ministers with male counselees is rare; the majority of cases reported in the United Church in
Edmonton involved female victims. Id. A policy report of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
reported that "between 10 and 23 percent of clergy nationwide have engaged in sexualized
behavior or sexual contact with parishioners, clients or employees ... within a professional
relationship." Presbyterians Adopt Guidelines to Curb Sex Misconduct by Clergy, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1991, at A20. According to A.W. Richard Sipe, a Baltimore psychotherapist and former
priest who has studied the sexual activities of the clergy since 1960, at any one time 20% of
Roman Catholic priests are involved in sexual relationships with women. Joanne Wojcik, Church
Scandals Prompt Action; Risk Management Strategies Adopted by Several Dioceses, BUS. INS.,
Jan. 3, 1994, at 1. A study released in 1990 by the Park Ridge Center for the Study of Health,
Faith and Ethics, in Chicago, claimed that one in every ten clergy has had an affair, while one in
four has had sexual contact with members of the congregation. John Dart, Churches Move Toward
Reducing Sexual Misconduct by Clergy, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1991, at F18. Twelve percent of
300 ministers surveyed by Christianity Today magazine admitted to committing adultery. Of
those, 39% admitted to such behavior with a church member, 17% with a person being counseled,
and 13% with a staff member. White, supra note 19, at E6.
88. Briggs, supra note 87, at F14.
89. Documented reports of clergy sexual misconduct come from all four comers of the
globe, and transect all religions. See, e.g., Bob Harvey, Harassment in Church; Various
Denominations Come to Grips with Growing Crisis, OTTAWA CITIZEN, July 13, 1991, at EIO
(describing a survey of female clergy and female students in theological colleges within the
United Church in Canada which revealed that about a third of them reported experiencing sexual
harassment within the church). Lee S. Hua, Sex-scandal Monk Quits, But Insists He is Innocent,
STRAITS TIMES, Apr. 21, 1995, at 21 (describing the scandalous sexual behavior of Buddhist monk
Phra Yantra Amaro Bhikku, that "prompted a near crisis of faith in Buddhist Thailand"); Tim
McGirk, All Kinds of Monkey Business, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 12, 1995, at 18, 19;
Kevin Myers, The Face Behind Ireland's Turmoil, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 17,
1994, at 17 (documenting the "sex abuse crisis" in the Catholic Church in Ireland); Michael
Rotem, Rabbi Starts 6 Months in Jail for Sex Abuse, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 1, 1991, at 02
(documenting a rabbi convicted of committing obscene sexual acts, fraud, and breach of trust after
molesting a woman during counseling related to an alimony matter); David Ward, Churchgoers
"Betrayed" by Rave Vicar, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 24, 1995, at 005 (documenting the rise and
fall of British "rave" vicar Chris Brain, who is alleged to have sexually abused more than 20
women during healing sessions at Brain's home). More than 25% of female students at a
Mennonite bible college in Winnipeg reported sexual abuse within the church during the previous
year, ranging from fondling to forced sex. Harvey, Harassment in Church, at E10; see also
Misconduct Will Join Any Denomination, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 24, 1992, at A]3 (stating that
the Rev. Marie Fortune, after examining over 700 cases of clergy sexual abuse, has found no
denominational pattern).
90. One journalist estimates that the Roman Catholic Church paid more than a half billion
dollars in medical and legal costs from 1982 to 1992. Carol McGraw, Casualties Abound When
Priests Stand Accused, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 24, 1994, at A01. A study conducted for the
National Conference of Bishops in 1984 estimated that litigation could eventually cost $1 billion.
Id.
91. John D. Vogelsang, Reconstructing the Response to Clergy Sexual Abuse, Q. REv. 3-10
(Winter 1993). Vogelsang identifies five models used by church officials to understand and
respond to sexual abuse within the church: the first model sees abuse as "sexual sin"; the second
views it as the act of a disturbed individual, a sociopath, or sexual addict; the third is the
therapeutic model, with both complainant and accused categorized as products of dysfunctional
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of denial and attacking the accusers in an attempt to avoid a scandal.92 The
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) General Assembly adopted guidelines in 1991
for use in the national office and as a model for individual presbyteries." The
United Methodist Church is training bishops, pastors, and district
superintendents to deal with cases of sexual abuse and avoid sexual
harassment.94 The North Georgia Conference of the United Methodist
Church's Pastoral Care Symposium, held in November of 1993, focused on
"sexuality and the ministry," and the North and South Georgia conferences
have held crisis management workshops, which included discussion of the
clergy's sexual transgressions with parishioners.95 Reform Jewish rabbis
added new warnings against even the "appearance of sexual impropriety" to
their revised code of ethics at a June 1991 meeting in Florida.'
In the Roman Catholic Church, celibacy is an integral aspect of the
priesthood, yet, there are estimates that at least fifty percent of the clergy are
not celibate at any given time.97 The Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapo-
lis has promulgated a policy on sexual misconduct by the clergy and church
employees, which is explained in a videotape and booklet sent to every Roman
Catholic household in the Archdiocese.98 The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
families; the fourth sees the clergy as having betrayed a professional relationship; and the fifth
subscribes to the theory that sexual abuse in the clergy/congregant relationship is a "manifestation
of the culturally condoned abuse of power and sexuality perpetrated by men on women and
children." Id.
92. See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 318 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 2153 (1994).
93. Presbyterians Adopt Guidelines to Curb Sex Misconduct by Clergy, N.Y. TIMES, June
12, 1991, at A20. General Assembly guidelines include a definition of misconduct, theological
and ethical reflection, guidelines for adjudicating cases, responses to victims and congregations,
employment and reporting procedures, description of a sexual misconduct response team, and
sample complaint-processing documents. Thomas S. Giles, Coping with Sexual Misconduct in the
Church, CHRIsTIANITY TODAY, Jan. 11, 1993, at 48.
94. Stuart Vincent, Policy on Sex Abuse Complaints, NEWSDAY, Feb. 24, 1994, at 39; see
also Virginia Culver, Methodists to Form Sex Conduct Team, DENVER POST, June 7, 1994, at B-
01 (discussing efforts of the Regional United Methodists to form "intervention and response"
teams).
95. Celia Sibley, Churches Forging Policies on Clergy Sexual Misconduct, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Nov. 18, 1993, at A15.
96. Dart, supra, note 87, at F18.
97. Kay Longcope, Sex Cases Put Celibacy Back in Spotlight, BOSTON GLOBE, May 30,
1992, at 1. A. W. Richard Sipe, a psychologist from Johns Hopkins University, conducted a 25-
year study which was released in 1990, and which revealed rates of celibacy in the church. Id.
Sipe, a former Benedictine monk, estimates that more than half of the 53,000 Roman Catholic
priests in the United States are breaking their vow of celibacy. Of those, about 28% are engaged
in long term relationships with women, while 10-13% are involved with men. He estimates that
nearly six percent are involved with adolescents-usually boys. Critics of Dr. Sipes point out that
many of the clergy interviewed for his study were already in therapy, so that the claimed
percentages are skewed and not representative of "typical" clergy. See Anastasia Toufexis, What to
do When Priests Stray, TIME, Sept. 24, 1990, at 79.
98. Martha Sawyer Allen, Archdiocese Expands Its Policy on Sexual Misconduct; Document
Will Go to All Catholics, STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 6, 1992, at ]A. The video includes vignettes
showing appropriate and inappropriate behavior, and provides information to the viewer regarding
reporting instances of abuse. Id. The policy includes performing background checks on all of the
Church's 4,000 employees, as well as providing an "advocate" system to facilitate the reporting of
incidents of abuse. Id. Additionally, the policy clearly defines "sexual harassment," "exploitation,"
and "abuse" so as to provide a sense of clarity on appropriate boundaries and behaviors. Id. The
Twin Cities archdiocese has been considered a leader within the church on this issue, as they have
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Chicago has instituted a toll-free hot line and an independent panel composed
of laymen to handle complaints of sexual abuse by priests. 99 The Roman
Catholic Diocese of Joliet added lay people to the investigating team in order
to address the suspicion that church! officials probing sexual misconduct by
clergy cover up the truth.' °° Two Roman Catholic dioceses in Ohio depend
on police checks to look into the backgrounds of priests and lay workers."
Recently, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Sacramento released its procedures
for handling sexual misconduct of its employees, to be made available to
anyone who wants a copy." The Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh has
established a policy to deal with sexual misconduct of clerics. 3 The policy
creates a comprehensive administrative process under which an assessment
board consisting of laity and priests evaluates the credibility of an accusation,
and recommends to the bishop the retention or dismissal of the accused. It
encourages victims to report the alleged abuse to the proper civil
authorities." 4 The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York has instituted a
similar policy of advising all complainants that any issues may be reported to
legal authorities. 5 The New Mexico Archdiocese established a four-step risk
management program and installed a toll-free line for victims to call to
register confidential complaints."° It also formed a lay commission which
includes non-Catholics, a victim, the parent of a victim, and several therapists,
to investigate past, present, and future claims of clergy misconduct. °"
Episcopal dioceses in New England require priests to fill out background
questionnaires." Religious leaders hope the checks will restore confidence
in the church." Some insurance companies are requiring these measures
before giving churches coverage for sexual misconduct."' The Episcopal
had a policy on sexual abuse since 1988. Id. However, in 1990, a jury awarded $2 million (later
reduced in remittitur) to one of the victims of Thomas Adamson, a former priest in the
archdiocese who was accused in the early 1980s of abusing at least six boys while he was a priest
in the 1970s. Id. This has been an expensive lesson for the archdiocese, not only in terms of
money, but also resulting in a tamished public image.
99. Larry Witham, Sex Scandals Lead Churches to Reassess Their Counseling Role, WASH.
TMES, Sept. 22, 1992, at A5; see also Archdiocese Issues Report on Sexual Abuse by Priests,
REUTERS (North American Wire), June 15, 1992 (outlining the recommendations of Chicago
archdiocese, including an independent nine-member review board consisting in part of laypersons,
a professional caseworker to deal with all allegations of sexual misconduct, and a mandatory
program of intensive and continuing therapy for guilty priests).
100. Andrew Herrmann, Diocese to Add Laity in Sex Abuse Probes, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1993, at 14; see also Archdiocese Issues Report on Sexual Abuse by Priests, supra note
99.
101. Bill Lindelof, Churches Screen Clergy for Scandal, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 11, 1995, at
BI.
102. Diocese Formulates Sex Policy, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 3, 1995, at B1.
103. Diocese Revises Policy on Sexual Abuse by Clergy, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 11, 1993.
104. Id.
105. An advisory board composed of four priests and eight lay people with backgrounds in
psychiatry, social work, law, and communications will review overall policy and procedures. Peter
Steinfels, Policy is Issued on Investigating Abuse by Priests, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1993, at Al.
106. Wojcik, supra note 87, at 1.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., PriestrUndergo Background Checks, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 1995, at
1A.
109. See, e.g., id.
110. Background Checks Extended to Clergy, PHOENIX GAZETrE, Aug. 8, 1995, at A2.
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Diocese of Southwest Florida, in 1994, issued a written policy on sexual
misconduct. The thirty-three-page document gives plain-spoken advice to
priests who counsel parishioners."' The Diocese of Long Island has
developed guidelines for churches within the diocese."2 In Minnesota, a
statewide interfaith committee has been developed to deal with sexual exploi-
tation by clergy.' Furthermore, in 1994, the Episcopal Church's General
Convention passed strict new procedures for the trial and discipline of clerics
accused of misconduct."' Some Lutheran churches are also doing back-
ground checks on new pastors and requiring ministers to attend seminars on
sexual harassment."5 The North Carolina Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church has begun "study days" for church leaders, geared toward prevention
of misconduct and toward helping clergy learn to take care of themselves."6
The Christian Reformed Church, Church of the Brethren, and Mennonite
Brethren, and United States Conference have adopted similar policies."' The
Mennonite Church, Congregation Leadership Office, has published guidelines
for disciplining clergy for sexual and other transgressions."' Southern
Baptists are beginning to keep records on clerics' sexual improprieties, on
moral grounds and because of possible litigation.' "'
Among the questions being asked are:
(i) Have you ever been charged or adjudicated with sexual misconduct?
(ii) Do you have a history of drug abuse?
(iii) Have you ever been charged with misappropriating funds?
Id. The responses are then forwarded to a Minnesota records company, which then verifies them
with the references the ministers also are asked to provide. Id.
111. Wilson, supra note 87. The plain-speaking manual includes advice on ways to minimize
the risk inherent in private meetings: "One seasoned priest has a comer in the local Denny's to
meet certain people for coffee. The waitresses know how to make themselves scarce so a private
conversation can happen." Id. Additionally, the policy recommends that priests "should be prudent
about self-disclosure, especially around sexual or highly personal matters," because "it is easy for
people to misinterpret." Id. "Finally, the policy urges priests to 'use care when exchanging the
Peace'-in other words, hug someone only when it is clear that a hug is welcome." Id.
112. J. Michael Parker, Episcopalians Tighten Policy on Clergy Sexual Misconduct, SAN
ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEws, Sept. 3, 1994, at 19A. Robert Royce of the Diocese of Long Island
characterized the changes, effective as of January 1, 1996, as having dragged the Episcopal
Church "kicking and screaming into the modem era." Id. The major focal point of change
involved eliminating the statute of limitations for charges of sexual abuse of people under the age
of 21. Id. The revisions also increase the period available to file suit for those over the age of 21.
Jim W. Jones, Episcopal Misconduct Code Revised, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 1, 1994,
at 6. Revisions also state guidelines on who has standing to file a complaint, including the victim,
the victim's spouse, the victim's parents, and groups of clergy. Id. Additionally, the position of
"church advocate" is created, whose role is to aid the victim in interpreting the church's
disciplinary process. Id.
113. See Woodward & King, supra note 6, at 48.
114. Clergy Discipline Procedures Revised, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 3, 1994, at D9.
115. Wendy Hundley, Churches Eye Ways to Deal With Clergy Misconduct, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 3, 1994, at 6C.
116. Flo Johnston, Sexual Crimes by Clergy Addressed-Lutherans Adopt Procedures,
Policies, DURHAM HERALD-SUN, July 2, 1994, at Cl.
117. Giles, supra note 93, at 48.
118. MENNONITE BOARD OF CONGREGATIONAL MINISTRIES, GUIDELINES FOR DIsCIPLINE
REGARDING MINISTERIAL CREDENTIALS (2d ed. 1993).
119. Sibley, supra note 95, at AI5.
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Reverend Marie Fortune, an expert in the prevention of sexual and
domestic violence, conducts workshops for clergy on sexual misconduct. 2
She sees the counseling relationship as fraught with potential dangers. She
recommends written policies that spell out the professional conduct expected
of clergy and the consequences of violating the agreement. 2' Priests engaged
in long-term counseling should be supervised and held professionally
accountable in a manner similar to psychologists, social workers, and
doctors.'22 Some large denominations have instituted rules regarding the
counseling situation, such as recommending ministers counsel a person only
three times, and that all counseling be done during working. hours at the
church.'23 Other safeguards include making sure there is a window in the
counseling room, and some have gone as far as to ban all opposite-sex
counseling. 24
Often, however, the church is unwilling or unable to address this problem
because of its own shortcomings. In Moses v. Diocese of Colorado,2 ' church
fathers tried to silence the victim to preserve the integrity of the "old boy
network" and the reputation of a minister who was considered "bishop
material."'26 In many instances, priests who had committed sexual abuse
returned from brief rehabilitation sessions to other parishes whose parishioners
were not aware of their histories. 2 ' If a minister embezzled money from his
church, it is unlikely that the hierarchy would recommend him to another
church, yet, as Moses illustrates, there are routine "cover-ups" of actions
viewed as mere sexual peccadillos. The interests of the woman should not be
subordinate to the interests of the church in protecting the priest engaged in
the misconduct.
B. Judicial Treatment of Clergy Malpractice Claims
The seminal case of clergy malpractice is Nally v. Grace Community
Church of the Valley. 2 ' The facts of Nally are very different from the cases
discussed in this article. Nally involved a wrongful death action filed against
the church and its pastors by the parents of a young man who committed
suicide after receiving informal counseling from the church.'29 The plaintiffs
asserted that the defendants were negligent in failing to prevent the suicide,
and had engaged in outrageous conduct. 30 The defendants claimed that as
pastoral counselors, not professional, medical or psychiatric counselors, no
120. See FORTUNE, IS NoTHING SACRED, supra note 5.
121. See id. at 135-153.
122. Mayes, supra note 87, at 14.
123. Virginia Culver, Sex Lawsuits Force Changes in Churches, DENVER POST, May 1, 1994,
at A-01.
124. Id.
125. 863 P.2d 310, 316 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994).
126. Moses, 863 P.2d at 42.
127. See Culver, supra note 123.
128. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).
129. Nally, 763 P.2d at 950-51.
130. Id. at 952-53.
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duty was owed to the plaintiff. 3' The court correctly declined to impose a
duty to refer difficult cases to professional counselors on the defendants,
allegedly fearful of stifling all gratuitous or religious counseling.'32 Although
many courts have addressed the question of whether a separate cause of action
exists for the malpractice of a member of the clergy while acting in a clerical
capacity, no court has allowed recovery under this theory.'33 Some courts
have held that the tort of clergy malpractice does not exist, 3 4 while others
have found that no clergy malpractice had been committed under the specific
facts of the case.'35 After Nally, claims against clergy for sexual misconduct
and negligent counseling steadily increased.'36 Furthermore, as churches
nationwide become more involved in the personal, spiritual and psychological
lives of parishioners, and more clergy provide pastoral counseling, these
claims are expected to multiply.'37
131. Id. at 950.
132. The Nally court considered these barriers under the heading of "public policy con-
siderations." Id. at 959. Specifically, the court stated:
Imposing a duty on defendants or other nontherapist counselors to... insure their
counselees [are also] under the care of psychotherapists, psychiatric facilities, or others
authorized and equipped to forestall imminent suicide, could have a deleterious effect on
counseling in general.... [T]he indeterminate nature of liability ... could deter those
most in need of help from seeking treatment out of fear that their private disclosures
could subject them to involuntary commitment to psychiatric facilities.
Id. at 960. The Nally Court also saw constitutional barriers to the imposition of liability:
Because of the differing theological views espoused by the myriad of religions in our
state and practiced by church members, it would certainly be impractical, and quite
possibly unconstitutional, to impose a duty of care on pastoral counselors. Such a duty
would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the particular
denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity.
Id.
In his concurrence, Justice Kaufman discounted both "public policy" concerns. Specifically,
as to the constitutional objections, he found that the compelling state interest in preserving the
lives of would-be suicides justified sanctioning tort recovery for non-religiously motivated actions
that occur within the scope of a pastoral counseling relationship. Id. at 969-70. "'Good faith and
reasonable conduct are the necessary touchstones to any qualified [First Amendment] privilege
that may arise from any invited and religiously directed family counseling, assistance, or advice."'
Id. at 970 (quoting Carrieri v. Bush, 419 P.2d 132, 137 (Cal. 1966)).
133. Destefano v. Gabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 285 n.l1 (Colo. 1988); see also Handley v.
Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993),
cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb.
1993); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio
1988). Several courts have refused to recognize a cause of action for clergy malpractice. See Isely
v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Rita M. v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Fontaine v. Roman Catholic Church, 625
So. 2d 548 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Jones v.
Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Lund v. Caple, 675 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1984). But
see Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (recognizing a
cause of action in malpractice against a cleric acting in the capacity of a marriage counselor);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Harvey, 887 F. Supp. 195 (C.D. I11. 1995).
134. John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Cause of Action for Clergy Malpractice, 75 A.L.R.4th
752, 753-54 (1990).
135. Id. at 754-55; Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1239; Hester, 723 S.W.2d at 551; Byrd, 565 N.E.2d
at 587.
136. Fain, supra note 10, at 99.
137. Id. Pastoral counseling has been described as "the use by clergy of counseling and
psychotherapeutic methods to enable individuals, couples, and families to handle constructively
their personal crises and problems in living. Pastoral counseling draws on insights from
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1. Clergy Sexual Misconduct as An Amatory Action
Cases like Nally are difficult ones, since questions concerning the content
of the counseling pose constitutional problems, in particular the First
Amendment Religion Clause, Establishment Clause, and free speech concerns.
Nally, however, is not the typical case; far more common are cases alleging
sexual misconduct. A plethora of cases are filed by men 3 ' who allege that
the defendant pastor developed a sexual and romantic relationship with the
plaintiff's wife during marital counseling. Strock v. Pressnell'39 is typical of
cases involving husband plaintiffs. Courts frequently dismiss these cases as
amatory actigns'" which are barred by statute.'4' In Strock v Pressnell, for
example, the court refused to recognize the tort of clergy malpractice under
the facts given, because the "alleged acts of Pressnell fell within the realm of
intentional tort law, i.e., amatory actions-not malpractice."' 42 The Strock
court dismissed the plaintiff's claims as an attempt to circumvent the ban on
amatory actions, and held that no legal right existed. "Indeed, a fundamental
principle of the law of all torts is that a legal right must exist and that this
right must be violated in order to warrant redress."'43 The Strock court also
contemporary understanding of human personality, therapeutic methods from current counseling
approaches, and scriptural and theological resources." Id. at 103-04 (quoting Patrick 1. Shea, Con-
stitutional Issues Involved in Regulation of Spiritual Counseling and the Duty to Train, 1990 ABA
TORT AND RELIGION 1F4).
138. See, e.g., Cherepski v. Walker, 913 S.W.2d 761 (Ark. 1996); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763
P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988); Roppollo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Greene v. Roy,
604 So. 2d 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987);
Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese of Omaha, 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1993); Byrd v. Faber, 565
N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla.
1993).
139. 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988). A husband brought suit against a minister of the Lutheran
Church for clergy malpractice, breach of a fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresentation, nondisclosure,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1236. The church was also a
defendant based on agency principles, and claims of negligent supervision and training of
Pressnell. Id.
140. The group of actions termed amatory actions includes criminal conversation, seduction,
alienation of affection, and breach of promise to marry. See infra notes 150-76 and accompanying
texL
141. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (1987); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-923 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
601 (1995); OI-o REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (Anderson 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220
(Michie 1992); WYO. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977).
142. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1239. "For clergy malpractice to be recognized, the cleric's
behavior ... must fall outside the scope of other recognized torts. It is clear.., that clergy
malpractice is distinct from an intentional tort, since the latter claims are currently actionable
against clergymen regardless of their 'professional nature."' Id. (citations omitted). The Ohio
Supreme Court left open, however, the possibility of maintaining an action for clergy malpractice
with the suitable facts. "This opinion should not be read as precluding an action, against a
counselor, pastoral or otherwise, in which a counselor is negligent in treating a patient. This
opinion is limited to the narrow holding that clergy malpractice is not a viable cause of action
under the facts of this case." Id. at 1240 n.5. "Moreover, we are unaware of any authority
supporting the proposition that sexual abuse by a member of the clergy is cognizable as 'clergy
malpractice."' Id. The court also ruled on the constitutionality of an Ohio statute which abolished
amatory actions, stating that it does not violate the Ohio Constitution or the Equal Protection or
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.; see also
Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("'[Olnce intentional offensive
conduct has been established, the actor is liable for assault and not negligence."') (quoting
Mazzaferro v. Albany Motel Enters., 515 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)).
143. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1243. The Strock court stated:
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
relied on the view that in order to recognize a cause of action for clergy
malpractice, the cleric's behavior must fall outside the scope of other
recognized torts.'" Because Strock's injury resembled an amatory injury, the
court ignored his allegation that the breach of trust had caused immeasurable
damage to his marriage relations and his personal psyche. 45 The Ohio
Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's order granting the defendants'
motion to dismiss)46
The Strock plaintiff's damage and the violation alleged were not a "heart
balm," 47 despite the court's view." It was a breach of trust by a clerical
counselor who had been expected to act in the best interests of his
clients-both wife and husband. The Strock court missed an opportunity to set
important public policy. The question before it was not one of moral
relativism, nor was it an issue of disgrace visited upon the family. The
imposition of civil liability would have a deterrent effect on this type of
relationship, which is abusive and manipulative, rather than a matter of the
heart. Whether the behavior results in harm to the husband or the wife, the
plaintiff should be able to recover against the cleric for the misconduct.
Courts have followed a policy of dismissing many actions brought by
wives or husbands who began counseling with a priest who subsequently
engaged in a sexual relationship with the wife.'49 Courts rejecting these
claims are usually relying on the abolition of amatory action torts such as
criminal conversation, 0  seduction, 5' alienation of affection,'52  and
Because OHIO R.C. 2305.29 abolished the torts of alienation of affections and criminal
conversation, any legal right that a spouse may have had under these common law
actions has been abrogated and, thus, there can be no violation of a nonexistent right.
Therefore, [the defendant] is not liable for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, or nondisclosure.
Id. at 1244. It is unclear why the court focused on the instrumentality of the injury rather than the
specific duties and rights being violated.
144. Id. at 1239; see also Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ohio 1991) (expressing
concern that "through the creative use of tort law, appellees may recover several times for the
same injury"); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Mo. App. 1987) (stating that "to avoid a
redundant remedy, . . . any functional theory of clergy malpractice needs [to] address incidents of
the clergy-communicant relationship not already actionable").
145. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1239-42.
146. Id. at 1244.
147. Id. at 1242.
148. "In fact, the special relationship existing between Pressnell and appellant in the instant
action is what distinguishes this case from a common amatory action." Id. at 1246 (Sweeney, J.,
dissenting). In his well reasoned contrast between amatory actions and breach of fiduciary duty,
Judge Sweeney noted:
Here, the couple's minister, under guise of offering pastoral counseling services, abused
the trust placed in him. This trust was the raison d'etre of the relationship. It is also
what distinguishes this case from those which the legislature intended to abolish when it
did away with amatory actions. This distinction also applies to Strock's claim of
misrepresentation-this was not your average lover's ruse.
id. at 1246 (quoting Strock v. Presnell, Nos. 4127, 4146, 1987 WL 14434, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App.
July 15, 1987) (Cacioppo, J., dissenting in part and concurring in result)).
149. See, e.g., Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987) (Maddox, J., concurring;
majority affirming dismissal on unstated grounds); Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct.
App. 1994); Greene v. Roy, 604 So. 2d 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1992); Strock v. Presnell, 527 N.E.2d
1235 (Ohio 1988); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1993).
150. Criminal conversation is essentially defined as the sexual intercourse of an outsider with
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breach of a promise to marry. "'53 The courts have, in effect, abolished torts
where the injury incidentally or expressly involves a sexual act. One of the
concerns expressed is that this is a "slippery slope," where liability based on
sexual misconduct will lead to the establishment of liability in the Nally-type
case."" This emphasis is misplaced. The courts should not be concerned with
the sexual nature of the act, but with whether the act involved a breach of a
fiduciary duty owed by the pastor toward his parishioner.'55 That misconduct
is the gravamen of the clergy malpractice claim.
The rationale behind the amatory torts was that one's affection was a
property interest, the loss of which had a pecuniary value recoverable under
tort law.'56 Some have speculated that the laws "developed ... as an
offshoot of the action for enticing away a servant and depriving the master of
the quasi-proprietary interest in her services."'57  Eventually parents,
employers, or spouses could all sue for seduction, assuming that the "seducee"
had previously been chaste and of some service to the plaintiff.' At early
a husband or wife. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 373 (6th ed. 1990). The Supreme Court apparently
felt strongly about the importance of the action when it stated:
Many of the cases hold that the essential injury to the husband consists in the defilement
of the marriage bed, in the invasion of his exclusive right to marital intercourse with his
wife and to beget his own children. This is a right of the highest kind, upon the
thorough maintenance of which the whole social order rests, and in order to the
maintenance of the action it may properly be regarded as a property right.
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 484 (1904).
151. "Seduction [is] 'the act of persuading or inducing a woman of previous chaste character
to depart from the path of virtue by the use of any species of arts, persuasions, or wiles which are
calculated to have, and do have, that effect and resulting in her ultimately submitting .... to the
sexual embraces of the person accused."' Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1980) (quoting Savage v. Embrey, 184 N.W. 503, 505 (Mich. 1921)); see also Destefano v.
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 282 (Colo. 1988) (quoting Weinlich v. Coffee, 176 P. 210 (Colo. 1919)
("Seduction is 'the act of a man in enticing a woman to have unlawful intercourse with him by
means of persuasion, solicitation, promise, bribes, or other means without the employment of
force.,')).
152. This tort involves an adulterer encouraging a spouse to leave the plaintiff, and is a step
removed from "criminal conversation." See Destefano, 763 P.2d at 279 & n.3.
153. Stanard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 96 (Wash. 1977). That court described the cause of
action:
The breach-of-promise-to-marry action is one not easy to classify. Although the action is
treated as arising from the breach of a contract ... , the damages allowable ...
resemble a tort action. Thus, ... [one can] recover for loss to reputation, mental
anguish, and injury to health, in addition to recovering for expenditures made in prepara-
tion for the marriage and loss of pecuniary and social advantages which the promised
marriage offered.
Id.
154. Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
155. See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1429 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's
dismissal of breach of fiduciary duty claim because it "was simply an elliptical way to state a
clergy malpractice claim, a cause of action that it had already held to be not recognized in
Illinois").
156. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at
915-16 (5th ed. 1984).
157. Id.; see also Magierowski v. Buckley, 121 A.2d 749, 753 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1956) ("The wife and minor children were considered, in early common law, as superior servants
of the husband and father ... ").
158. The theory of recovery for all groups originated in the tort of "enticement," a common
law reformulation of the ancient doctrine of "per quad servitium amisit." See Cravens/Povock Ins.
Agency v. Beasley Constr., 766 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Francis Bowes
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common law, a seduced female did not have a cause of action against her
seducer because she was also engaged in the wrongful act, and because loss of
service was indispensable to the plaintiff's right of recovery, based upon the
relation of master to servant.'59 Later, the seducee herself got the statutory
right to sue for the seduction, although the action was limited to unmarried
females."
States eventually began to pass statutes to abolish these common-law
amatory actions. In many states, the legislative intent was to limit the abuses
generated by a plaintiff using the cause of action for extortion purposes,'
Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. REV. 663, 663 (1923)).
This remedy originated in early Roman law when children, servants, and slaves were so
closely identified with the domestic head of the house that an injury to them gave rise to
an action by the pater familias, the male head of the house, who alone was entitled to
recover for these damages.
Id. at 310. So scarce was labor during and after the Black Death in Europe, that a statutory right
was created for. employers allowing recovery for servants "enticed" away from their employment.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, § 129 at 980.
The same "loss of services" rationale extended the cause of action to fathers, allowing them
to sue their daughters' seducers for the loss of the daughters' services. For an excellent description
of the evolution of the tort of seduction, see Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They
Call My Good Nature 'Deceit"': A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 374
(1993). Ms. Larson points out that as the nineteenth century passed, daughters no longer possessed
the same pecuniary interest for their fathers. "Urbanization and expanding wage labor
opportunities took young women outside the home to work, eroding fathers' control over their
daughters' activities. Many unmarried women gained unprecedented personal and economic
independence by taking work in factories and domestic service, and some began to live apart from
their families before marriage." Id. at 384.
159. Weinlich v. Coffee, 176 P. 210, 211 (Colo. 1919). In denying the plaintiff's action for
seduction, the court stated:
At common law a seduced female has no cause of action against her seducer, not only
because she is a party to the wrongful act, but also because loss of service is
indispensable to a right of recovery, and no one except those entitled to the services of
the female can maintain an action for the seduction; the right of action being based
solely upon the relation of master and servant.
Id. See also Welsund v. Schueller, 108 N.W. 483, 484 (Minn. 1906); Oberlin v. Upson, 95 N.E.
511, 512 (Ohio 1911). Even after statutes were passed allowing married women to sue in their
own right (the Married Women's Acts), courts went to extremes to deny recovery to women for
the alienation of their spouses' affection. Consider the following statement by the court in Duffies
v. Duffies, 45 N.W. 522, 525 (Wis. 1890), in justifying denial of recovery to the wife:
There are natural and unchangeable conditions of husband and wife that make that right
radically unequal and different... . [The wife] is purer and better by nature than her
husband and more governed by principle and a sense of duty and right, and she seldom
violates her marriage obligations, or abandons her home, or denies to her husband the
comforts and advantages of her society by any inducement or influence of others,
without just cause. With the husband the case is different .... He is exposed to the
temptations, enticements, and allurements of the world, which easily withdraw him from
her society, or cause him to desert or abandon her .... The wife had reason to expect all
these things when she entered the marriage relation, and her right to his society has all
these conditions, and is not the same in "degree and value" as his rights to her.
Id. at 525.
160. Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 282 (Colo. 1988) (citing Weinlich v. Coffee, 176
P. 210, 211 (Colo. 1919)).
161. See Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1240 (Ohio 1988). The court noted:
[lit is notorious that ... [amatory actions] have afforded a fertile field for blackmail and
extortion by means of manufactured suits in which the threat of publicity is used to
force a settlement. There is good reason to believe that even genuine actions of this type
are brought more frequently than not with purely mercenary or vindictive motives; that
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not a feminist aversion to "woman as property." The court in Strock
speculated that an "increased societal interest in personal choice, the
decriminalization of sexual activities in many states, and skepticism about the
role of law in protecting feelings and enforcing highly personal morality"
contributed to the passage of anti-heart balm statutes.'62
2. Beyond Amatory Torts
In a vigorous dissent in Strock v. Pressnell,'63 Justice Sweeney
contended that clerics should be held to the same duty of care as secular
counselors by focusing on the behavior of the practitioner and not his religious
or secular status.'" He also pointed out that both religious and secular
counselors would reject sexual relations as a viable treatment technique. 6'
He regarded "clergy malpractice" to be a misnomer, and would have held
"that a marriage counselor who engages in sexual relations with the spouse of
a client seeking professional guidance may be answerable in damages for
malpractice."'"
One of the distinct difficulties faced by claimants is showing that the
clergy malpractice claim is distinct from existing intentional tort and
negligence claims, and has not been thrown in as a "catch all" claim. 6
Justice Sweeney responded to the court's assertion that the tort of clergy
malpractice must fall entirely outside the scope of other defined torts:
[T]he counselor-client relationship is the basis of the cause of action.
It is because of this special relationship that liability results. The
standard of care applicable to the relationship exists irrespective of
any liability resulting from the negligent performance of acts arising
it is impossible to compensate for such damage which has derisively been called "heart
balm"; that people of any decent instincts do not bring an action which merely adds to
the family disgrace; and that no preventive purpose is served, since such torts are
seldom committed with deliberate plan.
Id. (quoting KEaTON ET AL., supra note 156, § 124, at 929 (5th ed. 1984)); see also Destefano v.
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 281 (Colo. 1988) (discussing the abuses perpetuated under alienation of
affection, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of contract to marry claims, and declaring a
legislative intent that the best interests of the people of the state will be served by the abolition of
these statutes).
162. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1240.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1244.
165. Id. ("The method by which each would be qualified to perform his respective functions
is wholly immaterial .... since, in either situation, sexual relations have never been an accepted
mode of treatment.").
166. Id. at 1245.
167. Mark A. Anthony, Through the Narrow Door: An Examination of Possible Criteria for a
Clergy Malpractice Action, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 493, 493-94 (1990); see also Hester v.
Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) ("To avoid a redundant remedy .... any
functional theory of clergy malpractice needs [to] address incidents of the clergy-communicant
relationship not already actionable."). That is, the court would find that conduct fitting within
assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with business
relationships, or obtaining donations of money by fraud, would be carved out of conduct
actionable for clergy malpractice.
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in a context unrelated to the fulfillment of professional
responsibilities."
Thus, Justice Sweeney hurdled an obstacle that other courts found
insurmountable: the foundation of the action is inextricable from the
environment in which the harm occurs. It does not matter that the minister's
acts, if committed privately, may historically have been amatory torts; 6
when a fiduciary or professional relationship exists and the fiduciary breaches
his duty, the law should provide protection, as it has traditionally done. A
minister who sleeps with a woman he is supposed to be counseling has abused
the trust placed in him. 7 ' He should be held accountable for that breach of
trust, whether by the husband whose marriage has been affected by the priest's
malpractice, or the victim herself.
The Svengali-like influence of a manipulative priest, in a position of
direct authority over the victim, does not permit an inference of a sexual
relationship between consenting adults. 7' Sex between equals is very
different from sexual contact between guardian and ward, yet the court in
Schmidt v. Bishop72 demonstrates the challenge faced by victims. Although
conceding that a fiduciary relationship was "one founded upon trust or
confidence reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another,"'
73
the Schmidt court failed to find a fiduciary relationship in a counseling
168. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1245.
169. It might also be argued that the amatory actions enumerated in the statutes are the only
ones abolished. See Destefano, 763 P.2d at 283, which stated:
In interpreting [the statute], we must give effect to the policy considerations enumerated
[therein], but should not read the statute so broadly as to preclude any cause of action
involving extramarital affairs, regardless of whether a claim for relief which is not
included in [the statute] is enumerated. In our view, the heart balm statute only
precludes those causes of action specifically listed in the statute.
Id.
170. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1246.
171. Some courts take the view that despite the plaintiff's claims of emotional vulnerability,
an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a clergy was subject to demurrer,
because the actions involved conduct between "consenting adults." Schieffer v. Catholic
Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907, 910-11 (Neb. 1993). But cf F.G. v. McDonell, 677 A.2d 258 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1996) (noting that an allegation that a cleric had exploited vulnerabilities of adult
counselee and induced her to engage in sexual acts was sufficient to state a claim of clergy
malpractice).
172. 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In Schmidt, the plaintiff alleged that when she was
12 years old, Joseph Bishop initiated sexual contact which "did not involve rape or sexual
intercourse, but... the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree, in violation of New York
Penal Law § 130.60 ...." Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 324. He invoked God while sexually abusing
Ms. Schmidt, assuring her that "the relationship was special and acceptable in the eyes of the Lord
. .. Id. The counseling relationship and abuse continued for 28 years, and the plaintiff's
affidavit states that during psychotherapy she "began to understand that the contact with Joseph
Bishop was wrong, that he sexually abused [her] and that [she] suffered severe damage as a result
of that abuse." Id. The court rejected the view that engaging in sexual contact during the
counseling relationship amounted to malpractice, instead saying that it "clearly" supported an
action for battery or "some similar intentional tort for which the statute of limitations is one year."
Id. The court also asserted that "[e]ven if the court were to invite a trial jury to engage in the
Constitutionally dubious task of setting a standard of reasonable care for clergymen engaged in
counseling, the obstacle remains that New York courts have rejected uniformly such attempts to
transmogrify intentional torts into negligence." Id.
173. Id. at 325 (quoting Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)).
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relationship between the minister and plaintiff which began when she was
twelve years of age. The court refused to hold the minister to a fiduciary
standard, imposed as a matter of social policy; he had only a general duty not
to violate the law.1
74
In Roppolo v. Moore, 5 the counselee committed suicide, in part,
because of an adulterous affair she had with the defendant, a medical doctor
and an Episcopal priest, when he was counseling her. In dismissing the
woman's claim, the court stated:
As there is no civil nor criminal prohibition against such conduct
between adult laypersons, the State cannot penalize such conduct
because Dr. Moore was an Episcopal priest .... To do so would
require this Court to determine the standards of the Episcopal Church
and then put the weight of the State behind those standards or to
require a different standard of behavior of the clergy, neither of
which is permissible.'76
The Roppolo court failed to distinguish between the priest's negligence, which
is unrelated to his status as a priest, and his breach of a fiduciary duty which
is inextricable from that status. By invoking the First Amendment's
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, the court promoted a policy whereby
those who incidentally wear a collar may engage in civil wrongs without
redress, even if the conduct complained of is not religious. The Roppolo court,
like the court in Schmidt, 77 ignored the power exerted by a spiritual pastor
over a parishioner when it alluded to conduct between "adult laypersons."'78
Both courts failed to distinguish consenting adults from someone engaged in a
sexual relationship with a counselee. The courts must impose a fiduciary duty
on ministers to abstain from sexual relationships with their parishioners.
Further, this rule will put the bad actors among the profession on notice that,
as a representative of the church, abuse of the parishioner's trust will not be
tolerated. 1
79
When the church is not involved, the courts have less difficulty finding
liability for similar sexual misconduct. In Roy v. Hartogs,' the plaintiff
174. Id. at 325-26. The court so decided even though the plaintiff was sent to the defendant
for "emotional, spiritual and familial counseling." Id. at 324.
175. 644 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
176. Roppolo, 644 So. 2d at 208 (citation omitted).
177. Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 325-26.
178. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
179. Consider the argument of Judge Cacioppo, in her dissent in Strock v. Pressnell:
"Ironically, far from impeding religious liberty, allowing malpractice claims against prurient
pastoral counselors reinforces the Church's own religious doctrine .... Imposing societal
prohibitions of such conduct on a minister through the civil law does not restrict religious liberty,
but actually enhances it." Strock v. Presnell, Nos. 4127, 4146, 1987 WL 14434, at *7 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987), judgment affid in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom Strock v. Pressnell,
527 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 (Ohio 1988) (rejecting, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty as a
viable cause of action)). Several courts have recognized breach of fiduciary duty in clergy sexual
misconduct cases. See Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex. 1995);
Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994);
Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988).
180. 366 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1975).
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alleged that her psychiatrist had engaged in a sexual relationship with her
during a course of treatment.' Using consent as a defense, the defendant
moved to dismiss the claim because the amatory action of seduction is no
longer recognized as a valid cause of action. The court rejected that defense,
noting that:
It was never the intention of the legislature to outlaw all actions in
which sexual intercourse is an element .... [Wihere consent could
not be given or where it was coerced as in cases of statutory rape,
rape or where there was a fiduciary relationship between guardian and
ward, there was always an action for damages on the case." 2
Using the analogy of guardian and ward, the court determined that the consent
of a vulnerable patient given to a psychiatrist, who is in the position of "over-
powering influence and trust," is not a bar to the cause of action.'83 The
breach of the fiduciary is unrelated to the "consent" of the ward. 84 The Roy
court heralded a public policy rationale for the recognition of a cause of action
for malpractice.8 5 There can be no consent8 6 when the victim holds the
person making the advances in such high esteem that she would be willing to
do anything. Charismatic leaders such as Jim Jones in Jonestown, Guyana,'87
and David Koresh in Waco, Texas,'88 are extreme examples of the loss of
will and the level of dedication that a religious leader can inspire.
C. Holding Churches Liable
The courts must balance claims alleging inappropriate behavior by clerics
against the church's vulnerability from its detractors and unscrupulous persons.
Admittedly, the church is a deep pocket, and many clergy are unable to pay
large damage awards; so, some plaintiffs seek to hold the hierarchical church
liable on the basis of vicarious liability, negligent hiring, or negligent supervi-
sion of the offending clergyman.
Torts committed within the scope of employment may create vicarious
liability. This imputed negligence or respondeat superior liability results from
the nature of the relationship between the clergy and the church. The church,
181. Roy, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
182. Id. at 299 (quotations omitted).
183. Id. at 300-01.
184. Id. at 299.
185. The New York court stated:
There is a public policy to protect a patient from the deliberate and malicious abuse of
power and breach of trust by a psychiatrist when that patient entrusts to him her body
and mind in the hope that he will use his best efforts to effect a cure. That right is best
protected by permitting the victim to pursue civil remedies, not only to vindicate a
wrong against her, but to vindicate the public interest as well.
Id. at 301.
186. Authentic consent "must take place in a context of mutuality, choice, full knowledge,
and equal power, and in the absence of coercion or fear. When there is an imbalance of power in
a relationship, these necessary factors will not be present." FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra
note 5, at 38.




as master, has control over the actions of the servant, because the master has
selected and trained the servant and should therefore be responsible for his
wrongs.8 9 This allocation of risk supposes that the employer who benefits
from the enterprise is in a better position to bear the loss than the innocent
victim."
Primarily in response to demands of insurance companies, churches
became concerned about the imposition of vicarious liability. 9 ' As a
threshold requirement for holding churches. liable, the clerics must be found
liable. Some commentators have argued potential liability under agency
theory since "churches represent their clergy as standing in a special
relationship to God."'93 In order to impose respondeat superior liability, the
employee must be viewed as a servant, under the control of the master, but
since most churches do not control the day-to-day activities of clergy, liability
should be avoidable. Besides, engaging in sexual activity with a counselee can
never be viewed as falling within the scope of the priest's employment, so
churches should be able to escape liability on that basis.'94
In addition, the public policy reasons for imposing vicarious liability do
not exist in this realm. Recognizing that churches are not-for-profit entities
that provide free counseling to needy clients, courts may be reluctant to
impose liability, fearing that churches may no longer engage in gratuitous
counseling of parishioners. In private industry, liability was imposed as a
189. See Moses, 863 P.2d at 327.
190. KEETON Er AL, supra note 156, § 69, at 500-01.
191. The Very Reverend Lloyd A. Lewis, Jr., Dean of the George Mercer, Jr. Memorial
School of Theology, expressed grave concerns about the Episcopal diocese's reason for embarking
on an educational campaign for clergy, deacons, and lay church employees around the issue of
sexual misconduct. The Church Insurance Fund mandated that churches and church organizations
participate in diocesan-run training in order to be indemnified in suits for sexual harassment, child
sexual abuse, or other sexual misconduct. As a result, the diocese embarked upon the training.
Dean Lewis stated that the essential nature of the Christian community is non-exploitive and this
should serve as an impetus for such training, not legal and financial threats. Interview with The
Very Rev. Lloyd A. Lewis, Jr., Dean of the George Mercer, Jr. Memorial Sch. of Theology, in
Garden City, Long Island, N.Y. (June 24, 1996). Although the availability of insurance is an
important issue in the resolution of whether clergy or their churches should be held liable for
clergy's sexual misconduct, this discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
192. Strock, 527 N.E.2d at 1244; see also Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese of Omaha, 508
N.W.2d 907, 913 (Neb. 1993) (citing Strock).
193. Jill Fedje, Liability for Sexual Abuse: The Anomalous Immunity of Churches, 9 LAW &
INEQ. J. 133, 154-55 (1990).
194. Id. at 587-88; see also Scott v. Central Baptist Church, 243 Cal. Rptr. 128, 129-30 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988) (stating that employer is not vicariously liable when employee substantially
deviates from his duties); Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that for respondeat superior liability to apply, the conduct must be
characteristic of the activities of the church or reasonably foreseeable, and "[ilt would defy every
notion of logic and fairness to say that sexual activity between a priest and a parishioner is
characteristic of the Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Church"); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado,
862 P.2d 310, 330 (Colo. 1993) (stating that priest engaging in oral sex was "serious breach of
[his] ordination vows" and not within the scope of employment with church); Alpharelta First
United Methodist Church v. Stewart, 472 S.E.2d 532, 535 (Ga. 1996) (finding that the defendant
church organizations were not liable under the theory of respondeat superior, because sexual
behavior was contrary to the tenets and principles of the Methodist Church and is not a part of, or
in any way incidental to, a minister's duties and responsibilities).
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deliberate allocation of risk.'95 The private enterprise which profited while
injuring others through its employees' torts was viewed as better able to
absorb the risk and distribute it through higher prices or insurance." The
problem of who should bear the loss was at the core of the discussion, and it
was clear that the private employer was in a better position to do so. In
addition, if an employer were held liable, there would be a greater incentive to
be careful in the selection, instruction, and supervision of the employees.'97
Negligent hiring is a separate cause of action which falls outside the scope
of vicarious liability.'98 Vicarious liability is based on an agency theory,
while negligent hiring is based on the law of torts.'" Some courts have pro-
tected churches by requiring that plaintiffs state with particularity all claims
alleging negligent hiring of clergy.2" Negligent hiring claims require that the
church knew or should have known of the cleric's propensity for sexual
misconduct.'O° This can be shown when there is a history of sexual
improprieties or through psychological evaluations. Liability should be
imposed only on a clear showing of sexual dysfunction.2 2 To impose
liability on the basis of negligent hiring, the plaintiff must allege that the
actions of the cleric were foreseeable because the individual cleric was known
to be potentially dangerous.2 3 If psychological tests are conducted2"4 or the
cleric has a history of such behavior, this will be easier to establish.
195. KEETON E7 AL., supra note 156, § 69, at 500.
196. Id. at 500-01.
197. Id. at 501.
198. Moses, 863 P.2d at 324 n.16.
199. Id.
200. Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589-90 (Ohio 1991).
201. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
202. See Alpharetta First United Methodist Church v. Stewart, 472 S.E.2d 532, 536 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996) (requiring a showing that the church knew of the propensity for the type of miscon-
duct alleged by plaintiff, and rejecting negligent hiring claim where plaintiff could only show
generalized knowledge of misconduct based on cheating on exams at seminary, and psychological
testing which revealed difficulty controlling impulses, aggression, etc.).
203. A church will be exposed to liability if it fails to inform prospective employers about a
former minister's employment record, especially incidents of sexual misconduct. For instance, in
Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), the
court awarded $855,000 in compensatory damages and $2.7 million in punitive damages to a child
who alleged that a priest had sexually molested children for years. The appeals court upheld the
lower court's reduction of the punitive damage award but also held liable the Diocese of Winona,
which transferred the priest to the Archdiocese, since a clergyman in the former was aware of the
priest's sexual transgressions. Id. at 809-10. The rationale for liability in these cases is
summarized by the Ohio Supreme Court: "[E]ven the most liberal construction of the First
Amendment will not protect a religious organization's decision to hire someone who it knows is
likely to commit criminal or tortious acts .... Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ohio 1991).
The Colorado Supreme Court has gone even further than the Minnesota and Ohio courts, imposing
liability for foreseeable behavior based not only on past conduct, but also on character attributes
of the employee. Liability attaches when the employer hires a person when that employer has
"reason to believe that the person, by reason of some attribute of character or prior conduct,
would create an undue risk of harm to others in carrying out his or her employment
responsibilities." Connes v. Molalla Transp. Sys., Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Colo. 1992). See J.
Brent Walker, Sins of the Flesh: When Preachers Sexually Transgress, LIBERTY, Nov.Dec. 1993,
at 24.
204. See Moses, 863 P.2d at 327-29.
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Churches should have a duty to disclose information about prior
misconduct of clerics and any resultant treatment. This duty will break the
code of silence which presently exists. If a priest has engaged in sexual
improprieties, the church should be required to submit a confidential report to
the hiring body at any prospective church and should be held liable to the
victims if it does not disclose this information.2"5 Pressure from their
denominations will make clergy cognizant of the seriousness of their sexual
improprieties, which should have a deterrent effect. Even if appellate courts
did not uphold damage awards, the loss of faith in the churches and the lack
of stewardship of its members would have a financial impact. Moreover, even
if the courts do not impose legal liability on churches for their clerics'
misconduct, the churches have a moral duty to protect the women involved.
Negligent retention and/or supervision claims also require a showing that
the church organization knew or should have known of the priest's behavior,
so that a trier of fact can find that the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff
was foreseeable."° To avoid liability, a church must act promptly to
investigate thoroughly any claims of sexual misconduct. If there is a pattern of
claims and the cleric is retained without adequate ameliorative action, the
church should be found liable.
Both the courts and legislature have rejected attempts to protect the
church from liability through charitable immunity. 7 In addition, although
churches are not profit-making establishments, they can allocate the risk by
obtaining liability insurance. Women have not received justice in society in
general, or in the courts in particular, and these injustices are reflected and
magnified as women enter the judicial system to seek legal remedies for
sexual abuse within the church. Women who seek redress within the legal
system often face a particularly difficult evidentiary burden because problems
derived from abuse do not necessarily surface in the area of sexual
dysfunction, but in seemingly unrelated areas such as anxiety disorders,
psychiatric hospitalizations, suicide attempts, depression, dissociative disorders
and pathological guilt.2"' In addition, the client's initial goal of the therapy
205. The vicarious liability claim is frequently based on an allegation that the church
negligently hired, supervised and/or retained the priest. An employment or agency relationship is a
prerequisite to this finding. Id. at 323-24. The existence of this relationship is determined by the
conduct of the parties and is a question of fact for the jury. Id. at 323-24. Denominations which
have a hierarchical church structure will be more vulnerable. If there is monitoring of the priest's
education, screening, and psychological evaluation by the governing body, compensation
monitoring, discipline and/or guidelines for pastoral counseling, then it is more likely that there
will be a finding of vicarious liability. Id. at 327. The agency doctrine of vicarious tort liability is
limited by a requirement that the principal may only be found liable if the agent is acting within
the scope of his employment. Id. at 324 n.16; Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 286-87 (Colo.
1988).
206. See Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386-87 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (acknowledging
a claim of negligent supervision where the plaintiff alleged that church employed cleric to counsel
parishioners, but failed to investigate claims of sexual misconduct, and failed to remove or
supervise cleric or warn parishioners after cleric's nervous breakdown).
207. James T. O'Reilly & Joann M. Strasser, Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the
Difficult Constitutional and Institutional Liability Issues, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 31, 59-60 (1994).
Only a few jurisdictions retain the doctrine of charitable immunity under very limited circumstanc-
es. Id. at 60.
208. See Victoria J. Swenson, A Proposal for Texas Re: Non-Psychiatric Physicians Who
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was never met and these problems may resurface, in an aggravated form, as a
result of the cleric's sexual abuse. Research shows that abuse by a therapist or
counselor discourages victims from seeking help for subsequent disorders,2"
alienates parishioners from their churches, often cuts them off from their
peers,20 and results in the frequent dissolution of marriages. Hence, the
cleric has doubly sinned, by failing to act in the best interests of his
parishioners, and by depriving them of the benefits of effective counseling,
now and in the future. When courts refuse to recognize a cause of action for




In the interest of maintaining the fine line of division between church and
state, states have statutorily exempted clergy from governmental regulation or
licensing."' "Were the state to require licensing of the clergy, it would, on
the one hand, have to establish criteria of eligibility which would necessitate
the state's involvement in doctrinal and theological matters clearly forbidden
by the First Amendment, one purpose of which was to free religious
institutions from domination or interference by the state." ' Even where the
state regulates psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, or other counseling
professionals, these states exempt clergy.2 3 This has been viewed as
evidence of a public policy not to regulate any form of counseling activities
engaged in by clergy.2 4 Such an interpretation reflects an overly restrictive
view of the public policy. There is no need for the legislature to turn a blind
eye to all activities engaged in by clergy, particularly when those activities
Engage in Sexual Conduct with Their Patients, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 269, 285-86 & n.100
(1994) (reporting on a survey of patients who engaged in sexual relations with their therapists
showing that 90% of the victims were psychologically damaged, 11% serious enough to be
hospitalized as a result of the sexual exploitation, while one percent committed suicide); see also
Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 188 (discussing array of injuries to patients who engage in
sexual contact with their psychotherapists). In one reported case, a pastor slept with more than 30
women, one of whom tried to commit suicide while several got divorced. After an investigation,
"[tlhe pastor was quietly removed, the records of the inquiry were destroyed and [the accuser] ...
was branded a 'troublemaker' by the new minister. The old minister moved on to a larger,
wealthier parish." Woodward & King, supra note 6, at 48.
209. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 186-87.
210. FORTUNE, Is NOTHING SACRED, supra note 5, at 110-12.
211. See Ben Zion Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, in
H. NEWTON MALONY ET AL., CLERGY MALPRACTICE 48, 56 (1986).
212. Id. at 48-49.
213. Id, at 49.
214. See Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice supra note 1, at 176.
Exemption provisions . . . indicate that the legislature has recognized that the subject
matter of counseling by the clergy may often be the same as that facing the licensed and
regulated profession. However, the legislature, through the exemption provisions, has
recognized that the secular state is not equipped to ascertain the competence of
counseling when performed by those affiliated with religious organizations.
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exploit women sexually. As illogical as it may appear, some legislatures have
done this.
Illinois statutes specifically exclude religious or spiritual counseling from
the reach of the statutes which purport to punish therapists engaged in
prohibited sexual contact with their clients.2 5 The case of Dausch v.
Rykse 16 addresses the issue of whether a cleric's counseling is psychother-
apy within the meaning of a state statute which prohibits sexual exploitation
by psychotherapists.2 7 The district court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss, finding that the plaintiff's allegations of professional negligence
against the church defendants amounted to a claim for clergy malpractice, a
cause of action not recognized under Illinois law.2 8  Regarding the
professional negligence allegation against Rykse, the district court concluded
that Mrs. Dausch "had failed to allege adequately that Rykse's psychological
counseling was not part of the church's religious beliefs and practices....
[Therefore] the First Amendment was implicated and Mrs. Dausch failed to
state a valid claim."2 9 The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed and
remanded in part, upholding claims for professional negligence against the
individual defendant and violation of the sexual exploitation by psychothera-
pists statute."'
Five states--Colorado, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Wyoming-specifically criminalize sexual contact or assault occurring under
the guise of medical treatment.22" ' In general, these states made it a felony for
a physician to engage in sexual contact during medical treatment or
examination.22 One New Hampshire court applied the New Hampshire
215. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 140/1-1(e) (West 1993) ("Psychotherapy does not
include counseling of a spiritual or religious nature.")
216. 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994).
217. Ms. Dausch alleged that between January 1988 and June 1990, the pastor of Knox
Presbyterian Church held himself out, as did his church, as a "duly qualified person engaged in
providing psychological counseling to members of his congregation." Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1427-28.
Ms. Dausch, while a member of the congregation, received psychological counseling from the
defendant to assist her in coping with ongoing depression. Id. at 1428. According to the
complaint, in the course of this counseling relationship, "Rykse compelled, encouraged, fostered
and engaged in dangerous and improper counseling relations" with Dausch, which culminated in
sexual relations during the psychotherapy sessions. Id.
218. id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1429.
221. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-403(1)(h), 404(1)(g) (1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
750.520b(l)(f)(iv) (West 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 I(g) (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
11-37-2(4) (1994); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-303 (a)(vii) (1988).
In People v. Terry, 720 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1986), the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-403(1)(h). The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, stating
that the phrase "bona fide medical purposes" is not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 127. The court
said that "sexual penetration or intrusion made during treatment or examination is for other than
'bona fide medical purposes' [as the phrase is used in § 18-3-403(l)(h)l, when it is not taken in
good faith, honestly, and sincerely in the course of investigating, preventing, alleviating, or curing
a disease or malady." Id. The statute was not found to be overbroad because constitutionally
protected behavior was not infringed. Id. at 128. "Defendant was convicted for committing a
sexual intrusion during the course of an examination on a patient. ... Such conduct is not
constitutionally protected and, thus, defendant's overbreadth argument fails." Id.
222. Linda Jorgenson et al., The Furor over Psychotherapist-Patient Sexual Contact: New
Solutions to an Old Problem, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 668-70 (1991).
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statute to a psychologist who was not a licensed physician since that state's
definition of "practicing medicine" included persons who "shall diagnose,
operate on, prescribe for or otherwise treat any human ailment, physical or
mental." '223 On the other hand, Michigan courts have refused to apply the
Michigan statute to psychologists.224 Wyoming, which includes as potential
defendants anyone "who by reason of his position, is able to exercise signifi-
cant influence over a person," has found that the statute applies to a girls'
volleyball coach accused of sexual assault by a student.225
Some states prosecute psychotherapists who sexually exploit their clients.
Proper wording of these statutes is essential to include all appropriate potential
defendants and all prohibited behavior. The language of the statutes, however,
varies significantly. For example "psychotherapy" is defined as "the
professional treatment, assessment, or counseling of a mental or emotional
illness, symptom or condition" in Minnesota, California, and Florida.226 Yet
Colorado more broadly defines it as "the treatment, diagnosis, or counseling in
a professional relationship to assist individuals or groups to alleviate mental
disorders, understand unconscious or conscious motivation, resolve emotional,
relationship, or attitudinal conflicts, or modify behaviors which interfere with
effective emotional, social or intellectual functioning." '227 Moreover, some
state statutes speak not to psychotherapy but to "mental health services," and
define such as "the treatment, assessment, or counseling of another person for
a cognitive, behavioral, emotional, mental or social dysfunction, including an
intrapersonal or interpersonal dysfunction.
228
Six states-Wisconsin, 229 Texas,230 South Dakota,23' North
223. State v. VonKlock, 433 A.2d 1299, 1302 (N.H. 1981) (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
329:1 (1955)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Smith, 503 A.2d 774 (N.H. 1985).
224. Jorgenson, et al., supra note 222, at 670 n.143.
225. See Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1042-43 (Wyo. 1987); WYO. STAT. § 6-2-
303(a)(vi) (1988).
226. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.93(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 491.0112(4)(a)
(West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.01 (West 1989).
227. See Jorgenson, et al., supra note 222, at 673 (quoting COLO. REv. STAT § 18-3-
405.5(4)(i) (Supp. 1995); CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.93(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
491.0112(4)(a) (West 1991)).
228. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.15(1)(d) (West 1993).
229. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.70(2)(a) (West Supp. 1995). That statute provides:
(a) Any person who suffers, directly or indirectly, a physical, mental or emotional injury
caused by, resulting from or arising out of sexual contact with a therapist who is
rendering or has rendered to that person psychotherapy, counseling or other assessment
or treatment of or involving any mental or emotional illness, symptom or condition has
a civil cause of action against the psychotherapist for all damages resulting from, arising
out of or caused by that sexual contact. Consent is not an issue in an action under this
section, unless the sexual contact that is the subject of the action occurred more than 6
months after the psychotherapy, counseling, assessment or treatment ended.
Id.
230. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 81.003 (West Supp. 1996). The Texas statute
provides a cause of action against a mental health provider for sexual exploitation causing
damages. Id. § 81.002. However, "mental health services" provided by a cleric do not include
"religious, moral, and spiritual counseling, teaching, and instruction." Apparently the legislature is
attempting to prohibit sexual conduct during personal counseling sessions, but excludes "spiritual
counseling" to ward off First Amendment challenges. § 81.001(7) (1996).
231. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-22-27 to -29 (Michie Supp. 1996). The definition of
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Dakota,232  Iowa, 33  and Minnesota 234-- expressly prohibit clergy persons
from sexual exploitation of counselees. Each of these states includes clerics in
the definition of "therapist" or "psychotherapist" in the statutes that prohibit
sexual exploitation in the psychotherapist-client relationship."' In addition to
civil penalties, Minnesota, under its Criminal Code, provides that criminal
sexual conduct in the third degree includes consensual sexual relations
between a psychotherapist and patient or former patient.236 The penalty in-
cludes imprisonment for not more than fifteen years or payment of a fine of
not more than $30,000, or both.237
Psychotherapist sexual contact with a patient is a felony in nearly all the
states that have criminalized such behavior. 3s For example, the Iowa Statute
makes it a felony for a counselor or therapist to engage in sexual contact with
a patient or client (or former patient or client) and defines counselor or
therapist as a "physician, psychologist, nurse, professional counselor, social
"psychotherapist" includes a member of the clergy. Id. § 22-22-27(3). A psychotherapist who
engages in sexual contact with an emotionally dependent patient commits a Class 5 felony. Id. §
22-22-28. A psychotherapist who knowingly engages in an act of sexual penetration with an
emotionally dependent patient commits a Class 4 felony. Id. § 22-22-29.
232. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06.1 (Supp. 1995).
233. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.15 (West 1993).
234. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.02 (West 1989) (stating that a "cause of action against a
psychotherapist for sexual exploitation exists for a patient or former patient for injury caused by
sexual contact with the psychotherapist, if the sexual contact occurred"); see also State v.
Ohrtman, 466 N.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (construing § 609.345(l)(h) (1990), and
finding no liability under this fourth-degree criminal conduct statute when a complainant alleged
that a pastor, during a counseling session,"requested a beer, asked for and, after pulling up his
shirt, received a back rub, allegedly encouraged [complainant] to divorce her husband and ...
gave [complainant] a hug during which he compressed her breasts against his chest... [and] [h]is
penis was erect during the hug").
235. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.70(1)(e) (West Supp. 1995) ("'Therapist' means a
physician, psychologist, social worker, marriage and family therapist, professional counselor,
nurse, chemical dependency counselor, member of the clergy or other person, whether or not
licensed or certified by the state, who performs or purports to perform psychotherapy."); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 148A.01. Subd. 5 (West 1989) ("'Psychotherapist' means a physician, psychologist,
nurse, chemical dependency counselor, social worker, member of the clergy, marriage and family
therapist, mental health service provider, or other person, whether or not licensed by the state,
who performs or purports to perform psychotherapy.")
Id.
236. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344. (West Supp. 1996). That section states, in part:
(g) ... [NJeither mistake as to the complainant's age nor consent to the act by the com-
plainant is a defense;
(h) the actor is a psychologist and the complainant is a patient of the psychotherapist
and the sexual penetration occurred:
(i) during the psychotherapy session; or
(ii) outside the psychotherapy session if an ongoing psychotherapist-patient
relationship exists.
Consent by the complainant is not a defense;
(i) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a former patient of the
psychotherapist and the former patient is emotionally dependent upon the
psychotherapist;
(j) the actor is a psychotherapist and the complainant is a patient or former patient and
the sexual penetration occurred by means of therapeutic deception. Consent by the
complainant is not a defense;
Id. § 609.344(l)(g)-(j).
237. Id. § 609.344(2).
238. See Jorgensen et al., supra note 222 at 683.
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worker, marriage or family therapist, alcohol or drug counselor, member of the
clergy, or any other person, whether or not licensed or registered by the state,
who provides or purports to provide mental health services." '239 Mental health
service is defined as the "treatment, assessment, or counseling of another
person for cognitive, behavioral, emotional, mental, or social dysfunction,
including an intrapersonal or interpersonal dysfunction." 2" In Georgia, the
call for legislation came on the heels of reports of the sexual exploitation of
parishioners by clergy.24  Washington has a law requiring a background
check on anyone working with children or vulnerable adults, regardless of
whether they are clergy.22
This approach is directed at punishing the offending behavior without
interfering with the general counseling relationship or running afoul of the
First Amendment. It is unlikely that any judge, politician or clergy would
make an argument that sexual relations with a parishioner is an integral and
protected aspect of a therapeutic relationship. In fact, Minnesota's criminal
statute may be criticized for not going far enough, by limiting the complainant
to "sexual penetration" which occurs during the "psychotherapy session" '243
when "former patient is emotionally dependent upon the psychotherapist,
''44'
or the "sexual penetration occurred by means of therapeutic deception. '
Under Minnesota's statute, a civil action permits a cause of action for injury
caused by the more broadly defined "sexual contact."" This more expansive
239. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.15(1)(a) (West 1993).
240. Id. § 709.15(l)(d).
241. Gayle White, Women Alleging Sex Links to Ministers Push for Law: Bill Would Make It
Illegal for Clergy to Exploit Flock, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 22, 1992, at C4.
242. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 43.43.830-.832 (West Supp. 1996); John Dart, Churches
Move Toward Reducing Sexual Misconduct by Clergy Abuse, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1991, at F18.
243. MINN. STAT. ANN, § 609.344(h)-(i) (West Supp. 1996).
244. Id. § 609.344(i).
245. Id. § 609.344(j). Therapeutic deception is defined as "a representation by a
psychotherapist that sexual contact with the psychotherapist is consistent with or part of the
patient's or former patient's treatment." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.01(8) (West 1989).
246. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148A.01(7) (West 1989). That section states:
"Sexual Contact" means any of the following, whether or not occurring with the
consent of a patient or former patient:
(1) sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse or any intrusion,
however slight, into the genital or anal openings of the patient's or former patient's body
by any part of the psychotherapist's body or by any object used by the psychotherapist
for this purpose, or any intrusion, however slight, into the genital or anal openings of the
psychotherapist's body by any part of the patient's or former patient's body or by any
object used by the patient or former patient for this purpose, if agreed to by the psycho-
therapist;
(2) kissing of, or the intentional touching by the psychotherapist of the patient's
or former patient's genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttocks, or breast or of the clothing
covering any of these body parts;
(3) kissing of, or the intentional touching by the patient or former patient of the
psychotherapist's genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttocks, or breast or of the clothing
covering any of these body parts if the psychotherapist agrees to the kissing or
intentional touching.
"Sexual contact" includes requests by the psychotherapist for conduct described
in clauses (1) to (3).
"Sexual contact" does not include conduct described in clause (1) or (2) that is a
part of standard medical treatment of a patient.
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view is exactly what the courts should have done, but have neglected to do, to
date.
The involvement of the legislature in curbing abusive behavior by clergy
engaged in this type of predatory behavior is essential. The legislature is able
to fashion a narrow remedy, tailored to the evil to be remedied-the use of the
clergy's position and influence to engage in sexual relationships with
vulnerable women. Because the parameters would be prescribed in the statute,
First Amendment difficulties and extension of liability to cover the Nally type
of case could be avoided. Therefore, when the case involves the content of the
counseling and the religious beliefs imparted by the priest, rather than the
priest's conduct, the statute would not be applicable. The courts, however,
could also recognize that once a cleric has gained the trust of his parishioner
during counseling, a duty to act in the best interests of the counselee attaches.
B. Judicial Solutions
1. Clergy-Counselee as a Fiduciary Relationship
a. Towards Recognition of Fiduciary Duty Liability
Some federal courts, applying New York and Illinois law,247 as well as
some state courts, 24 have rejected both the fiduciary duty theory and the
clergy malpractice theory to allow recovery for counselees injured by the
sexual misconduct of their clergy. Other courts have denied clergy malpractice
claims, but allowed claims based on breach of fiduciary duty,249 reasoning
that a breach of fiduciary duty involves a betrayal of trust and does not require
a professional relationship or a professional standard of care-two criteria of a
clergy malpractice action cited by courts as reasons for the denial of clergy
malpractice causes of action. 50 Courts allowing fiduciary duty actions to
247. See Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that defining the
scope of fiduciary duty would raise the same constitutional difficulties as formulation of a
malpractice standard); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1427 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Illinois
law).
248. See, e.g., Cherepski v. Walker, 913 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Ark. 1996) (barring breach of
fiduciary duty claim based on heart balm statute); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1239,
1243 (Ohio 1988) (questioning viability of clergy malpractice action but not finding on the facts,
and barring breach of fiduciary duty claim based on heart balm statute); Bladen v. First
Presbyterian Church, 857 P.2d 789, 794, 796 (Okla. 1993) (finding that since the clergy do not
utilize transference as a therapeutic tool, they cannot be charged with malpractice for mishandling
the transference phenomena, and barring breach of fiduciary duty claim based on heart balm
statute); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907, 911-12 (Neb. 1993) (finding that
parishioner's breach of fiduciary duty claim merely alleged the elements of clergy malpractice and
was, hence, not actionable).
249. See, e.g., Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Tex. 1995);
Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 314 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2153
(1993); Destdfano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988); DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of
Christ, 890 P.2d 214 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994), cert. granted, No. 95SC42 (June 19, 1995); Jones v.
Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (distinguishing Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp.
321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), on grounds that breach of fiduciary duty occurred outside the counseling
relationship, obviating the need to impose a uniform standard of religious counseling); Erickson v.
Christenson, 781 P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
250. Destefano, 763 P.2d at 284. The Colorado Supreme Court stated, "We have no difficulty
in finding that Grabrian, as a marriage counselor to [the plaintiffs), owed a fiduciary duty [to
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proceed find that the combination of the position of trust held by the clergy,
exacerbated by the counseling relationship, meant that the clergy, who were in
a superior position to the counselees, assumed a duty to act in good faith, and
then breached that duty.25' The courts that make this distinction are willing
to allow recovery for sexual abuse and other limited transgressions of
clergy, 52 while preserving the content of religious counseling from judicial
scrutiny."s A fiduciary relationship has been defined as one in which "trust
them]. His duty to the [counselee] was 'created by his undertaking' to counsel her." Id.; see also,
Moses, 863 P.2d at 321 n.13 (reaffirming the result in DeStefano). Specifically, the Moses court
noted that the relevant common facts were not the profession of the defendants but, rather, the
"relevant facts are that the defendants in both cases occupied a position of superiority, assumed a
duty to act in good faith, and then breached their duty." Id.
Destefano and Moses were distinguished somewhat by DeBose, 890 P.2d at 220-21. The
Colorado Court of Appeals found that in establishing the breach of fiduciary duty, the court must
look to the motivation behind the defendant's acts. Id. If actuated by a sincerely held religious
belief, all the attendant First Amendment free exercise concerns would be implicated, even in
cases based on breach of fiduciary duty. Id. Whether a belief is "religious" is an issue of law, but
whether the defendant's conduct was motivated by this belief is a fact question for the jury. Id.
The proposed legislative solution in Part IV of this paper attempts to balance these concerns. See
discussion infra Part IV.A.
The New York courts have found a fiduciary relationship outside the counseling scenario.
Jones, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 929. The New York Supreme Court found a fiduciary relationship between
a clergy member and a minor parishioner with whom he played sports. Id. However, the Jones
court found the lack of a counseling relationship a crucial element, as it obviated the perceived
need to implicate the court in the religious dogma and practices of the church. Id. at 930. This
distinction rests on the most tenuous of principles, and it pays undue homage to form over sub-
stance. The same standard should apply to both scenarios, that is, the duty to act in the best inter-
ests of the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship.
251. Moses, 863 P.2d at 321 n.13.
252. See, e.g., Adams v. Moore, 385 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989). The court found a
fiduciary relationship between a preacher and a member of his congregation in a real estate matter.
Id. at 801. Allegedly to assist a financially strapped parishioner, a pastor and a friend assumed the
parishioner's mortgage of $12,000 and paid her $1,000 in exchange for the house which was
valued at $32,000. Id. at 800. The pastor sold the house for a significant profit and the plaintiff
sued, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. id. The court upheld her claim. Id. at 801.
253. Concerns are often voiced of a slippery slope progression to a Nally-type "negligent
counseling" claim. Such concerns were best expressed by Judge Brieant of the United States Dis-
trict Court sitting in the Southern District of New York. After concluding that a claim premised
upon a breach of fiduciary duty was merely a clergy malpractice action in disguise, he stated:
The difficulty is that this Court ... must consider not only this case, but the next case
to follow, and the ones after that, before we embrace the newly invented tort of clergy
malpractice, This places us clearly on the slippery slope and is an unnecessary venture
since existing laws ... provide adequate protection for society's interests. Where could
we stop? Assume a severely depressed person consults a storefront preacher, unaffiliated
with any of the mainstream denominations, but with them, equally protected by the First
Amendment. The cleric consults with our hypothetical citizen, reminds him of his
slothful life, and that he is a miserable sinner; recommends prayer and fasting and warns
of the Day of Judgment. Our depressed person becomes more so, and kills himself and a
few more people .... As to a licensed psychiatrist or social worker, our lay courts
should have no trouble adjudicating a claim of professional malpractice on these facts.
As to a clergyman, it would be both impossible and unconstitutional to attempt to do so.
Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 328. The New York Supreme Court does not share this view:
This Court... is confident the judicial process can provide a brake to the slide when
needed. In the words of Mr. Justice Harlan, "It is always possible to shrink from a first
step lest the momentum will plunge the law into pitfalls that lie in the trail ahead. I, for
one, do not believe that a "slippery slope" is necessarily without a constitutional toehold.
Jones, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 931 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970)).
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and confidence are necessarily reposed by one party, investing in the other
party a corresponding amount of power.""5 4 Hence, an imbalance of power is
inherent in fiduciary relationships. Fiduciary law, rooted in equity, is designed
to counteract the risks associated with this imbalance of power by a variety of
protective rules and evidentiary presumptions. 5' Judge Cardozo's description
of the role of fiduciaries is instructive:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the
marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.256
The "constitutional toehold" referred to by Justice Harlan may very well be the distinction
between the sexual misconduct cases and the content-based negligent counseling claims of Nally.
Classically, the goal of fiduciary law is to minimize the inherent risk of the unequal power
relationship between the fiduciary and the "entrustor." See Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs.
Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV.
897, 946 n.227 (1993) (citing Niels B. Schaumann, The Lender as Unconstitutional Fiduciary, 23
SETON HALL L. REv. 21, 25, 49 n.103 (1992)). One of the rules that has developed over time to
protect the interests of the entrustor is that which forbids the fiduciary from self dealing, that is,
the fiduciary cannot put his own interests above that of his charge, even if the charge also benefits
from the transaction. Id. at 909-10.
From a fiduciary law perspective, sexual misconduct between the counselor and counselee
is a per se violation of the fiduciary's duty to act in the best interests of his entrustor. This is so
because regardless of the fiduciary's belief that the act is in the "best interests" of the counselee,
there is an element of immediate sexual and ego gratification that inures to the fiduciary's benefit,
almost always at the expense of his counselee. In the Nally negligent counseling scenario,
however, this element of self gratification is conspicuously absent. Although it is conceivable that
a clergy counselor that deliberately manipulated his counselee to reach a certain result beneficial
to the counselor would also be in violation of a fiduciary duty, such a situation is not amenable to
the proposed per se rule of sexual misconduct.
254. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 196; see also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71
CAL. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983) (providing a general discussion of fiduciary law, and coining the
term "entrustor" to indicate the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship).
255. Some of the advantages that typically accrue to the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship
include: 1) the fiduciary will have the burden of showing the fairness of the transaction in dispute;
2) the fiduciary will be subject to a duty of full disclosure, reversing the presumption of caveat
emptor; 3) the duty of the beneficiary to discover fraud will be relaxed; 4) the fiduciary
relationship may operate to remove an oral or defectively executed contract from the Statute of
Frauds in favor of the beneficiary; and 5) benefits accruing to the fiduciary may be held in trust
for the beneficiary. Gregory B. Westfall, "But I Know It When I See It": A Practical Framework
for Analysis and Argument of Informal Fiduciary Relationships, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 835, 869
n.3 (1992) (focusing on Texas law).
Of course, the overriding duty of all fiduciaries is the duty of loyalty. See generally, Austin
W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1949); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 170 (1959). Hence, even if the beneficiary gives his consent to the fiduciary, the
transaction can be voided if the consent was uninformed, or it was induced by improper conduct
of the fiduciary, or if the beneficiary was not of competent age and understanding. Scott, supra at
541-42. "[Tlhe consent of the beneficiary is indeed a slender reed upon which a trustee may lean."
Id. at 542. Even upon full disclosure and consent by the beneficiary, the transaction must be
objectively reasonable and undertaken in good faith. Id. At times, courts have made a distinction
between a "fiduciary relationship" and a merely "confidential relationship." Scallen, supra note
253, at 906-07; see also Westfall, supra, at 837-41 (describing the three types of fiduciary rela-
tionships recognized by Texas courts: the "formal" or "technical"; the informal, or "confidential
relationship"; and "special relationships"). The distinction between the two groups is reflected
more in evidentiary burdens rather than in substantive duties. See infra note 264 and accompany-
ing text.
256. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). This definition has been criticized
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Historically, fiduciary relationships include: trustee to beneficiary;
guardian to ward; agent to principal; attorney to client; executor to legatees or
beneficiaries; partner to partner; corporate directors or officers to the
corporation; majority shareholders to other shareholders; and bailor to
bailee.25 This range of relationships demonstrates that a professional
relationship does not preclude the existence of a fiduciary relationship."'
When presented with a new type of relationship which does not fit within the
parameters of a traditional fiduciary relationship, courts will analogize to
determine if a fiduciary relationship exists. 9 Consequently, some courts
have found fiduciary relationships between physicians and their patients,2"
social workers and their charges26' and, of course, between minister and
parishioner.262 The pattern that emerges is one where courts will extend the
as being unduly vague and nebulous. See, e.g, Scallen, supra note 253, at 907 n.36 ("Although
certainly a classic and vivid example of Cardozo's rhetorical prowess, one cannot defend it on the
grounds of clarity.").
257. Frankel, supra note 254, at 795-96. Cases illustrating these relationships include: Tante
v. Herring, 453 S.E.2d 686, 689 (Ga. 1994) (attorney to client); Mark Twain Kansas City Bank v.
Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 863 P.2d 355, 362 (Kan. 1992) (trustee to beneficiary); Steelman v. Mallory,
716 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Idaho 1986) (corporate director to corporation); Greene v. First Nat'l Bank,
516 N.E.2d 311, 315 (I11. App. Ct. 1987) (executor to beneficiaries); Deason v. Gutzler, 622
N.E.2d 1276, 1281 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (principal to agent); Linge v. Ralston Purina Co., 293
N.W.2d 191, 194 (Iowa 1980) (majority shareholders to minority shareholders); and Arpadi v.
First MSP Corp., 628 N.E.2d 1335, 1336 (Ohio 1994) (partner to partner).
However, "[tihe characterization of these relationships as 'traditional' ignores the
unequivocable fact that fiduciary law is a product of many centuries of development, some
categories may be more 'traditional' than others." Scallen, supra note 253, at 905.
258. Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 322 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2153 (1994),
259. Scallen, supra note 253, at 905; see also Frankel, supra note 254, at 804-05. The method
of analogy has been criticized, most notably by Professor Frankel, as being "uninstructive" and
"inconsistent." Id. at 805. However, the use of analogy to characterize novel fiduciary relation-
ships remains a prevalent judicial exercise. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879, 891 (1988). Professor Scallen states that:
The evolution of the law of fiduciary obligation illustrates, perhaps more powerfully
than most bodies of law, the power of analogy in legal argumentation. Courts
considering whether to impose a fiduciary constraint in a novel context rely heavily on
comparisons to more conventional contexts in which the constraint does apply. Although
some commentators find this pattern intellectually unsatisfying, its pervasiveness and
persistence suggest that it is an inevitable aspect of fiduciary analysis.
Scallen, supra note 253, at 903 n.18. Hence, it is the proposal of this paper that the clergy-
counselee relationship requires constraints that are similarly imposed in analogous relationships, in
order to guard against the abuse of the inherent power imbalance between the clergy and their
counselees.
260. See Hoopes v. Hammargren, 725 P.2d 238, 242 (Nev. 1986) (holding that fiduciary
obligations prohibit a neurologist from sleeping with his patient under the guise of treatment,
thereby aggravating her condition); Demers v. Gerety, 515 P.2d 645, 649 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973),
rev'd, 589 P.2d 180 (N.M. 1978) (requiring physician to exercise utmost good faith toward
patient); Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 446 S.E.2d 648, 649 (W. Va. 1994) (holding that
fiduciary relationship exists between physician and his patient, prohibiting unauthorized release of
confidential information).
261. Horak v. Biris, 474 N.E.2d 13, 17 (I11. App. Ct. 1985) (finding a state-licensed social
worker placed in position of trust, the breach of which would constitute a breach of the fiduciary
relationship).
262. Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988) (holding that defendant owed
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff); see also Moses, 863 P.2d at 321 n.13 (reasoning that "[tlhe
position of trust occupied by the defendant, when coupled with his positive act of counseling the
plaintiff, resulted in a duty to the plaintiff," and holding that the "position of trust ... a person in
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protection of fiduciary law to relationships whenever their prime characteristic
is that "the parties do not deal on equal terms, because the person in whom
trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts that trust and confidence is in
a superior position to exert unique influence over the dependent party. 263
Some courts recognize a difference between a "fiduciary relationship" and
a merely "confidential relationship," but have generally applied the substantive
rules of fiduciary law to both."6 These courts will set aside a deal or
undertaking between the parties upon a showing that the fiduciary or more
powerful party breached his fiduciary duty.
The difference between a confidential and fiduciary relationship is greatest
in the realm of evidentiary burdens. Various evidentiary presumptions work in
favor of the entrustor in a fiduciary relationship, but not for the dependent in a
confidential relationship.265  Specifically, the entrustor is entitled to a
presumption that she relied on the fiduciary to act in her best interests,
whether or not she actually did rely.26 In addition, the entrustor alone is
entitled to cancel certain transactions between the fiduciary and the
entrustor.267 The fiduciary has the burden of proof that his actions were fair
and in the best interest of the entrustor.26 In a confidential relationship, the
dependent must prove that she in fact relied upon the power-bearer without the
a fiduciary relation [owes] to another [implies] a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to
matters within the scope of the relation").
263. Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). Professor Scallen
suggests that courts have been willing to extend fiduciary obligations, though in various guises,
when there is a pattern of elements, such as:
(1) dependence or vulnerability by one party on the other, that
(2) results in power being conferred on the other,
(3) such that the entrusting party is not able to protect itself effectively .... and
(4) thig entrustment has been solicited or accepted by the party on which the fiduciary
obligation is imposed.
Scallen, supra note 253, at 922. While all fiduciary relationships involve the first two elements of
dependence, resulting in a conferral of power, these elements by themselves would typify most
contract claims. The practical inability of the entrusting party to protect itself typifies a fiduciary
relationship, entitling the relationship to the benefits of the fiduciary legal framework. Id. at 925.
Clergy counselees fall well within this paradigm.
264. See AUSTIN WAKERMAN Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5, at 39-40 (3d ed. 1967).
Scott writes:
A fiduciary relation is to be distinguished from a merely confidential relation. A
confidential relation exists between two persons when one has gained the confidence of
the other and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in mind. A confidential
relation may exist although there is no fiduciary relation; it is particularly likely to exist
where there is a family relationship or such a relation of confidence as that which arises
between physician and patient or priest and penitent. If one person is in a confidential,
but not a fiduciary, relation to another, a transaction between them will not be set aside
at the instance of one of them unless in fact he reposed confidence in the other, and the
other, by fraud or undue influence or otherwise, abused the confidence placed in him. A
fiduciary relation involves certain consequences to transactions between the parties that
follow automatically as a matter of law from the relation.
Id. Among the fiduciary relationships which typically serve as the foundation for the establishment
of a duty are those of guardian and ward, doctor and patient, attorney and client, and priest and
communicant. 36A C.J.S. Fiduciary § 383, at 386-89 (1961).
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benefit of any presumption, and she will also have the burden of establishing
breach.2"
Fiduciary relationships are inherently risky.270 The fiduciary is supposed
to be acting in the best interest of the entrustor, not in a manner that benefits
himself at the expense of the entrustor.27" ' So great is the need felt to
minimize the inherent risk of fiduciary relationships, many courts find that the
fiduciary is accountable for any benefit he receives, even if it is consistent
with the best interests of the entrustor.
272
In light of (1) the nature of the clergy-counselee relationship, (2) the
power imbalance between the clergy counselor and his victim, 273 and (3) the
paucity of alternatives for the victim, 27 4 the clergy-counselee relationship
should be deemed a fiduciary relationship as a matter of law.
269. Id.
270. See Frankel, supra note 254, at 808-12. Two elements exist in all fiduciary relationships
that "give rise to a risk that the fiduciary will misuse the power entrusted to him to the detriment
of the entrustor." Id. at 808. In fact, it is the inadequacy of protective mechanisms outside fidu-
ciary law to eliminate this risk that should guide courts in the imposition of fiducial restraint. Id.
These two elements are the "substitution role of the fiduciary," and the "delegation of power to
the fiduciary." Id. at 808-09. Hence, the fiduciary may act as a substitute for the entrustor in the
sense that the fiduciary has greater expertise in a certain area that makes his judgment valuable.
Secondly, the power is delegated to the fiduciary "not for his own use, but solely for the purpose
of facilitating the performance of his functions." Id. at 809. The risk of fiduciary relationships is
thus summarized:
[W]hile the fiduciary must be entrusted with power in order to perform his function, his
possession of the power creates a risk that he will misuse it and injure the entrustor....
Yet if the entrustor lessens his exposure to loss by reducing the delegated power, he
may also reduce the benefit expected from the relation.
Id.
271. Id. at 811.
272. Guth states the classic rule of fiducial accountability:
If an officer or director of a corporation, in violation of his duty as such, acquires gain
or advantage for himself, the law charges the interest so acquired with a trust for the
benefit of the corporation, at its election, while it denies to the betrayer all benefit and
profit. The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon the
narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting from a betrayal of confi-
dence, but upon a broader foundation of wise public policy that, for the purpose of
removing all temptation extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from a breach of
confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation. Given the relation between the parties, a
certain result follows; and a constructive trust is the remedial device through which
precedence of self is compelled to give way to the stem demands of loyalty.
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (citations omitted); accord, Borden v. Sinskey,
530 F.2d 478, 498 (3rd Cir. 1976); Savage v. Mayer, 203 P.2d 9, 10 (Cal. 1949); Billman v. Mar-
yland Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 585 A.2d 238, 246 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
909 (1991); Leppaluoto v. Eggleston, 357 P.2d 725, 731 (Wash. 1960).
273. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 189-94. Jorgenson and Randles suggest that the
following five factors contribute to the imbalance of power between counselors and counselees:
(i) the client's initial vulnerability;
(2) the therapist's control of the environment;
(3) the threat of breach of confidentiality;
(4) client intimacy; and
(5) unilateral self-revelation.
Id. at 194. These factors should be strongly considered by courts in fashioning the appropriate
scope of fiduciary duty to apply; the larger the power imbalance, the more protections should be
granted to protect congregant/patients from the misuse of that power.
274. See Frankel, supra note 254, at 808-12.
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i. The Nature of the Relationship
Courts have generally found that secular counselors who engage in sexual
relationships with their clients incur liability under either a professional
malpractice or a fiduciary duty theory.275  Psychotherapists' sexual
involvement with their patients is a growing problem.276 The clergy
relationship shares the same attributes that imbue the secular relationship with
such high risk. People seeking help, whether of a spiritual or secular nature,
are likely to be vulnerable and dependent.277 They perceive some area of
their lives as deficient and the counselor as having the ability to make it
whole.27 For any counseling relationship to work, the counselee has to place
her absolute trust in the counselor, and believe that the counselor will be
acting in her best interest.
279
275. See, e.g., Lenhard v. Butler, 745 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) ("Where a
therapist mishandles transference and becomes sexually involved with his patient, courts common-
ly hold such action to constitute malpractice."); accord Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363,
1365 (9th Cir. 1986); Waters v. Bourhis, 709 P.2d 469, 476 (Cal. 1985); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 296 S.E.2d 126 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Corgan v. Muehling, 522 N.E.2d 153,
156-57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (unregistered psychologist); Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 804 (Me.
1986) (social worker); Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Zipkin
v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 761-62 (Mo. 1968); MacClements v. LaFone, 408 S.E.2d 878, 880
(N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
276. See Swenson, supra note 208, at 269 n.40 (reporting sexual misconduct as the most
frequent cause of malpractice suits against psychologists insured under the American Psychologi-
cal Association's policy in a ten year period from 1976 to 1986). The prevalence of sexual mis-
conduct claims against therapists has greatly increased the cost of malpractice insurance, and al-
most all agencies refuse to cover for negligence grounded in mishandling of the transference phe-
nomena by engaging in sexual contact with a patient. Linda Jorgenson, et al., Therapist-Patient
Sexual Exploitation and Insurance Liability, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 595, 599-608 (1992). It has been
noted, however, that the actual rates of sexual misconduct by professionals may be declining. Carl
Sherman, Behind Closed Doors: Therapist-Client Sex, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May/June 1993, at
64-65. Rather, what may be on the increase is an awareness among the authorities of the reality of
such abuse. So stated Glen 0. Gabbard, M.D., Director of the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kan-
sas:
The abuse went on for years, but it didn't come out into the open until the last decade
or so. It used to be, when a patient said her therapist had sex with her, we assumed it
was a fantasy. The rise of feminism made us all more aware of what is really going on.
Id. at 65.
277. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 190 n.52 (describing that vulnerability is, in fact,
a necessary pre-requisite to effective treatment in many schools of psychoanalytic thought). As it
pertains to therapists in general:
Clients come to therapy with personal crises and problems that they have been unable to
resolve themselves. Many times patients lack self-esteem or are fearful and doubting of
their own sanity. Patients often feel they must rely upon a professional to help them
resolve their conflicts. Clients come to therapy in search of approval and concrete an-
swers to their problems. Struggling with their private crises, many clients are in a help-
less, almost childlike position in relation to the therapist. The therapist often becomes a




279. Instructive on the necessity of trust in the therapist-counselee relationship is Melvin S.
Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of Psychiatry, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 401 (1957).
Heller states:
The kind of self-awareness necessary for a cure is come by painfully and reluctantly.
The patient is called upon to discuss in a candid and frank manner personal material of
the most intimate and disturbing nature .... He is expected to bring up all manner of
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The overlay of religious doctrine further complicates the relationship. The
counselee sees the minister as spiritually superior-more enlightened and
closer to understanding the will of God.2 " The structural organization of the
church, or even the tenets of the religion itself, may foster this perception. For
example, parishioners call a priest in the Episcopal and Roman Catholic
denominations "father," evoking both the patriarchal structure of the church
hierarchy, as well as his religious significance as a guide, authority figure, and
a source of parental love and approval.
The transference phenomenon is also at work in this relationship,28" ' as
socially unacceptable instincts and urges, immature wishes, perverse sexual thoughts-in
short, the unspeakable, the unthinkable, the repressed. To speak of such things to anoth-
er human requires an atmosphere of unusual trust, confidence and tolerance .... Patients
will be helped only if they can form a trusting relationship with the psychiatrist. Psy-
chology becomes otherwise an ineffective and intellectual exercise.
Id. at 405-06.
280. "What makes clerical seduction different from those of secular counselors is the God
factor: unlike other therapists, the minister's power and authority are perceived as ultimately de-
rived from the Lord." Woodward & King, supra note 6, at 48. It has also been observed that "'the
more the minister sees his own person as central to delivering the message of God, the more he is
likely to become sexually involved with members of his congregation."' Id. at 49 (quoting psychi-
atrist Glenn Gabbard, director of the Menninger Hospital in Topeka, Kansas). Hence, it is suggest-
ed that in denominations having a "strong Pentecostal or revivalist tradition," religious rituals and
ceremonies are "linked to sexual passion." Id. "'[W]omen may well imagine that a sexual union
with this figure is going to have a tremendous benefit."' Id. (quoting Dr. Gabbard). When patho-
logical narcissism is alloyed with a claim of a divine mandate, the results have often been tragic.
Most notably in recent history was the death in a fiery inferno of more than 80 followers of David
Koresh. Tim Reiterman, Parallel Roads Led to Jonestown, Waco; Cults: Similar Forces Shaped
Jim Jones and David Koresh into the Violent, Power-Mad "Messiahs" Who Doomed Their Fol-
lowers to Death, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1993, at A24. Koresh was the leader of a splinter group of
the Seventh-day Adventists called the Branch Davidians. Born in a small town in Texas, Koresh
ultimately became "The Lamb of God" and a doomsday prophet. Id. "In [his] endless harangues,
[Koreshl bent the Bible to shake the traditional beliefs of [his] followers-and to suit [his] own
needs. Growing increasingly grandiose, [he] professed to be a pipeline to God, then God himself."
Id. After a seven week siege by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, who had been
investigating Koresh on allegations of weapons violations and child molestation, the Branch Davi-
dian compound was set ablaze. Id. It is still unclear whether the incident was a mass suicide or a
mass murder. Id.
Other self proclaimed messiahs have included the Reverend Jim Jones, who told his follow-
ers, "'Everyone has to die.... If you love me as much as I love you, we must all die or be de-
stroyed from the outside."' Tom Mathews, The Cult of Death, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, 1978, at 38.
After a hellish morning of confusion and despair, more than 900 of Jones's followers were dead
after drinking a poison concoction of cyanide, tranquilizers, and strawberry-flavored Kool-aid. Id.
at 39. Some took the potion voluntarily, believing in the prospect of reunion with Jones in the
afterlife, others were forced to drink at the muzzle of a gun. Id. at 40. "One old man resisted
violently; he was thrown to the ground, his jaws were pulled open and a cupful of poison was
poured down his throat." Id. Babies were murdered by spraying the cyanide down their throats
with a hypodermic syringe. Id. at 39. See also Richard Lacayo, In the Reign of Fire, TIME, Oct.
17, 1994, at 59 (describing apparent murder suicides of over 50 people in two countries at the
direction of Luc Jouret, the self-proclaimed messiah of the 'Solar Temple' sect). Glen Gabbard
explains:
I've noticed again and again that ministers go into the profession with a longing to be
loved, to be idealized, to be godlike.... When middle age sets in .... a minister fre-
quently is disappointed with the congregation's response to him. He wants to be ide-
alized but his congregation dwells on his human frailties. Then a young woman comes
to him for pastoral counseling. He is attracted to her and . . . "the client gratifies the
minister's original wish to be loved like God is."
Woodward & King, supra note 6, at 48 (quoting in part, and citing, Dr. Glenn Gabbard, psychia-
trist and director of the Menninger Hospital in Topeka, Kansas).
281. A parishioner involved in pastoral counseling may develop a "deep emotional depen-
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in all counseling relationships.282 Transference involves a process where the
counselee identifies the counselor with a character from her past, typically a
father figure.283 The counselee is able to resolve past conflicts by confronting
the counselor.8 4 A competent counselor will handle this transference
appropriately and allow the counselee to resolve the conflict."5 However,
when the counselor engages in a sexual relationship with the counselee in the
course of the transference phenomenon, he has switched roles and creates
psychological confusion in the counselee.2"6 The counselee cannot resolve
the past issues, and faces new obstructions to recovery, one of which is that
she has to "keep the secret." '287 The counselor, on the other hand, is no Ion-
dence on a priest." Moses, 863 P.2d at 328 (Colo. 1993). The emotional dependence is a signifi-
cant concept in therapy known as "transference." It is the term used by therapists to describe a
counselee's emotional reaction to the therapist, and is "'generally applied to the projection of
feelings, thoughts and wishes onto the analyst, who has come to represent some person from the
patient's past."' Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting STED-
MAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1473 (5th Lawyers' ed. 1982)). Hence, therapists often become the
personification of repressed hopes, fears and frustrations. Joseph C. George, Psychotherapist-Pa-
tient Sex: A Proposal for a Mandatory Reporting Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 431, 437 (1985). As a result,
a patient may react sexually or affectionately to the persona represented by the priest, rather than
being actuated by a desire for the priest himself. "Transference is crucial to the therapeutic process
because . . . '[i]t is through the creation, experiencing and resolution of these feelings that [the pa-
tient] becomes well."' Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1365 (quoting DONALD J. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRA-
CTICE OF PSYCHIATRISTS 6 (1973)). Similarly, the priest may experience a phenomenon of "coun-
ter-transference," whereby the counselee/parishioner represents to him an idealization of his
dreams, hopes, and fears. George, supra at 437. The dictionary of the American Psychoanalytic
Association defines countertransference as "[a] situation in which an analyst's feelings and atti-
tudes toward a patient are derived from earlier situations in the analyst's life that have been dis-
placed onto the patient." BURNESS E. MOORE AND BERNARD A. FINE, eds., PSYCHOANALYTIC
TERMS AND CONCEPTS 47 (Yale 1990). Hence, an underlying sense of inadequacy or unfulfilled
narcissism may cause the priest to engage in sexual behavior in an effort to unite with his "ideal-
ization" of what the counselee represents. Clearly, the duty is on the priest/counselor to recognize
the transference phenomena, which occurs in every therapeutic relationship, even if not affirma-
tively used as a psychoanalytic tool, and deal with it effectively. Forewarned is forearmed.
282. See Hans H. Strupp, A Reformulation of the Dynamics of the Therapist's Contribution, in
EFFECTIVE PSYCHOTHERAPY: A HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH (Alan S. Gurman & Andrew M. Razin
eds., 1977) (stating that transference is associated with, but not limited to, the psychotherapeutic
relationship). Management theorists suggest that transference occurs in any leader-follower rela-
tionship, rendering followers vulnerable to the way a leader communicates and proposes action.
Daniel Sankowsky, The Charismatic Leader as Narcissist: Understanding the Abuse of Power,
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Spring 1995, at 57, 59.
283. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1473 (5th Lawyers' ed. 1982).
284. See DONALD J. DAWIDOFF, THE MALPRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRISTS 6 (1973).
285. Courts have held that mishandling of the transference phenomenon is malpractice or
gross negligence. See Waters v. Bourhis, 709 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1985); Moses, 863 P.2d at 328 n.22;
Seymour v. Lofgreen, 495 P.2d 969 (Kan. 1972); Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp.
1342 (E.D. Pa. 1983); L.L. v. Medical Protective Co., 362 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Wis. Ct. App. 19-
84).
[A] sexual relationship between therapist and patient cannot be viewed separately from
the therapeutic relationship that has developed between them. The transference phenome-
non makes it impossible that the patient will have the same emotional response to sexual
contact with the therapist that he or she would have with other persons.
L.L., 362 N.W.2d at 178.
286. George, supra note 281, at 437.
287. See Moses, 863 P.2d at 316. The parishioner's sister was also asked to keep the secret
after she confronted the offending priest, Father Robinson. Id. He claimed that by admitting the
sexual relationship with Moses, he had made a "confession" which she could not divulge. Id. The
priest's superior also ascribed to this warped view:
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ger a facilitator and trusted fiduciary acting in the counselee's self interest;
rather, he is an impediment to effective healing by acting in his own self
interest.
ii. The Power Imbalance
There are six identifiable factors involved in the counseling relationship
between the cleric and parishioner that aggravate the imbalance of power
between the parties: the counselee's initial vulnerability; the counselor's
control of the environment; the confidentiality of the relationship; the leverage
gained from unilateral self-revelation; the spiritual superiority or worthiness
associated with the clergy; and finally, the counselee's desire to achieve
salvation.288 The counselee typically pursues secular or religious
counseling for marital difficulties, depression and suicidal tendencies, faith
crises or uncertainty or coping skills in many facets of her life.289 The social
stigma of seeking outside help may aggravate the counselee's vulnerable
state."' Many people envision the counseling request as a sign of weakness
and lack of self-sufficiency.29 Hence, counselees may enter the counseling
relationship full of self-doubt in their capabilities to handle the problems
facing them.
The counselor generally plays the dominant role in determining the
sequence and location of therapy. The counselee looks to the counselor to
determine how long and how often the sessions should be. The meetings often
take place in the minister's office, away from the comforts and securities of
the parishioner's home. The counselor sets the rules and leads the discussions
in an attempt to get at the root of the problem. Hence, the minister's control
of the counseling environment, literally as well as figuratively, serves to
increase the imbalance of power.
The counselor also gains power by informing the counselee that the
relationship is confidential and the counselee can put absolute trust in him. By
being the repository of confidential information, including the darkest fears
and desires of the counselee, the counselor remains in a dominant role.
292
Father Myers was angered that Mohr [the sister] did not keep Father Robinson's secret
and scolded her for discussing the relationship.... Father Myers said Father Robinson
was bishop material and that Mohr and her husband should not ruin his career. Father
Myers also... said that Father Robinson's actions were not that bad and that Tenantry
[the victim, Moses] had not been injured.
Id. The burden of keeping the secret led to the fragile plaintiff's mental and physical deterioration,
as well as the demise of her marriage and business. At the time of trial, she was under indefinite
psychiatric care. Id. at 314.
288. Four of these elements have been generally adapted from Jorgenson & Randles, supra
note 65, at 190-94. The last two factors are peculiar to religious counselors. There have been
occasions, however, where the therapist's control has been so complete that the patient sees him
as a "God-like" figure. See, e.g., Greenberg v. McCabe, 453 F. Supp. 765, 771 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
affd, 594 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979) (recounting that the patient
testified that the therapist had become a "God," and that she dared not act contrary to his wishes
lest she displease him).
289. See Fain, supra note 10, at 103.
290. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 190-92.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 193; see also GERALD COREY, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COUNSELING AND PSY-
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The counselee is there not to convince the counselor that she is a nice
person, 3 but to unburden herself from the weight of the most troublesome
aspects of her life. Revelations of sexual indiscretions, fears of homosexuality,
criminal behavior and every type of secular or spiritual confession are risky
for the counselee, but may be encouraged by the counselor as necessary for
her treatment. She must trust the minister completely not to divulge this
information to anybody else.294 This aggravates the power imbalance.295
The fact that only one party, the counselee, is disclosing information, also
contributes to the power imbalance.296 More specifically, the minister may sit
in silence during these revelations and the success of the therapy does not
require him to reveal any of his own deepest, darkest fears. Because he is in
control of his own disclosures and may legitimately refuse to answer personal
questions posed by the counselee, the transference phenomenon is facilitated.
The counselee can transform him into anyone from her past that she wishes.
Interestingly, many documented cases of sexual abuse by psychotherapists
show a pattern of the therapist selectively disclosing personal aspects of his
life in order to make the victim believe "she was special.""29 The victim is
then lulled into a false sense of security and familiarity with the counselor and
becomes an easy prey.
The final two elements are interrelated. Clergy are often considered
authorities on spiritual matters and act, in many denominations, as
intermediaries between the parishioner and God. Regardless of whether the
religion holds that a parishioner cannot hope for salvation without confession
to a priest, the cleric stands in a superior position to a parishioner. The cleric
is respected and revered. Often, clergy are entrusted to tell their parishioners
the "correct" path to salvation in compliance with the tenets of the religion.
The risk of abuse in this area is extreme and the consequences are devastating.
When a parishioner fears for the salvation of her soul, she is willing to
acquiesce to treatment that she would otherwise reject.29 This salvation
CHOTHERAPY 31-32 (1986).
293. See Heller, supra note 279, at 405.
294. Id. at 405-06; see also Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 193.
295. Id.
296. Jorgenson & Randles, supra note 65, at 193 n.69 ("Classical analysts assume anonymity
toward clients, sometimes called blank-screen approach; they engage in very little self-disclosure
to foster transference.").
297. Swenson, supra note 208, at 283. Factors identified by researchers Gutheil and Gabbard
as warning signs of the violation of the boundaries of the counseling relationship are:
(1) Changing from a last name to a first name basis, thus developing a false sense of
intimacy;
(2) Discussing personal matters, particularly those of the therapist's;
(3) Moving from handshakes to pats and hugs;
(4) Meeting outside the office or for a lunchtime session;
(5) Meeting for social events;
(6) Giving gifts, waiving debts, offering a ride home.
Id. Gutheil also noted that such behavior is often preceded by comments such as, "'I ordinarily
don't do this ... "' or, "'While I don't usually do this with my patient . I..' Id. (quoting Thomas
G. Gutheil, Borderline Personality Disorder, Boundary Violations, and Patient-Therapist Sex:
Medicolegal Pifalls, 146 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 599 (1989).
298. See Moses, 863 P.2d at 318 (stating that the victim was so concerned about her salvation
that she requested and received absolution from the Bishop who had previously refused to disci-
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"trump card" is unparalleled in the realm of secular counseling. Religious
counselors are not compelled to find a logical or rational explanation for the
path they suggest as correct, for faith is not built on foundations as fragile as
logic or social conventions. Additionally, a major Christian tenet is to
unquestioningly accept the burdens placed upon us, because who are we to
question the will of God?
iii. Alternatives for Victims
Judges often look with incredulity at the professed naivet6 of the female
victims of sexual abuse. Ignoring the classic pattern that exists in incest
victims, battered women, and victims of abuse generally, the male judge will
often apply the more rational explanation from the male perspective-that the
female consented to the sexual relationship, and now in the cold, harsh, reality
of day, she is belatedly sorry.'" Consequently, female victims of sexual
abuse by the clergy or others lack appropriate remedies in the courts. The
damage from such abuse is long-lasting, often surfacing years after the abuse,
which adds to the woman's lack of credibility.3m
Churches should have a duty to investigate thoroughly any reports of
sexual impropriety on the part of clergy. If, however, the plaintiffs could show
that the church ignored prior complaints, failed to conduct an investigation or
undertake internal measures to determine the veracity of the complaints, actual
notice could be demonstrated. Once the organization is put on notice, there is
a duty to monitor carefully the clergy's conduct, provide assistance for the
clergy, and take appropriate disciplinary measures against repeat offenders.30'
pline her clergy/therapist abuser).
299. This can lead to overly simplistic analysis. See Roppollo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206 (La.
Ct. App. 1994). Judge Byrnes wrote of an Episcopalian priest who slept with his counselee:
Plaintiff complains about the adulterous sexual relationship between the decedent and
Dr. Moore.... But they were both adults. As there is no civil nor criminal prohibition
against such conduct between adult laypersons the State cannot penalize such conduct
because Dr. Moore was an Episcopal priest.
Id. at 208. By ignoring the true cause of injury that is conferred solely by the relation of the par-
ties, that is, a breach of trust, and equating that to a nonfiduciary relationship, Judge Byrnes decid-
ed the case on grounds of form rather than substance. The decision in Roy v. Hartogs provides a
more enlightened approach, recognizing a counselee's inability to effectively consent to abuse at
the hands of her counselor.
The ward cannot waive performance of this duty or surrender these rights of protec-
tion.... [The guardian] should not be heard to say in a court of justice, by way of legal
excuse or justification for the seduction, that the ward was capable of consenting. Con-
sent obtained under such circumstances is no consent and should stand for naught.
Roy v. Hartogs, 366 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (N.Y. 1975). By placing the focus on the relationship
between the parties rather than on the formalistic aspects of the sex act, the law attempts to pro-
vide an avenue to check the inherent risk of a fiduciary relationship. Such a treatment is not based
on the patronizing view of the hysterical woman unable to determine her own sexual destiny;
rather, it recognizes that the counselor-counselee relationship is analogous to other fiduciary rela-
tionships, and one cannot remove the sex act from the environment in which it occurs. Denise
LeBouef, Psychiatric Malpractice: Exploitation of Women Patients, 11 HARV. WOM. L.J. 83, 102
(1988).
300. See Teresa K. Douglass, Comment, Psychotherapist Sexual Misconduct: A Proposal for
Legislative Change in Missouri, 62 UMKC L. REV. 777, 805 n.195 (1994).
301. Moses, 863 P.2d at 328.
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A plaintiff would then escape summary judgment in a negligent hiring or
retention case only if she could plead with particularity facts which indicate
that the clergy had a past history that the employer knew or could have
reasonably discovered. 2 Liability would attach only if the plaintiff could
demonstrate that the cleric had sexual contact with her while engaged in a
counseling relationship. Sexual contact during the course of counseling would
be prima facie evidence of malpractice. This proposed scheme protects all the
parties, and the church would not be liable unless the cleric's propensity for
prohibited sexual contact were or should have been known. The plaintiff
would find refuge, under limited circumstances, in the court. To allow
churches and clergy to escape liability on the basis of the First Amendment
"would go beyond First Amendment protection and cloak such bodies with an
exclusive immunity greater than that required for the preservation of the
principles constitutionally safeguarded.""3 3 Unfortunately, a clergyman falsely
accused on more than one occasion would then be subject to liability.
Although the specter of false accusations is very real, and institutions may
overreact to any accusation, the legal system is capable of determining the
veracity of witnesses, and the clergy would already have the advantage of
credibility in this area.
b. Professional Malpractice Standard
The standard for professional malpractice in jury instructions is that the
professional "must have and use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily
possessed and employed by members of the profession in good standing."3"
This refers to the skill of the practitioner in good professional standing-one
who meets the minimum negligence standard.0 5 Some commentators and
courts claim that this poses a dilemma when clergy are involved.3" For
302. Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 589-90 (Ohio 1991).
303. Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 932 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
304. KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, § 32, at 187. Malpractice is also defined more expan-
sively as "[pjrofessional misconduct or unreasonable lack of skill.... It is any professional mis-
conduct, unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in professional or fiduciary duties, evil practice or
illegal or immoral conduct." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990).
305. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, § 30 at 164-65. The elements of a cause of action
in negligence are:
(1) A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the person to conform to a
certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable
risks.
(2) A failure on the person's part to conform to the standard required: breach of
duty.
(3) A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting inju-
ry [legal or proximate cause].
(4) Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another.
Id.
306. Id.; see also Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice, supra note 1. Ericsson, who was defense
counsel in Nally v. Grace Community Church, asserts that courts are equipped to handle empirical
issues, but "[tihe issues raised in clergy counseling cases are not empirical, but religious.... They
are not conducive to judicial review because they lack objective standards." Id. at 169. Other
problems delineated by this author include the identification of the scope and nature of church-re-
lated counseling. Id. Does it include short emergency calls as well as confessions, or extended
office or home visits over long periods of time? Id. at 170. Does the duty owed to the counselee
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clergy malpractice to occur, there must be "professional misconduct," or some
deviation from a standard of care on the part of the cleric.3" Yet
determination of the appropriate standard of care for clergy is fraught with
difficulty. If the courts must determine which activities are secular and which
are spiritual, the mere analysis of activities, it is argued, will intrude upon the
First Amendment.3 8 However, it is arguable that the secularization of the
counseling function separates this activity from the ecclesiastical functions
performed by the clergy, and that imposition of a duty of care and competence
in this area would not violate First Amendment principles.3"
Another difficulty faced by the courts is that there is no prescribed
educational standard for clergy. Religion is the ultimate equal opportunity
employer. Individuals with less than a high school education and those with
postdoctoral work may achieve the same degree of success in terms of size of
congregations and incomes."' Because there is no objective standard that can
be applied to the conduct of clergy from the wide range of denominations,
some argue that courts would become involved in making judgments regarding
the competence and training of clergy and the methods and content of their
counseling in order to determine whether the cleric breached the duty imposed
by the standards of that denomination."' This argument is specious.
Certainly the tenets of organized religions and cultural norms do not approve
of sexual activity as a counseling method." 2 A secular professional is subject
vary according to the "ecclesiastical office and authority flowing from such office"? Id. Should the
training and competence inquiry of the court be limited to secular training because of the dif-
ficulty of evaluating the "spiritual gifts" of the counselor? Id. at 171. Finally, in addition to consti-
tutional problems, evaluating the content of the counseling to church members is fraught with
difficulties. Id. at 172. These objections are smokescreens. Courts are well equipped to determine,
on a case by case basis, whether a counseling relationship exists. If a clergyman hears a parishio-
ner's confession only, this would not qualify as counseling, because this is part of a liturgical
function. Home visits could qualify if they were part of an ongoing attempt to provide assistance
with a psychological problem. Bible study in the home would not be considered counseling. If the
court is determining liability for sexual misconduct, then the ecclesiastical office of the clergy, the
competence and training of the pastors, and the content of the counseling should all be secondary
considerations. The cleric's conduct should be the primary consideration.
307. "Standard of care" refers to the conduct required of an individual in a given situation.
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 156, at 164. In negligent tort actions, that standard is often de-
scribed as that degree of care which a reasonably prudent person should exercise "under the same
or similar circumstances." Id. at 175. In the professional context, the standard of care refers to the
standard established by the professionals, and in the medical profession it has either varied by
locality or been applied according to a national standard. Id. at 185-88.
308. See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 290 (Colo. 1988) (Quinn, J., concurring).
309. Bergman, supra note 211, at 45.
310. Accord Kelly Beers Rouse, Note, Clergy Malpractice Claims, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 383,
385 (1989).
311. Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice, supra note 1, at 171.
312. In a national random-sample survey of 1,423 practicing psychiatrists, the majority (97.-
4%) believed that sexual contact between patient and therapist is usually or always harmful to the
patient. Judith Lewis Herman et al., Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact: Results of a National
Survey, II: Psychiatrists' Attitudes, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 165 (1987). Ninety percent of patients
who had engaged in sexual relationships are psychologically damaged-many severely. Carl Sher-
man, Behind Closed Doors: Therapist-Client Sex, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May 1993, at 66. Eleven
percent of sexually exploited victims were hospitalized; one percent committed suicide as a result
of their involvement. Id. A Wisconsin survey showed, without exception, that every professional
group polled believed sexual contact between therapists and client/patient is highly likely to have
an injurious effect on the latter. Anthony Kuchan, Survey of Incidence of Psychotherapists' Sexual
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to a duty imposed based upon the state of the art within the professional
standards prescribed by his or her profession. Clergy engaged in counseling
should be subject to some minimal standard of competence-based on the
state of the art in counseling-as a psychiatrist, psychologist, or social worker
should be.3 The clergy, however, would not be held to the level of compe-
tence of the specialist."4
In the case of clergy engaged in counseling, the cleric should be held
liable if his conduct did not conform to what a reasonable, prudent, competent
counselor would have done under similar circumstances.3 ' This should not
be difficult to establish when the cleric has engaged in sexual misconduct
during the counseling relationship. This view of malpractice as the deviation
from predetermined professional standards is used successfully in defending
suits in clergy malpractice.3 6 The defendants' rationale is that since clergy
cannot and should not be regulated by society, determining the appropriate
"standards" for clergy violates the separation of church and state. 3 ' This
may be true for content-based analysis of the cleric's actions (that is,
examining a cleric's statements does implicate the First Amendment), but
analyzing what he does (that is, conduct-based analysis) may avoid these
thorny constitutional issues.'
Contact with Clients in Wisconsin, in PSYCHOTHERAPISTS' SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT WITH CLIENTS:
INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION 51, 63 (Gary S. Schoener, et al. eds., 1989). Therapist-patient
sex may produce disorders including depression, sleep adjustment, and sexual dysfunction. KEN-
NETH S. POPE & JACQUELINE C. BOUHoUTSoS, SEXUAL INTIMACY BETWEEN THERAPISTS AND PA-
TIENTS 63-66 (1986); see also Jorgenson et al., supra note 222, at 662-63 & n.90 (discussing
damage caused by sexual exploitation to a patient by a therapist).
313. Bergman compares the clergy engaged in counseling to the mohel:
The practice of ritual circumcision originated in antiquity and its rules were developed
before the discovery of microscopic organisms and their relation to infection. If a mohel
today were to perform a circumcision in the same manner as it was performed two thou-
sand years ago, without sterilizing his instruments, and if infection were to result, would
we not be justified in considering him to have breached a duty of care?
Bergman, supra note 211, at 57-58.
314. Id. at 60-61.
315. Among the standards suggested and discarded are the "secular standard," the "state of
the art standard," and the "denominationally specific standard." Fain, supra note 10, at 101-03;
Lawrence M. Burek, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable to a Lower Power, 14 PEPP.
L. REV. 137, 152-54 (1986).
The secular standard would require that clergy conform to the standard held by mental
health professionals, and is viewed as a temporal, non-religious standard. Fain, supra note 10, at
101. It has been criticized as inappropriate largely because of the differences in training and tech-
niques employed by secular mental health professionals and religious counselors. Id. at 102.
The state of the art standard poses similar problems, since it would require clergy to be-
come conversant with the latest psychological theories and therapeutic methods and to employ
them. Id. at 102-03. This has been identified as an unrealistic requirement, given that these psy-
chological techniques may be contrary to the clergy's religious beliefs. Id. at 103. The denomina-
tionally specific standard, while comparing clergy to other clergy rather than mental health pro-
fessionals, requires entanglement by the court, which may be most offensive to the First Amend-
ment. Id.
316. See Esbeck, supra note 11, at 8 (indicating that if the matters of creed, teaching and
ecclesiastical discipline are implicated in a lawsuit, the First Amendment provides an "immuniz-
ing" defense).
317. Esbeck has suggested that the barriers imposed by the Free Exercise Clause and the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment are insurmountable. Id. at 8-9.
318. Asking the court to distinguish between religious and secular content in counseling may
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The mere settlement of a dispute involving a cleric by a civil court does
not imply that the civil court has inhibited the free exercise of religion.
Society should provide some redress for the victim when a counselor betrays
her trust and causes her psychological harm. The content of the counseling
relationship is clearly privileged," 9 but this shield of privilege is intended to
protect the parishioner, and the courts should not let the clergy use it to
protect themselves from exposure for their misdeeds.
3. The First Amendment Barrier Removed
a. Counseling-Religious or Secular Activity?
One commentator has suggested that the counseling conducted by clergy
is not equivalent to secular counseling, because it is a religious activity that
"involves the application of religious insight to day-to-day problems, such as
difficulties in marriage, parenthood, employment or other relationships, to
produce new religious understanding and, thereby, change in the counselee.
'The counselor and the troubled person ... enter into an emotional
relationship, in which God is the third party.' 32' This religious component,
it is argued, precludes the use of scientifically or medically based forms of
counseling in developing a standard of care.32' In addition, the diversity of
religious belief systems prevents the definition of a general standard by which
conduct may be measured. One potential solution is the application of a
require the court to interfere in issues which are inextricably intertwined. This, in itself, may be a
violation of the Establishment Clause. Mark Taylor, Nally v. Grace Community Church: The Fu-
ture of Clergy Malpractice Under Content-Based Analysis, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 661, 678-79 (19-
90).
319. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 4505 (McKinney 1992); see also People v. Carmona, 627
N.E.2d 959, 962 (N.Y. 1993) (recently interpreting § 4505).
320. Funston, supra note 1, at 515 (citing F. Braceland & D. Farnsworth, Psychiatry and
Religion, in PSYCHIATRY, THE CLERGY AND PASTORAL COUNSELING 1, 5-6 (D. Farnsworth & F.
Braceland eds., 1969)). There is an inherent tension between religious or pastoral counseling and
secular psychological treatment. David Delapane, Stand by Me: The Role of the Clergy and Con-
gregation in Assisting the Family Once It Is Involved in the Legal and Treatment Process, in
ABUSE AND RELIGION: WHEN PRAYING ISN'T ENOUGH, 173, 178 (Anne L. Horton & Judith A.
Williamson eds., 1988). Religious counselors often fear that secular therapists will discount the
faith and religious beliefs of the counselee, while secular therapists seek to find an underlying
pathology, the discovery of which may necessitate coming to grips with realizations or desires that
run contrary to the tenets of the church. Id.
Although Funston argues that the religious nature of counseling is not severable from its
secular components, this concern only seems pertinent when addressing the "negligent counseling"
type claim of Nally. Funston, supra note 1, at 516. Sexual misconduct by the clergy, however,
seems to be clearly severable from the religious milieu in which such abuse can occur.
There is increasing evidence that stronger spousal abuse laws have contributed to reduced
incidents of domestic violence, suggesting that allowing actions for clergy malpractice could have
a similar effect on the pastor-congregant dynamic. Delapane, supra at 180.
321. See Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App. 1982). The
Oregon Court of Appeals reasoned that beliefs could not be dissected into individual components.
The court noted:
Statements made by religious bodies must be viewed in the light of the doctrines of that
religion. Courts may not sift through the teachings of a religion and pick out individual
statements for scrutiny, deciding whether each standing alone is religious .... Although
certain of the theories espoused by Scientology appear to be more psychological than




denomination-specific standard;322 however, the disadvantage of this standard
is that it would require courts to examine religious doctrine and tenets, which
would contravene the First Amendment.
323
This argument fails every logical, moral and philosophical scrutiny.
Certain behaviors, including sleeping with a woman who has come to a cleric,
for counseling, simply fall outside the realm of any religious tenet. The Free
Exercise Clause is a defense only if the defendant's conduct is religious.324
Engaging in a sexual relationship with a parishioner who seeks counseling is
undoubtedly not. Despite this, many clergy and their churches have asserted
First Amendment defenses in sexual misconduct cases, and courts have agreed
that First Amendment rights are implicated.323
b. Role of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
The First Amendment's two clauses referring to religion serve a single
value-that of the individual's freedom of religious beliefs and practices.326
The Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ,327
The Free Exercise Clause prevents the government from curbing the
individual's religious freedom.32 On the other hand, the Establishment
322. Funston, supra note 1, at 523 (noting that such a denominational standard would invite
the type of inquiry deemed unconstitutional in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)).
323. Id. at 524.
324. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). "[To have the protection of the
Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief." Id. The Yoder Court held that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prevented the state from compelling the respondents to send
their children to high school until they reached sixteen. Id. at 234.
325. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 327-28 (S.DN.Y. 1991); Destefano v.
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988).
326. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2, at 1157 (2d ed. 1988),
(citing Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947)) (noting that the natural result of
government-established religions was the persecution of religious dissenters).
327. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
328. The Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner provided the high water mark for
the protection of the free exercise of religion. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In that case, the Court estab-
lished a "compelling interest" test to justify governmental burdens on the free exercise of religion.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. Under this test, government action that substantially burdened a
person's exercise of religion could only be justified if it were in furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, and was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Id. at 406-07.
Hence, in that case, a state unemployment compensation scheme that required claimants to be
available for work from Monday to Saturday violated the free exercise rights of a Sabbatarian. Id.
at 410.
However, in more recent years, the Court has moved away from such a deferential stan-
dard. In a recent case, the Court enunciated a new standard, providing that as long as the laws are
religiously neutral and of general applicability, the incidental impact on one's exercise of religion
is constitutionally permissible. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 884-85 (1990). Therefore, the violation of a criminal law forbidding the use of peyote could
be validly used to deny unemployment benefits under the Oregon compensation scheme, despite
the fact that the claimants used the peyote in their religious ceremonies. Id. at 1606.
Congress re-established the less deferential "compelling interest" standard of Sherbert in
Free Exercise Clause cases by creating a cause of action under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act did not purport
to alter Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id. § 2000bb-4.
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Clause prevents the government from aiding a particular religion.329 The
government cannot inhibit an individual's choice of religion, or aid religion in
general.33 The amendment thus requires the state to maintain a distance
from the organized church. Although individual freedom is the single value
identified with the First Amendment, the two clauses are at odds with each
other, requiring accommodation and balance."' This balance is accomplished
when the government seeks to achieve only secular goals, and does so in a
religion-neutral way.332 Although the right of religious liberty has been
restricted on occasion,33 this country has a strong jurisprudential history of
maintaining the wall between church and state."' There is mutual societal
329. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW, § 17.1, at 1223 (5th
ed. 1995).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1218-19.
332. Id.
333. See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
334. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871) (standing for the broad principle of absolute
judicial deference to the internal disputes of religious institutions). Where the right of property
ownership in the civil court is dependent on the question of church doctrine, discipline, ecclesiasti-
cal law, rule, custom, or church government:
[Tlhe rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound
view of the relations of church and state under our systems of laws ... is, that, whenev-
er [such questions] have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to
which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as
final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.
Id. at 727. The dispute arose over the ownership of local church property in Louisville, Kentucky,
after the General Assembly called for its members in local congregations who believed that slav-
ery was a divine right to "repent and forsake these sins." Id. at 691. The minority faction in the
local church argued that the resolution of the General Assembly was a departure from the doctrine
held when the local church joined the General Assembly. Id. The minority espoused the theory
that the General Assembly held an interest in the property of the local church, subject to an im-
plied trust in favor of the doctrine which existed when they joined. Id. at 693. Any departure from
that doctrine was a breach of trust, and was a forfeiture by the General Assembly of the interest in
the local church property. Id. This case, however, was decided not on constitutional grounds, but
on a common law view of separation of church and state, in marked contrast to the British stan-
dard under which the court must determine the true standard of faith in an organization and deter-
mine which of the contending parties support that standard. Id. at 726. In addition, it was decided
before the Fourteenth Amendment made the First Amendment applicable to the states. Three gen-
eral rules were established by the majority for the civil courts' resolution of internal ecclesiastical
disputes. When property is given to a congregation with stipulations as to its use, if use for that
specific purpose is discontinued, the civil courts could order the property returned. Id. at 722.
When property is given for the general use of an independent religious group, the group decides,
by majority decision or another method previously established, use of the property. Id. at 721.
Finally, when property is acquired by a group which constitutes a larger organization, the civil
courts must defer to the decision of the ecclesiastical court. Id. at 727. See also Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (dis-
cussing the limitations imposed on civil courts in awarding church property based on the church
doctrine); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (discussing unconstitutionality of
transfer of property in limiting free exercise of religion).
This doctrine of total judicial deference to churches was somewhat tempered 100 years
later when the Court established a "neutral principles of laws" approach. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 602 (1979). In Jones, the Court resolved the issue of whether civil courts, consistent with the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, could resolve an issue involving church property under neutral
principles, or whether they must defer to the decision of the hierarchical church tribunal. Id. at
597. The lower court determined that Jones did not preclude an analysis based on "neutral princi-
ples of law," and the court could legitimately examine documents such as deeds, state trust stat-
utes, and the corporate charter of the local church in order to determine whether there was lan-
guage creating a trust in favor of the regional body. Id. at 600. The Supreme Court remanded the
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benefit to institutional separation-the church cannot use the state and civil
courts to achieve its sectarian purposes, and the state cannot interfere within
the church's sphere of competence.335
The Free Exercise Clause operates when the cleric has a sincerely held
religious belief, and the government action has a coercive effect against his
practice of religion. There cannot be a 'truth test' as to one's faith, and the
objective evidence of the sincerity of the belief has been described as a
fervency test.336 If the presence of the cleric is incidental, and his religious
beliefs are not central to the dispute, the Free Exercise Clause is not
implicated.337 Cases of clergy sexual misconduct form the paradigm for the
application of this principle.
The Establishment Clause, on the other hand, may be implicated in a
negligent hiring, retention, or supervision claim if the court has to examine
and assess the employment policies and practices of the religious organization,
and these policies are imbued with religious tenets.338 The Supreme Court in
case, noting that although the First Amendment "prohibits civil courts from resolving church prop-
erty disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice," a state may adopt an approach for
settling property disputes "so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matter, whether the
ritual and liturgy of worship, or the tenets of faith." Id. at 602. The neutral-principles approach
met this criterion, as "it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommo-
date all forms of religious organizations and polity. [It] . . . relies exclusively on objective, well-
established concepts of trust and property law.... It therefore promises to free civil courts com-
pletely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity and practice." Id. at 602-03.
335. See Esbeck, supra note !1, at 12. "Next to the family, religious organizations comprise
the largest single group of societal institutions that generate, mold and propagate those shared
norms essential to a reasonably cohesive society capable of self-government." Id.
336. Id. at 32.
337. TRIBE, supra note 326, at 1185. Professor Tribe emphasizes that there are contexts in
which religiously neutral actions by the govemment should not warrant constitutional consider-
ation unless the neutral government action is a pretext for interference with religion:
Just as the First Amendment's free speech clause is not even implicated in the arrest of
a newscaster for speeding, or in the closure of a bookstore for violation of a health regu-
lation, so the free exercise clause is not implicated in the imprisonment of a member of
clergy for embezzlement, or in the closure of a church as a fire hazard.
Id. See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (discussing the constitutional right to
be a conscientious objector to war for religious reasons and what constitutes a religious belief
within that exception); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (discussing religious beliefs as
a constitutional basis to prevent indictment).
Only claims that are "so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation" will be denied First
Amendment protection, Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). While the Court held
that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in
order to merit First Amendment Protection," sexual misconduct by clergy clearly falls within the
first category of conduct--"clearly nonreligious in motivation." Id. at 714.
338. Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ohio 1991). For cases finding a constitutional
barrier against negligent hiring and/or supervision claims, see Isely v Capuchin Province, 880 F.
Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (dismissing claim of negligent hiring); Gibson v. Brewer, No. WD
50238, 1996 WL 93511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d
780 (Wis. 1995). But cf Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994) (refusing to grant churches immunity for being sued in civil actions for
negligent hiring and supervision); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 287-88 (Colo. 1988)
("[Wle hold that [the diocese that] knows or should have known that [a clergyman's] conduct
would subject third parties to an unreasonable risk of harm may be directly liable to third parties
for harm proximately caused by his conduct."); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927, 930-31 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1992) ("'[E]ven the most liberal construction of the First Amendment will not protect a
religious organization's decision to hire someone who it knows is likely to commit criminal or
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Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,339  in addition to
discussing a church property dispute, determined whether a secular tribunal
could review a church tribunal's defrockment of a bishop. The Supreme Court
found that in a matter of internal church discipline, when the highest clerical
tribunal has spoken, a detailed review was impermissible under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.3 °
c. First Amendment Inapplicable
A broad reading of Serbian Orthodox Diocese suggests that cases
involving clergy sexual misconduct would have no place in the secular courts
if a hierarchical church tribunal has made a decision. Some commentators 34'
and courts342 argue that the First Amendment bars all clergy malpractice
actions because governmental interference in religion is prohibited. 343 This
argument is flawed in several respects. The general view is that "government
violates the Establishment Clause only if its actions are born of a religious
intent, or if they exert primarily religious effects, or if they create excessive
church-state entanglement." 3" Courts do not violate the Establishment Clause
when they try a minister for crimes or entertain a priest's action for breach of
contract. The Establishment Clause does not imply that clergy can never be
present in a civil court of law. It insulates a priest or minister only when he
engages in conduct related to religion. 45 Sleeping with his counselees does
tortious acts."') (quoting Byrd, 565 N.E.2d at 590); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386
(Or. Ct. App. 1989) ("[P]laintiff's claim for outrageous conduct is not premised on [the] mere fact
that Christenson is a pastor, but on the fact that, because he was plaintiff's pastor and counselor, a
special relationship of trust and confidences developed.").
339. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
340. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 718. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan stated:
In short, the [Constitution] permit[sl hierarchical religious organizations to establish their
own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals
for adjudicating disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesias-
tical tribunals are created to decide disputes over the government and direction of subor-
dinate bodies, the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding
upon them.
Id. at 724-25.
341. See Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice, supra note 1, at 176; O'Reilly & Strasser, supra
note 207, at 55.
342. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla.
1993).
343. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses have been incorpo-
rated through the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states by the Court's deci-
sions in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 8 (1947), respectively. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses represent fundamental aspects of liberty and must be protected from state
and federal interference. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 903. In a case involving mail fraud, the Ballards
claimed they could cure diseases through supernatural gifts. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,
80-81 (1944). The Court stated that the First Amendment prevented the courts from examining the
truth of the religious representations made by the Ballards. Id. at 86.
344. TRIBE, supra note 326, at 1187. The excessive entanglement test was established in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), although some have argued that recent First Amend-
ment jurisprudence shows less reliance on the Lemon test. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of
the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos? 70 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 581, 583 (1995).
345. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 109 (1952). If subversive ac-
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not fit that description. Sexual battery during religious or secular counseling, is
simply not a religious activity that should trigger the First Amendment when
courts try to curtail such activity.34 In cases like Nally where the content of
the counseling is in question, clergy should be accorded First Amendment
protection, but this should not extend to sexual misconduct cases.
347
In Byrd v. Faber3" the court was concerned that an inquiry into whether
a religious organization had exercised due care in hiring would require
examination of employment policies and practices, which would be "infused
with the religious tenets of the particular sect involved. If the state becomes
involved in assessing the adequacy of these standards, serious entanglement
problems may arise under the First Amendment." '349 This court was overly
protective of the church, setting up heightened 'pleading requirements for plain-
tiffs to avoid summary judgment, while acknowledging that if a religious
organization hired someone with a history of criminal or tortious behavior, the
First Amendment would not protect the religious organization from
liability.35 ° These fears are unfounded. There is no need for a court to
inquire into whether a member of the clergy engaging in such behavior acted
in conformance with church teachings on clergy conduct, or to call expert
witnesses; the court can declare, as a matter of law, that a clergy engaged in a
sexual liaison with a counselee has breached a fiduciary duty owed to the
counselee.
If some religious group were to claim that sexual activity was a
sacramental rite, and that intercourse with twelve-year-old vestal virgins were
an integral aspect of that rite, the state would have a compelling interest in
protecting its citizens and would not run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause in
regulating such conduct.35" '
tion "should actually be attempted by a cleric, neither his robe nor his pulpit would be a defense."
Id.; see also Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (hold-
ing that the respondent's religious motivation for using the drug peyote did not place the respon-
dents beyond the reach of a criminal statute that was not specifically directed at their religious
practice, and that was concededly constitutional as applied to those who used the drug for other
reasons).
346. See Esbeck, supra note 11, at 88 ("Regardless of what the church claims are its canoni-
cal standards for the proper behavior of priests, the civil law can say that sexual seduction of a
counselee is not even 'arguably religious,' that it is wrongful and thus punishable in tort.").
347. Nally, 763 P.2d at 960.
348. 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991).
349. Byrd, 565 N.E.2d at 590; see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (1976) (holding that constitutional prohibitions prevent civil courts' intervention in eccle-
siastical affairs, and that even an arbitrary decision of a church hierarchical body would be off
limits to the civil courts if it would involve any review of religious doctrine and practice); Pritzlaff
v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 920
(1996) (holding that plaintiff's claim for negligent hiring, supervision or retention of priest who
allegedly coerced her to have sexual relations with him was barred by the First Amendment, be-
cause a determination of competence as a Catholic priest would require interpretation of church
canons and internal church policies and practices).
350. Byrd, 565 N.E.2d at 590.
351. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (holding that statute which pro-
hibited polygamy was constitutional, and religious belief did not excuse adherence to law since
"[t]o permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself"); see also United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (holding that an Amish employer was obligated to pay
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Statutory rape laws and a public policy of protecting the health and
welfare of the citizenry in general, and minors in particular, would justify
using the state's police powers to curb this "religious" sexual activity. Courts
have intervened in cases involving the employment of minors by religious
organizations finding that the application of the child labor laws and other
aspects of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) did not violate the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. 52 The courts
also reject these First Amendment arguments in cases involving the minimum
wage and equal pay provisions of the FLSA, as well as state workers'
compensation laws.353 These examples demonstrate that mere potential for
entanglement with religion is not always a shield for the religious employer.
When the potential victims are women whose judgment has been clouded by a
combination of factors, the state is justified in intervening. The state allows
women to recover for malpractice when their psychologists have sex with
them, and it should intervene on the same grounds here.
The First Amendment does not apply exclusively to clergy. Theoretically,
in cases against psychologists, psychiatrists, or therapists-where the courts
clearly have jurisdiction-the defendants could also hide under the Free
Exercise umbrella by asserting that the sex furthered a "sincerely held
religious belief."'354 Exempting clergy as a class without examining whether
the "contested conduct is in fact religious in character" '355 addresses the
problem with a sword, when a scalpel would be adequate. The First
Amendment requires the identical standard for secular counselors and clergy
engaged in counseling. The emphasis should be on the behavior, not the
religious or secular status of the offender.
Some courts have recognized the fallacy in providing First Amendment
protection for clerics who have sex with their counselees when the Free
Exercise Clause protects only religious beliefs or practices:
social security taxes despite his religious convictions); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 145, 158
(1944) (holding mother not constitutionally protected from application of child labor laws); Bra-
unfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609-10 (1961) (upholding validity of Sunday closing laws). The
First Amendment has never been considered to confer a right to engage in activity threatening the
public safety, peace, or order, no matter how religiously motivated the behavior is. The freedom to
believe is not synonymous with the freedom to act. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879-90.
352. Brock v. Wendell's Woodwork, Inc., 867 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Tony
& Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (holding it proper to extend
FLSA to religious foundation). See generally David L. Gregory, Government Regulation of Reli-
gion Through Labor and Employment Discrimination Laws, 22 STETSON L. REV. 27, 51 (1992)
(discussing decisions of the Supreme Court which have favored the religious employer at the
expense of the employee). Professor Gregory asserts:
As the Burger and now Rehnquist Court matured, this activist, pro-institutional, statist
jurisprudence became increasingly inimical to the severely debilitated First Amendment
and Title VII rights of religious employees, provisions which theoretically were designed
to promote free exercise of religion and to protect employees against unlawful employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of religion.
Id. at 28-29 (citations omitted).
353. South Ridge Baptist Church v. Industrial Comm'n, 911 F.2d 1203, 1211 (6th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 754 (1991).




Notwithstanding the due deference that we are required to give in
determining the legitimacy of religious beliefs or practices, we cannot
accept the premise that the sexual activities in which Pressnell is
alleged to have participated are protected by the Free Exercise
Clause. Indeed it is clear that the alleged conduct was nonreligious in
motivation - a bizarre deviation from normal spiritual counseling
practices of ministers in the Lutheran Church. Therefore, since
Pressnell's alleged conduct falls outside the scope of First
Amendment protections, he may be subject to liability for injuries
arising from his tortious conduct.356
Despite this declaration, the court rejected each of the plaintiff's causes of
action.
Sometimes, the injection of the First Amendment in these state tort claims
arguably violates the basic rule of judicial decision making-that a court
should not consider constitutional issues unless such a decision is
essential.357 Despite this rule, courts, in their eagerness to dismiss these
actions, decide them on First Amendment grounds.35 s
d. Neutral Principles Paradigm
Clergy sexual malpractice actions could also be decided under "neutral
principles of law" that do not implicate the First Amendment. The Supreme
Court determined in Jones v. WolfP9 that as long as the civil courts remained
free of entanglement in questions of "religious doctrine, polity and
356. Id. at 1238; see also Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988), where the court
noted that:
[While] marital counseling by a cleric presents difficult questions because it often incor-
porates both religious counseling and secular counseling ... [iun the spiritual counseling
context, the free exercise clause is relevant only if the defendant can show that the con-
duct that allegedly caused the plaintiffs distress was in fact 'part of the belief and pract-
ices' of the religious group ... [when, however,] the alleged wrongdoing of a cleric
clearly falls outside the beliefs and doctrine of his religion, he cannot avail himself of
the protection afforded by the [Flirst [A]mendment.
Id. at 283-84. However, other courts have claimed that the Free Exercise Clause is implicated in
this type of action. See Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994). In Dausch, the Sev-
enth Circuit relied on the district court in finding that
Illinois does not recognize a claim for clergy malpractice .... [C]ourts that have consid-
ered but rejected such a claim have recognized the free exercise implications of any such
recognition.... [S]uch free exercise considerations would not be relevant if Rykse's
conduct was not part of the belief and practices of his church .... [T]he district court
concluded that Mrs. Dausch had failed to allege adequately that Rykse's psychological
counseling was not part of the church's religious beliefs and practices. As a result, con-
cluded the court, the free exercise clause of the First Amendment was implicated and
Mrs. Dausch failed to state a valid claim.
Id. at 1428.
357. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581 (1958) (considering a non-constitutional issue
before a constitutional issue pursuant to the Court's "duty to avoid deciding constitutional ques-
tions presented unless essential to proper disposition of a case").
358. See, e.g., Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 794 (Wis. 1995)
(Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
359. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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practice,' ° they could decide questions of ownership of church property.
The civil court might have to scrutinize religious documents-e.g., a
constitution-but if this examination relied on secular terms, rather than
religious precepts, it would pass First Amendment muster. The court
concluded that "[o]n balance .... the promise of non-entanglement and
neutrality inherent in the neutral-principles approach more than compensates
for what will be occasional problems in application."36' The Supreme Court
again prohibited excessive entanglement, but affirmed the use of neutral
principles in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church.362
Is a woman less valuable to our society than property? If the Supreme
Court has allowed this compromise in situations involving property, afortiori,
it should be available in the more important issues of the health and welfare of
citizens. Public policy considerations which allow state courts to intervene in
property disputes should allow such intervention in matters involving clergy
malpractice.363 Clergy malpractice involves abuse of power and sexual abuse,
and the courts can apply the neutral principles for resolving these disputes.
Such principles can be adopted from analogous situations involving other
360. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603.
361. Id. at 604.
362. 393 U.S. 440 (1969). In deciding a property dispute, the Supreme Court held that the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment forbid any application of a de-
parture-from-doctrine rule. Mary Elizabeth, 393 U.S. at 450. The Georgia Supreme Court had
determined that the Presbyterian Church-U.S.A. substantially departed from established Presbyteri-
an doctrine and awarded the property in dispute to the local members and ministers who had with-
drawn from the main organization. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church,
159 S.E.2d 690 (Ga. 1968). The Supreme Court stated that in resolving civil disputes involving
churches, secular authorities may not engage "in the forbidden process of interpreting and weigh-
ing church doctrine." Mary Elizabeth, 393 U.S. at 451. The court rejected the departure-from-
doctrine rule, saying it "can play no role in any future judicial proceedings." Id. at 450 (emphasis
added).
363. An appellate court in Illinois reversed a trial court's dismissal of an action against a
Baptist minister and the church on First Amendment grounds. The appellate court used neutral
principles analysis:
We cannot conclude from plaintiffs' complaint that their cause of action against First
Baptist Church of Energy will infringe upon, or place a burden upon, the church's free-
dom to exercise its religion. Inquiring into whether the church was negligent in its fail-
ure to protect plaintiffs from the sexual misconduct of its minister may not call into
question the church's religious beliefs or practices or subject them to analysis or scruti-
ny.... [T]he minister's sexual misconduct was not rooted in the church's religious
beliefs and was outside the boundaries of the church's ecclesiastical beliefs and
practices.
Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
In a case of first impression in the New Jersey courts, an intermediate appellate court re-
versed the trial court's dismissal of a clergy malpractice claim, articulating a neutral principles
model for the resolution of clergy malpractice claims:
[Olne test to determine whether a cause of action against a cleric is cognizable in civil
courts is whether adjudication of the claim requires an evaluation of dogma or ritual, or
other matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. In the present case it is unlikely that de-
fendants will assert that sex with a counselee by a pastoral counselor is sanctioned by or
somehow involves tenets of the Episcopalian church, or would otherwise create an en-
tanglement with religious beliefs or rituals of First Amendment concern.
F.G. v. McDonell, 677 A.2d 258, 262-63. (N.J. 1996).
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helping professionals. The mere existence of a clerical collar should not
prevent their application.
Right-thinking judges are concerned about doctrinal entanglement in
religious values: "[W]hereas the other forms of entanglement involve
government in the apparatus of religion, doctrinal entanglement involves
government in religion's very spirit, in its decision on core matters of belief
and ritual."3" But the sex that underlies clergy malpractice has no
relationship to the beliefs or rituals of established religions, and courts and
legislatures addressing it would not be entangling themselves in matters of
belief or ritual. No religious truths are implicated, unless the defendants were
to claim a religious experience in the sexual contact.365 Even so, whether
these views are sincerely held could be questioned."6
e. Sexual Activity As Conduct, Not Content
Courts have consistently held that sexual relationships between a secular
therapist and a patient constitute malpractice.367 The courts have permitted
recovery for emotional distress and other damages.3" Despite the
acknowledgment by the founders of modern psychology, Freud and Jung, of
the debt owed to the church and the similarity between secular and religious
counseling,3" the courts have resisted liability for clergy who engage in
similar behavior with their parishioners during counseling. Some courts,
however, have recognized that a court can apply a secular standard to clergy
when the conduct is secular and tortious.37 °
If a woman is sexually abused by a cleric, goes to the church government
which then begins an investigation, resulting in charges and an ecclesiastical
trial at which the clergy is exonerated, is the woman precluded from seeking a
364. TRIBE, supra note 326, at 1231 (citing to the Supreme Court's assertion in Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871), that such entanglement "would lead to the total subversion of...
religious bodies, if anyone aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts
and have them reversed").
365. The Supreme Court decided that no judge or jury could decide whether the claims of a
religious experience by defendants in a mail fraud case were true, although they could determine
whether the defendants' beliefs were sincerely held. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87
(1944).
366. Id.
367. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Stone, 61 F.3d 1321, 1324 (7th Cir. 1995); McNi-
choles v. Subotnik, 12 F.3d 105, 109-10 (8th Cir. 1993); Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d
1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986); Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366, 368-69 (4th Cir. 1984).
368. Cruz, supra note 4, at 503 & n.30 (citing Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363,
1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (health service counselor); Richard H. v. Larry D., 243 Cal. Rptr. 807, 808-
09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (psychiatrist); Horak v. Binis, 474 N.E.2d 13, 18 (Il1. App. Ct. 1985)
(social worker); Lenhard v. Butler, 745 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (psychologist)); see
also Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602 (I1. 1991) (holding that damages for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress caused by sexual misconduct of psychologist not subject to the "zone of
danger" rule; the damages are recoverable as an element of malpractice).
369. P. C. Vitz, Psychology As Religion, in BAKER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 932,
933-34 (David G. Benner ed., 1985).
370. See Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S.Ct. 2153 (1994); Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 898 F. Supp 1169, 1174 (N.D. Tex.
1995).
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civil remedy? On the other hand, if the church determines that some
disciplinary action is required, does the cleric have a recourse in the secular
courts? If either party argues that the church did not follow its own rules, can
the civil courts intervene?
The Supreme Court held in Serbian Orthodox Diocese that civil courts
cannot make a determination after the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a
hierarchical church has spoken.37" ' Analysis of whether the church's action is
consistent with canonical church laws and regulations would entail inquiry into
the procedures that ecclesiastical law requires the church to follow, which is
forbidden by the First Amendment.372 The Supreme Court asserts that "it is
the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are
to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational or measurable by
objective criteria." '373 Notwithstanding plaintiff complaints that the decision
was arbitrary or there was lack of due process, the ecclesiastical decisions of
church tribunals are not appealable in the civil courts.37 4 This deference to
the First Amendment exceeds the original intent of either the Free Exercise or
the Establishment Clauses. The Supreme Court has condoned a level of
immunity for hierarchical churches' decision-making which extends beyond its
own guideline, whether the inquiry is "at the core of ecclesiastical
concem."
375
A hypothetical illustrates the difficulties and potential injustice inherent in
this approach. A priest employed "at will" by a church organization which
owns several nursing homes is assigned to one of these nursing homes. A
nurse's aide refuses to bring patients from her floor to a service led by the
priest. He complains to her superior in writing. She immediately lodges a
sexual harassment complaint against him, alleging that he gave her unwanted
gifts and made advances toward her. Within days the priest is summoned by
personnel and told to accept a suspension or resign. He is not given charges in
writing, not allowed to have legal counsel present, or face his accuser, as
required by the diocesan procedures. He accepts the suspension, while
protesting his innocence, then consults with legal counsel. In response to
rumors concerning his suspension, he circulates a memo to his fellow
employees informing them of the reason for his absence. He is summarily
dismissed. The organization has failed, in every respect, to follow its own
procedures. Should this priest have recourse in the civil court if the
ecclesiastical courts fail him? If he were not a priest, despite his "at-will"
status which suggests that he can be fired without cause, courts should find
that the policies and procedures in an employee handbook set certain minimal
guidelines to be followed.376 The priest was fired for alleged sexual
371. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 708.
372. Id. at 713.
373. Id. at 714-15.
374. Id. at 713.
375. Id. at 717.
376. Some courts have found that an employee handbook may create a unilateral contract
when (1) the handbook is sufficiently definite in its terms to create an offer to the employee; (2)
the handbook has been communicated to and accepted by the employee; and (3) the employee, by
continuing to work, has provided the necessary consideration. Yockey v. Iowa, 540 N.W.2d 418,
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harassment; presumably, without the sexual harassment accusation, he would
still be employed. If the core of the concern is the sexual harassment, not an
ecclesiastical concern, the priest, as well as his accuser, should be entitled to
due process. If the church is unwilling to provide due process, the courthouse
door should not be closed. The court's approach is too indulgent of the
church, with too little concern for the parties harmed.
The Supreme Court in Serbian Orthodox Diocese stated that "it would be
unconstitutional for state tribunals to question a church's suspension or
expulsion of a member for defying the church's hierarchy and challenging the
church's authority through civil litigation." '377 In cases involving sexual
misconduct, because the challenge is not based on an "ecclesiastical
concern" 378 regarding the cleric's religious beliefs, or the doctrine of the
church, the challenge should be heard by the civil courts. When clergy are
involved, some courts have taken a "hands off' approach.379 It appears that
the churches themselves, or the state legislatures, are left to effect needed
change.
C. Education
Education of clergy may be the first line of defense in deterring sexual
abuse within the counseling relationship. The prevalence of this form of abuse
indicates that an ostrich-like reaction will further exacerbate the problem.
Courses in the psycho-sexual dynamics of the counseling relationship and
human sexuality should be included in every seminary. If celibacy is required
of the clergy, counseling in coping with the demands of this choice is
required. Proactive measures in training all clergy is essential. Other approach-
es are necessary once the sexual contact has occurred. For clergy who are not
sexual predators, but merely succumb to bad judgment, recognition of the
warning signs and a procedure for referral or otherwise terminating the
counseling relationship is advisable. In order to heal both the clergy and the
congregation, the church has to be willing to discuss sex and sexuality and the
role power plays in sexual abuse. If the church responds sympathetically to the
victim, rather than adversarially, the victims are less likely to seek civil
remedies.
422 (Iowa 1995); see also Sowards v. Norbar, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (hold-
ing employee handbooks or oral representations may change "at will" employment); Shelton v.
Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 459 S.E.2d 851 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that an employee hand-
book created a jury issue on existence of employment contract); Sanchez v. Life Care Ctrs. of
America, Inc., 855 P.2d 1256 (Wyo. 1993) (holding that an employer's right to discharge may be
changed by an employee handbook).
377. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 720. For a description of the disciplinary
measures in hierarchical, representative, and congregational churches, see Esbeck, supra note 11,
at 63-76.
378. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 717.
379. See supra Part III.B.
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CONCLUSION
In addition to actions taken by churches, the legislature is best suited to
fashion a remedy for the growing number of people sexually abused by clergy
during counseling. A "bright line" prohibition of such behavior, tailored to the
specific evil to be remedied, will protect counselees while avoiding the pitfalls
encountered when the courts attempted to handle the problem. Churches
should support such legislation because it will ultimately inure to their
benefit. The courts can also provide remedies. Viewing the clergy as having a
fiduciary duty to protect the counselee can provide the basis for a higher
standard of care-one to act in the best interest of the counselee. The cleric
and parishioner share a very special relationship-one that is similar to the
professional relationship between psychiatrist, psychologist, or social worker
and patient. This relationship is one of trust and respect-for the professional
achievements of the cleric, as well as for the cleric's spirituality. Consequent-
ly, it may be argued that a fiduciary duty is created between the clergy and
parishioners. The law recognizes that the existence of a fiduciary relationship
can be used to establish a legal duty. This duty is frequently found in
malpractice suits against medical professionals, based on the fiduciary
relationship between doctor and patient. Within the relationship between clergy
and parishioner, this supplies the first prong in the elements necessary for
establishing negligence.
Reports of sexual abuse by clergy weaken faith in the church as an
institution. The churches' past response to reports suggested more interest in
protecting "members of the club" (the clergy) than in healing the victims of
abuse. The church hierarchy, the accused clergy, the accuser, and the
congregation conspire to keep the secret, even after it has been revealed. This
act does not empower the victim, or future potential victims. Imposing a duty
to disclose on churches when clergy seek transfers within the denomination
will protect future victims. Openness in handling these accusations-genuine
ones as well as false-will inevitably lead to greater respect for church
leaders, and can serve as a "witness" by strengthening the spiritual family of
the church and bringing more people to the faith.
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AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT
STUDY COMMISSIONS
CARL TOBIAS*
During the 104th Congress, senators representing Pacific Northwest states
mounted the fourth serious effort to split the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit since 1983.' The Senate Judiciary Committee approved a
bill that would have divided the court;2 however, the Senate eventually passed
a measure which would have created a national study commission to analyze
the federal appellate system. 3 This compromise was only one of several study
proposals that Congress considered in 1995 and 1996. For example, California
Governor Pete Wilson and Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain recom-
mended the establishment of commissions which would have assessed the
Ninth Circuit.' Nevertheless, Congress ultimately decided neither to authorize
a commission that would evaluate the appeals courts nor to bifurcate the Ninth
Circuit partly because each action proved to be rather controversial.
Congressional failure to pass legislation which would have created a study
commission or which would have split the court during the last two years does
not mean that Congress will ignore these possibilities in the future. Indeed,
many public officials who participated most actively in considering the study
proposals and the circuit's possible division have clearly stated that they intend
to have the 105th Congress seriously examine both prospects.5 The events
described above and the difficulties which growing caseloads increasingly pose
for the appeals courts suggest that it is an appropriate time to assess recent
proposals for studying the appellate system. This essay undertakes that effort.
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. B.A., Duke University, 1968; L.L.B.,
University of Virginia School of Law, 1972. 1 wish to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable
suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the Harris
Trust for generous, continuing support. I serve on the Ninth Circuit Local District Rules Review
Committee and on the Advisory Group that the United States District Court for the District of
Montana has appointed under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990; however, the views expressed
here and errors that remain are mine.
1. See SEN. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NINTH CIRcurr COURT OF APPEALS
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995, S. REP. No. 104-197, at 4-5 (1995).
2. Id. at 11.
3. 142 CONG. REC. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
4. Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chair, U.S.
Senate Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 6, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wilson Letter]; Ninth
Circuit Split: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995)
[hereinafter Ninth Circuit Split], available in WESTLAW, Database CONGHRT, File No. 1995
WL 10382809, at *29; see also Diarmuid O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split is Inevitable, but Not
Imminent, 56 Oo ST. L.J. 947, 950 (1995) (repeating Judge O'Scannlain's recommendations).
5. This assertion is premised on conversations with numerous participants and members of
their staff.
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The first section of the paper emphasizes congressional consideration of the
Ninth Circuit's potential bifurcation while briefly describing legislative branch
examination of appeals courts studies. The second part scrutinizes four study
commission proposals which public officials proffered. Finding that these
proposals either would have afforded insufficient time for a commission to
complete the work envisioned or would have been overly narrow in scope, the
third section offers suggestions for a national commission which would
analyze the appellate courts.
I. ACTIVrTES OF THE 104TH CONGRESS
Congressional activity relating to the possible division of the Ninth Circuit
warrants considerable treatment here, although some features of the applicable
history have been evaluated elsewhere.6 Moreover, assessment of relevant
developments involving the appellate courts that occurred during the most
recent Congress should enhance understanding of the study commission
proposals which senators and representatives analyzed.
Senators from Pacific Northwest states introduced a bill that would have
split the Ninth Circuit in late May 1995.7 This measure's introduction
constituted the fourth analogous effort to divide the appeals court in the last
thirteen years s The proposal would have included Alaska, Idaho, Montana,
Oregon and Washington in a new Twelfth Circuit and would have placed
Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands
in the Ninth Circuit.9 The proposed Twelfth Circuit would have been assigned
nine active judges and the new Ninth Circuit would have had nineteen active
members, but Senate Bill 956 authorized no new judgeships.'0
On September 13, 1995, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing
on S. 956, and the Committee received much cogent testimony from advocates
and critics of circuit-division." In a December Committee markup session,
the Judiciary Committee approved an amendment in the proposal as introduced
which would have left California, Hawaii, Guam and the Northern Mariana
Islands in the Ninth Circuit with fifteen judges and would have placed Alaska,
Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon and Washington, the remaining
states of the existing Ninth Circuit, in a new Twelfth Circuit with thirteen
judges.'2
6. See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 2; Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-
Why the Proposal to Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such
a Good Idea, 22 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 917 (1990); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-
Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357 (1995).
7. S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); see also S. 853, 104th Cong. (1995) (setting forth an earlier
proposed amendment to Title 28 of the United States Code).
8. See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 4-5; see also Baker, supra note 6, at 923-45 (chronicling
early and modem attempts to divide the Ninth Circuit and listing the motivations for such efforts);
Tobias, supra note 6, at 1363-75 (describing the historical proposals for splitting the Ninth Circuit
and the arguments for doing so).
9. S. 956, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
10. Id. § 3.
11. See Ninth Circuit Split, supra note 4, at * 1-69.
12. See Markup of Pending Legislation: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 104th
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The Senate and Committee members received and assessed numerous
well-considered ideas that favored and opposed splitting the Ninth Circuit.
Division's advocates stressed the problems which have purportedly resulted
from the circuit's mammoth size. These encompassed the court's gigantic
geographic magnitude, the Circuit's substantial number of judges (twenty-eight
members), the court's massive caseload, and the substantial expenses of
operating the circuit. 3
Opponents of the court's division addressed the above arguments in
several ways. They claimed that the circuit has instituted reforms which treat
complications ascribed to size. 4 For instance, over a decade ago, the circuit
created an administrative unit in Seattle where appeals can be filed and orally
argued, and this change has proved responsive to the distances that counsel
and litigants must travel.'" Establishment of the projected Twelfth Circuit
would not have modified this circumstance for many attorneys who now
practice in the proposed circuit. Furthermore, critics suggest that the court's
magnitude affords benefits. For example, it offers economies of scale, and
provides considerable diversity both in terms of the complexity and novelty of
cases, and in terms of the judges' gender, race, political views and geographic
origins."
Another important contention of circuit-splitting's proponents was that
Ninth Circuit case law is inconsistent. The statistical possibilities for conflict-
ing opinions on a twenty-eight judge court seem significant because, for
instance, 3,276 combinations of three-judge panels could resolve an issue. "
The Ninth Circuit Executive Office and experts who have analyzed the circuit
have found insufficient inconsistency to warrant concern. 8 The court has
correspondingly instituted measures to reduce conflicts. For example, the
circuit's staff attorneys fully review every appeal and code into a computer the
issues for resolution. The court then assigns to the same three-judge panel
those cases which raise similar issues and are ready for resolution at the same
time.'9
Cong. (Dec. 7, 1995) [hereinafter S. 956 Markup]; S. REP. No. 104-197, at 2.
13. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton);
id. at S7505 (statement of Sen. Bums).
14. See Ninth Circuit Split, supra note 4, at * 15 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
15. See generally JOSEPH S. CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE
COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT 13-14 (1985); Baker, supra note 6, at 929.
16. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE FOR THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT, POSITION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S. 956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995 (6/22/95) (1995) [hereinafter S. 956 POSITION PAPER]; Steve
Albert, Congress Weighs Plan to Divide the 9th Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1, 1993, at 12, 13
(quoting former Chief Judge James Browning's assertion that court's diversity is an asset in
response to previous attempts at splitting the circuit).
17. See Baker, supra note 6, at 938; Ninth Circuit Split, supra note 4, at *10 (statement of
Sen. Gorton).
18. See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 16, at 4-5; Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and
Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 541 (1989).
19. Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth
Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV. 937, 944-45, 957-58 (1980).
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The third argument of S. 956's advocates was that the court's California
judges, perspectives and appeals have dominated the Pacific Northwest."
This contention partly reflected the champions' dissatisfaction with Ninth
Circuit decisions in fields, such as environmental law and the death penalty.2
In prior attempts to divide the court, some opponents charged proponents of
circuit splitting of acting primarily for political reasons, and of specifically
engaging in "environmental gerrymandering."22 Critics also challenged the
proponents' underlying premise that judges who were located in California
were monolithic and idiosyncratic.23 Assessment of the judges' viewpoints
and the computerized, random selection of three-judge panels made untenable
efforts to stereotype the circuit's California judges.24 Finally, a majority of
the court's active judges were not even stationed in California."
There are certain additional ideas which proponents and critics enunciated
in support of and against the Ninth Circuit's division. Critics emphasized that
the proposed Ninth Circuit would have had a significantly less beneficial ratio
of three-judge panels to appeals than the new Twelfth Circuit and a
considerably less advantageous ratio than the current Ninth Circuit. Panels of
the proposed Ninth Circuit would have annually faced 1,014 appeals and
panels of the proposed Twelfth Circuit would have annually confronted 645
cases, while panels of the existing Ninth Circuit addressed 868 filings in
1994.6 Critics also argued that the proposed Twelfth Circuit would have
imposed much new administrative expense and would have replicated
functions which the Ninth Circuit now discharges satisfactorily.2" Moreover,
opponents claimed that most active members of the court and many attorneys
who practice before it opposed bifurcation.2"
Proponents of circuit-splitting urged that judges on a smaller court, such
as the proposed Twelfth Circuit which would have had nine judges, would be
more collegial, thereby enhancing efficiency.29 This proposition has some
20. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
21. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7504-05, (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statements of Sen.
Gorton and Sen. Bums).
22. See, e.g., Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 948 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 10 1st Cong. 284,
286 (1990) (statement of Sen. Wilson); Dan Trigoboff, Northwest Favors Splitting "California"
Circuit, LEGAL TIMEs, June 12, 1989, at 2 (quoting former Chief Judge Goodwin).
23. Baker, supra note 6, at 941; Tobias, supra note 6, at 1373.
24. Baker, supra note 6, at 941-42.
25. See THE AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION 4, 22-93 (Marie T. Finn et al. eds.,
1995-96).
26. See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 16, at 5-6; see also OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT
EXEcUTIVE FOR THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, PosIToN PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S.
956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995 (1217/95) AND COM-
PANION BILL H.R. 2935 (2/1/96) 3 (Mar. 7, 1996) [hereinafter SECOND S. 956 PosmoN PAPER]
(finding that reconfiguration, approved in December markup, meant that proposed Ninth Circuit
would have annually faced 1065 appeals and proposed Twelfth Circuit would have annually
confronted 765 appeals).
27. See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 16, at 2-3.
28. See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 20-21; SECOND S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 26, at 5.
29. See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 10; see also S.. 956 Markup, supra note 12 (approving
thirteen judges for proposed reconfigured Twelfth Circuit and fifteen judges for proposed
reconfigured Ninth Circuit).
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validity; however, additional evidence suggested that familiarity could lead to
disadvantageous routinization and in certain situations might have fostered
disagreement." The circuit's small size may have concomitantly sacrificed
the benefits of diversity and economies of scale that a bigger court offers.
On March 18, 1996, a few of S. 956's advocates attempted to have the
Senate consider the circuit-splitting measure as an amendment to federal courts
appropriations legislation. Critics of the bill sharply attacked this effort on
procedural grounds; however, senators participated in much substantive debate
over the court's division.3 Proponents and opponents ultimately agreed on a
study commission proposal which received strong bipartisan support, and the
Senate approved a commission on March 20.32 Upon receipt of the Senate
measure, the House assigned the proposal to the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration which Representative Carlos
Moorhead (R-Cal.) chaired; however, Congress took no final action on the
Senate proposal during the 104th Congress."
II. ANALYSIS OF COMMISSION PROPOSALS
A. The Senate Proposal
The Senate proposal required that the commission "transmit its report to
the President and the Congress no later than February 28, 1997" and that the
Senate Judiciary Committee act within sixty days of the document's
transmittal.34 This measure was somewhat different than an earlier study
commission suggestion that Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) had developed
and offered as an amendment which the Judiciary Committee narrowly
rejected during its December 7, 1995 markup." Senator Feinstein's proposal
provided a two-year period for a commission to complete its analysis and did
not require that the Judiciary Committee act on the commission report.36
The time frame which the March 21, 1996 proposal provided for the
commission to conclude its assessment was insufficient at the time that the
Senate approved it. An informative yardstick for evaluating this temporal
consideration is the time which analogous study entities have required to finish
similar projects. The Federal Courts Study Committee conducted the most
recent analogous endeavor, and that entity consumed eighteen months in
30. See Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 159, 168-
70 .(1993). See generally FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 213-29 (1994) (defining appellate
collegiality and discussing what can be done to foster it).
31. See 142 CONG. REC. S2219-48 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996).
32. 142 CONG. REc. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996). The Senate decision to leave the
Ninth Circuit intact was advisable. Dividing the court would have been a limited reform, and it
could have precluded implementation of numerous solutions which might prove more effective,
such as realigning the existing regional circuits, establishing a third tier of appellate courts, or
creating additional judgeships.
33. See 142 CONG. REC. Hl1644-01, Hl1859 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996).
34. See 142 CONG. REC. 52545 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
35. See S. 956 Markup, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); S. REP. No. 104-197, at
20.
36. See S. 956 Markup, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
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completing its work.37 Some federal court observers found this time period
inadequate and suggested that the temporal limitation might have prevented the
Study Committee from assembling an even better report.38 The Commission
on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska Commission)
undertook another similar endeavor, and this group concluded its study of the
appeals courts after eighteen months.39
Comparison of the March 21, 1996 Senate proposal with these prior,
analogous study commission efforts thus suggests that the recent Senate
measure would have allotted too little time for the proposed commission to
complete the finest possible study. Legislative inaction, therefore, was
probably advisable. Congress should not have established a commission which
lacked adequate time to collect the most accurate data and to formulate the
best suggestions.
Rather similar difficulties involving scope also seemed to accompany the
proposed commission's mandate which the Senate included in the March 21,
1996 measure. This proposal provided that the commission's functions were
to:
(1) study the present division of the United States into the
several judicial circuits;
(2) study the structure and alignment of the Federal courts
of appeals with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit;
and
(3) report to the President and the Congress its
recommendations for such changes in circuit boundaries
or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious
and effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal
Courts of Appeal, consistent with fundamental concepts
of fairness and due process.'
37. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 31 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMM=ITEE REPORT]; see also Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644-45 (1988).
38. Telephone Interview with Arthur Hellman, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh
(June 1, 1996); Tobias, supra note 6, at 1408.
39. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, THE
GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE,
reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) [hereinafter CIRCUIT BOUNDARY RECOMMENDATION]; see also
Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807-08 (1973) (establishing the Commission on
Revision of the Federal Appellate System of the United States). The Act required the Commission
to report its recommendations regarding the geographical boundaries of the circuits within 180
days after the ninth member was appointed and to report on the structure and internal procedures
of the appellate system within 15 months of the date the ninth member was appointed. The Long
Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference recently required over four years to
compile its final long range plan; however, given the Committee's emphasis on long-term
planning, that endeavor resembled less closely the March 21, 1996 proposal which the Senate
considered than the Hruska Commission and the Federal Courts Study Committee. See JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 3 (1995);
COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 2 (1995).
40. 1.42 CONG. REC. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
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The charge provided appeared overly narrow. For instance, the initial two
mandates required the commission to analyze the country's present division
into several appeals courts and the structure and alignment of the federal
circuits "with particular reference to the ninth circuit"'" but did not speak to
the increasing number of appeals which is the major complication that the
appellate courts currently face.42 The two strictures probably could have been
interpreted, however, to include docket growth.
The third command did specifically prescribe suggestions for improvement
that would lead to "expeditious and effective disposition" of appeals.43
Nevertheless, those recommendations for alterations were limited to "such
changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for" prompt
and efficacious resolution.' Confining commission consideration to structural
alternatives would have been too narrow. There are many other ways of
treating the problems attributable to mounting caseloads which should not be
described as structural. Examples are increases in the complement of judges
authorized and measures, such as those implemented by the Ninth Circuit,
which a number of appellate courts have instituted.45 Precluding commission
consideration of non-structural options seemed unwise because it would have
eliminated numerous apparently promising approaches. This circumstance was
worsened because it was quite difficult to ascertain which measures would
have appeared most efficacious until the commission that was established had
carefully assembled, assessed and synthesized the maximum applicable
information.
B. Additional Ninth Circuit-Specific Proposals
During the debate over the advisability of dividing the Ninth Circuit and
of passing S. 956, Governor Wilson and Judge O'Scannlain offered separate
proposals to create a commission to study the circuit. Governor Wilson raised
the possibility of establishing a commission in a letter which he sent to
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, on
the eve of the December 1995 Committee markup.' Judge O'Scannlain
mentioned the prospect during his testimony in the September 1995 Judiciary
Committee hearing. 7
41. Id. The proposal that Senator Feinstein developed was similar, but it did not include the
phrase "with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit." See S. 956 Markup, supra note 12
(statement of Sen. Feinstein). However, "any national analysis of the appeals courts may well
emphasize this circuit." See infra text accompanying note 59.
42. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 37, at 109; THOMAS
E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL 31-51 (1994).
43. 142 CONG. REc. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-197, at 27-28; Tobias, supra note 6, at 1363-64, 1405-07;
supra notes 15, 19 and accompanying text.
46. Wilson Letter, supra note 4.
47. See Ninth Circuit Split, supra note 4, at *29.
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Governor Wilson wrote Senator Hatch to register his "strong opposition to
any split before an objective study is concluded as to whether a split will
properly address the concerns that have been raised concerning the size of the
circuit."' The governor expressed the belief that such an analysis could
"focus on the concerns raised about the Ninth Circuit and determine whether a
split is the answer."'49 By way of illustration, he observed that "reform of our
habeas corpus procedures and reforms which curb frivolous inmate litigation
may do more to address a growing caseload than splitting the circuit."
Governor Wilson urged that "a study be commissioned to carefully examine
the concerns raised about the Ninth Circuit and determine whether the
concerns are legitimate and whether a change in the circuit's boundaries is the
best method of addressing them."' The Governor offered no additional
specific recommendations regarding the study. Perhaps most salient was his
clear suggestion that the evaluation be limited in scope to the Ninth Circuit.
Judge O'Scannlain proposed that Congress "direct the Circuit judges of
the Ninth Circuit to reflect over the next few years and then to recommend, as
did the judges on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1980s, what the
proper division of their circuit should be."5 He proposed that the Ninth
Circuit judges' suggestion be premised on an assessment of those
considerations which would best enable the court to fulfill its objectives in the
future.52 Judge O'Scannlain urged that any Ninth Circuit realignment or
restructuring insure accountability to all individuals whom the court now
serves.5 " He admonished champions of prompt circuit bifurcation that there
had been "no recent systematic evaluation of the division of the Ninth
Circuit ... since the ... [Hruska] Commission report in the 1970s.''s
The problem with the studies which Governor Wilson and Judge
O'Scannlain proposed was that their geographic scope would have been overly
narrow. An assessment confined to the Ninth Circuit would by definition have
been incomplete. The major difficulties that most of the circuits and the
appellate system now face involve increasing caseloads, and these problems
are essentially systemic complications which will probably require systemic
treatment. A study that encompassed solely the Ninth Circuit, therefore,
necessarily would have failed to address all of the difficulties being
experienced and would have resulted in only partial recommendations. Had
Congress implemented remedies which applied only to the Ninth Circuit, those
48. Wilson Letter, supra note 4. For a sense of the divergent views regarding the size of the
Ninth Circuit see supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
49. Wilson Letter, supra note 4.
50. Id.
51. Ninth Circuit Split, supra note 4, at *29; see generally Tobias, supra note 6, at 1361-62
(analyzing the decision to divide the Fifth Circuit).
52. Ninth Circuit Split, supra note 4, at *29.
53. Id.
54. Id. For the first set of recommendations by the Hruska Commission regarding boundaries
for the circuits, see CIRCurr BOUNDARY RECOMMENDATION, supra note 39. For a brief historical
treatment of the Hruska Commission see Baker, supra note 6, at 924-26 and Tobias, supra note 6,
at 1361-63.
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measures could well have precluded subsequent effectuation of more
comprehensive solutions.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The material in the second segment of this essay indicates that the time
frame provided for concluding the commission's work and that entity's
charter, which the Senate prescribed in the March 20, 1996 proposal, were too
circumscribed. The study suggestion that Senator Feinstein developed was
responsive to temporal concerns because it afforded two years for completion
of the effort; however, the analysis which she recommended would have been
only marginally broader in scope than the Senate measure." The evaluations
that Governor Wilson and Judge O'Scannlain suggested would correspondingly
have been too limited in terms of their geographic compass.
56
The difficulties which attended these study proposals do not necessarily
mean that national examination of the appellate courts is inadvisable. Indeed,
there is an important need to assess the appeals courts before growing dockets
overwhelm the system and additionally undermine the quality of appellate
justice dispensed by, for instance, further reducing the number of oral
arguments granted or published opinions issued.57
When the 105th Congress considers proposals for studying the appeals
courts, it should broadly view the temporal aspect, and the scope, of projected
commission efforts. The time required for completing prior similar
assessments, namely the Hruska Commission and the Federal Courts Study
Committee, indicates that Congress ought to provide any commission proposed
at least eighteen months, but probably two years, to finish its work. This time
frame should permit the entity to collect, analyze and synthesize the maximum
relevant material and to develop the most effective suggestions.
Congress could rather felicitously enlarge the evaluation's scope by
omitting the limiting commands that the Senate imposed in the mandate for
the projected commission which the Senate considered during 1996. For
example, the "study" restrictions regarding "structure and alignment" as well
as respecting the Ninth Circuit included in the Senate measure," the latter of
which resembled the Ninth Circuit limitation articulated by Governor Wilson
and Judge O'Scannlain, might be deleted. However, the considerations,
principally involving the Ninth Circuit's magnitude, which I surveyed
earlier 9 mean that any national analysis of the appeals courts may well
emphasize this circuit. The "recommendations" stricture regarding "changes in
55. See S. 956 Markup, supra note 12 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see also supra text
accompanying notes 35 and 36 and text of note 41 (discussing Sen. Feinstein's proposal).
56. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
57. For 12 month's data on the disposition of cases heard by the appeals courts through
September 30, 1995, see LEONIDAS R. MECHAM, JUDICIAL BusiNEss OF THE UNITED STATES
CouRTs, tbl. S-I, at 28; tbl. S-3, at 30 (1995). See generally Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century:
Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 11, 25-32 (arguing that
burgeoning caseloads cause a "dilution of appellate justice in individual cases").
58. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 13, 17 and accompanying text.
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circuit boundaries or structure" in the Senate measure should concomitantly be
omitted.'
The suggestions that I propose will allow any commission which Congress
authorizes to study all of the significant problems confronting the appellate
courts, to scrutinize a plethora of potential solutions, and to recommend those
modifications which seem most efficacious.
CONCLUSION
The Senate passed a measure in the 104th Congress that would have
instituted a national commission to evaluate the federal appellate system.
Senator Feinstein developed an analogous proposal that would have afforded
greater time for a study, while Governor Wilson and Judge O'Scannlain called
for analysis of the Ninth Circuit. The difficulties facing the appellate courts
deserve systemic assessment and probably require systemic treatment, but all
of the evaluations suggested were too narrow in terms of both time allocated
and scope. When Congress considers the prospect of establishing a study
commission during 1997, it should seriously examine the possibilities of
allotting considerable time for the entity to conclude its study and of
prescribing an expansive commission charter. Those improvements would
facilitate compilation of the most-and most accurate-data, analysis of a
broad spectrum of potential solutions and formulation of the most defensible
suggestions.
60. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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The world of veiled human events is often a world of unconfirm-
able truths. Communities past and present have faced difficult dilem-
mas concerning the assessment of individual behavior from the stand-
points of morality and custom. The contemporary preoccupation with
child sexual abuse surely has many parallels with the preoccupations
of other times, such as witchcraft and heresies....
... As we do today, they had to rely on what experts, using their
special devices, told them were the signs of the very private phenom-
ena they sought to regulate and suppress. In our opinion, our means
of discerning the portents are no better than they have ever been,
relative to prevailing moral standards, in the history of human af-
fairs.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Empirical data demonstrates that gay men and lesbians are the least likely
persons to sexually abuse children.2 These scientific conclusions have not,
however, dissuaded the public and the courts from automatically condemning a
gay or lesbian person accused of child sexual abuse prior to application of
even the most rudimentary principles of fairness and due process of law.
Lamentably, accusations of child sexual abuse are becoming more
prevalent in custody and visitation battles regardless of the accused parent's
sexual orientation.3 The mere allegation of such an unspeakable act,4 raised in
1. Thomas M. Homer & Melvin J. Guyer, Prediction, Prevention, and Clinical Expertise in
Child Custody Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been Made: I. Predictable
Rates of Diagnostic Error in Relation to Various Clinical Decisionmaking Strategies, 25 FAM.
L.Q. 217, 251-52 (1991) [hereinafter Homer & Guyer I].
2. E.g., Robert L. Barret & Bryan E. Robinson, Gay Dads, in REDEFINING FAMILIES: IM-
PLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENT 157, 161 (Adele Eskeles Gottfried & Allen W.
Gottfried eds., 1994) (stating that "at this time it appears that children living with heterosexual
parents are more at risk of incest than children living with gay fathers"); Patricia J. Falk, The Gap
Between Psychosocial Assumptions and Empirical Research in Lesbian-Mother Child Custody
Cases, in REDEFINING FAMILIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN'S DEVELOPMENT 131, 142-43
(Adele Eskeles Gottfried & Allen W. Gottfried eds., 1994) (noting that child sexual abuse in the
United States has been committed overwhelmingly by heterosexual males); Carole Jenny et al,
Are Children at Risk for Sexual Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94 PEDIATRICS 41, 44 (1994) (conclud-
ing that a heterosexual is 100 times more likely to abuse a child than is a homosexual).
3. E.g., Gordon J. Blush & Karol L. Ross, Sexual Allegations in Divorce: The SAID Syn-
drome, 25 CONCILIATION Crs. REV. 1, 1 (1987) (noting that "[mIore and more reports of sexually
abused children are being made" and warning that "an entirely different set of dynamics and vari-
ables may exist" when allegations are made in the context of a family which "has become dys-
functional" due to the divorce process); Gerald Cooke & Margaret Cooke, Dealing with Sexual
Abuse Allegations in the Context of Custody Evaluations, 9 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 55, 65
(1991) (concluding that clinical experience indicates a rising number of sexual abuse allegations
during custody evaluations).
4. The devastation caused by sexual abuse of a child is often viewed as irreparable. See,
e.g., Sarah E. Romans et al., Sexual Abuse in Childhood and Deliberate Self-Harm, 152 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1336 (1995) (discussing a study which found a clear statistical correlation between
child sexual abuse and deliberate self harm as an adult, including involvement in further abusive
relationships); Kenneth R. Silk et al., Borderline Personality Disorder Symptoms and Severity of
Sexual Abuse, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1059, 1062 (1995) (reporting that persons sexually abused
as children often experience "chronic feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness," are unable to
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initial divorce and custody proceedings or in subsequent actions to modify
custody and visitation orders, immediately reverses the "innocent until proven
guilty" principle. Stated differently, "[tihe field of child sexual abuse
assessment has become sensationalized, creating a climate wherein allegations
alone are quickly raised to the status of evidence signifying abuse. Through
this bootstrap transformation allegations are then used to establish
culpability." 5
In this sensationalized climate, the allegations of sexual abuse alone cause
a de facto shifting of the burden of proof to the accused in both civil and
criminal cases.6 The difficulties inherent in proving a negative-that is, in
proving that the accused did not do the specific act or acts on which the
sexual abuse allegations are based-further inflate the accused's evidentiary
burden to a nearly insurmountable level. 7 But the bar is raised even higher
when the sexual orientation of the accused parent is non-heterosexual.8 In this
scenario, the accused must disprove not only the specific acts alleged but also
overcome the stereotypes of homosexuals as perverts, sexual deviants, and
child molesters.9 These widely held erroneous views, by themselves, may
attach to other persons "in satisfying and safe ways," and develop a firm "belief in a malevolent
object world" where people seek only to satisfy their own needs at the expense to others); Vicky
Veitch Wolfe et al., The Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A PTSD Formulation, 20 BEHAV.
THERAPY 215, 226 (1989) (concluding that "sexually abused children display both global adjust-
ment problems and problems specific to the sexual abuse, including sex-associated fears and intru-
sive thoughts").
5. Thomas M. Homer & Melvin J. Guyer, Prediction, Prevention, and Clinical Expertise in
Child Custody Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been Made: II. Prevalence
Rates of Child Sexual Abuse and the Precision of "Tests" Constructed to Diagnose It, 25 FAM.
L.Q. 381, 387 (1991) [hereinafter Homer & Guyer Ill. See generally HOLLIDA WAKEFIELD ET AL.,
ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 121-52 (1988) (discussing the justice system and accusa-
tions of child sexual abuse and concluding that societal condemnation of persons accused of child
sexual abuse creates a substantial risk of persons being falsely accused and convicted).
6. This article deals primarily with civil cases, although many of the principles discussed
are equally applicable to criminal complaints. For an excellent overview of concerns regarding
expert witnesses in criminal prosecutions for child sexual abuse, see Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael
H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecu-
tions, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2027 (1994), and Diana Younts, Note, Evaluating and Admitting Ex-
pert Opinion Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 41 DUKE LJ. 691 (1991). See also
DANIEL W. SHUMAN, PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE §§ 13.06-.10 (2d ed. 1994)
(addressing sexual and general child abuse); Robert G. Marks, Note, Should We Believe the Peo-
ple Who Believe the Children?: The Need For A New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Excep-
tion Statute, 32 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 207 (1995).
7. This burden is arguably impossible to satisfy. "Because it is always possible that a given
individual-even one randomly drawn from the general or a specific population-has sexually
molested a child, an incontrovertible proof that that individual has not molested a child is impossi-
ble." Thomas M. Homer et al., Prediction, Prevention, and Clinical Expertise in Child Custody
Cases in Which Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse Have Been Made: IlI. Studies of Expert Opin-
ion Formation, 26 FAM. L.Q. 141, 170 (1992) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Homer et al.].
8. Such is the case with gay, lesbian, and possibly bisexual and transgendered parents.
Since the "homosexual" aspect of a bisexual parent's life is more controversial than the heterosex-
ual aspect, most of the analysis herein regarding biases against a homosexual parent also applies
to a bisexual parent. Specific biases that may stem from being transgendered or bisexual, however,
are outside the scope of this article.
9. For an interesting discussion of the stereotypes of gay individuals as child molesters and
sex-crazed maniacs, see RICHARD D. MOHR, A MORE PERFECT UNION 1-4 (1994). These stereo-
types are born of the myth "that gays and lesbians are predators and defilers of America's youth,"
Doug Arey, Gay Males and Sexual Child Abuse, in SEXUAL ABUSE IN NINE NORTH AMERICAN
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seem adequate grounds for condemnation regardless of the actual evidence of
record. 0
While tilting at windmills on the legal battlefield, the accused is also
trying to nurture her parental relationship with the child at the center of the
controversy. This goal is virtually unachievable due to the immediate and
severe restrictions imposed upon an accused parent's contact with her child,
restrictions which "inevitably alter the child-parent relationship to a degree that
can, in many cases," irreparably damage the relationship."
This article examines the critical role played by experts in the legal battles
which erupt when child sexual abuse is alleged. In light of the courts' reliance
on expert testimony to determine the veracity of the charges, additional
safeguards must be utilized to test the qualifications of a proffered expert and
the admissibility of the expert's opinions. As more thoroughly explained
throughout this article, such safeguards are especially critical when the
accusations are leveled against a gay or lesbian parent. Indeed, many of the
safeguards proposed herein are designed to detect the existence and
corresponding impact, if any, of an expert's anti-gay animus on the opinions
she offers to the trier of fact. Some of the suggestions, such as requiring that
the expert have sufficient familiarity with the empirical data on lesbian and
gay parents, are aimed at eliminating heterosexual partisanship 2 which may
inappropriately influence an expert's decision even absent a specific anti-gay
bias. 3
CULTURES 200, 209 (Lisa Aronson Fontes ed., 1995), and are "promiscuous by nature," Kim I.
Mills, Security Clearance OK'dfor Gays, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 5, 1995, at A7 (quoting statements
made by U.S. Rep. Bob Doman of California in opposition to security clearances for gay and
lesbian government employees). See also Elvia R. Arriola, Faeries, Marimachas, Queens, and
Lezzies: The Construction of Homosexuality Before the 1969 Stonewall Riots, 5 COLUM. J. GEN-
DER & L. 33 (1995) (discussing the historical discrimination against homosexuals before the Sto-
newall Riots of 1969); Judith G. Fowler, Homosexual Parents: Implications for Custody Cases, 33
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 361 (1995) (discussing impact of negative stereotyping on gay
and lesbian parents seeking custody of their children); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes,
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995) (presenting a framework for examin-
ing legal and social conceptions of sex, gender and sexual orientation).
10. See e.g., People v. Mercado, 592 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1992) (finding that evidence
which inferred that defendant had been expelled from military school due to an alleged homosexu-
al encounter was intended to and may have in fact led the jury to believe that defendant "had a
propensity for child abuse"). In dissenting from the denial of defendant's leave to appeal his con-
viction for sexually abusing his daughter and son and arguing for reversible prosecutorial miscon-
duct where the prosecutor asked defendant if he was a homosexual, Judge Cavanagh observed: "It
would require unconvincing naivete not to recognize this innuendo as a deliberate appeal to the
widespread prejudice in our society that homosexuals are generally more likely to sexually molest
children." People v. Kosters, 467 N.W.2d 311, 315-16 (Mich. 1991) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
11. Homer & Guyer II, supra note 5, at 386. For a thoughtful discussion of the impact of
custody litigation on a family, see Martha L. Deed, Court-Ordered Child Custody Evaluations:
Helping or Victimizing Vulnerable Families, 28 PSYCHOTHERAPY 76, 78-79 (1991).
12. The "heterosexual norm" through which many people view the world is founded in an-
cient religious and cultural beliefs that a family unit consisting of a man, a woman, and their
offspring is "the foundation of all human community." The Ramsey Colloquium, The Homosexual
Movement, in HOMOSEXUALITY: DEBATING THE ISSUES 31, 35 (Robert M. Baird & M. Katherine
Baird eds., 1995).
13. Although the author is not convinced that pro-gay bias is a problem in such cases, im-
plementation of the safeguards should also detect any pro-gay bias which may have caused the
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The author does not take the position that allegations of sexual abuse
against gay or lesbian parents are always false. This article is premised,
however, on four firmly-held convictions.
First, the proliferation of false allegations of child sexual abuse in custody
and visitation disputes demands extremely close scrutiny of the source and
content of such allegations. 4 As one court opined regarding false allegations
of sexual abuse:
The introduction of sexual abuse charges into bitterly contested
custody actions seems to have become epidemic. Yet, as one expert
in this case testified, such allegations are unsubstantiated in as many
as eight of ten times. We do not know in how many of these
instances one party has falsely raised these allegations to gain an
advantage. We do know that such a deed speaks mightily to the
character of one responsible for it. 5
Second, any person-including a mental health professional 6  or
judge-who plays a role in convincing a child that her parent has sexually
abused her when no such abuse has occurred is herself causing severe
emotional abuse to the child and must be stopped. 7
Third, while gay and lesbian parents have made tremendous strides in the
last decade in being recognized as heading legitimate family units, 8 they still
experience significant discrimination in visitation and custody matters. 9 The
expert to inappropriately manipulate, intentionally or inadvertently, her gathering of factual data
and professional analysis in the case.
14. See RICHARD M. GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME 126 (1992) ("Many
of these accusations are conscious and deliberate, and the accuser knows quite well that the spouse
did not in any way sexually molest the child."); Homer & Guyer I, supra note 1, at 220-21 (re-
porting that about 80% of allegations of sexual abuse in the context of domestic relations cases
are unsubstantiated); Rosalyn Schultz, Evaluating the Expert Witness: The Mental Health Expert
in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 9 AM. J. FAM. L. 1, 2-3 (1995) (explaining that many reports of
child sexual abuse are true, but that allegations made by adults in the context of custody deter-
minations are especially difficult to evaluate). But cf Nancy Thoennes & Patricia G. Tjaden, The
Extent, Nature, and Validity of Sexual Abuse Allegations in CustodylVisitation Disputes, 14 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 151, 161 (1990) (concluding that false sexual abuse allegations are not
disportionately high in custody and visitation cases).
15. Kohlman v. Kohlman, No. 920T046, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 4481, at *16 (Ohio Ct.
App. Sept. 24, 1993).
16. "Mental health professionals may create or help perpetuate false allegations because of
their biases, assumptions, and poor interviewing procedures, all of which can lead to misinterpreta-
tion of their findings." Schultz, supra note 14, at 2.
17. See Kathleen M. Quinn et al., Resolved: Child Sex Abuse is Overdiagnosed, 29 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 789 (1989) (suggesting that sexual abuse is
overdiagnoseddue to inadequate investigations by experts).
18. In cases where non-biological parents have been allowed to adopt the children of their
same-sex partners, for example, the courts have described lesbian-headed households in extremely
positive terms. See generally Robert M. Horowitz & Hiromi Maruyama, Issues in Gay and Les-
bian Adoption, 15 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 2 (1994-95) (discussing state adoption laws affect-
ing adoptions by gays and lesbians). See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Mass.
1993) (stating that more than a dozen witnesses testified that the mother and her lesbian partner
participated equally in raising Tammy "and that the three form a healthy, happy, and stable family
unit"); In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 998 (N.Y. 1992) (finding that adoption was in
child's best interests because the child "is part of a family unit that has been functioning success-
fully for the past six years," and because having another legally-recognized parent would signifi-
cantly increase the child's level of emotional and financial support).
19. In jurisdictions which do not expressly condemn homosexual parents, the gay or lesbian
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discrimination is. found not only in the courts' express moral condemnation of
the parents' "chosen lifestyle," but also in the insidious discrimination
disguised as "exercises of discretion" by the courts on evidentiary rulings,
credibility determinations, and fact finding regarding the relative fitness of the
parents.2"
Fourth, expert witnesses play a critical role in custody and visitation mat-
ters. And while there is no such thing as a completely "neutral" expert wit-
ness, modem evidentiary standards demand that courts take very seriously the
task of identifying expert witness bias. The tremendous discretion afforded
trial courts regarding fact and expert witness testimony creates the opportunity,
as well as the temptation, for the court to abuse its discretion by accrediting
the particular "expert" who agrees with the court's personal opinion and re-
jecting experts who do not." Judicial discretion is especially broad in domes-
tic relations cases:
Divorce law has traditionally relied on judicial wisdom to achieve fair
results. Instead of bright-line rules, legislatures have typically given
judges in the divorce court almost unlimited discretion, bounded only
by indeterminate standards or lists of factors that may be considered.
Judicial discretion has also been enhanced by the rarity of jury trials
in divorce cases; in almost all divorce actions the judge both deter-
mines the facts and interprets the law.22
In sum, the role of the courts and the experts is to safeguard the rights of
the parents to enjoy a meaningful relationship with their children and to
protect the children from abuse of any nature. No just society can tolerate
parent will not be denied custody or experience restricted visitation unless there is a "nexus" be-
tween the parent's sexual orientation and harm to the child. See, e.g., Teegarden v. Teegarden, 642
N.E.2d 1007, 1008, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (overruling the trial court's grant of custody to
lesbian mother conditioned upon her "not co-habitating with women with whom she is maintain-
ing a homosexual relationship" and "not engaging in homosexual activity in the presence of the
children" due to lack of evidence that mother's behavior would adversely effect her sons); Van
Driel v. Van Driel, 525 N.W.2d 37, 39 (S.D. 1994) (holding that absent a showing of "some har-
mful effect on the children," mother's cohabitation with another women was not sufficient to deny
custody); In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. 1983) (stating that the best
interest of the child remains paramount and that "homosexuality in and of itself is not a bar to
custody or to reasonable rights of visitation"). In theory, the burden of proof is on the person
asserting the claimed harm; in reality, once the parent's sexual orientation is at issue, a significant
burden shifts to the homosexual parent to show that his or her sexual orientation will not harm the
child. See generally Robert G. Bagnall et al., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the
Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 497 (1984); David P. Russman, Note, Alternative Families: In Whose Best Interests, 27
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 31 (1993).
20. See discussion of court's presumptions regarding gay and lesbian parents infra Part II.D.
21. The author is not the only one to hold this view. See, e.g., Homer et al., supra note 7, at
166.
22. Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Dis-
cretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 403-04 (1996). Garrison observes that "[i]f any
single thing is apparent from this inquiry . . . , it is that the results of discretionary decision mak-
ing are by no means uniform." Id. at 505. Garrison also concludes that one of the "consistent
themes" revealed by her research is that the judges' individual values and the social climate in
which the decisions are rendered affect the judges' decrees regarding property division, alimony,
and child support issues. Id. at 511. Garrison did not analyze child custody and visitation
decisions.
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discrimination, whether blatant or insidious, against any class of parents or
children, especially when such discrimination discourages individuals from
seeking redress in the courts to vindicate their rights.23 As one family law
judge opined, "[wihen managing child abuse cases, we must always keep in
mind that an erroneous finding of guilt can be almost as damaging to the child
and her family as an erroneous dismissal." 4
On one level, this article serves as a litigation primer for attorneys
representing gay or lesbian parents accused of sexual abuse. 5  More
importantly, however, it is an appeal to judges and persons retained as experts
in such cases to acknowledge and, if necessary, to reconsider their views on
sexual orientation and the undue influence that these views may have on the
outcome of their opinions when child sexual abuse is alleged.26
Section II of this article sets forth the legal standards for determining
whether a proffered witness is qualified to offer an expert opinion, whether the
proffered expert's testimony should be admitted, and, if properly admitted,
whether the expert's testimony should be deemed credible. Section II also
identifies presumptions and prejudices which courts may possess regarding
homosexual parents and acknowledges the controversy surrounding the correct
methodology for diagnosing child sexual abuse and the impact this discord has
on a court's evidentiary decisions regarding experts. Section III presents a case
study of Hertzler v. Hertzler,"7 which illustrates the travesty resulting from a
trial court's failure to set aside its own prejudices and presumptions and to
adhere to the proper evidentiary standards. Section IV compares the
evidentiary standards articulated in Section II and the lessons learned in
Hertzler, urging that heightened standards should be used for expert witnesses
when a gay or lesbian parent is accused of child sexual abuse; it also proposes
additional safeguards for insuring relevant and reliable expert testimony in
such cases. A brief conclusion is set forth in Section V.
23. Anecdotal evidence from the author's legal practice and from other attorneys' experienc-
es strongly indicates that gay and lesbian parents often concede custody or agree to substantially
limited visitation to avoid a lengthy legal battle in a system which they perceive as substantially
biased against them. This conclusion is difficult if not impossible to verify empirically because
there is no objective method for ascertaining the motivations of parents who quietly consented to
custody and visitation arrangements rather than openly dispute the matters in court.
24. Jeffry H. Gallet, Judicial Management of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 23 FAM. L.Q. 477,
478 (1989).
25. Many of the observations and recommendations, however, may apply to cases involving
allegations of sexual abuse against a heterosexual parent.
26. No one is totally free of biases. The key to fair adjudication of legal disputes is recog-
nizing those biases and working to overcome them. "There is no doubt that none of us, judges in-
cluded, are able to refrain absolutely from introducing our own outlook and value system into
decisions or opinions. However, we must be aware of this and strive to make [as] objective an
analysis as possible of the facts before us." Judge Saviona Rotlevy, Expert Evidence: The Court's
Expectations, in ETHIcs & CHILD MENTAL HEALTH 272, 277 (Jocelyn Y. Hattab ed., 1994); see
also Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1 (1994) (discussing the effect of
judges' personal biases on their decision making process and the judicial system). Judge Nugent
believes that it is difficult, if not impossible, for a judge to set aside all internal and external influ-
ences when adjudicating cases, id. at 6, especially child custody cases, id. at 40-41, and that judg-
es bear responsibility for being sensitive to their biases and obtaining the education necessary to
overcome them, id. at 58-59.
27. 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995).
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II. THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF EXPERT WITNESSES IN ADJUDICATING CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS
The role of expert witnesses in our adversarial system has long been the
subject of debate." Some view experts as barking seals or hired guns who
will perform as commanded by the party who retained them." Others
perceive experts as critical actors in the search for truth, especially when
technical, scientific, medical, or other issues arise which are beyond the ken of
juries and judges." Regardless of one's perception of experts, they have
become a permanent point of reference in our legal landscape.3
Cases involving allegations of child sexual abuse set the stage for a
classic battle of the experts. Disagreement among professionals regarding the
proper theories and methodology for diagnosing sexual abuse allows for
diametrically opposed-yet apparently well-founded--expert opinions in a
given case. Moreover, the judge's discretionary decisions on the admissibility
and relative credibility of the expert testimony will forever alter the lives of
the litigants and the alleged victim. 2 Thus, especially keen attention must be
paid by trial and appellate courts to the evidentiary standards which govern
expert testimony. As two experts in the area of child sexual abuse and the law
warned:
The clinician-expert constitutes the thirteenth juror or phantom judge
in any tried case of child sexual abuse. Privileged by the rules of
evidence that admit their opinions, experts give free-ranging and often
unreasoned opinions based on biases, prejudices, and assessment
heuristics that are merely idiosyncratic. Frequently, they present their
data selectively so as to make their opinions seem inevitable, when in
fact they are not.33
A. The Requisite Qualifications for Expert Witnesses
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which allows a witness to qualify as an
expert based on "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,""
28. Anthony Champagne et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in
American Courts, 31 JURIMETICS J. 375, 376-77 (1991).
29. Id. at 376 (describing expert witnesses as "well-paid prostitutes"); see also Eymard v.
Pan Am. World Airways, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[Experts whose opinions are
available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a court of law.").
30. Champagne, supra note 28, at 376.
31. See generally Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert
Witnesses in the Courts-Part 11: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193 (1994).
32. "The decision to accept expert testimony in custody and visitation proceedings is gener-
ally within the discretion of the trial judge. The discretion extends to the qualification of experts,
the number of experts, and the admissibility of testimony .... SHUMAN, supra note 6, at 13-1I.
33. Homer & Guyer II, supra note 5, at 406.
34. FED. R. EVID. 702 reads in its entirety: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
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reflects the general rule used in all state codes of evidence. 5 A trial judge
has extremely broad discretion in determining whether a particular witness
qualifies as an expert, based on one or more of these five factors.36 The result
of such discretion is that the judge's decision regarding a particular witness,
while not completely unfettered, will rarely be reversed on appeal.37
"One unique aspect of child custody and visitation litigation is that there
is a broader range of categories of witnesses courts will recognize ... than in
many other types of cases."" This phenomenon is especially true when
allegations of child sexual abuse have been raised. Medical doctors,
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, nurses, and others representing a
wide range of clinical and academic experience have been allowed to offer
expert opinions on the veracity of child sexual abuse claims.39
B. The Standards Governing Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony
After qualifying a witness as an expert on child sexual abuse, the court
must independently determine the admissibility of the substance of the expert's
opinions. State courts primarily use two approaches to determine admissibility
of expert scientific testimony.'
The older standard, based on a 1923 District of Columbia opinion, Frye v.
United States," requires a threshold finding that the science and methodology
on which the expert bases her opinion are generally accepted in the expert's
particular discipline. 2 The alternative approach, articulated in the Supreme
Court's 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,43
purports to reject the Frye standard in favor of what is commonly termed a
"more liberal" avenue for the admission of expert testimony." Closer
35. FAUST F. Rossi, EXPERT WITNEssES 6 (1991).
36. The trial court's broad discretion has been respected in this country for more than a
century. Stillwell Mfg. Co. v. Phelps, 130 U.S. 520, 527 (1889) (stating that the qualification of a
witness is a preliminary question for the judge and it is conclusive "unless clearly shown to be
erroneous"); accord Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1974) ("[T]he District Court has
wide discretion in its determination to admit and exclude evidence, and this is particularly true in
the case of expert testimony.").
37. Rossi, supra note 35, at 8.
38. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at § 13-5.
39. Homer et. al, supra note 7, at 142-43; John E. B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in
Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1989).
40. Custody and visitation disputes are resolved by state courts because federal courts tradi-
tionally refuse to accept jurisdiction over domestic relations cases, even when diversity or other
federal court jurisdictional requirements are met. See generally Michael Ashley Stein, The Domes-
tic Relations Exception to Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine,
36 B.C. L. REv. 669 (1995) (examining the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction).
41. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
42. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
43. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
44. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (rejecting the Frye standard). A number of courts have referred
to Daubert as being more lenient than Frye regarding the admission of expert testimony. See also
Lisa M. Agrimonti, Note, The Limitations of Daubert and its Misapplication to Quasi-Scientific
Experts: A Two-Year Case Review of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 35 WASHBURN L.J.
134, 135 (1995) (concluding that Daubert "increased the number of ways by which scientific ex-
perts could qualify"). See, e.g., Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[B]y loosen-
ing the strictures on scientific evidence set by Frye, Daubert reinforces the idea that there should
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examination of the Frye and Daubert standards, however, reveals significant
similarities and suggests that reliability and relevance are the threshold
requirements of admission of expert testimony regardless of the standard
used.' Moreover, characterization of Daubert as creating a "more liberal" or
"easier" test than Frye is at least misleading if not altogether erroneous.'
1. The Frye Stanaard
The Frye decision affirmed a trial court's exclusion of expert testimony
offered to establish the truthfulness of a defendant being prosecuted for
murder.47 The testimony was based on the results of a systolic blood pressure
test.' The court held that the lack of the test's general acceptance in the par-
ticular field from whence it came was fatal to the admissibility of the test re-
sults. 9 The Frye court readily conceded that its standard did not establish a
bright line test for admissibility:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Some-
where in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting ex-
pert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs."
The Frye "general acceptance" requirement has been and is still being
applied to various psychological methodologies and theories, including rape
trauma syndrome, the psychological profiles of sexual offenders, and post
traumatic stress disorder." Admissibility of an expert's diagnosis of child
be a presumption of admissibility of evidence."); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993)
("It is not lost upon us that this new standard serves to remove some of the barriers in the admis-
sion of expert testimony in many fields, including child sexual abuse cases.").
45. Divergent views have been offered on the impact of Daubert. Some have warned that
Daubert will result in courts and juries being inundated with "junk science." See, e.g., Charles R.
Richey, Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use of the Word "Expert" Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537, 547-50 (1994).
Others prophesied that the decision will have minimal impact due to the incorporation of the ele-
ments of Frye into the Daubert standard. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading
Cases: Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 107 HARV. L. REV. 254, 258 (1993). Another concern
is that Daubert is being used more broadly than the Supreme Court intended due to courts "misap-
plication of the decision to quasi-scientific experts" such as attorneys, police officers, and accoun-
tants. Agrimonti, supra note 44, at 140-56.
46. Daubert did not create an easier test than Frye. Rather, Daubert "is more lenient in that
it allows more, and more novel, science into evidence, but it can be much more difficult in that,
absent judicial notice, it requires a much more difficult, expensive, and time consuming founda-
tion" for admission of expert testimony. G. Michael Fenner, Evidence Review: The Past Year in
the Eighth Circuit, Plus Daubert, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 611, 641 (1995).
47. Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1014.
51. See also United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
trial court properly denied criminal defendant's request to have an expert examine him to deter-
mine if he met the profile of a sex offender because neither courts not scientific community had
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sexual abuse in a jurisdiction which uses Frye depends on the level of general
acceptance of the various methodologies, theories, and syndromes on which
the expert relied in reaching that diagnosis. 2 The requisite general acceptance
can be established through peer-reviewed publications in the relevant disci-
plines, previous judicial recognition, protocols established by professional
associations, and testimony by the experts on their peers' attitude regarding the
methodology or theory at issue.53
Critics of the Frye general acceptance test claim that it is too restrictive.
Many critics argue that this common law standard was superseded by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975"4 and the subsequent ad-
option of similar rules in a majority of the states.55 The Supreme Court
agreed with these arguments in its 1993 Daubert opinion, and rejected the sin-
gle-factor Frye general acceptance test in federal courts.56 Although state
courts which previously followed Frye are not bound by Daubert,57 a number
of them have adopted it,5" while others have explicitly rejected it in favor of
accepted profile as valid diagnostic technique); United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 49-50 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that psychiatric testimony regarding mental facility of the defendant satisfied
Frye standard because it was generally accepted); Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 688 F. Supp.
1072, 1077-78 (E.D. Va. 1988) (holding that testimony of expert based on post traumatic stress
disorder and rape trauma syndrome was not admissible to prove that alleged rape occurred be-
cause, inter alia, the conditions were not accepted in scientific community as proof that an event
occurred, but rather were accepted only as tools for diagnosis and treatment of patients), affd, 894
F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990). See generally JOHN WILLIAM STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE § 203, at 363 (4th ed. 1992); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evi-
dence: Frye v. United States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
52. For an extensive discussion and critique of the application of Frye to expert testimony in
child sexual abuse cases, see Myers et al., supra note 39, at 23-29.
53. Giannelli, supra note 51, at 1205-07; Myers et al., supra note 39, at 23-29.
54. In United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985), for example, the court wres-
tled with the admissibility of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification. The
court concluded that the literal language and spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence, paired with
the difficulties encountered by courts in applying the Frye standard, compelled rejection of the
general acceptance test in favor of a more flexible standard. Id. at 1237. The test articulated in
Downing required a multi-step analysis which relegated general acceptance to a permitted but not
required inquiry for determining the reliability of the evidence. Id. The Downing decision influ-
enced the Supreme Court in Daubert. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 & n.12.
55. States with provisions governing expert witness testimony that are similar to FED. R.
EVID. 702 are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebras-
ka, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. GREGORY D. JOSEPH, ET AL., EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE
STATES § 51.5 (1994).
56. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
57. There are at least two reasons why state courts are free to adopt or reject Daubert. First,
14 states, including 10 which adopted Frye, do not have an evidentiary rule directly analogous to
FED. R. EVID. 702. See JOSEPH, ET AL., supra note 55, at § 51.5. Thus, a Supreme Court ruling
specifically interpreting Rule 702 is arguably irrelevant. Second, even where a state's evidentiary
code is modeled after the federal rules, the Supreme Court's interpretation of a rule of evidence is
not binding unless grounded in constitutional principles, which the Daubert decision is not. See,
e.g., State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1182-83 (Ariz. 1993) (noting that states are not bound by the
Supreme Court's "non-constitutional construction of the Federal Rules of Evidence").
58. Jurisdictions which utilize the Daubert standard include: Arkansas, see Jones v. State,
862 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Ark. 1993); Delaware, see Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 74 (Del. 1993);
District of Columbia, see Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 652 (D.C. 1995); Iowa, see
Hutchison v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1994); Kentucky, see
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retaining the Frye standard. 9
2. The Daubert Factors
The Daubert plaintiffs alleged that prenatal ingestion of the prescription
drug Bendectin caused serious birth defects for which the drug manufacturer
should be held liable." Defendant's motion for summary judgment was sup-
ported by the affidavit of a "well-credentialed expert," physician and epidemi-
ologist Dr. Steven H. Lamm.6 Dr. Lamm supported his conclusion that
Bendectin is not a cause of birth defects in humans with extensive citations to
published epidemiological studies.62 Plaintiffs countered with affidavits from
eight experts, "each of whom also possessed impressive credentials." '63 The
conclusions of plaintiffs' experts that Bendectin could cause human birth de-
fects were based on studies linking Bendectin to malformation in animals,
analyses of chemical structure of Bendectin compared to other substances
known to cause human birth defects, and the "re-analysis" of previously pub-
lished epidemiological studies.' 4
The trial court found plaintiffs' proof insufficient to withstand defendant's
motion for summary judgment because the methodology employed by
plaintiffs' experts was not, in the court's opinion, generally accepted in the
discipline to which it belonged." The trial court reasoned that since epidemi-
ological study was the method most widely accepted by the scientific commu-
nity for proving causation, and because the peer-reviewed and published epide-
miological studies cited by defense expert, Dr. Lamm, all negated a finding of
causation between Bendectin and human birth defects, plaintiffs' evidence
based on re-analysis of such data was not admissible. 6' Relying on Frye and
its progeny, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the exclusion of
plaintiffs' evidence for lack of general acceptance in the relevant scientific
Cecil v. Commonwealth, 888 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Ky. 1994); Louisiana, see State v. Foret, 628 So.
2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993); Montana, see Hart-Albin Co. v. McLees Inc., 870 P.2d 51, 56 (Mont.
1994); New Mexico, see State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203 (N.M. 1993); Oklahoma, see Taylor
v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328-29 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); South Carolina, see State v. Dinkins, 462
S.E.2d 59, 60 (S.C. 1995); South Dakota, see Department of Soc. Servs. v. McCarty, 506 N.W.2d
144, 147 (S.D. 1993); Texas, see E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549,
556 (Tex. 1995); Vermont, see State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226, 229 (Vt. 1993); West Virginia, see
Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 1993); and Wyoming, see Springfield v. State, 860
P.2d 435, 442 (Wyo. 1993). Wisconsin adheres to a standard virtually identical to Daubert which
was articulated in State v. Walstad, 351 N.W.2d 469, 485-86 (Wis. 1984).
59. States which continue to adhere to Frye include Arizona, see State v. Bible, 858 P.2d
1152, 1182-83 (Ariz. 1993); Florida, see Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829 n.2 (Fla. 1993);
Maryland, see Keene Corp. v. Hall, 626 A.2d 997, 1004 n.2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); Nebraska,
see State v. Dean, 523 N.W.2d 681, 692 (Neb. 1994); New York, see People v. Wesley, 633 N.E-
.2d 451, 454 (N.Y. 1994); and Washington, see State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 48 n.1 (Wash. 1994).
See generally JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 55, at § 51.5.
60. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 583.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 583-84.
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community.67 The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision, stat-
ing that the "austere" general acceptance standard of Frye was "absent from
and incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence."'
On remand, the Supreme Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to replace
Frye with a multifaceted approach designed to insure the relevancy and reli-
ability of the proffered expert evidence.' While acknowledging that
"[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence,"7 the Daubert Court directed inferi-
or courts to undertake additional gatekeeping measures to exclude specious
and potentially misleading expert testimony.' Simply stated, the Court sought
to draw the line between "shaky but admissible" and inadmissible expert testi-
mony.
The first step in the Daubert line-drawing exercise is determining the
relevance of the proffered expert testimony to the issues in the case." Rele-
vancy is established, the Court explained, if there is a "fit" between the expert
scientific testimony and the issues in the case.73 No fit exists, however, unless
the scientific testimony is based on valid scientific methodology and data.74
The Court further explained the relationship between relevance and scientific
validity as follows:
The study of the phases of the moon, for example, may provide valid
scientific "knowledge" about whether a certain night was dark, and if
darkness is a fact in issue, the knowledge will assist the trier of fact
[and is thus relevant and admissible]. However (absent credible
grounds supporting such a link), evidence that the moon was full on a
certain night will not assist the trier of fact in determining whether an
individual was unusually likely to have behaved irrationally on that
night [and thus is not relevant and not admissible]. 5
The Court declined to provide a "definitive checklist or test" in favor of
offering "general observations" for determining scientific validity of an
expert's testimony.76 The proper focus, the Daubert Court cautioned, "must
be solely on principles and methodology [employed by the expert], not on the
conclusions that they generate."77 A key inquiry identified by the Court is
67. Id. at 584.
68. Id. at 589.
69. Id. at 589-90.
70. Id. at 596 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
71. Id. See generally Linda Sandstrom Simard & William G. Young, Daubert's Gatekeeper:
The Role of the District Judge in Admitting Expert Testimony, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1457 (1994) (stat-
ing that district courts' role as "gatekeepers" will limit the expansion of opinion testimony).
72. The Daubert relevance requirement is based on the general provisions of FED. R. EVID.
401 and 402, which allow admission of relevant evidence and exclude irrelevant material, and on
FED. R. EVID. 702, which permits expert testimony if it will "assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Daubert, 509 U.S at 587-91.
73. Id. at 591.
74. Id.
75. Id. (bracketed materials added).
76. Id. at 593.
77. ld. at 595 (bracketed materials added).
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whether the methodology or theory employed by the expert can and has been
tested,78 a factor referred to by social scientists as "falsifiability."7 9 Publica-
tion of the theory or methodology in a peer-reviewed journal, identification of
the known or potential rate of error of the technique employed by the expert,
and consideration of the general level of acceptance of the theory or method-
ology in the relevant discipline also bear on the reliability inquiry." Thus, the
Daubert Court did not reject the Frye "general acceptance" standard whole-
sale; rather, it described general acceptance as "an important factor in ruling
particular evidence admissible."'" The Court further explained that a tech-
nique known to the relevant scientific community, but which has only gar-
nered minimal support, "may properly be viewed with skepticism."82
Application of the Daubert standard to expert testimony in a case involv-
ing child sexual abuse thus demands a highly nuanced inquiry into the meth-
odology employed by the proffered experts, with the general level of the
methodology's acceptance-which would serve as determinative under
Frye-being only one of several important criteria of admissibility. The
expert's skill and integrity in the selection, execution, and application of her
chosen method of diagnosing sexual abuse must also be closely scrutinized be-
fore the evidence is deemed sufficiently reliable and thus admissible.
The question has been raised as to whether Daubert should apply to the
"soft" sciences such as behavioral and social science data offered in child
sexual abuse cases, or only to the "hard" sciences which were actually at issue
in Daubert.83 Others have cautioned that if Daubert applies to all cases in-
78. Id. at 593. The testing requirement is based on the work of two philosophers of science,
Sir Karl Popper and Professor Carl Hempel, who identified "falsibility"-that is, the ability to test
and the actual testing of a theory-as the factor which "distinguishes science from other fields of
human inquiry." Id.
79. See generally James T. Richardson et al., The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psycho-
logical Syndrome Evidence, 79 JUDICATURE 10, 12-14 (1995); Ralph Underwager & Hollida
Wakefield, A Paradigm Shift for Expert Witnesses, 5 ISSUES CHILD ABUSE ACCUSATIONS 156,
158-60 (1993).
80. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
81. Id. at 594. Incorporation of the Frye general acceptance standard into the Daubert crite-
ria for applying the Federal Rules of Evidence to expert testimony arguably creates an internal
inconsistency, since the Daubert Court specifically held that "the Frye test was superseded by the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id. at 587. Unlike the Frye test, however, the determi-
nation of admissibility under Daubert is not limited to the single criterion of general acceptance.
In applying the Daubert criteria on remand, for example, the Ninth Circuit examined each of the
Daubert criteria, but affirmed its earlier ruling made under Frye that the expert testimony offered
by plaintiffs to establish the causal link between Bendectin and birth defects was inadmissible.
Daubert v. Men-ell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit interpreted
the Supreme Court's pronouncements as follows:
[Tihe proponent of expert scientific testimony may attempt to satisfy its burden through
the testimony of its own experts. For such a showing to be sufficient, the experts must
explain precisely how they went about reaching their conclusions and point to some
objective source-a learned treatise, the policy statement of a professional association, a
published article in a reputable scientific journal or the like-to show that they have
followed the scientific method, as it is practiced by (at least) a recognized minority of
scientists in their field.
Id. at 1319. See generally John S. Mills, Case Comment, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. on Remand: The Ninth Circuit Loses Its Way in the "Brave New World," 29
GA. L. REv. 849 (1995) (discussing the application of Daubert on remand).
82. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
83. See C. Robert Showalter, Distinguishing Science from Pseudo-Science in Psychiatry:
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volving experts, "criticisms of the use of expert testimony by psychiatrists and
psychologists will become more aggressive," especially on grounds of reliabili-
ty (or lack thereof).,4
Courts have recognized, however, that the gatekeeping function of the trial
judge established by Daubert is readily applicable to all expert testimony, and
is not limited to expert evidence grounded in the hard sciences. s5 For many
reasons parsed throughout this article, the author believes that the judge's
gatekeeping role as established in Daubert is workable and indeed necessary
to screen for credibility and bias in expert testimony regarding child abuse
allegations.8 6
3. The Commonality of Frye and Daubert Criteria
The differences between the Frye and Daubert standards for the admissi-
bility of expert testimony can and have been debated at length. 7 Both stan-
dards, however, require a threshold showing that some agreement exists
among the relevant discipline's members regarding the particular methodology
and theories used by the expert before that expert's opinion is deemed admis-
sible. Under Daubert, further examination of the expert's data and methodolo-
gy is required to uncover potential cracks in the dam through which a stream
of unreliability may seep. In addition, the courts must apply other evidentiary
standards to expert testimony, including the requirement that even reliable,
relevant evidence should "be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." 8
Expert Testimony in the Post-Daubert Era, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 211, 227 (1995); Agrimonti,
supra note 44, at 136.
84. Showalter, supra note 83, at 226.
85. See generally Krista L. Duncan, Note, "Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics"? Psycho-
logical Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom After Daubert, 71 IND. L.J. 753 (1996) (addressing
application of Daubert standard to combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder, rape trauma syn-
drome, battered woman syndrome, and battered child syndrome). See, e.g., Berry v. Detroit, 25
F.3d 1342, 1350 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 902 (1995).
86. For the view that the Daubert criteria are not sufficient to guide a court's determination
of the admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony, see Showalter, supra note 83. Showalter pro-
poses a series of specific "gatekeeping" functions for the trial court when this type of expert evi-
dence is proffered. The series parallels the suggestions made in this article, such as increased
scrutiny of the expert's qualifications, an in-depth analysis of the facts on which the expert based
her opinion, and an intense review of the methodology employed by the expert. Id. at 236-37. The
primary difference between Showalter and this author is that this author believes Daubert already
mandates each of these steps. See, e.g., Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit No. 16, 845 F. Supp. 1342
(D. Neb. 1994) (applying Daubert criteria to testimony of psychiatrists and psychologists offered
in civil case alleging that the plaintiffs, seven mentally retarded individuals, were physically, emo-
tionally, and sexually abused by their teachers), affd, 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995).
87. See, e.g., Gordon J. Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 36 (1995) (concluding that "Daubert did not contemplate a revolutionary
change in the practice of the federal courts"); Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for
Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345 (1994); Nancy A. Miller, Daubert and Junk
Science: Have Admissibility Standards Changed?, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 501 (1994); Joseph Sanders,
Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1387 (1994);
Simard & Young, supra note 71, at 1457.
88. FED. R. EVID. 403. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumu-
lative evidence." Id.
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Regardless of the evidentiary standard applied, the trial judge undertakes a
significant burden in determining the validity of an expert opinion predicated
on scientific analysis. The judge may be particularly tempted to abandon care-
ful review of scientific principles in favor of crediting the expert's conclusions
which coincide with the judge's personal beliefs. Professor Shelia Jasanoff,
Chair of the Department of Science and Technology Studies at Cornell Uni-
versity, aptly observed that courts evaluating scientific testimony "inescapably
give up the role of dispassionate observer to become participants in a particu-
lar construction ... of scientific facts." 9 She further cautioned that judges
faced with complex scientific evidence may "shape an image of reality that is
colored in part by their own preferences and prejudices about how the world
should work."' As more fully illustrated through the textual treatment of the
Hertzler case, the reshaping of reality is a distinct possibility in cases involv-
ing allegations of sexual abuse by a gay or lesbian parent.9
C. The Standards for Determining the Credibility of Expert Witness
Testimony
After a court has qualified an expert as a witness, the court must indepen-
dently assess the credibility of the expert's testimony regarding the allegations
of sexual abuse. As one judge explained:
The Court eventually decides on the basis of facts stated by ordinary
witnesses and, where necessary, on the basis of the conclusions of
expert witnesses. From this it becomes apparent that the expert
witness' conclusion, like every other fact, is not unequivocal proof,
and it may be contradicted by other evidence. Even as far as the
expert evidence is concerned, the Judge evaluates it according to
criteria of veracity and credibility, including the professional ability
of the witness, the manner in which his opinion is drafted and the
Court's impression of the witness in the witness box.92
In determining the expert witness's credibility, either in isolation or in
comparison to the testimony of other expert and lay witnesses, the court's
exercise of discretion is even broader than its initial determination regarding
admissibility of the expert's testimony.93 Authority for this deference is
found, inter alia, in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 and its state law coun-
terparts, which provide in relevant part that in cases tried to the bench,
"[flindings of fact.., shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credi-
89. Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 77 JUDICA-
TURE 77, 82 (1993).
90. Id.
91. See discussion of Hertzler, infra Part Ii.
92. Rotlevy, supra note 26, at 274. Although Rotlevy was commenting on the Israeli court
system, his words apply equally to the U.S. civil system.
93. See, e.g., People v. Zimmerman, 189 N.W.2d 259, 285 (Mich. 1971) (holding that the
trial court has properly exercised its discretion regarding expert testimony when, after carefully
reviewing the expert's qualification and skills, the court utilizes "good judicial common sense as
to whether the witness's testifying would be in the best interest of justice").
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bility of the witnesses. 94 Indeed, appellate courts traditionally give almost
total deference to the trial court's assessment of the relative credibility of any
witnesses,95 including experts.96 This rationale for vesting trial courts with
such a high degree of discretion regarding credibility determinations was elo-
quently explained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court more than a century ago:
The judge before whom the cause was tried heard the testimony,
observed the appearance and bearing of the witnesses and their man-
ner of testifying, and was much better qualified to pass upon the
credibility and weight of their testimony than this court can be. There
are many comparatively trifling appearances and incidents, lights and
shadows, which are not preserved in the record, which may well have
affected the mind of the judge.., in forming opinions of the weight
of the evidence, the character and credibility of the witnesses, and of
the very right and justice of the case.97
But while the reasons for allowing deference to the trial court's credibility
may be sound, this "hands-off' standard of review also offers an invitation for
the trial court to base its credibility evaluation of an expert on Whether the
expert's opinion is consistent with that reached by the judge herself.98 In J.P.
v. P.W.,9 for example, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court
had complete authority to determine that the social science evidence indicating
no significant difference between heterosexual and homosexual parents was
not credible, even though no contradictory evidence was adduced on that is-
sue."r In Professor Jasanoff's words, the judge's determination as to which
expert provides the most credible opinion on the sexual abuse allegations may
be based on the judges "own preferences and prejudices" regarding gay par-
ents rather than the relative strength of the scientific methodology underlying
the experts' opinions."'
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
95. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Diehl, 582 N.E.2d 281, 291 (11. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that
trial court judge is in the best position "to observe and judge the witnesses' demeanor and credi-
bility"); Pennington v. Pennington, 596 N.E.2d 305, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) ("We will not re-
weigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses."); Adams v. Adams, 357 So. 2d 881, 882
(La. Ct. App.) ("The factual findings of the trial court, particularly where those findings are based
on an evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great weight and will not be dis-
turbed unless clearly erroneous."). Interestingly, a New York court of appeals had no compunction
summarily reversing a trial court's credibility assessments where the lower court's credibility de-
terminations vindicated rather than condemned the gay parent accused of sexually molesting his
children. In re Michael C., 566 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
96. As one court observed: "The trial court was simply not required to accept the opinions
of experts. ... There was evidence intrinsic to this record and the knowledge of the trial court
which would seriously damage the credibility of the witnesses [including that of the experts]."
J.L.P. v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
97. McLimans v. City of Lancaster, 15 N.W. 194, 195 (Wis. 1883).
98. For a compelling statistical demonstration as to why a judge relying on her own conclu-
sions can never be more accurate than an expert's opinion on the veracity of sexual abuse allega-
tions, see Homer & Guyer I, supra note 1, at 241-44.
99. 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
100. J.P., 772 S.W.2d at 793.
101. Jasanoff, supra note 89, at 82. Examples of the "preferences and prejudices" often dis-
played by courts regarding gay and lesbian parents are discussed immediately infra Part Il.D.
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D. Assumptions made by Courts Regarding Gay and Lesbian Parents
A parent's gay or lesbian orientation often results in denial of custody and
severe restrictions of visitation rights.'O2 Although modem courts have been
more respectful of the constitutional rights of gay and lesbian parents to asso-
ciate with their children, a non-heterosexual parent's sexual orientation still
takes center stage under the rubric of the "best interest of the child" determi-
nation." 3 Moreover, the best interests standard "gives substantial discretion
to a judge to make his own implicit predictions and impose his own value
judgments about which parent might better serve the child's needs or inter-
ests. ' ' "M Bottoms v. Bottoms"5 is a case in point.'"
Sharon Bottoms' mother, Kay, challenged Sharon for custody of Sharon's
two-year-old son.0 7 In her petition for custody, Kay claimed that Sharon had
abused her son by once hitting him hard enough to leave a mark on his leg,
had neglected him, and was endangering his well-being by living in a lesbian
relationship.' 8 The trial court granted Kay's petition, holding that Sharon's
lesbian relationship constituted illegal and immoral conduct which automati-
cally rendered her an unfit parent."°
The intermediate appellate court reversed due to the absence of evidence
sufficient to rebut the presumption favoring parental custody.'"' Contrary to
the trial court's interpretation of the law and facts, the intermediate appeals
court found significant evidence in the record that the boy was well-adjusted
and happy and that Sharon was a good mother."' Moreover, significant so-
cial science data presented at trial supported the conclusion that the boy would
not suffer future emotional or psychological harm because of his mother's
sexual orientation." 2 Sharon's victory, however, was short-lived.
The Virginia Supreme Court reinstated the award of custody to the child's
grandmother.' The four-to-three majority repeatedly denied that it was jud-
102. See generally Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eight-
ies--Part 2, 11 U. DAYTON L. REv. 275, 327-71 (1986) (discussing custody cases involving gay
and lesbian parents); Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay
Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623 (1996) (examining the relevance of sexual identity
and conduct in determining custody and visitation rights).
103. See Fowler, supra note 9, at 362-63.
104. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LE-
GAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 282 (1992). The uncertainty of the judge's application of the best in-
terests standard also "provides an uncertain backdrop for out-of-court negotiations." id. The author
is aware of a number of instances in which a gay or lesbian parent has conceded custody to a
former spouse for fear that the court will deny all custody and visitation to the non-heterosexual
parent under the "best interests of the child" rubric.
105. 444 S.E.2d 276, 279 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
106. See generally Amy D. Ronner, Bottoms v. Bottoms: The Lesbian Mother and the Judi-
cial Perpetuation of Damaging Stereotypes, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 341 (1995) (discussing the
Virginia Supreme Court's decision regarding a lesbian mother's right to custody).
107. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 279.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 280-81.
111. Id. at 281.
112. Id. at 283-84.
113. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
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ging Sharon based on her sexual orientation per se." 4 But there is little else
to explain its evaluation of the evidence of record and all of its inferences
drawn therefrom as negatively as possible toward Sharon, nor to explain its
willingness to overlook the fact that Kay was, until the time of trial, cohab-
itating with a man who had repeatedly sexually abused Sharon."' The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court also refused to consider the social science evidence ad-
mitted at trial regarding the parenting abilities of lesbian mothers. Instead, the
court reaffirmed the position taken a decade earlier "that living daily under
conditions stemming from active lesbianism practiced in the home may impose
a burden upon a child" due to the social stigma involved." 6
The dissenting justices noted that there was no evidence of record in Bot-
toms showing that the mother's homosexual conduct harmed the child, and
that "the majority improperly presumes that its own perception of societal
opinion and the mother's homosexual conduct are germane to the issue wheth-
er the mother is an unfit parent."" 7 This perspective was echoed by Char-
lotte Patterson, the University of Virginia psychology professor who, as an
expert at the Bottoms trial, presented significant empirical data on gay and
lesbian parents which directly contradicted the majority's conclusions.' If
the courts won't pay heed to the evidence, Professor Patterson asked, "with
what are we left?""' 9
As the Bottoms case illustrates, because of society's general stereotyping
of homosexuals as per se negative influences on children, "lesbian and gay
parents face judicial scrutiny that is more rigorous than that experienced by
heterosexual individuals in similar circumstances. In fact, their claims are
sometimes peremptorily dismissed by presumptions which a priori reject ho-
mosexuals as custodial parents."'2 °
Substantial empirical data on homosexual parents demonstrates that many
common assumptions courts make regarding such parents and their children
are simply false.'2' As Professor Patricia Falk points out in her comprehen-
114. Id. at 108.
115. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 278-79.
116. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 108 (citing Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985)).
117. Id. at 109 (Keenan, J., dissenting). Similar suggestions of anti-gay bias are found by
comparing the majority decision with the dissent in White v. Thompson, 569 So.2d 1181 (Miss.
1990), where another young lesbian mother lost custody of her children to their paternal grandpar-
ents, and in the internally inconsistent Hertzler decision, discussed infra Part HI. See also Note,
Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection Analysis, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 617, 618-621 (1989) (providing an explanation of cases predicating determination of
custody on parent's sexual orientation).
118. Chris Bull, Losing the War: The Courts Disregard Evidence in Denying a Lesbian
Mother Custody of Her Son, ADVOCATE, May 30, 1995, at 33-35.
119. Id. at 33 (quoting Charlotte Patterson).
120. David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions, Scientific Realities, 3
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 346 (1994). In J.P. v. P.W., 772 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989), for example, the court boldly stated that "it is established that expert testimony is not a
necessary basis for a determination that exposure to a homosexual influence will adversely affect a
child." Id. at 793. The court cited similar authority from Virginia, North Dakota, Kentucky, and
Pennsylvania for the proposition that the court could take the equivalent of judicial notice that any
exposure to homosexuality harms children. Id.; see also Fowler, supra note 9, at 363 (discussing
courts' per se approach to homosexuality as an absolute bar to custody).
121. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 2.
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sive collection and analyses of these data, lesbian mothers enjoy the same or
higher degree of emotional stability and mental health than their heterosexual
counterparts, 2 and possess similar if not superior parenting skills.123 Chil-
dren living with a lesbian mother are no more likely to experience mental or
emotional difficulties than other children2 4 and do not suffer gender identity
crises.2 5 Moreover, children of lesbian mothers are no more likely to be ho-
mosexual than other children 2 6 and are not socially stigmatized by their
mother's sexual orientation. 27 Although the research on gay fathers is not as
voluminous as that available on lesbian mothers, the same results have been
indicated. 2 1 Children living with homosexual parents are not at an increased
risk to contract AIDS, even if the parent is HIV-positive 29 In addition, as
previously noted, children are much more likely to be sexually abused by
heterosexuals than homosexuals. 3 °
Despite this growing body of scientific proof that gay and lesbian parents
are as competent, if not more so, as heterosexual parents, courts still tend to
focus on a parent's homosexuality and exclude consideration of other factors
relevant to a child's best interest when deciding custody and visitation dis-
putes. '3 "Also, the courts tend to base their decisions more on the attitudes
or stereotypes of gay individuals than on the facts in any particular case."'
32
After studying a number of custody and visitation cases involving gay and
lesbian parents, one legal scholar concluded that "[t]he image that materializes
in judicial decisions is a composite of two separate stereotypes of homosexu-
als: the first, as an emblem of dangerous malum in se criminality, and the
second, as someone with a life-style devoid of any marital or familial attrib-
utes.' 3' A parent's sexual orientation should be an issue only where there
is a proven nexus between the orientation and harm to the child.134 But even
when courts "find" the requisite harm to the child, such findings are often





The courts' aversion to gay and lesbian parents reflects a fundamental
122. Falk, supra note 2, at 137-38. The American Psychiatric Association removed homosex-
uality from its list of approved mental disorders in 1973. Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff,
Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation Strategy, 25 BuFF. L. REv. 691,
726 (1976).
123. Falk, supra note 2, at 138-40.
124. Id. at 140-42.
125. Id. at 143-46.
126. Id. at 146-47.
127. Id. at 147-51 (stating that "the majority of children were not conscious of society's atti-
tudes toward their mothers").
128. For a compilation of this research, see Barret & Robinson, supra note 2, at 157-69.
129. Flaks, supra note 120, at 361.
130. Barret & Robinson, supra note 2, at 161-62; Falk, supra note 2, at 142-43; Flaks, supra
note 120, at 359-61; Jenny et al., supra note 2, at 44.
131. Falk, supra note 2, at 136; Fowler, supra note 9, at 362-63 (noting that homosexual
parents in Canada experience same bias as their counterparts in the United States).
132. Falk, supra note 2, at 136.
133. Ronner, supra note 106, at 345.
134. See cases cited supra note 19; see also Fowler, supra note 9, at 364-65 (discussing the
"nexus" test).
135. Falk, supra note 2, at 136; Fowler, supra note 9, at 365-71.
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misunderstanding of what homosexuals do and who they are. Much of the
misunderstanding is a result of categorizing persons solely as "homosexuals"
and use of terms such as "sexual orientation." The "sexual" emphasis of this
language reduces every member of this radically diverse group to a one-di-
mensional character defined by the type of sexual behaviors in which others
assume he or she engages.'36 The terms also imply that sexual behavior is
the most important aspect of their existence, a misconception which has signif-
icant negative ramifications when a gay or lesbian parent is accused of child
sexual abuse.
In fact, the diversity within the gay and lesbian population is at least as
broad as that found in society as a whole." 7 Unfortunately, the chronic mis-
characterization of homosexuals as single-minded sexual predators is further
fueled by the invisibility of the vast majority of gay and lesbian people.
Courts, and many others in our society, think of homosexuals as flaming hair
dressers or motorcycle dykes living decadent, separatist lives in the gay ghet-
tos of San Francisco, West Hollywood, New York City, Provincetown, or Key
West. '3 In reality, gay and lesbian persons are so diverse that they remain
virtually unnoticed as they go about their lives, working hard, paying their
taxes, and taking care of their families of origin and families of choice.'39
Many gay and lesbian persons choose to remain invisible to avoid just the
kind of prejudice that the courts and others display when sexual orientation is
revealed."4 Ironically, their invisibility further perpetuates the courts' mis-
conceptions as to who homosexuals are.
As the Hertzler case illustrates, judicial reliance on assumptions as to who
gay and lesbian persons are and what they do is especially malapropos when a
homosexual parent is accused of child sexual abuse.' 4'
136. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX & REASON 293 (1992) (while discussing the numer-
ous legal disadvantages encountered by homosexuals, Posner defines homosexuals as "persons
who have a strong and basically lifelong preference for sexual relations with persons of their own
sex").
137. An author who has long studied lesbian "culture" explains: "Ask a hundred different
lesbians about identities and acts, and there will be a thousand different answers. We are not re-
ducible to any identity captured by the category lesbian, nor are we reducible to our sexual activi-
ties." RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OuT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 83 (1992)
(emphasis in the original).
138. One gay activist observes "that there is no such thing as a separate homosexual com-
munity; that gay men's lives can be as ordinary, dull or exciting as anyone else's." Nick Cohen,
Secret World of 'Outing' Group that Seeks Publicity for Others, INDEF.ENDENT, July 30, 1991,
Home News Page Section, at 3 (quoting Michael Cashman).
139. The reality is that homosexuals "are your friends, your minister, your teacher, your bank
teller, your doctor, your mail carrier, your office-mate, your roommate, your congressional repre-
sentative, your sibling, parent, spouse. They are everywhere, virtually all ordinary, virtually all un-
known." Richard D. Mohr, Gay Basics: Some Questions, Facts, and Values, in BIGOTRY, PREJU-
DICE AND HATRED: DEFINITIONS, CAUSES & SOLUTIONS 167 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E.
Rosenbaum eds., 1992).
140. Id.
141. See discussion of Hertzler, infra Part III.
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E. The Discord Among Experts Regarding the Diagnosis of Child Sexual
Abuse and Its Implications for the Admissibility and Credibility of Expert
Testimony
Like the courts,"42 the mental health and medical communities strive to
advance the "best interests of the child" when making evaluations for custody
and visitation purposes.'43. This hyper-elastic standard allows the experts and
the courts tremendous discretion in rendering an opinion as to the proper
boundaries of the relationship between a particular child and parent. Due in
part to this almost unfettered discretion afforded the experts, commentators
have argued that expert testimony-routinely offered by psychiatrists, psychol-
ogists, and other mental health professionals-is not necessary in most custody
and visitation matters.'" Critics claim "that no empirical data exist to dem-
onstrate the usefulness of psychological theory in child custody determinations,
that ambiguous psychological theories are often used as excuses for bad legal
decisions, and that, at best, testimony based on psychological theory is simply
common sense and a superfluous use of experts."'45 Others contend that
since experts can only make recommendations based on present circumstances,
"experts are generally no better equipped or positioned than ordinary partici-
pants in the judicial system" to predict the future results of any given custody
or visitation determination."
In response, advocates of expert testimony in custody and visitation cases
counter that experts provide a wealth of information that courts would not
receive but for the expert testimony. 47 Information that might escape the
court's notice includes "the feelings, attitudes, and personality traits of the
relevant parties; the communication of emotions the parties are themselves
unable to communicate to the court directly; and the highlighting of significant
portions of the evidence that might otherwise go unnoticed or unappreciat-
ed."'"
The debate regarding the need for experts is greatly diminished in cases
142. The statutory or case law standard of "the best interests of the child" is used in all U.S.
jurisdictions to determine child custody and visitation matters. "The simplicity and flexibility of
this standard" which precludes "generalizations about its meaning or content" requires application
on a case-by-case basis and does not allow precision in predicting results in any given case.
SHUMAN, supra note 6, at § 13-2. For the roles which expert witnesses play in the "best interests"
determination, see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986).
143. The premier guideline adopted by the American Psychological Association in its Guide-
lines for Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings, for example, states that "[tihe prima-
ry purpose of the evaluation is to assess the best psychological interests of the child." Marc J.
Ackerman, American Psychological Association Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Di-
vorce Proceedings, 8 Am. J. FAM. L. 129, 129-30, app. at 132 (1994). The second guideline reaf-
firms that "[tihe child's interests and well-being are paramount." Id. See generally JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN Er AL., supra note 142 (discussing, inter alia, the conflicts inherent in the custody
recommendations made by child care professionals); Homer & Guyer I, supra note 1, at 247-50.
144. See, e.g., SHUMAN, supra note 6, at § 13-5; Homer & Guyer I, supra note 1, at 247-48.
145. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at § 13-5.
146. Homer & Guyer 1, supra note 1, at 247-48.
147. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at § 13-5.
148. Id.; see also Sanford S. Dranoff & Mitchell Y. Cohen, Psychiatrists, Psychologists, and
Social Workers: Getting the Most Out of Experts, 10 FAM. ADVOC. 20, 21 (1987) (contending that
"the nature of custody litigation requires expert testimony").
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where sexual abuse of a child is alleged. 49 Indeed, the value of competent
expert testimony is almost universally recognized by the medical and legal
communities. 5 ' As one family law judge explained, "[blecause so many sex-
ual abuse cases involve children whose ability to recall, report, or evaluate
events is in question, there is an unusually high incidence of, and need for,
reliance on expert testimony."''
Unfortunately, the experts to whom the courts turn for guidance are divid-
ed about the proper methodology for determining whether a child has been
sexually abused and for identifying the perpetrator.' Disagreement among
medical and mental health experts on a reliable method for diagnosing sexual
abuse of children has caused various theories and methodology to wax and
wane in popularity over the years. As a result, behaviors or characteristics
viewed by one mental health professional as indicative of sexual abuse will be
viewed by another as counter-indicative of abuse.'53 Indeed, "almost any cir-
cumstance, behavior or observation can be rationalized as supporting the con-
clusion that sexual abuse occurred."'5 4 The one point on which experts agree
is that the diagnosis of child sexual abuse is an extremely controversial and in-
exact science,'55 especially in the context of custody and visitation dis-
putes.'56 As several experts explained in a collaborative piece:
The diagnosis of child sexual abuse is difficult for several reasons.
There is often little or no clear history of abuse. Sexual abuse is usu-
ally committed secretly and incidents are rarely witnessed. Young
children with limited verbal skills might be unable to describe their
experience or their account might be questionable. Even when it ap-
149. See also Homer & Guyer II, supra note 5, at 402-03 (discussing the role of experts in
sex abuse cases). Cf Homer & Guyer I, supra note 1, at 249-50 (arguing "that experts have no
special insights to offer beyond those of the ordinary person" when presented with the ambiguities
inherent in child sexual abuse allegations in the divorce context).
150. See generally Myers et al., supra note 39 (discussing scientific and legal standards and
conflicts which come into play when child sexual abuse is at issue). See, e.g., INGER J. SAGATUN
& LEONARD P. EDWARDS, CHILD ABUSE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 210 (1995) (stating that "[a]
significant means of proving that child abuse has occurred is through the testimony of an expert
witness").
151. Gallet, supra note 24, at 480.
152. See, e.g., Underwager & Wakefield, supra note 79, at 160-62.
153. Id. (stating that a number of inconsistent behaviors are all construed as being "consistent
with" sexual abuse).
154. Id. at 161.
155. In one study, 129 child abuse specialists were each asked to estimate the probability that
a mother's allegations of child sexual abuse against the child's father were true. Thomas M. Hor-
ner et al., The Biases of Child Sexual Abuse Experts: Believing Is Seeing, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 281, 288 (1993). Participants were provided with extensive data about the child
and parents including videotaped presentations of the child interacting with both parents. Id. The
extremely wide range of probability estimates offered by the experts led the authors of the study
to conclude that while some of the experts were probably more accurate than others, it was impos-
sible to determine which, if any, of the experts were correct. Id.
156. In fact, "[tihe issue of sexual-abuse allegations in custody and visitation (access) disputes
is perhaps one of the most controversial issues in Forensic Child Psychiatry." George A. Awad &
Hanna McDonough, Therapeutic Management of Sexual Abuse Allegations in Custody and Visita-
tion Disputes, 45 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 113, 113 (1991). Awad and McDonough suggest that
the judicial model for determining the veracity of the allegations should be replaced with a long-
term therapeutic management of all the parties involved. Id. at 120.
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pears that children are describing abuse, doubts might persist about
the veracity of their statements, particularly in the context of an acri-
monious custody dispute."'
Experts have identified a number of behavioral problems in children as
indicative of sexual molestation, with age-inappropriate sexual behavior seen
as a primary predictor of sexual abuse. 5 Common sense, as well as psycho-
logical data, seem to support the connection between sexual abuse and sexual
activity, but the association between the two is far from certain. 59 One of
the drawbacks to making this link is defining "abnormal" sexual activities or
knowledge." For example, masturbation is common in children; thus, the
issue arises as to when masturbation is so excessive as to indicate sexual
abuse.' 6' Moreover, a child's heightened sexual activity may result from
stimulus other than sexual abuse, such as clandestinely observing parents or
others engaging in sexual activity.'62 "In addition, highly sexualized behavior
is sometimes seen in children who are not thought to have been abused."'63
Sexually abused children also display a commonality of psychological
traits including aggression, high levels of anxiety and fear, depression, low
self-esteem and psychosomatic disorders such as enuresis."6M But since none
of these problems is unique to sexually abused children, the existence of one
or more of these traits does not automatically support a finding of abuse.'65
Finally, even evidence obtained during a medical examination of an al-
leged victim is subject to debate among experts." 6 This uncertainty stems
from investigators' disagreement as to what constitutes "normal" childhood
anatomy, and is exacerbated further by disagreement as to what constitutes
"abnormal" anatomy.'67 Even when evaluators agree that a particular physi-
cal characteristic is abnormal, they disagree as to whether that characteristic is
caused by sexual abuse."6 Physical abnormalities may also be due to causes
other than sexual abuse.
69
The discord among child sexual abuse experts regarding the accuracy of
various diagnostic tools should not, however, serve as an excuse for the judge
to disregard a qualified and credible expert's testimony and decide the case
157. Howard Dubowitz et al., The Diagnosis of Child Sexual Abuse, 146 AM. J. DISEASES









166. See Myers et al., supra note 39, at 34-51; Schultz, supra note 14, at 6-7.
167. Dubowitz et al., supra note 157, at 688-89; see generally David M. Paul, The Pitfalls
Which May Be Encountered During an Examination for Signs of Sexual Abuse, 30 MED. Sci. L. 3
(1990).
168. Dubowitz et al., supra note 157, at 689.
169. "For example, unusual vaginal irritations or discharges can result from overly zealous
cleaning, poor hygiene, or self-stimulation; genital redness may be due to bubble baths or diaper
rash; and anal discoloration may be due to hard stools." Schultz, supra note 14, at 7.
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based on his layman's perspective on the subject or, even worse, on a "gut
feeling" that the abuse did or did not occur. In view of the serious ramifica-
tions of child sexual abuse allegations and the general duty imposed on the
court as an impartial trier of fact, the court, with the aid of the respective
parties' counsel, must ensure that expert testimony admitted and deemed credi-
ble in the case is offered by competent professionals whose diagnoses are
grounded in solid scientific principles and not in the experts' bias against the
gay or lesbian parent. Accordingly, the qualifications of experts and the rele-
vance and reliability of the methodologies and theories underlying the experts'
opinions must be subject to vigorous review pursuant to the evidentiary princi-
ples of Frye, Daubert, and the rules of evidence previously discussed.
The Hertzler case, discussed immediately below, illustrates the injustice
which results when the court refuses to set aside its anti-gay bias and appro-
priately scrutinize the proffered expert's testimony according to the proper
standards.
III. THE HERTZLER V. HERTZLER170 LITIGATION
A. The Divorce and Initial Custody Agreement
Pamela and Dean Hertzler were married in 1976 and resided on the
Hertzler farm in Veteran, Wyoming. 7 ' During their marriage they adopted
two children, Joshua and Miriam,'72 immediately after the children's
births.73 Shortly after the second child arrived, tensions in the marriage be-
came acute.'74 Pamela initiated divorce proceedings and moved away from
the Hertzler farm with Joshua and Miriam in January, 1991.71
In the spring of 1991, Pamela, who had been questioning her sexual ori-
entation for some time, determined that she is a lesbian. 76 Dean did not con-
test the divorce, but just before the divorce decree was finalized in July 1991,
Pamela lied to Dean about her sexual orientation so she could keep her chil-
dren. 77 By agreement of the parties, Pamela became the custodial parent and
Dean was provided with seasonal visitation rights.
7
1
In October 1991, while living in Morrill, Nebraska, Pamela became ro-
mantically involved with Peggy Keating of Lakewood, Ohio. 179 Pamela's
170. 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995).
171. Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 13, 14, 17, 780, Hertzler v. Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Dist.
Ct. Goshen Cty., Wyo. 1992) (all trial and hearing transcripts, exhibits and court orders referenced
are on file with the author) [hereinafter Tr.].
172. Id. at 780-82, 784-85.
173. Id. at 781-85.
174. Id. at 790-91.
175. Id. at 793. Dean was not angered by this situation; in fact, he offered to help Pamela
pack. Id.
176. Id. at 18-19.
177. Id. at 19, 793-94. Dean vowed to fight for custody if Pamela was a lesbian. Id.
178. Decree of July 30, 1991, at 1-2, Hertzler, No. 24-269.
179. Tr. at 19, 775-76. Peggy was a licensed social worker and certified child care worker
with a Master of Arts Degree in Psychology and 13 years of experience working with severely
emotionally disturbed children and adolescents. Id. at 553-62.
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brother told their parents that Pamela is a lesbian8 0 and, on the day after
Christmas, 1991, Pamela's parents informed Dean that Pamela was in a rela-
tionship with Peggy.' Dean immediately confronted Pamela and threatened
to sue to obtain custody of the children unless she voluntarily granted him
custody.'82
B. Modification of the Original Custodial Agreement
When Pamela acknowledged her sexual orientation to Dean and explained
that she was contemplating moving with her children to Ohio to live with
Peggy, he presented her with two "choices:" (1) she could fight to retain cus-
tody, knowing that the court might deny her any contact with the children due
to her sexual orientation; or (2) she could stipulate to a reversal of the custody
and visitation rights established by the existing court order.8 3
Feeling betrayed and abandoned by her family, Pamela sought legal coun-
sel. She was further discouraged by legal advice that a custody dispute would
likely center on her sexual orientation, would be a lengthy and perhaps devas-
tating process for everyone involved, and that her likelihood of success was
extremely slim in such a conservative jurisdiction.'84 Following an agonizing
period of debating the two "choices" presented in Dean's ultimatum, Pamela
concluded that it was in the children's and her best interests to stipulate to the
modification.8 5
With the court's approval,8 6 Dean became custodial parent and Pamela
secured the right to unsupervised visits with Joshua and Miriam every other
weekend from 7 P.M. Friday until 7 P.M. Sunday, two months visitation dur-
ing the summer, visitation on holidays including Christmas and the children's
birthdays, and any other visitation to which the parties agreed.'87
Pamela relocated to Lakewood, Ohio, and began living with Peggy. 8
She secured a job as a nurse with a nonprofit agency serving the needs of the
terminally ill and their families, and became a deacon and a choir member of
her church.8 9 Back in Wyoming, Dean continued to operate the family farm
and work part-time as an emergency medical technician (E.M.T.).'9  His
parents, Betty Jo and M.L. "Bud" Hertzler, and others provided child care for
Miriam and Joshua six days a week. 9'
After her move, Pamela maintained contact with her children through
180. Id. at 798.
181. Id. at 20-21, 56.
182. Id. at 56-57, 799.
183. Id. at 57, 107, 799-800. Dean stood by his ultimatum even when Pamela offered to ter-
minate her relationship with Peggy. Id. at 802.
184. Id. at 801-03.
185. Id. at 21, 801-03.
186. Order of Feb. 26, 1992, Hertzler, No. 24-269.
187. ld.
188. Tr. at 22, 572.
189. Id. at 13, 777-78.
190. Id. at 54.
191. Id. at 112, 325.
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letters, photo albums, packages, biweekly phone calls, and personal visits.'92
In the summer of 1992, Joshua and Miriam spent eleven weeks at Pamela and
Peggy's Lakewood home.'93 Joshua and Miriam made friends with a number
of other children in the neighborhood, including the four Durkalski chil-
dren,' 94 and enjoyed their summer in Lakewood. 95
C. Dean's Marriage to Christine
In October 1992, Dean met Christine Thompson of Wilmington, Ohio,
through "Country Connections" mail order dating service.'96 Christine visited
Dean at his farm in Veteran during the Thanksgiving 1992 weekend, and they
became engaged in early 1993.'9'
During a visit with Dean around Easter 1993, Christine concluded that
Joshua and Miriam needed additional structure and discipline and that she
would be the person to provide these things.' Christine also decided, with
Dean's approval, that she would be the children's mother and that Pamela
should no longer be considered their mother."9
Prior to the children's 1993 summer visit with Pamela and Peggy, Dean
instructed seven-year-old Joshua that his mother and Peggy (whom he referred
to as "faggots") were in a lesbian relationship, that lesbians are women who
have sex with other women, that neither Dean nor Christine approved of the
relationship, that Pamela had left Joshua to live a life of sin, and that Pamela
did not want to take care of him anymore."
That same summer the children attended Pamela and Peggy's Commit-
ment Ceremony at the Archwood United Church of Christ. The ceremony
consisted of songs, readings from the Bible, a message by the church pastor,
and blessings offered by friends and family.2"'
Dean and Christine were making final arrangements for their wedding
when Joshua and Miriam returned from the summer with their mother. 2
During this period and after their honeymoon, Dean and Christine reportedly
observed behaviors in the children-including masturbation by Miriam, gener-
al unruliness, use of "foul" language by both children, and the licking of "Go
Fish" cards and an ice tea pitcher by Miriam-which allegedly alerted them to
the possibility that the children had been sexually abused while with
192. Id. at 301-02, 804-05.
193. Id. at 115, 809.
194. Id. at 171-72, 520, 525-26.
195. Id. at 118-19.
196. Id. at 121, 306, 311.
197. Id. at 121-22, 312, 317.
198. Id. at 319-25.
199. Id. at 127-28, 163-64, 326, 333-34.
200. Id. at 126-27, 158-65. Joshua called his mother a "faggot" at the commencement of the
summer 1993 visit. Id. at 532, 811. Joshua ceased using this word when Pamela explained that it
was hurtful, but reverted to this term after visiting with Christine for a weekend. Id. at 595, 811-
12.
201. Id. at 27-28, 597-98.
202. Id. at 340-41.
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Pamela."3 Interestingly, the children's paternal grandparents did not observe
such behaviors when they cared for Joshua and Miriam during Dean and
Christine's honeymoon.2 4
D.o Gathering of Sexual Abuse "Evidence" by Dean and Christine
In the fall of 1993, Pamela resumed regular contact with her children
through letters, phone calls, packages, and personal visits. During the Thanks-
giving holiday, Pamela and Peggy spent a few days with the children at a
ranch in Wyoming. When the children returned from that visit, Joshua had a
wash-off Mario decal on each forearm and Miriam had a Bugs Bunny decal
on her chest.2"5 Dean and Christine concluded that Miriam's decal was "evi-
dence" of sexual abuse but did not report their conclusion to civil or criminal
authorities (even though Dean, as an E.M.T., was admittedly required by law
to report any suspicion of child abuse). The couple did not seek medical or
psychological evaluations of the children to confirm or repudiate their suspi-
cions or to help the children cope with this alleged trauma.2" Instead, Dean
and Christine took a picture of Miriam's decal and started gathering other
"evidence" to support their allegations against Pamela.2 7 Toward that end,
Dean and Christine began listening to Pamela's phone conversations with her
children."'
Around Christmas 1993, Dean and Christine began intercepting cards and
packages Pamela sent to Joshua and Miriam and refusing to answer the phone
when Pamela telephoned her children at scheduled times.2" Dean and Chris-
tine continued to revile Pamela to her children,2"0 telling them that she was
"an evil person living an evil life." ''
According to Dean and Christine, Miriam's masturbation became chronic
to the point that her labia were red and sore.2 2 They told her that it was a
"private" matter but did not tell her to stop this behavior;2 3 they did not take
Miriam to a medical doctor, even though Christine was frequently at the
doctor's office for a variety of illnesses during this period;2 4 and they did
not consult a physician or mental health professional until May of 1994.2"5
203. Id. at 64-66, 80-83, 284, 341-42.
204. Id. at 234-35, 265-66.
205. Id. at 69-70, 362.
206. Id. at 150-52, 174-75, 364-65.
207. Id. at 152, 282, 364.
208. Id. at 153-54.
209. Id. at 172-73. When allowed to talk, the children were very anxious about time limits
and were often distracted by movies, games, or other activities that continued despite Pamela's
repeated requests that Dean suspend such activities during the children's telephone visits with her.
Id. at 807-08.
210. Id. at 160-64, 333-34.
211. Id. at 168. They also had Joshua look up the word "abomination" in the dictionary so he
could understand the Bible's view of homosexuality. Id. at 328-29. Christine also repeatedly re-
ferred to Pamela as "WW" (meaning "wicked witch") in front of the children. Id. at 343.
212. Id. at 355.
213. Id. at 137, 354, 357.
214. Id. at 143, 147-48, 152, 358-60.
215. Id. at 369-70.
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Instead, Christine repeatedly rubbed nonprescription Desitin or hydrocortisone
on Miriam's labia.2 6
Pamela, Peggy, and other child care providers never saw Miriam mastur-
bate," 7 and Miriam's paternal grandmother, who spent significant amounts
of time with both children, only witnessed this behavior once in early
1994.28 When her grandmother told Miriam to stop, she did.2 9
Long after Dean had allegedly concluded that Pamela had sexually abused
her children 2 ' and was "a detriment to their very souls, 22' he agreed to
Pamela's request for an extended three-day weekend visit in mid-February,
1994.121 In late February, 1994, Dean and Christine terminated all telephone
contact with no explanation to Pamela or the children.223 Christine also be-
gan repeated interrogations of Miriam, not yet four years old, as to whether
anyone had touched her "business," meaning her genital area.2 4 As dis-
cussed more fully below, Christine's interrogations, which occurred while she
was rubbing ointment on Miriam's labia, yielded a variety of implausible and
inconsistent answers.225
E. The Temporary Restraining Order
On March 7, 1994, Dean again refused to allow Pamela to speak with her
children at the pre-scheduled time; Pamela left a message on Dean's answer-
ing machine that she would resort to legal action, if necessary, to reinstate her
right to speak with her children.226 Immediately thereafter, Pamela's counsel
faxed a letter to Dean's attorney enumerating Dean's violations of the custody
and visitation agreement and order and asked that Dean cease and desist such
violations.227
Neither Dean nor his counsel responded to the letter. When Pamela's legal
counsel finally reached Dean's counsel by telephone, counsel learned of
Dean's plan to file a petition for a temporary restraining order (T.R.O.) the
next morning. 28 Dean sought to bar all contact between Pamela and her chil-
216. Id. at 142, 357, 360-61.
217. Id. at 533-34, 603, 809.
218. Id. at 235.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 150, 154.
221. Id. at 168.
222. Id. at 156, 821-22.
223. Id. at 170, 172-73, 828. Dean and Christine did not let Pamela talk to Joshua on his
birthday in February, 1994 and did not tell Joshua that she had called. Id. at 172-73, 828.
224. Id. at 374-75.
225. See infra Part III.G.
226. Tr. at 173-74.
227. Letter from Susan J. Becker, Attorney for Ms. Hertzler, to James A. Eddington, Attorney
for Mr. Hertzler (March 2, 1994) (on file with the author).
228. Tr. at 174. Since the motion for a T.R.O. and the motion to modify custody and visita-
tion sought to modify an existing order stemming from the original divorce decree, Pamela contin-
ued to be designated as "Plaintiff' and Dean as "Defendant" during the litigation of the sexual
abuse allegations, even though Pamela was clearly placed in the defensive posture throughout. See
Defendant Dean Hertzler's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Mar.
11, 1994). To avoid confusion, the parties are referred to by their first names throughout this
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dren, claiming that she had sexually abused them." 9
The petition informed the court of Pamela's sexual orientation and her
relationship with Peggy. The "evidence" of sexual abuse cited by Dean was
the Bugs Bunny decal Miriam had on -her chest when she returned from the
Thanksgiving visit, Miriam's purported chronic masturbation, the children's
supposed use of inappropriate language, Miriam's licking of objects such as
"Go Fish" cards and the ice tea pitcher, and other unruly behavior by Joshua
and Miriam.23°
The petition was supported solely by affidavits from Dean and Christine.
Noticeably absent were any affidavits from a medical or mental health profes-
sional supporting Dean's allegations that Miriam and Joshua had been sexually
abused or that the behaviors alleged in the petition were indicative of sexual
abuse.23'
Pamela had never witnessed the behaviors listed in Dean's petition and
was devastated by Dean's allegations.232 She and her legal counsel233 ap-
peared at the T.R.O. hearing via telephone and Dean and Christine appeared in
person with their testimony consisting of a reading of the allegations in the
petition.
Based solely on Dean and Christine's allegations, the trial court issued a
verbal T.R.O. on March 11, 1994, allowing Pamela extremely limited, super-
vised visitation with her children, one phone call per week, and barring all
contact between Peggy and the children.3 The court also indicated its intent
to hold a full hearing on the matter at the earliest possible time. In the corre-
sponding written order issued by the court on March 23, 1994, the court man-
dated that "neither party, spouse, companion, friends or relatives shall discuss
this matter with the minor children nor shall they attempt to influence the
children in any way.
'235
discussion of the litigation.
229. Tr. at 174.
230. Id.
231. See Defendant Dean Hertzler's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Temporary Restrain-
ing Order, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Mar. 11, 1994). This glaring omission occurred because no doc-
tors had yet examined the children, even though Dean filed the petition many months after he and
Christine had concluded that Pamela had sexually abused her children and had started "gathering
evidence" to support their claims. See supra text accompanying notes 202-203
232. Tr. at 830.
233. Pamela was provided pro bono representation by the author and Susan Laser-Bair of
Cheyenne, Wyoming.
234. Tr. at 830.
235. Temporary Restraining Order at 1-2, Hertzler, No. 24-269. Between the entry of the
T.R.O. and trial, Dean and Christine continued, in direct contravention of this order, to instruct the
children that homosexuality was a sin, that their mother was a sinner who was worse than a thief
or a liar or a prostitute, and that Plaintiff no longer wanted to care for them. Id. at 85-86, 167-69,
333. Retracted Diaries of Christine Hertzler, Ex. 3 at Apr. 30, 1994, Hertzler, No. 24-269 [herein-
after Ex. 31.
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F. The Court's Refusal to Appoint an Expert
In an effort to expedite the resolution of the sexual abuse allegations, with
the minimum amount of trauma to then eight-year-old Joshua and four-year-
old Miriam, Pamela's counsel proposed that the court appoint a single expert
to evaluate the children and the parties. Initially Dean agreed. Pamela also
moved the court for the appointment of a specific expert, Dr. Marilyn Tka-
chut.236 The court set a deadline for Dean's counsel to agree to the appoint-
ment or to file objections. Dean did not propose any other counselors and did
not file an objection to Dr. Tkachut's appointment until after the court-im-
posed deadline. Dean offered no basis for his tardy objection to Dr. Tkachut,
merely stating that "a court-appointed psychologist is unnecessary because the
parties will select their own experts." '237
Despite Pamela's protest that multiple experts would unnecessarily disrupt
the children's and the parents' lives, dramatically and unnecessarily increase
the experts' fees incurred by the parties, and delay the trial date, 238 the court
refused to appoint an expert. As more fully explained below, the court's fail-
ure to appoint a single expert exacted the dire consequences foretold by
Pamela's counsel.
G. The Repeated Interrogations of Miriam and Resulting "Disclosure"
On twelve to fifteen occasions between February and May 1994, Christine
questioned Miriam as to whether anyone had been touching her "busi-
ness." 23 9 This inquisition occurred while Christine was applying ointment to
Miriam's labia."4 Miriam's responses, recorded in Christine's diary, primari-
ly implicated her brother Joshua.24
Miriam's grandmother Hertzler also questioned Miriam once in January or
February of 1994. Miriam asked Mrs. Hertzler, "Aren't you going to look at
my business? '242 Mrs. Hertzler noticed that Miriam's labia were quite red.
When asked what caused the redness, Miriam responded quickly, "Josh did it,"
which sounded like a prepared response to Mrs. Hertzler.2 " Mrs. Hertzler
told Miriam that she should not let anyone touch her and if they did she
should "scream and holler" and tell them to "stop it, stop it."
2 4
On Tuesday, May 17, 1994, Christine talked with Mr. Lynn Rhodes, the
236. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Objection to Appointment of Psychologist 1 1, Hert-
zler, No. 24-269. Dr. Tkachut, a psychologist practicing in Cheyenne, Wyoming, had extensive
training and experience with abused children. (Dr. Tkachut's resume is on file with the author).
237. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Objection to Appointment of Psychologist 5, Hert-
zier, No. 24-269.
238. Id. IM3-5.
239. Tr. at 374.
240. Id. at 142, 372.
241. Id. at 372-75; Ex. 3 at Mar. 2 and Apr. 24, 1994. Miriam made these accusations during
a time when she frequently blamed others, her brother Joshua, and even ghosts to avoid getting
into trouble. Tr. at 176, 237, 385.
242. Tr. at 235.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 236, 238.
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"expert" retained by Dean.245 Mr. Rhodes had twice interviewed the children
and found no evidence of sexual abuse. Christine and Mr. Rhodes talked about
the need for a "breakthrough" in the case.2
That same evening, Miriam complained about her "business" being
sore.247 Christine asked Miriam why her "business" hurt, and Miriam re-
sponded, "I guess I played with it."2" Christine asked Miriam if she under-
stood that her "business" wouldn't get sore if she didn't play with it and that
she shouldn't play with it, and Miriam said she understood.249 Miriam asked
to have medicine put on her labia. °
Christine reported in her diary that the following exchange occurred while
Christine was applying Desitin to Miriam's labia on May 17, 1994:
I asked why it was hurting, she said because I played with it. I asked
when, she said a lot. I asked her if anyone ever played with her busi-
ness, she said "not anymore." She said "Josh used to." I asked if
anyone else did and she said "Mary from Ohio." I asked why did
Mary do it, she said "because I let her." I asked if Pam or Peggy ever
played with her business, she said "Yes all the time." I said are you
sure they played with it or just put medicine on it. She said
"PLAYED WITH IT" in an angry tone. I asked Miriam what she said
to Pam & Peggy when they did this, she said "I told them to stop it,
STOP IT, STOP IT & they laughed at me and did it again." "I don't
like it when they play with my business." "I used to fondle their
breasts too." This story was repeated to me 3 times (concerning Pam
& Peggy) over a 1/2 hr. time period.'
Christine admittedly spanked Miriam for behaviors Christine considered
inappropriate.252 When this "breakthrough" occurred, however, Christine
hugged Miriam and instructed her: "You need to tell Mr. Rhodes what has
happened to you. ' 253 Christine then said a special prayer with Miriam"
and hugged her again.255 Miriam thrice repeated the story implicating Pamela
and Peggy at Christine's urging, and each time Christine told Miriam "that she
needed to tell that to Mr. Rhodes." '256 Christine reported the "breakthrough"
to Mr. Rhodes the next morning and another appointment was scheduled.257
Christine also provided Mr. Rhodes with a copy of her diary entries describing
245. Id. at 376, 378-79.
246. Id. at 294, 378-79.
247. Id. at 294, 380.
248. Id. at 294, 381.
249. Id. at 294.
250. Id.
251. Ex. 3, at May 17, 1994; see also Tr. at 295, 380-84.
252. Tr. at 324.
253. Id. at 295-96, 387-89.
254. Christine prayed "God to please be with Miriam" and "help her through this time be-
cause obviously she's been traumatized by something and to please watch over her, you know,
and reassure her that she's a very special girl and I love her very much and I'm very sorry that
something like that would ever happen to her." Id. at 296, 388-89.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 389.
257. Id. 297, 388-89, 391.
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Miriam's "disclosure."
258
H. Evaluation of the Children by Mr. Rhodes
At the time Mr. Rhodes evaluated the children, the parties, and their re-
spective partners in this case, he had been working as a counselor for less than
two years and had extremely limited training, education, and experience re-
garding allegations of sexual abuse of young children. 259 His twenty-seven
years as a minister strengthened his personal views that homosexuality is mor-
ally wrong and admittedly affected his "professional" opinion rendered in the
case. 21 In fact, Dean confirmed that Mr. Rhodes had an anti-gay bias before
retaining him to evaluate the children.26'
Mr. Rhodes interviewed Joshua, Miriam, Dean and Christine on May 7,
1994 and interviewed the children again on May 17.262 When Mr. Rhodes
asked the children about sexual abuse, Miriam again blamed Joshua for
"touching her business" but did not mention Pamela or Peggy.263 Joshua re-
ported that his father and Christine fought a lot2 and that Christine spanked
Miriam frequently 265-reports that did not surprise Christine.2" Joshua stat-
ed that neither he nor anyone else had been touching Miriam's "business.""26
Mr. Rhodes's third, post-"breakthrough" interview of Miriam, on May 20,
1994, was recorded on both audio26 and video tape.2' The audio tape re-
veals that as soon as Mr. Rhodes greeted Miriam, Miriam began repeating,
almost verbatim, the story she had told to Christine which implicated Pamela
and Peggy.2""
Mr. Rhodes switched on the video camera and urged Miriam to tell him
again what "Pam and Peggy" did.27' After significant prompting, Miriam re-
peated the story, again almost verbatim.272 Miriam was distracted and used a
sing-song voice suggesting that her story was rehearsed and she was tired of
telling it.
273
While Mr. Rhodes attempted to use anatomically correct dolls to ascertain
what Pamela and Peggy supposedly did, Miriam volunteered several times that
"they haven't been touching my business. ' When asked if anyone else had
258. Id. at 391-93.
259. Id. at 407-11.
260. Id. at 398, 476-79.
261. Id. at 472-73.
262. See Report of J. Lynn Rhodes, Ex. 8, Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. 8].
263. Tr. at 440; Ex. 8, at 10-11.
264. Tr. at 456-57.
265. Id. at 458.
266. ld. at 345.
267. Ex. 8, at 8-9.
268. Interview by J. Lynn Rhodes with Mariam Hertzler (audio tape of May 20, 1994), Ex. Q,
Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. Q].
269. Interview by J. Lynn Rhodes with Mariam Hertzler (video tape of May 20, 1994), Ex. E,
Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. El.
270. Tr. at 426, 449; Ex. Q; Ex. 8, at 12.
271. Tr. at 426, 731-32; Ex. E; Ex. Q.
272. Tr. at 731-32; Ex. E.
273. Ex. E; Ex. Q; Tr. at 731-32.
274. Ex. 8, at 12-13; Ex. E; Ex. Q. Mr. Rhodes ignored these statements during the interview,
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played with her business, Miriam rambled off the names of Charlotte, John,
little John, Mary, and Joshua (Durkalski), friends and neighbors of her mother
in Lakewood. 75 Mr. Rhodes ignored these accusations. 76
Mr. Rhodes conducted a third interview of Joshua on May 22, 1994.277
In this videotaped meeting,278 Mr. Rhodes assured Joshua that he would not
get in trouble for anything he said and Joshua agreed to tell the truth.2 79
Joshua again repeatedly denied that anyone had sexually abused him or Miri-
am."' Mr. Rhodes "found" this videotape in his drawer during his deposition
and explained that he had not produced it in response to previous requests
because he did not believe it contained anything significant."'
Based primarily upon Miriam's "disclosure" during the taped May 20
interview282 and upon information supplied by Dean and Christine, 23 Mr.
Rhodes concluded that Miriam and Joshua had been "eroticized" and Miriam
had possibly been sexually abused; that even absent abuse, continued contact
between the children and their mother would be detrimental because it might
influence the children's sexual orientation; that further contact with Peggy
should be barred; and that contact with their mother be terminated or limited
to supervised visits. 4
I. Evaluation of Miriam and Joshua by Other Experts
The children were both examined by Pamela's expert witnesses, Dr. Larry
Bloom and Dr. Carole Jenny.2"5 Dean's family physician and witness, Dr.
Karen Brungardt, examined Miriam. 6 None of these experts confirmed Mr.
Rhodes's theory that the children had been sexually abused or that the sexual
orientation of a parent is determinative of the children's best interest when
visitation is at issue. 87 In fact, Drs. Bloom and Jenny independently repudi-
ated Mr. Rhodes's methodologies and conclusions, and even Dean's own wit-
ness, Dr. Brungardt, readily conceded that her conclusion that Miriam had
been sexually abused should be reconsidered because it was based on mis-
but, after they were brought to his attention during his deposition, he hypothesized that Miriam
was talking about the dolls when she made the disclaimers. Tr. at 446-47.
275. Ex. E; Tr. at 430-31. Miriam also incorrectly told Mr. Rhodes that each person she had
just accused of sexually abusing her was, except for baby Joshua, an adult like him. Ex. E.
276. Tr. at 448.
277. Ex. 8, at 9.
278. Interview by J. Lynn Rhodes with Joshua Hertzler (video tape of May 22, 1994), Ex. 18,
Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. 181.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Tr. at 464-65; Ex. 8, at 9.
282. Tr. at 435.
283. Id. at 463.
284. Ex. 8, at 23-25.
285. Report of Larry J. Bloom, Ex. 17, Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. 17]; Report of
Carole Jenny, Ex. 15, Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. 15].
286. Tr. at 177-92.
287. See, e.g., Ex. 17, at 14-17 (questioning the validity of Rhodes's interview); Ex. 15, at 7-
10 (stating that there was no objective evidence of sexual abuse).
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leading and incomplete information provided by Dean."'
1. Dr. Larry L. Bloom
When retained as an expert in the Hertzler case, Dr. Bloom was a licen-
sed clinical psychologist and professor of psychology at Colorado State Uni-
versity with almost twenty years of experience in evaluating family dynamics
and seventeen years of experience identifying sexually abused children." 9
Dr. Bloom was also familiar with the empirical data and literature relating to
lesbian and gay parents.2" Dr. Bloom conducted comprehensive evaluations
of Pamela, Peggy, Miriam, Joshua, Dean, and Christine over a two-day period
shortly after Miriam's "disclosure" to Christine and Mr. Rhodes.29' In res-
ponse to Dr. Bloom's inquiries, both Miriam and Joshua denied that anyone
had been touching or playing with their genital areas.292 Dr. Bloom's testing
of Miriam established that she is a highly suggestible child who strives to
please adults.293 Dr. Bloom met separately with the adults and observed the
children interacting with their parents and the parents' partners.294 Dr. Bloom
also studied the audio and video tapes of the May 20, 1994, interview in
which Miriam "disclosed" to Mr. Rhodes that Pamela and Peggy had been
"touching her business."' ' Dr. Bloom found this disclosure unconvincing
due to the fatally flawed methodology employed by Mr. Rhodes, including his
failure to test for suggestibility, his failure to explore Miriam's inconsistent
statements regarding sexual abuse made during the "disclosure" and previous
interviews, and his use of leading rather than nondirective questions.2" Dr.
Bloom determined that Miriam's "disclosure" immediately upon entering the
room was the result of preparation by an adult whom Miriam was striving to
please.297
Dr. Bloom further concluded that: (1) absolutely no credible evidence
existed to corroborate Dean's allegations of sexual abuse; (2) Pamela and
Peggy encouraged and facilitated the relationship between Dean, Christine, and
the children while Dean and Christine caused parental alienation between the
children and their mother; (3) the children benefitted by spending significant
amounts of (unsupervised) time with their mother; and (4) Dean and Christine
should obtain professional counseling to put aside their own needs and biases
288. See Ex 15; Ex 17; Tr. at 202 (cross examination of Dr. Brungardt).
289. Tr. at 607, 612, 649; Curriculum vitae of Larry Jay Bloom, Ex. 16, Hertzler, No. 24-269
[hereinafter Ex. 16].
290. Tr. at 611-12.
291. Ex. 17; Tr. at 613.
292. Tr. at 637, 653; Ex. 17, at 7-8.
293. For example, Miriam readily agreed with Dr. Bloom's suggestions that Pamela and Peg-
gy are sisters and later agreed that they are mother and daughter. Tr. at 640-42; Ex. 17, at 8.
294. Tr. at 614-16. During Dr. Bloom's observations of the children with their mother and
Peggy, Dean hovered nearby. Id. at 646-47. When asked why, Dean said his diligence was neces-
sary to prevent Pamela from kidnapping her children. Id. at 617-18. Dr. Bloom was not able to
persuade Dean that kidnapping was not a possibility in the clinical setting. Id. at 618. Dean had
also told Joshua that his mother might try to kidnap Joshua and his sister. Ex. 17, at 14.
295. Tr. at 615, 648-49.
296. "Id. at 651-53.
297. Id. at 649-51.
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and focus instead on the needs of the children to value and appreciate their
mother and Peggy. 98
2. Dr. Carole Jenny
Carole Jenny, M.D., is a board-certified pediatrician who had served as
the Director of The Child Advocacy and Protection Team at the Denver
Children's Hospital for four years when she became involved in this case.2
She personally examined four or five children per week where sexual abuse
was suspected and twenty to thirty cases of emotional abuse per year.3" She
taught at the University of Colorado School of Medicine, conducted empirical
and clinical research, and has published in the field of child abuse.3"' Her
peer-reviewed, published research included work on the prevalence of child
sexual abuse by gay men and lesbians. 2
Dr. Jenny interviewed both children, physically examined Miriam, and
provided a comprehensive report of her findings and observations.3 3 Both
children reported that Dean and Christine told them that their mother was
wrong to live in a lesbian relationship, that Christine often spanked Miriam,
and that they wanted to see Pamela frequently."
Dr. Jenny talked with Dean at length but found Christine "rude and imma-
ture" and hostile. Dr. Jenny based these conclusions on Christine's rebuff of
Miriam's pleas to play with her -in the waiting room and her refusal to comfort
Miriam during the physical examination." 5 After Dr. Jenny's interview with
Miriam, Miriam ran up to Christine and spontaneously reported: "I didn't tell
her about my business, we talked about other stuff.""3 6 Dr. Jenny interpreted
this remark as evidence that Christine, who appeared embarrassed by Miriam's
statement, had been coaching Miriam and that Miriam was "checking in" with
Christine tor see if she had met Christine's expectations.3 7 Dr. Jenny found
further evidence of Christine's coaching in Miriam's hurried "disclosure" to
298. Ex. 17, at 15-17.
299. Tr. at 716, 718. The Team is a joint program of the Children's Hospital and the C. Hen-
ry Kempe National Center, a child abuse research and treatment center sponsored by the Universi-
ty of Colorado. Id. at 716. Dr. Jenny had worked as a pediatrician and served as the medical di-
rector of the Harborview Sexual Assault Center at the University of Washington for six years prior
to heading the Kempe Center. Id. at 716-17. Her curriculum vitae was introduced as Ex. 14. Id. at
720.
300. Id. at 718, 764.
301. Id. at 716-18.
302. See Jenny et al., supra note 2, at 41. Pamela was not aware of Dr. Jenny's research on
this topic when she retained her to evaluate Miriam.
303. Ex. 15, at 8; Tr. at 721-23. Prior to compiling her report, Dr. Jenny reviewed depositions
collected in the case, Christine's redacted diaries, Dean's T.R.O. Petition and his Petition to Modi-
fy Decree, answers to interrogatories, Mr. Rhodes's report, and the audio and video tapes of Miri-
am's May 20 interview by Mr. Rhod s. Tr. at 721-23. After examining the children, Dr. Jenny
also reviewed Dr. Bloom's report ant. ,e medical record submitted by Dr. Brungardt. Tr. at 722.
Dr. Jenny did not communicate with amela or Peggy.
304. Ex. 15, at 3-4. Joshua told Dr. Jenny he wanted to spend half the year in Wyoming with
his father and the other half in Ohio with his mother. Id. at 4.
305. Tr. at 724-25, 754-55; Ex. 15, at 5.
306. Tr. at 729.
307. Id. at 730-31, 770.
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Mr. Rhodes on May 20, 1994.308 Dr. Jenny's expert opinions include the fol-
lowing:
An extensive physical examination of Miriam showed no evidence of
sexual abuse or infection or inflammation in her genitals or anus.3"
* Joshua and Miriam were outgoing, "healthy and happy," and showed none
of the hypersensitivity to new people and environments indicative of sexually-
abused children; they did not suffer from post traumatic stress disorder."0
* Miriam's "disclosures" that Pamela and Peggy "played with her business"
lacked credibility due to the use of leading questions, Christine's coaching,
and the attendant rewards Miriam received only for implicating Pamela and
Peggy."'
* Christine and Dean's attempts to alienate the children's affection for their
mother and convince them that they had been sexually abused "cause[d] tre-
mendous emotional abuse and correlate[d] with a bad long-term outcome in
terms of the child's mental health and the development of mental illness,"3 2
including schizophrenia.3 3
* Miriam's masturbation may have been due to an intermittent medical
condition which compelled her to rub her already inflamed genitals, such as
strep infection in the vagina, pinworms, or an allergy.3 4
* Other behaviors which Dean and Christine deemed indicative of sexual
abuse were in fact behaviors that are age and gender appropriate for Miriam
and Joshua.3"'
* Frequent masturbation is not a specific sexual abuse behavior, but it is
common in children who are not getting their emotional needs met and feel
isolated, frustrated, lonely or bored.316
* As recorded 'in her diary, Christine's act of telling Miriam that Pamela
moved to Ohio because Pamela did not want to care for Miriam anymore was
an abusive act, as were other acts where Dean and Christine denigrated Pam-
308. Id. at 729-30.
309. Id. at 723-26.
310. Id. at 726-28.
311. Id. at 727-31.
312. Id. at 735.
313. Id. at 734-37, 745.
314. Id. at 768-69.
315. Ex. 15, at 5-6.
316. Tr. at 762.
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ela to the children.
t 7
. There was no evidence in the medical or psychological literature that chil-
dren of lesbian parents suffer psychological dysfunction or gender confu-
sion.3
o Peer-reviewed, published, empirical data compiled by Dr. Jenny and her
husband, Dr. Thomas Roesler, proved that a child is over 100 times more
likely to be abused by a parent's heterosexual partner than by someone identi-
fied as a homosexual.1 9
o Children can do very well going between two diverse environments as
long as they understand the different expectations and as long as the caretakers
in each home encourage the children to respect the rules in both environ-
ments. 2°
Based upon these and other findings, Dr. Jenny recommended that Joshua
and Miriam be allowed and encouraged to maintain unsupervised contact with
their mother and Peggy.32' Dr. Jenny further cautioned that Dean and Chris-
tine would injure the children's mental health and happiness if they continued
their campaign to alienate the children from their mother -a possibility
that Mr. Rhodes also acknowledged.323
3. Dr. Karen Brungardt
Just a few weeks before trial, Dean had Miriam examined by Dr. Karen
Brungardt, a Doctor of Osteopathy (D.O.) from Torrington, Wyoming. Dr.
Brungardt is board-certified in family practice and examines three or four
alleged victims of sexual abuse per year.324 Consistent with Dr. Jenny's
findings, Dr. Brungardt found no physical abnormalities indicative of sexual
abuse. 325 During this examination, however, Miriam repeated her story that
"Peggy and Pam" had been touching her business, but this time expanded the
touching to include her anus. Based on information supplied by Dean and
Miriam's "disclosure" during the examination, Dr. Brungardt found a "proba-
bility" that Miriam had been abused.
3 26
317. Id. at 735-43.
318. Id. at 737-38; Ex. 15, at 8.
319. Tr. at 739; Ex. 15, at 9.
320. Tr. at 740-41, 745; Ex. 15, at 9.
321. Tr. at 739-41, 744-46; Ex. 15, at 9.
322. Tr. at 745; Ex. 15, at 9.
323. Tr. at 466-69.
324. Id. at 179.
325. Id. at 185; Exhibit C: Report of Dr. Brungardt, Hertzler, No. 24-269 [hereinafter Ex. C).
Dr. Brungardt noted some redness and irritation of Miriam's vagina, Tr. at 185; Ex. C, but testi-
fied that Miriam's own "small finger" would "typically not" cause this type of irritation. Tr. at
187. Dr. Brungardt's conclusion was consistent with Dr. Jenny's concern that Miriam's genital
irritation could be caused by pinworms or other intermittent medical condition. Tr. at 769.
326. Tr. at 191.
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J. The Trial
A four-day trial was held during July 1994 in Torrington, Wyoming. In
addition to the expert opinions of Drs. Jenny, Bloom, Brungardt, and Mr.
Rhodes,32 testimony was elicited from ten fact witnesses. These witnesses
included the parties, their partners and the children's paternal grandparents.
Joshua and Miriam did not testify. Pamela and Peggy called several character
witnesses and Mrs. Charlotte Durkalski, a close friend and neighbor of Pamela
and Peggy. Mrs. Durkalski, along with her husband and four children, spent
significant time with Joshua and Miriam during their summers in Lakewood.
All witnesses, including Dean, Christine and Dean's parents, testified that
Pamela had been a good parent, that she loved her children,32 and that the
children loved her. 29
Witnesses traveled from Ohio to testify as to Pamela and Peggy's integrity
and also testified concerning their own observations of the children's behavior
and the interactions of Pamela and Peggy with the children while in
Lakewood.33' None of these witnesses observed any inappropriate behavior
or anything they considered indicative of sexual abuse. 3
In addition to the substantial evidence exculpating Pamela from the sexual
abuse allegations, Dean's expert, Mr. Rhodes, admitted that he held significant
anti-gay bias which affected his "expert" evaluation in this case. Indeed, the
following exchange occurred between Pamela's counsel and Mr. Rhodes in
open court:
Q. * * * I'm just trying to separate out here what part of this report
is your conclusions and your recommendations that Pamela Hertzler
no longer have contact with her children and her partner, Peggy
Keating, no longer have any kind of contact with the children that
they have cared about and loved.... I'm trying to figure out is it
your professional judgment that leads you to these conclusions or is it
your moral judgment that leads you to these conclusions.
A. I believe I made that clear in the report, that if indeed there is
sexual abuse taking place, then there should not be any contact and I
base that on the sexual abuse and then I added the other possibility,
and I label that as my value system. I made that very clear that I was
speaking from my value system around the homosexuality. You see, I
don't see the homosexual issue as being the primary issue here. I see
that as a side issue and I think the sexual abuse is the primary issue
in the recommendation that I made.
327. The court rejected the motions and arguments of Pamela's counsel, made prior to and
during trial, that Mr. Rhodes should not be qualified as an expert witness due to his lack of quali-
fications and admitted anti-gay bias. See Tr. at 88-99.
328. Tr. at 101-02, 225, 256.
329. Id. at 225, 393, 540.
330. Id. at 507-09, 516-17.
331. Id. at 509, 517, 527-28. The witnesses also stated that they would have no reservations
whatsoever entrusting Pamela and Peggy with their own young children or grandchildren. Id. at
498, 519, 529, 540-41.
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Q. I agree with you.
A. It is an issue, the homosexuality is an issue, but it's not the pri-
mary issue. It's a secondary issue.
Q. As an issue in this case, Mr. Rhodes, if homosexuality is an issue
in this case, then the recommendations that you gave to this Court are
not expert recommendations, but the recommendations of a layman;
isn't that correct?
A. Well, you see, in the realm of morality and a religion, I'm sup-
posed to be an expert there, too.
Q. That's not what you were retained for, was it, Mr. Rhodes?
A. That's correct, and that's why I labeled that as my opinion.
Q. So let me get this straight. Your recommendations of sexual
abuse are based on your professional judgment?
A. Um-hum.
Q. Your recommendations on the termination of contact between
Pamela Hertzler and Peggy Keating and those children based on their
homosexuality is based on your moral judgment?
A. Partially.
Q. So you can't tell us what weight-what weight your professional
judgment and what weight your moral judgment had in that conclu-
sion?
A. I hadn't thought about it in those terms.
Q. So that's a no?
A. Given some time, I probably could.
Q. Can you do so now?
A. In terms of homosexuality, the greater weight would go to the
moral issue simply because there is in the professional area so much
confusion around the effects of homosexuality and how people be-
come homosexual, what happens when kids are exposed to it, there's
a lot of confusion there, so it's tough to make a professional, absolute
determination there.332
Just as Mr. Rhodes readily acknowledged his anti-gay bias, Dean's other
expert, Dr. Brungardt, admitted during trial that she had not been given suffi-
cient information with which to make a diagnosis that Miriam had been sexu-
ally abused.33 3 The information Dean supplied to Dr. Brungardt was that
Miriam had been masturbating frequently and that Miriam had disclosed to a
family counselor in Greeley that Pamela and Peggy had sexually abused
her." 4 Dean did not, however, inform Dr. Brungardt of many factors which
she considered important in determining the veracity of sexual abuse allega-
332. Id. at 476-79.
333. Id. at 193-95.
334. Id. at 193-95.
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tions. For example, Dr. Brungardt did not know that Miriam had been ques-
tioned about sexual abuse twelve to fifteen times prior to the "disclosure"
while Christine was applying medication to Miriam's vaginal area.335 Dr.
Brungardt said her awareness of some of these facts compelled her to want to
re-interview or re-evaluate her conclusion that a "probability" of sexual abuse
existed.336
K. The Trial Court's Decision
Despite the overwhelming weight of evidence favoring Pamela's inno-
cence and fitness as a mother and Mr. Rhodes's admitted bias against Pamela,
the trial court relied almost exclusively on Mr. Rhodes's "expert" opinions in
finding337 that "eroticization"33 of the children had occurred during visits
with Pamela. The court further concluded that the children were "subjected to
inappropriate sexual behavior while visiting" Pamela and Peggy Keating.339
The court's conclusion credited the testimony of Dean, Christine, and Mr.
Rhodes as to the behaviors in which Joshua and Miriam allegedly engaged and
the purported causal relation between those behaviors and sexual abuse.
The court rejected the testimony of Pamela's experts, Drs. Jenny and
Bloom, stating that it was not "useful or credible."3" The court claimed that
Dr. Jenny "simply disregarded any evidence which conflicted with her conclu-
sion that there had been no inappropriate behavior"34 and that she failed to
consider the statements Miriam made to Dr. Brungardt.342 The trial court
similarly rejected Dr. Bloom's expert opinions, stating that "Dr. Bloom
initially failed to consider the intensity of the conduct of Miriam following
visitation, but then admitted that such conduct could be an indicator of sexual
abuse. He also admitted to making over-statements and inaccurate quotations
in what I found to be important portions of his report."343 The trial court also
opined that Drs. Jenny and Bloom "focused extensively on what they believed
to be deficiencies in how the Defendant [Dean] responded to the
335. Id. at 198-99. Other information that Dean did not share with Dr. Brungardt was that
Dean had raised the sexual abuse allegations in the context of a domestic relations dispute, id. at
196, that he and Christine had been gathering "evidence" against Pamela since Thanksgiving
1993, id. at 197, that Miriam's "disclosures" had been made to a counselor retained by Dean spe-
cifically to evaluate Dean's allegations of sexual abuse, id. at 195, that Miriam also "disclosed"
the names of her brother and an Ohio family to her counselor, id. at 198, and that Miriam had
medication applied to her labia approximately 30 times before Dean contacted a doctor, id. at 201-
02.
336. Id. at 202.
337. These findings were set forth in a Decision Letter issued by the court on July 21, 1994,
and subsequently incorporated into an Order dated Sept. 8, 1994. See Decision Letter, Hertzler,
No. 24-269 (July 21, 1994) [hereinafter Decision Letter]; Court Order, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Sept.
8, 1994) [hereinafter Court Order I].
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situation.'"3
Other than criticizing Dr. Jenny for failing to credit Miriam's statements
to Dr. Brungardt, the court did not discuss Dr. Brungardt's testimony in its
findings.
Based upon its conclusion that the children experienced "eroticization"
and had been exposed to "inappropriate sexual behavior" while in Pamela's
care, the court restricted Pamela's visitation with her children to six supervised
Saturday and Sunday visits per year (no overnight visits), and one phone call
per week, and prohibited Peggy from all contact with the children.345 The
court ordered the parties to jointly select a counsellor and further directed that
"both parties and the children participate in counseling regarding the children's
sexual expressions, the Defendant's [Dean's] attitude toward the Plaintiff
[Pamela] as portrayed to the children, the children's relationship with each
parent and future visitation."3" The court ordered the parties and the
counsellor to file a report by January 1, 1995, "indicating the parties'
compliance with this order and any recommendations or conclusions
reached."347
The court further addressed "the impact of the Plaintiff's [Pamela's]
lifestyle on her visitation with the children."3 The court opined that
"[hiomosexuality is inherently inconsistent with families, with the relationships
and values which perpetuate families,"349 and continued:
The moral climate in which children are raised is an important factor
in child custody and visitation. The Plaintiff's open homosexual
relationship creates much of the moral climate surrounding her life.
The moral climate is probable to have an effect on the children's
development of values and character which is inconsistent with that
supported by the Defendant or society.
Because the Plaintiff's open homosexuality has and is likely to
create confusion and difficulty for the children, and because her
lifestyle is likely to negatively affect the development of the
children's moral values, and because the State has an interest in
supporting conventional marriages and families, the Court would find
it appropriate to reduce the Plaintiff's visitation with the children
even if the issues of sexual abuse or eroticization were resolved.35
Pamela filed a timely appeal of the court's decision with the Wyoming
Supreme Court.35" '
344. Id.
345. Id. at 3.
346. Id. at 4.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 5.
350. Id.
351. Wyoming has no intermediate appellate courts. WYo. CONST. art. 5, § 18.
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L. Evaluation by Dr. Rachael Moriarty and the Ensuing Post-trial
Proceedings
In compliance with the trial court's mandate that the parties and the
children obtain counseling, Pamela agreed to a counselor suggested by
Dean-Dr. Rachael Moriarty of Fort Collins, Colorado.352 In her report to
the trial court dated December 20, 1994,"'3 Dr. Moriarty concluded that the
children had not, as the trial court found, been sexually abused, and that
Dean's unrelenting efforts to convince them otherwise constituted severe
emotional abuse which would cause serious long term harm if not
terminated.354 Dr. Moriarty recommended that full visitation be restored to
Pamela, that the therapy continue for the parties and the children, and that
custody be changed to Pamela if Dean did not cease his attempts to alienate
the children from their mother.355 Braced with Dr. Moriarty's report, Pamela
petitioned the trial court for full restoration of her visitation rights as
established in the February 26, 1992, order,356 and sought a T.R.O. enjoining
Dean from continuing to alienate the children joined with a motion to show
cause why Dean should not be held in contempt for violating the previous
court orders forbidding such conduct.357
On January 31, 1995, the trial court held a five-and-one half hour hearing
on Pamela's motions.35 ' Dr. Moriarty testified, as did Pamela and two of the
social workers who had supervised her visits with Joshua and Miriam.
359
Pamela's counsel also called Dean and Christine to the witness stand.
With the aid of transcriptions Pamela obtained of her telephone
conversations with her children,3" the testimony of Dr. Moriarty, 36' and the
testimony of the visitation supervisors,362 Pamela unequivocally discredited
352. Dr. Moriarty is board certified in clinical psychology with more than 15 years experience
as a therapist and extensive training and experience in the diagnosis and treatment of sexually
abused children. Transcript of Motions Hearing, at 6-7, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Jan. 31, 1995)
[hereinafter Motions Tr.].
353. Dr. Rachel Moriarty, Ed.D., Psychological Report on the Hertzler Family, Hertzler, No.
24-269 (Dec. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Moriarty Report].
354. Id. at 2.
355. Id. at 4.
356. Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Judgment, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Jan. 10, 1995).
357. Plaintiff's Motion for a T.R.O. and to Show Cause, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Jan. 10, 1995).
358. Testimony from the Jan. 31, 1995 Hearing and Accompanying Exhibits, Hertzler, No.
24-269 [hereinafter Tr. II and Tr. II Ex.].
359. Christine supplied extensive written reports to the court about what purportedly happened
during the phone calls with Pamela and during supervised visits. Tr. II Ex. 4. Her accounts were
based upon the information obtained from Joshua and Miriam when she questioned them after
each visit with Pamela. Tr. II at 123-24. For example, Christine reported that on a supervised visit
on October 16, 1994, "Pam and Miriam slept in a waterbed beneath the covers while behind a
closed bedroom door." See Tr. II at 137-38 (discussing trial Exhibit 6). The supervisor testified
that this conduct never occurred and that, in fact, Pamela was never alone with the children during
this visit. Tr. II at 137-38.
360. Tr. It at 100-29, 142-71; Tr. II Exs. 6, 7, 8. Christine testified that her reports to the
court, including numerous quotes from conversations between Pamela and her children which
supposedly upset the children, were completely accurate. Tr. II at 103, 114-15, 118. Actual tran-
scripts of the taped conversations introduced into evidence by Pamela's counsel revealed that
Christine's "verbatim" accounts were largely fictional. Tr. II Ex. 8.
361. Tr. II at 6-94, 180-88.
362. The supervisors for Pamela's visitation, Dora Zamora and Rob Branhan, were social
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Dean's and Christine's representations that any contact with Pamela, even
under supervised conditions, caused the children to act out in sexually or other
inappropriate ways.
Moreover, after being recognized by the court as an expert witness,
3 63
Dr. Moriarty testified at length about the basis for the conclusions in her
report.3" Dr. Moriarty also explained, as Drs. Jenny and Bloom had at the
initial trial, the flaws in the methodology used by Dean's trial expert, Mr.
Rhodes, in concluding that the children had been "eroticized.
3 6
1
Dr. Moriarty specifically reported on a conversation with Mr. Rhodes after
the case had been referred to her. In that conversation, Mr. Rhodes conceded
that he was not aware that Miriam had been coached by Christine to tell him
that Peggy and Pamela had sexually abused her.3" Mr. Rhodes also told Dr.
Moriarty that his conclusions were ultimately based on "a gut feeling" that the
children had been eroticized and that Peggy was somehow responsible for this
condition.3 67 Dean tried to discredit the conclusions reached by Dr. Moriarty,
the counsellor he had selected.3"
At the conclusion of the hearing on January 31, 1995,' 69 and in
subsequent writings,t37 he court expressed disappointment that Dr.
Moriarty's counseling failed to address the children's "eroticization." The
court stated:
The Court further finds that counselling [sic] did not address the
eroticization which the Court found to have occurred in its Order of
September 8, 1994, and no progress has been made in assuring that
future visitation is not accompanied by eroticization or inappropriate
sexual expression by the children. Plaintiff [Pamela] continues to
deny that the children were eroticized or exposed to any inappropriate
sexual behavior while in her care. There is no indication that the
Plaintiff recognizes any concern about the sexual activity of the
children which previously accompanied visitation, and there is no
indication that the parties will work together to prevent or address
such activity.'
The court directed continued counseling with Dr. Moriarty, although Dean
was allowed to select a different counselor for himself provided that the
person he selected was willing to work with Dr. Moriarty.372 The court also
recognized that Dean had violated previous court orders by continuing to
workers employed by the Wyoming Department of Family Services. Id. at 129-41.
363. Id. at 9.
364. Id. at 6-94; Tr. II Ex. 2.
365. Tr. II at 20-21, 58-60.
366. Id. 59-60.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 63-87.
369. ld. at 182-86.
370. Letter from District Judge Keith Kautz to Counsel, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Feb. 13, 1995);
Court Order, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (Mar. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Court Order II].
371. Court Order II at 2.
372. Id. (requiring that a "report on the results of such counseling" be filed by the end of
1995).
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exhibit "his extremely negative attitude" toward Pamela in front of her
children, but imposed no sanctions for Dean's behavior other than again
ordering him to cease monitoring the children's phone conversations with
Pamela.373 The court recognized Pamela's parents as appropriate supervisors
for her visits with her children and marginally expanded her visitation
schedule to include one week in June and one in August, three weekends, and
the five days preceding New Year's Day.374 The court continued to bar all
contact between the children and Peggy.375
In short, the trial court's ruling on Pamela's motions did not alter its pre-
vious findings that: (1) the children had been exposed to inappropriate sexual
behavior or "eroticized" while in Pamela's care; (2) that homosexuality
renders a parent per se immoral and unfit; (3) that Pamela's visitations with
her children should continue to be supervised and severely curtailed; and (4)
that the children could have no contact with Pamela's life-partner, Peggy.
M. Appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court
Pamela's consolidated challenge to the trial court's Orders of September
8, 1994, and March 6, 1995,376 was three-fold. Pamela first argued that there
was no credible factual evidence of record that Joshua or Miriam had been
sexually abused; second, that there was no credible expert evidence supporting
a finding of sexual abuse; and, finally, that there was no evidence to support
the trial court's determination that Pamela's sexual orientation alone provided
sufficient grounds to reduce her visitation to a de minimus level377 or that
Peggy should be excluded from the children's lives.378
373. Id. at 1-2.
374. Id. at 3.
375. Id.
376. Pamela appealed the court's March 6, 1995, order and moved to consolidate it with the
pending appeal of the September 8, 1994, decision. The Wyoming Supreme Court denied Pam-
ela's motion to consolidate but subsequently granted her motion to supplement the record in her
existing appeal with the testimony and exhibits from the January 31, 1995, hearing. Thus, Dr.
Moriarty's findings and the record of the January 31, 1995, proceedings were before the Wyoming
Supreme Court but were not fully briefed by the parties.
377. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Pamela M. Hertzler, Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946
(Wyo. 1995) (No. 94-262) [hereinafter Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant].
378. As Pamela explained in her brief, courts have long recognized that children are not
harmed by maintaining a close relationship with a gay or lesbian parent. See, e.g., In re Marriage
of Ashling, 599 P.2d 475 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (reversing the trial court's order that a lesbian mo-
ther could not have other lesbians in her home when her three children visited). In Ashling, the
appeals court noted that the three children were aware of their mother's sexual preference, that the
mother had sexual relations in her home when the children were staying there but not in their
presence, and that the mother behaved affectionately toward other women in front of the children.
Id. at 476. In striking down the no-other-lesbians condition on visitation, the court stated:
We find nothing in the present record to justify such a restrictive provision. So long as
the mother's sexual practices remain discreet a requirement whatever the sexual prefer-
ences of the parties might be ... and the presence of lesbians in the home from time to
time does not of itself create difficulties for the children of a greater magnitude than that
suggested by this record, the restriction is inappropriate.
Id. (citation omitted); see also In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(refusing to limit gay father's visitation rights when evidence did not indicate that contact with
homosexuals caused any detrimental effects to child); Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633 (Ill.
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To facilitate the argument that Dean and Christine's factual reports about
the children's behaviors lacked credibility, Pamela explained in the text of her
brief379 and illustrated in a time-line graphic included in her appendix3"
that the behaviors of Dean and Christine were totally inconsistent with those
of parents who believed their children were being sexually abused."' Pamela
also pointed out, as had the testimony of Drs. Bloom and Jenny and empirical
data presented to the trial court in her trial and post-trial briefs, that gay and
lesbian parents are just as capable of raising healthy, well-adjusted children as
are their heterosexual counterparts.3"2 The primary thrust of Pamela's appeal,
however, was that the trial court abused its discretion383 in recognizing Mr.
Rhodes as an expert and in crediting his "expert" opinions over the testimony
of Drs. Bloom, Jenny, and Moriarty.
As to Mr. Rhodes, Pamela argued that his qualifications fell far short of
the standards required of witnesses qualified by Wyoming courts as "child
App. Ct. 1993) (reinstating lesbian mother's right to unsupervised overnight visitation with her son
at the home she shared with her partner and finding that son's attendance at a gay/lesbian pride
parade and his exposure to hugs and kisses between his mother and her partner were not detrimen-
tal); In re Marriage of Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1990) (striking down visitation restriction
on gay father prohibiting the presence of any "unrelated adult" when evidence showed father to be
a good, loving, and responsible parent); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980) (stat-
ing that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, mother's homosexuality alone bore no rele-
vance to parental fitness); Johnson v. Schlotman, 502 N.W.2d 831 (N.D. 1993) (allowing regularly
scheduled, unsupervised, overnight visitation with children in the home lesbian mother shared with
her partner); Large v. Large, No. 93AP-735, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5810 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 2,
1993) (holding that mother's involvement in a lesbian relationship is merely one factor to consider
when assessing the children's best interest in a custody or visitation dispute and stating that even
if the lesbian relationship imposed some difficulties on the children, expert testimony demonstrat-
ing that a loving and supportive environment, combined with a good explanation of the situation,
would allow the children to adjust to any negative situation they might encounter due to the rela-
tionship); Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (overturning visitation limitations
because of a lack of evidence linking parental sexual orientation to child's disruptive behavior);
Barron v. Barron, 594 A.2d 682 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (upholding trial court's order allowing ex-
tensive visitation fights for lesbian mother and refusing to limit contact with mother's partner);
Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that mother's homosexuality
did not justify change in custody when evidence did not show that mother's sexual preference
harmed the child); In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 718 P.2d 7, 8 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (striking
down restriction on gay father that would have allowed visitation only when the father's male
companion was not present).
379. Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant at 38-40, Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995) (No. 94-262).
380. Id. tbl. 1, at app.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 58-64. Pamela's position was strongly supported by amicus briefs submitted by
various organizations, including the American Psychological Association, the American Civil
Liberties Union, and several gay and lesbian legal advocacy groups. See generally M.P. v.S.P.,
404 A.2d 1256, 1263 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1979) (suggesting that exposure to others' adverse
reactions to gay parents might actually better prepare children for developing their own moral
standards); Blew, 617 A.2d at 31 (noting that other people's reactions to a parent's homosexuality
should not affect child custody determination and that "[o]f primary importance to the child's
well-being is the child's full and realistic knowledge of his parents, except where it can be shown
that exposure to the parent is harmful to the child") (emphasis added).
383. In Wyoming, as in many jurisdictions, the trial court has broad discretion in determining
whether a witness is qualified to provide expert testimony. See generally Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d
1010 (Wyo. 1993); Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363 (Wyo. 1991). In Wyoming, a court abuses its
discretion when "it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstanc-
es," with the ultimate question being "[w]hether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it
did." State v. DDM, 877 P.2d 259, 262 (Wyo. 1994).
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sexual abuse experts," '384 and that the error in qualifying Mr. Rhodes as an
expert was compounded by his bias against homosexuality which admittedly
affected his "expert" opinions in this case.385 Allowing Mr. Rhodes to mask
his private anti-gay bias behind the guise of expert opinion, Pamela reasoned,
was directly contrary to both the literal language and the spirit of the applica-
ble rules of evidence.386
Pamela also argued that the substantive testimony offered by Mr. Rhodes
did not satisfy the criteria for admissibility under Wyoming Rule of Evidence
702387 and Daubert.a8  Pamela urged that the relevance, and hence admissi-
bility, of a proffered expert's testimony hinges upon the reliability of the ex-
pert's opinion," 9 and that reliability, in turn, "[is] based on whether the un-
derlying theory is scientifically valid and pertains to the facts of the case.""
Aside from the aforementioned anti-gay bias which should have rendered the
testimony per se unreliable, Pamela argued that the fatal flaws in the method-
ology Mr. Rhodes employed to diagnose sexual abuse, which included his
failure to consider the inconsistencies in Miriam's statements regarding sexual
abuse3 1' and the impact of Christine's coaching on Miriam's "disclo-
sures," 392 independently rendered his testimony unreliable.
384. See generally MMOE v. MJE, 841 P.2d 820, 826 (Wyo. 1992) (recognizing "expert"
status in person with a Ph.D. and over 30 years experience treating over 1000 children for sexual
abuse); Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 978 (Wyo. 1988) (admitting "expert" testimony by the
coordinator of a sexual assault service agency who had extensive education, training, and experi-
ence in counseling abuse victims). Mr. Rhodes, in contrast, merely had a B.A. in Bible and spent
27 years as a minister with the Church of Christ. He had obtained his M.A. in counseling in 1992
and had only examined five or six children for the purpose of determining sexual abuse when he
did the evaluations in this case. He was not yet licensed as a counselor and still had to be super-
vised by a licensed counselor, but his supervisor did not directly review Mr. Rhodes's methodolo-
gy or conclusions in this case. Tr. at 88-89, 408-11.
385. Mr. Rhodes's report stated that he saw no characteristics in Pamela, other than lesbian-
ism, that would make her an unfit mother. Ex. 8, at 15.
386. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding
expert opinion inadmissible to the extent that it is personal opinion); Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co.,
826 F.2d 420, 423-24 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding physician's personal opinion of causation inadmis-
sible); Staggs v. Commonwealth, 877 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Ky. 1993) (finding expert witness's per-
sonal opinion irrelevant and far more prejudicial than probative when the testimony did not aid the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence).
387. Identical to its federal counterpart, Wyoming evidence law allows expert testimony "if
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." WYo. R. EvID. 702.
388. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993). The Wyoming Su-
preme Court adopted this position in Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435, 443 (Wyo. 1993).
389. Springfield, 860 P.2d at 443 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580).
390. Id.
391. See B.L.E. v. V.A.E., 791 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding "fragmentary
and unrevealing" audiotapes of child's statement insufficient to support allegations of sexual abuse
against father); Jane P. v. John P., 515 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (finding no
credibility in statements of three-year-old twin girls regarding alleged sexual abuse by their father
where the statements ranged from claims that the "touching" occurred "lots of times" in "all the
rooms" of the father's house to statements completely denying any "touching" by the father).
392. See B.L.E., 791 S.W.2d at 430 (finding no evidence of sexual abuse where child's state-
ments could have been the result of coaching by the mother and the influence which may have
resulted from the mother's reward of hugs and kisses any time the child made statements implicat-
ing the father as an abuser); O.J.G. v. G.W.G., 770 S.W.2d 372, 372 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (up-
holding joint award of custody where evidence indicated that statements by child that father had
sexually abused her were prompted by the mother); Swift v. Swift, 557 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (N.Y.
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Pamela further demonstrated that the trial court's characterization of Dr.
Jenny's testimony was completely contrary to her lengthy written report and
trial testimony in which she addressed each of the behaviors of which Dean
and Christine complained and explained why such behaviors did not indicate
sexual abuse.393 Pamela also challenged the trial court's concern that Dr. Jen-
ny failed to consider Miriam's statements to Dr. Brungardt on two levels.
First, Pamela argued, the trial court's finding was factually incorrect; Dr. Jen-
ny had considered Miriam's statements but found this "evidence" suffered
from the same flaws-primarily the repeated coaching of Miriam-which
rendered Miriam's "disclosures" to Mr. Rhodes invalid.394 Second, Pamela
pointed out that the court's finding was inconsistent because Dr. Brungardt
readily conceded that she would have to reconsider her own crediting of Miri-
am's statements in light of the facts that were withheld from her during her
examination of Miriam.395
Pamela challenged the trial court's dismissal of Dr. Bloom's conclusions
by demonstrating the direct contradiction between the trial court's character-
ization of Dr. Bloom's testimony, which included a charge that Dr Bloom
admitted "making overstatements and inaccurate quotations," and Dr. Bloom's
actual testimony at trial.396
Due to the procedural posture of the case, Dr. Moriarty's testimony was
not fully briefed to the court.397 In her Reply Brief to her original appeal,
however, Pamela summarized how Dr. Moriarty, who was Dean's chosen
expert, had independently confirmed the findings of Drs. Bloom and Jenny
that no sexual abuse had occurred and that the actions of Dean and Christine
were harming the children. 8 Pamela also noted Dr. Moriarty's criticism of
the methodology employed by Mr. Rhodes in concluding that the children had
been eroticized' 9Y
Finally, Pamela focused on the lower court's own language as proof that
the court improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the competent
App. Div. 1990) (invalidating claims of abuse based on a showing at trial of mother's strong mo-
tivation to influence her three-year-old daughter that her father had sexually abused her).
393. See Dr. Jenny's report, Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, at 6, Hertzler, No. 24-269 (July 6, 1994);
Tr. at 716-74 (Dr. Jenny's direct and cross examination).
394. Tr. at 747-52.
395. Id. at 193-202.
396. Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant at 47-49. Pamela pointed out, for example, that Dr. Bloom did
not admit (nor was he ever asked to admit) to making any "overstatements," and that while he
conceded to mistakenly placing a few words in quotes regarding the number of persons Miriam
accused of molesting her during Mr. Rhodes's videotaped interview, the content of the statement
was correct despite the errant quotation marks. Id. at 48 (citing Tr. at 680).
397. As previously noted, the Wyoming Supreme Court granted Pamela's Motion to Supple-
ment the record of her pending appeal with the transcript and exhibits of the January 31, 1995,
hearing. See supra note 376. Since the court did not order additional briefing regarding Dr.
Moriarty's findings or the proceedings of January 31, 1995, the only textual treatment on those
topics is contained in Pamela's Motion to Supplement and her Reply Brief submitted in the origi-
nal appeal. See Appellant's Motion to Supplement at 2-3, Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995)
(No. 94-262); Appellant's Reply Brief at 2-5, Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946 (Wyo. 1995) (No. 94-262)
[hereinafter Appellant's Reply Br.].
398. Appellant's Reply Br. at 4.
399. Id.
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expert testimony on the subject of sexual abuse. The trial court stated: "Be-
yond the testimony of experts, I find that it has been demonstrated by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that Miriam and Joshua have been exposed to
sexual behavior inappropriate to their ages while visiting with Plaintiff."'
Pamela argued:
When the court's statement is read in light of its condemnation of gay
and lesbian parents in the second half of its Decision Letter, two
things become readily apparent. First, the judge erred in rejecting the
compelling evidence presented by Plaintiff's experts who possess
decades of experience in the delicate area of child sexual abuse in
favor of his own amateur analysis. Second, all conclusions reached by
the trial judge were tainted by his belief that any exposure to a gay or
lesbian parent constitutes exposure to "inappropriate sexual behavior."
A review of the record in this case established that the only way the
court could independently conclude that Plaintiff had exposed her
children to "inappropriate sexual behavior" is if, perhaps even uncon-
sciously, the court embraced the stereotypes of homosexuals as sexual
perverts and child molesters which have long been disproven by solid
empirical data."°
N. The Wyoming Supreme Court's Decision
By a 3-2 decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
restrictions on Pamela's visitation.' In an opinion devoted primarily to vili-
fying both Pamela and Dean for their continued attempts "to reduce the chil-
dren to mere proselytes of conflicting lifestyles" 3-a castigation unwarrant-
ed of Pamela based on the record before the court-the supreme court held
that the trial court erred as a matter of law by qualifying Mr. Rhodes as an
expert and erred in its factual findings based on the testimony of Mr. Rhodes,





In addition to these errors of law and fact, the supreme court found that
the trial court's diatribe about homosexuality and family values constituted an
inappropriate indulgence in "an essentially personal viewpoint in derogation of
Pamela's lifestyle."'45 The trial court's views on homosexuality were not
supported by the "expert" testimony of Mr. Rhodes, the supreme court deter-
mined, since Rhodes's "acknowledged homophobic bias vitiate[d] any value
his testimony might have [had] as a factual basis for the district court's cri-
400. Decision Letter at 3 (emphasis added).
401. Appellant's Reply Br. at 9. See generally GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS (Fredrick W.
Bozett ed., 1987); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbians and Gay Parent, 63 CHILD DEV.
1025 (1992); Julie Schwartz Gottman, Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 14 MARRIAGE &
FAM. REv. 177 (1989).
402. Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 952 (Wyo. 1995).
403. Id. at 952.
404. Id. at 950-5 1.
405. Id. at 951.
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tique of homosexuality."'
Despite these major flaws in the trial court's decision, the supreme court
found no error in the trial court's summary rejection of the evidence presented
by Pamela's experts. The supreme court itself dismissed the quality and quan-
tity of this expert evidence in two short paragraphs:
Dean and Pamela both called expert witnesses to bolster their
cases. The district court rejected testimony of Pamela's experts, find-
ing it neither particularly useful nor credible. Our deference to that
decision cannot be extended to the district court's inappropriate reli-
ance on the testimony of Dean's expert, Mr. Rhodes. Mr. Rhodes'
categorical bias against homosexuality, compounded by his truncated
professional experience, necessarily relegate his views to the dubious
stature reserved by the district court for the opinions of Pamela's
experts.
Entirely discounting the "expert" testimony, we nonetheless dis-
cern a substantial basis in the record upon which to sustain the dis-
trict court. Searching the record for abuse of discretion, we cannot
say, under the circumstances revealed, that the district court's deci-
sion was either arbitrary or capricious.'
The supreme court's wholesale rejection of expert testimony in deference
to the trial court is ironic at best and dangerous at worst. As previously dis-
cussed, the supreme court renounced the trial court's reliance on Mr. Rhodes
due not only to Mr. Rhodes's lack of qualifications but also because of his
bias; the court further recognized that the trial court's personal bias improperly
influenced its decision. Despite the finding, the court gave complete deference
to the trial court's conclusory rejection of Pamela's compelling expert evi-
dence without addressing the need for experts in a case involving child sexual
abuse, the standards for expert witnesses, or the admissibility and weight that
should have been afforded Pamela's trial experts Drs. Bloom and Jenny. Also
conspicuously absent is any discussion of the testimony of Dean's chosen
counselor and child sexual abuse expert, Dr. Moriarty, which was presented at
the hearing held six months after the trial court issued its initial ruling. The
dangerous message conveyed through this opinion is that judges can disregard
credible expert testimony and decide cases based on their own personal beliefs
without fear of reversal on appeal.
The supreme court justified its affirmance of the specious trial court opin-
ion by repeatedly retreating to the degree of "discretion" afforded the trial
court in visitation and custody matters."8 Indeed, the supreme court specifi-
cally held that the trial court's blanket condemnation of homosexuality did not
present "indices of malice or prejudice sufficient to cast doubt upon the
court's capacity to remain 'open to the conviction which evidence might pro-
duce."'" It concluded by stating that "although we cannot condone the dis-
406. Id. at 950.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 951 (citations omitted).
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trict court's indulgence of a personal viewpoint, we likewise cannot reverse a
discretionary decision which is reasonable and benefits from substantial sup-
port in the record."41
The majority opinion begs the question of what "support" there is in the
record-much less "substantial support"--for the severe restriction of
Pamela's visitation rights other than the (now-discredited) testimony of Mr.
Rhodes and the trial judge's own conclusions based largely on his personal
bias.
The two dissenting justices answered this fundamental question by observ-
ing simply that there was no evidence to support the majority's affirmation of
the trial court's restrictions. Specifically, the dissent opined that the personal
bias of the judge and the "categorical bias" of Mr. Rhodes, Dean, and Chris-
tine mandate "that the district court's decision must be reversed and this mat-
ter remanded for a new trial presided over by a judge who does not hold such
views."4"' Moreover, the dissent criticized the majority for exceeding its re-
view function by engaging in fact finding, and then finding "facts" not sup-
ported in the record:
As I understand the evidence, the cause of the children's inappro-
priate behavior is found in the father's and Christine's "zealous
machinations," not the mother's.
The record quite clearly reveals that the father and Christine
worked long and hard at alienating these children from their mother.
They should have been held in contempt for what they have done;
instead, they are, despite the spin placed on it by the majority, re-
warded for their outrageous behavior." 2
In addition to the inherent flaws in the majority's reasoning illuminated by
the dissent, there is yet another irony underlying the Hertzler decision. The
majority's recitation of the "facts," including the statements that Pamela was
trying to indoctrinate the children to her lifestyle and that this supposed indoc-
trination was harming the children, finds little support in the record except for
the testimony and report of Mr. Rhodes. Thus, while purporting to reject all
expert testimony in this case, the majority relies upon-and thus gives cred-
ence to-the one "expert" they found uniquely unqualified to render an opin-
ion in this case.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
It is evident, from the kinds of testimony given by experts in the
mental health and medical fields, and from the untested and therefore
undocumented reliability and validity of the evaluative techniques,
that few safeguards exist for people, whether parents or surrogate care
providers, who are wrongly but vigorously accused of having molest-
410. Id. at 952.
411. Id. at 953.
412, Id. at 954.
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ed a child under their care or supervision."3
A comparison of the general evidentiary standards governing expert wit-
nesses with the particularly flawed application of those standards by the Wyo-
ming courts in Hertzler suggests that a three-tiered examination of a proffered
expert testimony is necessary in cases where gay or lesbian parents are ac-
cused of child sexual abuse. At each level of evaluation, the trial court must
be sensitive to the corrupting impact that anti-gay bias may have had on the
information obtained by the expert and the conclusions gleaned by the expert
from the information. This author advocates that any degree of bias should be
sufficient to prevent a witness from being qualified as an expert; at a mini-
mum, demonstrations of bias should substantially undermine the credibility of
the expert witness.
First, it must be established that the proffered expert possesses significant
experience in diagnosing sexual abuse and is familiar with the empirical data
regarding gay and lesbian parents. Second, the expert's sources of factual
information must be carefully examined for reliability in light of the emotion-
ally charged atmosphere in which the allegations are made and investigated.
Third, the methodologies and theories which the expert applied to the factual
information must be compared to the accepted practices in the expert's field.
It is, of course, highly unlikely that any witness will readily admit person-
al bias or concede the possible impact of bias on his testimony. Thus, a court
reviewing proffered expert testimony must look for indicia of bias which ma-
terialize, for example, "in testimony that is emotionally delivered, resistant to
change in light of new facts, or delivered with absolute certainty."4 4 Subtle
distortions of fact, inappropriate emphasis on minor details, and demonstra-
tions of either overt hostility or excessive leniency toward a party also suggest
that the expert "may be acting out of personal beliefs and attitudes rather than
professional expertise."4  Due to the importance of this screening process
for assuring full and fair adjudication of child sexual abuse allegations made
against a gay or lesbian parent, each tier is discussed more fully below.
A. Heightened Scrutiny of the Expert's Qualifications
Qualifying an expert on the basis of "knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing or education"" 6 allows a significant range of witnesses-from medical
doctors to social workers-to qualify as "experts" on the issue of child sexual
abuse in any given case."7 But as Mississippi's highest court advised,
"[c]ourts should proceed cautiously when considering the admissibility of
expert testimony on child sexual abuse. It is vitally important that profession-
413. Homer & Guyer It, supra note 5, at 382.
414. Stephen A. Newman, Assessing the Quality of Expert Testimony in Cases Involving Chil-
dren, J. PSYCHIATRY & L., Summer 1994, at 181, 205.
415. Id.
416. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also discussion supra Part I.A.
417. See discussion supra Part II.A.; see also Newman, supra note 414, at 184-86 (cautioning
that many so-called experts on child sexual abuse do not possess the requisite experience and
other qualifications necessary to make competent determinations).
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als offering such testimony be highly qualified. Courts should insist on a thor-
ough showing of expertise before permitting individuals to testify as ex-
perts."4 8 Some courts have taken this admonition to heart by recognizing,
for example, that the "mere fact that one is a licensed and practicing physician
hardly suggests expertise in child sexual abuse."4 '9
More specifically, courts should require a proffered child sexual abuse
expert to demonstrate competency in at least two categories.42 The first cate-
gory, "technical expertise," requires a showing that the expert possesses spe-
cialized skills in eliciting accurate information from the accused and the child;
principle tools of expertise include, for example, proper interviewing tech-
niques42' and the proper use of anatomically correct dolls. 22 The other
category, "cognate expertise," is satisfied by a showing that the expert pos-
sesses extensive knowledge in the areas of child development, sexuality and
related relevant topics.423
In addition to ascertaining an appropriate degree of theoretical and practi-
cal experience in the field,424 courts should make several additional threshold
inquiries of a witness proffered as an expert when a gay or lesbian parent is
accused of child sexual abuse. First, the witness should be extensively voir
dired to ascertain the extent of any personal bias he has against gay and lesbi-
an parents in general and the accused in particular. This is critically important
because an expert's attitude about a targeted individual may well be framed by
418. Goodson v. Mississippi, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1145 (Miss. 1990). For a list of appropriate
voir dire questions for child abuse experts, see Schultz, supra note 14, at 2.
419. Goodson, 566 So. 2d at 1145 n.2.
420. See Homer et al., supra note 7, at 142-44.
421. Common errors in interviews for determining whether a child was sexually abused in-
clude "using peer pressure and rewards, suggesting answers, supplying sexual knowledge and
vocabulary, offering information from other child interviews, and forcing children to continue
unwanted interviews." Newman, supra note 414, at 202-03.
422. Homer et al., supra note 7, at 143. The use of anatomical dolls is one type of "play
therapy" used to help children of tender years communicate with a therapist or interviewer. The
interviewer asks the child questions about the dolls, observes the child's physical handling of
them, and then draws conclusions as to whether the child has been sexually abused. Use of the
dolls has proven controversial due to the physical construct of the dolls which may include exag-
gerated sexual organs and the subjectivity inherent in the interviewer's interpretation of the child's
play with the dolls. See Newman, supra note 414, at 198-201; Judy S. DeLoache, The Use of
Dolls in Interviewing Young Children, in MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WITNESS 160,
160-78 (Maria S. Zaragoza et al. eds., 1995) (concluding that little empirical data exists showing
that the dolls are effective in determining whether a child has been sexually abused); see also
discussion of dolls infra Part IV.B.I.b.
423. Homer et al., supra note 7, at 143. Empirical studies, however, reveal that even when an
expert satisfies both categories of expertise, there remains in any given case a significant likeli-
hood of a false-positive finding of child sexual abuse. Id. at 144.
424. Although actual experience may be relevant in determining whether a particular individu-
al meets the legal criteria for an expert witness, there is "a considerable and consistent body of
research that runs contrary to the belief that experience improves clinicians' diagnostic or predic-
tive accuracy." David Faust, Use and Then Prove, or Prove and Then Use? Some Thoughts on the
Ethics of Mental Health Professionals' Courtroom Involvement, 3 ETHICS & BEHAV. 359, 373
(1993). The counter-intuitive finding that experience does not necessarily correlate with compe-
tence stems from the lack of feedback regarding a clinician's judgments, biases caused by self-
fulfilling prophesies, and systematic errors in a clinician's practice that are never uncovered. Id.
Psychologist Faust concludes that "given the current conditions under which we practice in the
mental health field, there are strong empirical and theoretical reasons to question the stereotype
that experience is the best teacher or even an effective one." Id.
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the expert's attitude toward the individual's defined population.425 Second,
the witness should be questioned as to whether the parent's sexual orientation
affected the selection and execution of a diagnostic methodology or influenced
his ultimate opinions in the case. Third, the witness should be required to
demonstrate significant familiarity with empirical data regarding the parenting
skills of gay and lesbian parents. No witness should be deemed an expert if
the responses to these lines of inquiry reveal, as they did in Hertzler, that the
professional opinions are contaminated by personal bias against gay or lesbian
parents or are otherwise inherently unreliable due to insufficient knowl-
edge.426
Some may argue that these areas of inquiry are inappropriate for deter-
mining expert status of a witness because a witness's bias affects only the
credibility-and not the admissibility-of the witness's testimony. The more
compelling argument, however, is that an expert's opinion contaminated by his
personal beliefs is not, as required by federal and state evidentiary rules and
the case law interpreting those rules, an opinion based on "scientific, technical
or other specialized knowledge [which] will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."427 Moreover, a biased
opinion is arguably irrelevant,4 2 and, even if relevant, properly excluded as
being more prejudicial than probative. 429 And, as the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized, "[p]rivate biases might be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. ' '4  Allowing an individual to
provide "expert" testimony contaminated by personal anti-gay animus legiti-
mizes that bias in direct contravention of the Supreme Court's mandate and
425. Homer & Guyer II, supra note 5, at 395.
426. Several courts have rejected "expert" evidence where the witness did not have the requi-
site knowledge regarding homosexuals to offer a credible opinion in the case. See, e.g., Baker v.
Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1131 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (discounting testimony of psychologist who
favored retaining Texas sodomy statute because expert's opinions were neither based on his inde-
* pendent research nor supported by literature in his field regarding the attributes of homosexuals),
rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985); Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293, 296 n.2
(Mass. 1983) (finding that because of expert psychiatrist's personal experience regarding his theo-
ries and the lack of supporting medical literature, his testimony that mere association between
minor child and homosexual parent would harm child was not credible).
427. FED. R. EvID. 702. See, e.g., Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360
(6th Cir. 1992) (stating that an expert opinion is inadmissible to the extent that it is a personal
opinion); Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding a physician's
unsupported personal opinion of causation inadmissible); Staggs v. Commonwealth, 877 S.W.2d
604, 606 (Ky. 1993) (finding expert witness's personal opinion was irrelevant and far more preju-
dicial than probative because the testimony did not aid the finder of fact in understanding the
evidence).
428. The Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., reiterated that
relevancy is the threshold requirement for all evidentiary determinations including the admissibili-
ty of a proffered expert's testimony. 509 U.S. 579, 586-93 (1993).
429. FED. R. EVID. 402 and its state law counterparts provide that, in general, relevant evi-
dence is admissible and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible, while FED. R. EVID. 401 and many of
its state law counterparts define relevant evidence as that which makes an important fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403 and its state law counter-
parts provide that even relevant evidence may be excluded for a variety of reasons, including
unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. Under these standards, an expert's attempt to cloak
his personal biases in the guise of a professional opinion renders that opinion irrelevant, and even
if deemed relevant, make it more prejudicial than probative.
430. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
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numerous rules of evidence.
Such contaminated testimony is also forbidden pursuant to the ethical
constraints adopted by the many disciplines from which experts on child sexu-
al abuse are routinely selected.43" ' For example, the "Guidelines for Child
Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings," adopted by the American Psy-
chological Association (APA) in 1994,432 caution "psychologists to be aware
of personal and societal biases '433 relating to sexual orientation and further
mandate that psychologists "must not rely on their own bias or unsupported
beliefs when rendering opinions. '434 A psychologist who cannot overcome
his bias is instructed to withdraw from the evaluation.433 Although the APA
guidelines are described by their drafters as "being aspirational in intent,'
436
psychologists "who do not follow them will be operating outside the standard
of practice as set forth by the parent organization" which governs their profes-
sion.437
Similar guidelines apply to social workers, counselors, and others who are
among the 60,000 members of the American Counseling Association (ACA).
A position paper authored by the ACA's Human Rights Committee states that
members should "engage in [an] ongoing examination of his/her own attitudes,
feelings, stereotypic views, perceptions and behaviors that might have prejudi-
cial or limiting impact on ... gay/lesbian persons,""43  and should be active
in trying to educate others and eliminate discrimination against gay and lesbian
individuals.439
431. For an excellent overview of the ethical constraints on the role of the mental health and
other expert witnesses, see Special Issue: The Ethics of Expert Witnessing, 3 ETHICS & BEHAV.
223 (1993); see also Diane H. Schetky, Ethical Issues in Forensic Psychiatry, in ETHICS & CHILD
MENTAL HEALTH 265, 266 (Jocelyn Y. Hattab ed., 1994) ("The psychiatrist needs to consider
whether her own strong personal beliefs preclude involvement in a particular case. Homophobia or
bias towards mothers having custody would preclude an objective assessment of a gay father seek-
ing custody of his child."); Sari H. Dworkin & Fernando Gutierrez, Counselors Be Aware: Clients
Come in Every Size, Shape, Color, and Sexual Orientation, 68 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 6, 7 (1989)
(noting that many therapists lack knowledge about their gay, lesbian and bisexual patients in direct
violation of their ethical standards as members of the American Association for Counseling and
Development).
432. See generally MATHILDA B. CANTER ET AL., ETHICS FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS-A COMMEN-
TARY ON THE APA ETHICS CODE (1994) (explaining, among other things, the importance of Stan-
dard 1.08, which requires respect for human differences including those based on sexual orienta-
tion; Standard 1.10, which mandates nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation among
other factors; and Standard 7.01, defining professionalism as including knowledge and competence
for expert witnesses especially where specialized knowledge of a specific population is required).
433. Ackerman, supra note 143, at 130, app. at 133. The APA revoked the membership of a
psychiatrist for violating its ethical principles when the psychiatrist misrepresented the empirical
data regarding homosexuality in a variety of forums. See Patricia J. Falk, The Prevalence of Social
Science in Gay Rights Cases: The Synergistic Influences of Historical Context, Justificatory Cita-
tions and Dissemination Efforts, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 65 n.247 (1994) [hereinafter Falk, Preva-
lence of Social Science].
434. Ackerman, supra note 143, at 131, app. at 133.
435. Id. app. at 133.
436. Id. at 129.
437. Id.
438. Position Paper of the Human Rights Committee of the American Association for Coun-
seling and Development 1 (1987), quoted in Dworkin & Gutierrez, supra note 431, at 6. The ACA
previously operated under the name of the American Association of Counseling and Development.
439. Id.
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In sum, the failure of an otherwise qualified expert to follow the standards
of ethics and professionalism established by her own discipline provides suffi-
cient grounds for excluding her proffered testimony because such testimony
fails to satisfy the "generally accepted" criterion of Frye and Daubert.
The third line of suggested inquiry before qualifying a witness as an ex-
pert-i.e. whether the expert is familiar with the empirical data on gay and
lesbian parents-is also critical. Knowledge of this data indicates an appropri-
ate sophistication regarding the overall atmosphere in which the allegations of
sexual abuse have been raised. Moreover, the witness will undoubtedly be
asked to comment on whether the parent's sexual orientation, even absent the
allegations of sexual abuse, is harmful to the child. A witness unfamiliar with
the data on gay and lesbian parents does not possess the knowledge base nec-
essary to form a credible opinion on that issue. In this respect, requiring famil-
iarity with empirical data on gay and lesbian parents is simply a logical exten-
sion of the "cognitive expertise" prerequisite for qualification as an expert wit-
ness.
B. Heightened Scrutiny of the Sources of Factual Information Upon Which a
Proffered Expert's Opinion is Based
Expert opinion is based upon facts. Inaccurate facts "directly lead to erro-
neous opinions."' Unfortunately, the procedures commonly used by experts
and others to gather the facts surrounding allegations of child sexual abuse are
commonly rife with opportunities for inaccuracy. As one family law judge
with substantial experience in child sexual abuse cases concluded: "[e]xperts,
with the best of intentions, often come to their conclusions using incompetent
and incomplete evidence, without regard for even the most basic due process
safeguards.""'
Civil cases in which allegations of child sexual abuse are raised often
share a common sequence of events."2 The child first makes a statement
suggesting inappropriate sexual behavior by the accused. The child's state-
ments may be spontaneous, but more frequently are given in response to prob-
ing and potentially coercive questioning by the accuser or other adult. The
following scenario is not uncommon:
Mistrustful and/or sexually preoccupied parents might misperceive
innocent bathing or toileting of the child by the estranged spouse as
evidence of sexual molestation. Washing, powdering, or drying of the
genital or anal area may be viewed as genital or anal fondling. In
these situations, the child might respond positively to the question,
"did Daddy touch your private parts?'" 3
440. Rotlevy, supra note 26, at 274.
441. Gallet, supra note 24, at 480.
442. See generally Ralph Underwager et al., Interrogation as a Learning Process, in ACCUSA-
TIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 19, 19-30 (Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager eds., 1988).
443. Arthur H. Green, Factors Contributing to False Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in
Custody Disputes, 15 CHILD & YOUTH SERVICES 177, 179 (1991).
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Next, the adult to whom the information is revealed-often a person who
is not an expert on sexual abuse-interprets the information as evidence of
sexual abuse. The accuser's attorney then rephrases and reinterprets the state-
ments to support allegations in civil pleadings. After litigation is commenced,
the child undergoes extensive physical and psychological evaluations by pro-
fessionals retained as experts by the parties. Finally, the experts offer conflict-
ing opinions as to whether the child's statements and behavior confirm or
negate the veracity of the allegations.
Throughout this process, the child is encouraged to tell and retell the story
as remolded by a series of interpreters. Ultimately, the retelling and reinterpre-
tation of the child's original statement and previous and subsequent behaviors
yields a result about as reliable as the child's game of "telephone," where a
message is whispered from player to player until the communication made to
the last player lacks even a remote resemblance to the content or import of the
initial statement. An expert's reliance on this potentially distorted message
from the child is further suspect due to its nature as classic hearsay.'
This "tell and interpret/retell and interpret" process is further complicated
when the accused is a gay or lesbian parent. The child may be receiving con-
tradictory information from the accuser and other adults regarding the meaning
of the parent's sexual orientation and the definition of inappropriate "sexual"
conduct. For example, the child may be told that two women holding hands,
hugging, or engaging in other innocuous demonstrations of affection are en-
gaging in homosexual conduct, with the emphasis on the "sexual" aspect of
the behavior. 45 Thus, the child may answer in the affirmative when asked if
his lesbian mother engages in "sexual" conduct with him, even though the
only contact between the child and mother was holding hands and hugging.
The potential for miscommunication and the resultant metamorphosis of
wholly innocuous conduct into allegations of child sexual abuse requires ex-
tremely close examination of the sources of factual information on which the
witness relied in forming his expert opinions and the methods the expert em-
ployed to harvest those facts. Sources of particular concern are the child al-
leged to be the victim of sexual abuse, the accuser, the accused, and other fact
witnesses. An expert's "[flailure to utilize these appropriate sources reduces
444. In the context of a criminal conviction for child sexual abuse where Confrontation
Clause rights are implicated, the U.S. Supreme Court warned that trial courts have a duty to ascer-
tain the reliability of a child's hearsay statement which forms the basis for an expert's opinion that
the abuse occurred; the reliability is to be assessed based upon the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement which "render the declarant particularly worthy of be-
lief." Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819 (1990). See generally Clay Edwards, Note, The Reliabil-
ily of Out-Of-Court Statements by Child Victims of Sexual Abuse: Evaluating Consistency Via the
Process of Disclosure, 33 J. FAM. L. 685 (1994-95) (presenting a thorough discussion of the hear-
say and other evidentiary rules governing a child's statements).
445. For homosexuals as well as heterosexuals, "[mlisinterpretation of normal caretaking
practices involving physical or affectionate contact between parent and child during bathing,
toileting, dressing, hugging, or kissing is often at the core of the abuse allegation." Green, supra
note 443, at 177.
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the value of any resulting opinion" considerably.'8 On the other hand, elicit-
ing accurate facts from these sources requires skill, patience, and the ability to
be a gatherer and observer of objective information rather than a reconstruc-
tionist seeking to build a factual base to support preconceived conclusions. ' 7
The failure of an investigator to look for explanations other than sexual abuse
for the child's statements and behaviors is one of many shortcomings indicat-
ing potential bias and incompetence of the expert."8
1. The Child
"Despite problems associated with children's disclosure, experts in the
field of child maltreatment agree that the history obtained from the child is
usually the most important evidence in diagnosing sexual abuse.""' 9 But
while social scientists agree that information received directly from the child
may be the most important information available in any given case, it may
also be the most unreliable.45 The unreliability is not predicated on lack of
faith in a child's veracity per se, but rather the child's "vulnerability, immatu-
rity, and impressionability." '45 Reversing a nursery school teacher's convic-
tions for child sexual abuse in the extremely high profile case of New Jersey
v. Michaels, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:452
Woven into our consideration of this case is the question of a child's
susceptibility to influence through coercive or suggestive questioning.
As the Appellate Division noted, there is a constantly broadening
body of scholarly authority [which] exists on the question of
children's susceptibility to improper interrogation. The expanse of
that literature encompasses a variety of views and conclusions.
Among the varying perspectives, however, the Appellate Division
found a consistent and recurrent concern over the capacity of the
interviewer and the interview process to distort a child's recollection
through unduly slanted interrogation techniques. The Appellate Divi-
sion concluded that certain interview practices are sufficiently coer-
446. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at 13-7.
447. See Newman, supra note 414, at 214-17 (explaining, inter alia, the importance of fact
finding and the difficulties inherent in determining past events).
448. See Schultz, supra note 14, at 4.
449. Dubowitz et al., supra note 157, at 688; see also Chery Hysjulien et al., Child Custody
Evaluations: A Review of Methods Used in Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 32 FAM.
& CONCILIATION Crs. REv. 466, 473 (1994) (stating that the interview is "one of the most impor-
tant methods used in child custody evaluations").
450. See Goodson v. Mississippi, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1146-47 (Miss. 1990) (excluding doctor's
testimony about allegedly "sexually traumatized" victim when doctor lacked specialized knowl-
edge and evidence did not support reliability of expert opinions regarding sexual abuse).
451. State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1372, 1376 (N.J. 1994). For an excellent overview of the
social science and legal challenges to determining the reliability, and hence admissibility, of child
testimony, see LucY S. McGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LE-
GAL SYSTEM (1994).
452. For a detailed description of the prosecution of Margaret Michael Kelly for child sexual
abuse, see Robert Rosenthal, State of New Jersey v. Margaret Kelly Michaels: An Overview, I
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 246 (1995). The same volume of this publication also contains the
amicus brief presented by the "Committee of Concerned Social Scientists" and a number of relat-
ed articles on the use of expert testimony in the prosecution of Michaels.
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cive or suggestive to alter irremediably the perceptions of the child
victim.453
The manner in which an expert questions a child regarding sexual abuse
allegations is of utmost concern in evaluating the reliability of the expert's
opinions based upon those interviews. "Recent research clearly shows that the
skill of the interviewer directly influences whether a child related a true mem-
ory, discusses a false belief, affirms details suggested by others, embellishes
fantasies, or provides no information at all. 454 Based on this scientific evi-
dence and courtroom experience, courts have also concluded that improper
child interview techniques can cause "memory". to be created for events which
never occurred and "that once tainted the distortion of the child's memory is
irremediable. 455
Accordingly, information provided directly by the child to the expert must
be carefully evaluated for contamination by persons who may have, intention-
ally or inadvertently, coached the child into saying-and possibly bel-
ieving-that certain events oc curred. An effective evaluation "requires a highly
nuanced inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding those inter-
views. Like confessions and identifications, the inculpatory capacity of state-
ments indicating the occurrence of sexual abuse and the anticipated testimony
about those occurrences requires that special care be taken to ensure their
reliability."456
a. Common Interview Errors
Asking the same question repeatedly is among the most common and
most serious interview errors. "When a child is asked a question and gives an
answer, and the question is immediately asked again, the child's normal reac-
453. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1376 (citations omitted). Margaret Kelly Michaels was sentenced
to 47 years in prison after a jury convicted her of 115 counts of sexual assault on twenty children
entrusted to her care as a nursery school teacher. The intermediate appellate court reversed the
convictions and remanded for retrial, inter alia, because the techniques used to. interrogate the
alleged victims were extremely coercive and suggestive. See State v. Michaels, 625 A.2d 489, 517
(N.J. Super. 1993). The appellate court also held that if the state decided to retry Michaels, it
would first have to hold a pretrial "taint hearing" in which the testimony of the alleged victims
would be examined to determine whether the interrogation itself distorted the children's memories
and caused them to fabricate their "memories" of sexual misconduct by the defendant. Id. at 516.
The New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously upheld the appellate court's finding regarding the
impropriety of the techniques used to interview the children and the necessity of a "taint" hearing
prior to a retrial. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1380. On December 2, 1994, the state announced its deci-
sion not to retry Michaels. The announcement came almost 10 years after the initial indictment
was returned and after Michaels had already spent five years in prison. See Evelyn Nieves, Prose-
cutors Drop Charges in Abuse Case from Mid-80s, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at 25.
454. Nancy E. Walker & Matthew Nguyen, Interviewing the Child Witness: The Do's and the
Don'ts, the How's and the Why's, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1587, 1588 (1996).
455. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1378. In an impassioned dissent in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.
836 (1990), Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, urged courts to
protect innocent persons charged with sexually abusing children and provided a lengthy overview
of the problems which stem from children's suggestibility regarding sexual abuse allegations. Id.
at 867-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Carol B. Cole & Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Memory of
Children, in CMLDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 178, 190-99 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1987)
(reporting that it is possible to create a memory in a child through improper interview techniques).
456. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1375. See generally Walker & Nguyen, supra note 454.
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tion is to assume that the first answer was wrong or displeasing to the adult
questioner."4 7 Additionally, "[t]he insidious effects of repeated questioning
are even more pronounced when the questions themselves over time suggest
information to the children." '458 Leading questions also render responses in-
herently unreliable,459 as does lack of neutrality by the interviewer.'
The interviewer's bias regarding the facts of the case provides another
common source of interview error:
The bias results in the interrogator more readily picking up informa-
tion that supports his beliefs and ignoring or not responding to details
which suggest a different direction or falsity of the assumptions....
Statements that contradict or do not fit into his beliefs will be seen as
lies or evasions or confusions. This is particularly evident in the inter-
rogation of children when a child says that nothing happened. The
interviewers almost universally just keep on plowing ahead, repeating
the question, asking other questions about the hypothesized, believed-
in event, and finally eliciting from the child the desired response. 6'
These bias-based flaws were well-documented in Mr. Rhodes's videotaped
interview of, Miriam in the Hertzler case." Moreover, a highly nuanced in-
quiry into the Hertzler case suggests that an expert's anti-gay bias can taint
the interview process in several other important respects. The interviewer may
focus only on responses which tend to inculpate an accused gay or lesbian
parent and disregard exculpatory information.: 3 Ambiguous information may
be construed as supporting the interviewer's preordained conclusions. The
interviewer may also overlook important messages that the child is trying to
convey-for example, that the accuser instilled the child's answers or that
someone other than the parent sexually abused the child.
To determine whether the interview was contaminated due to the expert's
anti-gay bias, a proffered expert should be voir dired extensively to determine
whether she adequately tested the child for suggestibility and coaching or, as
Mr. Rhodes erred in the Hertzler case, simply accepted the child's inculpatory
statements as true and ignored the child's exculpatory comments.' Addi-
457. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377 (citing Debra A. Poole & Lawrence T. White, Effects of
Question Repetition on the Eyewitness Testimony of Children and Adults, 27 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 975 (1991)). See generally Jean Montoya, Something Not so Funny Happened on the
Way to Conviction: The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 ARiz. L. REV. 927 (1993)
(documenting the numerous errors made during interviews of children where sexual abuse was
suspected).
458. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377.
459. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 813 (1990).
460. "Neutrality is crucial to ensure the evaluator remain as impartial and objective in provid-
ing information to the courts, which will guarantee the best-interest-of-the-child standard is met."
Hysjulien et al., supra note 449, at 473-74 (citations omitted).
461. Underwager et al., supra note 442, at 31.
462. See supra notes 268-273 and accompanying text.
463. The Michaels court recognized that "an interviewer's bias with respect to a suspected
person's guilt or innocence can have a marked effect on the accuracy of a child's statement."
Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1377 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has also accepted this reality.
See Wright, 497 U.S. at 813.
464. See supra notes 274-276 and accompanying text.
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tional specific inquiry should be made as to whether the expert explored the
child's understanding of the accused parent's sexual orientation, the sources of
information as to the parent's homosexuality, and the child's interpretation of
the impact of the parent's sexual orientation on the child. An expert's failure
to test the child's capacity for veracity and failure to gather information on the
child's perspective on the parent's sexual orientation should render the witness
unqualified to offer expert testimony based upon information received from
the child. Moreover, the court should substantially discount the reliability of an
expert's conclusions unless the expert videotaped the child's interview and can
show that appropriate questions were asked and the child's responses were
accurately reported. 65
b. Use of Anatomically Correct Dolls
An expert's use of anatomically correct dolls to elicit information from
the child must be closely scrutinized by the trial court. In this controversial
method of diagnosing sexual abuse, the expert observes the child playing with
anatomically correct dolls.' A display of age-inappropriate sexual knowl-
edge is interpreted as indicative of sexual abuse.
Substantial "[d]isagreement exists among researchers both as to the repre-
sentative characteristic of the dolls and conclusions that may be drawn from
children's play with them."'" Critics claim that the use of dolls is highly
suggestive' and that the dolls are at best therapeutic tools which do not
meet the criteria for scientific proof.69 Other commentators note that the
dolls are used for at least seven different functions ranging from "Icebreaker"
or "Comforter" to "Diagnostic Test""47 and that "any critique of the dolls
must take into account the specific function or role that the dolls serve in a
particular evaluation and the skills of the individual interviewer.""47 A few
courts have excluded testimony based on use of the dolls, but many courts
have deemed this evidence reliable.472 The American Professional Society on
the Abuse of Children advises that aberrant behavior with the dolls might sug-
gest that additional investigation is needed, but should not be considered a
465. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 812-13.
466. For an excellent discussion of presentation the effectiveness and pitfalls of using dolls in
diagnosing child sexual abuse, see Younts, supra note 6, at 708-20.
467. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at 13-21. See generally Mark D. Everson & Barbara W. Boat,
Putting the Anatomical Doll Controversy in Perspective: An Examination of the Major Uses and
Criticisms of the Dolls in Child Sexual Abuse Evaluations, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 113
(1994).
468. David C. Raskin & Phillip W. Esplin, Statement Validity Assessment: Interview Proce-
dures and Content Analysis of Children's Statements of Sexual Abuse, 13 BEHAV. ASSESSMENT
265, 270 (1991) (stating that dolls, puppets, drawings, and other techniques used to elicit informa-
tion during an interview with a child "frequently distract the child from the task of providing
complete and accurate descriptions, and they can be suggestive, provoke fantasy, and lack a scien-
tific basis").
469. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at 13-21; Schultz, supra note 14, at 5.
470. Everson & Boat, supra note 467, at 115-18.
471. Id. at 126.
472. See Margaret Bull Kovera et. al, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Effects
of Expert Evidence Type and Cross-Examination, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 653, 655 (1994).
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conclusive diagnosis of sexual abuse.473 As one expert explained:
The principal misuse of dolls occurs when ambiguous or equivocal
doll play behavior is the basis for a diagnosis of child abuse. In es-
sence, a clinician attempts to translate the child's behaviors into a
verbal account of an experience. Even the foremost proponents of the
utility of anatomically detailed dolls concede that the risk of inter-
viewer error when using doll play as a diagnostic test is unacceptably
high.
474
As demonstrated by Mr. Rhodes's use of dolls during a videotaped inter-
view with Miriam in the Hertzler case,47 there is an added twist to unreli-
ability when a gay or lesbian parent is at issue. While the variety of human
sexual activities belies defining a particular sexual act as "gay" or "straight,"
experts who utilize the dolls generally focus on any increased sexual
knowledge demonstrated by the child as evidence of sexual abuse. Simply put,
the fact that a child might be able to demonstrate how a male and female doll
would have sex does not indicate that they have learned this information from
a homosexual. If anything, it should tend to alert the evaluator that the het-
erosexual parent should also be considered a source of the child's sexual
knowledge.
2. The Accuser
The individual alleging child sexual abuse obviously offers key informa-
tion for the expert retained to evaluate such allegations of sexual abuse. Quite
frequently accusations come from a former spouse with unresolved feelings of
anger and rejection stemming from the separation or divorce. "[T]he frequency
of false accusations under these circumstances is quite high, especially because
of the vengeance and exclusionary benefits to be derived from such an accusa-
tion."476 Feelings of anger may be especially intense when the spouse who
decided to end the marriage has entered a new same-sex relationship.
The expert's evaluation of the accuser may reveal, among other things,
"any gross psychopathy, ulterior reasons for seeking custody such as punishing
the other parent or resolving unmet needs from some unrelated situation, or
unrealistic expectations about parenting." '477 In very rare instances, a thor-
ough evaluation will reveal that the accuser is suffering from Delusional Dis-
order or another mental illness which prevents her from distinguishing reality
from fiction47 and that the delusional parent has transferred her beliefs to
the child.479 In most cases, however, the "mistaken or false allegations are
473. See Newman, supra note 414, at 201, 228 n.67.
474. McGOUGH, supra note 451, at 246 (citing Everson & Boat, supra note 467).
475. See supra notes 268-273 and accompanying text.
476. GARDNER, supra note 14, at 126.
477. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at 13-8 (citations omitted).
478. See Martha L. Rogers, Delusional Disorder and the Evolution of Mistaken Sexual Alle-
gations in Child Custody Cases, 10 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 47, 47-48 (1992) (reporting that
"Delusional Disorder leading to accusations of sexual molestation is not a new or recent phenome-
non," and that other mental conditions of the accuser which should be considered include Affec-
tive Disorders, Schizophrenia, Brief Reactive Psychosis, and Paranoid Personality Disorder).
479. The child's dependence and intimate involvement with a parent who suffers from a delu-
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initiated by a parent who, rather than being psychotic, may have had overval-
ued ideas or may have evidenced less severe perceptional distortions that led
to a mistaken view of what transpired. ' '""o
It is tempting to paint the accuser as a vindictive villain willing to sacri-
fice the welfare of his children and to commit perjury to wreak vengeance on
his former spouse. The problem with such labeling is the paradox that the
accuser may be making the false allegations in good faith. The accuser may be
convinced, based on archaic stereotypes, previously unexamined religious or
moral tenets, or other sources of misinformation, that exposure to a gay or
lesbian parent causes sexual harm to the child. The accuser may believe, for
example, that a gay or lesbian parent is incapable of refraining from having
sexual contact with a child, especially a child of the same sex. The accuser
might also believe that the child's exposure to the gay or lesbian parent's
"lifestyle" will cause the child to become homosexual.
Such unfounded but emotionally charged fears may cause a parent to
become hypervigilant. An accuser who has no accurate knowledge of behav-
iors indicative of child sexual abuse might begin seeing "evidence" of sexual
abuse in every good-bye hug or kiss or other innocuous physical contact be-
tween the gay or lesbian parent and the child." In the Hertzler case, for ex-
ample, a washable Bugs Bunny tattoo was perceived as concrete evidence of
sexual abuse by the accusers. 2 Behaviors common in a child experiencing a
family breakup, such as crying, throwing tantrums, or otherwise acting out
when the child leaves one parent to be with the other, are also interpreted as
indicating that something awful must be responsible for the child's behavior.
Thus, it may be ignorance and overzealousness, rather than evil intent, that
motivate the accuser to level sexual abuse allegations against the gay or lesbi-
an parent. Such accusers rarely reconsider these conclusions even when faced
with compelling expert evidence that the child has not been sexually abused.
On the other hand, the accuser may intentionally raise false allegations of
sexual abuse to punish the other parent and to play into the possible bias and
prejudice of an expert or judge against gay and lesbian parents. Accusers in
this category have rightfully been the object of judicial scorn:
A parent who will deliberately use such means to further selfish inter-
ests is acting in his or her interests, and not in the child's interest.
Civilized people abhor and condemn sexual child abuse. Bringing
false charges of parental sexual abuse of children, and the deliberate
use of children as pawns to try to validate the charges, is equally
despicable and condemnable. 3
sional or similar disorder may cause the child to believe the accusation that the other parent has
been sexually molesting her. id. at 48-49.
480. Id. at 48.
481. A New York state family court judge reported his observations that while sometimes the
allegations of sexual abuse are manufactured by a parent or child, there are numerous cases where
the accusers are not lying but rather have misconstrued the facts. Gallet, supra note 24, at 482-83.
482. See supra notes 205-207 and accompanying text.
483. Becker v. Becker, 613 So. 2d 275, 279 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (the parties are not related to
the author) (finding the mother's false allegations of sexual abuse so detrimental that "the result-
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While attempting to assess the accuser's motivations for bringing the
sexual abuse allegations, the expert must carefully assess the extent to which
an anti-gay animus or other improper motivation has colored the accuser's
perceptions. The court should not qualify a witness as an expert where the
witness has unquestionably relied on the accuser's view of the facts without
seeking collaboration of the facts from other credible sources. 4
3. The Accused
Allegations of child sexual abuse devastate the accused's life from the
very moment the accusations are uttered. The accused may lose current em-
ployment and career opportunities. The accused may also be subject to scorn
and ostracism by family, friends, and acquaintances, incur substantial legal ex-
penses, and find herself defending against criminal charges while embroiled in
the civil custody or visitation litigation. 5 In addition, the lesbian or gay par-
ent must deal with the consequences of having his or her sexual orientation
made public. Even if the accused is ultimately vindicated, the damage caused
by the accusation will never fully be repaired. 6 The most serious long-term
ing damage" to the children was "incalculable"). The court further concluded that the mother's use
of the children as pawns in her battle against her former husband warranted termination of her
domiciliary custody. Id.; see also Hartman v. Hartman, 621 N.E.2d 917, 920 (I11. App. Ct. 1993)
(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to father where the
mother falsely alleged that the father had sexually abused their child); Mullins v. Mullins, 490
N.E.2d 1375, 1390-91 (I11. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that the permanent custody of parties' two
children was properly transferred to father where mother had made false allegations of sexual
abuse and where mother attempted to alienate children from their father by, inter alia, requiring
them to call their new stepfather "daddy" and their birth father by his surname). In an extreme
case, a parent who falsely accuses his co-parent of sexually-abusing their child may be found
civilly liable for damages under the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Rich-
ard R. Orsinger, Asserting Claims for Intentionally or Recklessly Causing Severe Emotional Dis-
tress in Connection with Divorce, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1253, 1254-55 (1994) (describing a recent
Texas case which could set a trend for other jurisdictions). A false accuser could also be prosecut-
ed for perjury, or even be sanctioned for tampering with witnesses. See Victor I. Vieth, Broken
Promises: A Call for Witness Tampering Sanctions in Cases of Child and Domestic Abuse, 18
HAMLINE L. REV. 181 (1994) (advocating prosecution of accused persons who attempt to improp-
erly influence child's testimony and noting the same standard could be used for accusers). The
growing body of potential sanctions for the "despicable" act of making false allegations of child
sexual abuse has also been expanded by state legislative action. For example, Minnesota law man-
dates that the court specifically consider, when determining the child's best interest, evidence that
a parent has made false allegations of sexual abuse. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (l)(a) (West
1990). California allows an award of costs against a party raising false allegations of child abuse
or neglect. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3027 (West Supp. 1996).
484. In a number of cases where no corroboration existed on the allegations of abuse, courts
have ordered a psychiatric examination of the accuser to test the accuser's veracity on the subject.
See SHUMAN supra note 6, at 13-25 and cases cited therein.
485. Once the allegations of child sexual abuse are made in one forum, such as a domestic
relations court, the accused may have to simultaneously defend herself against criminal charges,
disciplinary proceedings brought by professional licensing and disciplinary boards, and investiga-
tions by social services agencies.
486. For example, a person charged with sexual or other abuse of a child may be listed as a
"suspected" child abuser in a state child abuse registry even if the charges are found to be unsub-
stantiated. This registration could affect the accused's ability to obtain or maintain professional
licenses and to obtain employment. See Jill D. Moore, Comment, Charting a Course Between
Scylla and Charybdis: Child Abuse Registries and Procedural Due Process, 73 N.C. L. REV.
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effect may be the damage to the relationship between the accused and her
child. To protect the child while the case is pending, the court will often allow
limited, supervised visitation."
The short duration of these visits and the requirement that a "supervisor"
be present communicates to the child that the parent has done something
wrong and must be watched. In worst case scenarios, this message is amplified




Not surprisingly, a person accused of child sexual abuse may display a
high degree of righteous indignation and even hostility toward the accuser, the
court, and everyone associated with the legal proceedings, including the ex-
perts retained to evaluate the sexual abuse allegations. While such reactions
are certainly understandable, they can also be misread by the expert as being
overly-defensive and thus indicative of guilt. Conversely, an accused whose
innocence causes him to appear nonchalant about the charges may also be
perceived by the expert as reacting inappropriately, and thus not credible in his
denial of guilt. The accused is faced with a classic catch twenty-two situation
regarding any emotional display. Again, a court should view with extreme
skepticism any expert who condemns the accused based upon the accused's
negative reaction to the expert."
4. Other Fact Witnesses
Relatives, friends, neighbors, employers, pastors, social workers, investi-
gators, co-workers, acquaintances, and other individuals with varying degrees
of loyalty to one or both parties often play critical roles in custody and visita-
tion litigation both inside and outside of the courtroom. Those who had ample
opportunity to observe the accuser and/or the accused with the child may pro-
vide information to the expert about what they saw and heard, and may also
offer inferences or conclusions they drew from their observations.
Any witness's recounting of past events is, of course, always suspect due
to the unreliability of human memory.4' As the Texas Supreme Court re-
2063, 2111-20 (1995); Michael R. Phillips, Note, The Constitutionality of Employer-Accessible
Child Abuse Registries: Due Process Implications of Governmental Occupational Blacklisting, 92
MICH. L. REV. 139, 140-41 (1993).
487. Visitation is usually supervised by social workers or other child care workers approved
by the court, who often charge an hourly rate paid by the accused. The supervised visitation pro-
tects the accused (as well as the children) from additional allegations of inappropriate conduct
stemming from the supervised visitation, but also sends the message to the child that she is unsafe
in the presence of the accused.
488. This type of destructive behavior has come to be known as the "Parental Alienation
Syndrome." See generally Cheri L. Wood, Comment, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Dan-
gerous Aura of Reliability, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 136 (1994).
489. For a discussion of the impropriety of an expert relying on "evidence" that the accused
meets the "profile" of a sexual abuser, see infra notes 547-562 and accompanying text.
490. See generally ELIZABETH F. LoFrus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEwTrNESS TESTIMONY:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (2d ed. 1992) (explaining that memories of a particular event are inaccurate
reports and are highly vulnerable to revision and distortion due to after-acquired information);
ELIZABTH F. LoFrus & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE: THE ACCUsED, THE
EYEwITNEss, AND THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON TRIAL (1991) (documenting numerous
cases where persons convicted of crimes based on eyewitness testimony were later fully exonerat-
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cently observed:
Memory is a multifarious, complex, usually reconstructive process. It
does not retrieve information the way a video recorder or computer
does. Everything sensed is not stored; recall of picture perfect images
is not automatic. A variety of social, psychological, and developmen-
tal factors commonly cause distortions at each stage of the pro-
cess. 9
The inherent inability of each witness to relate past events accurately may
be compounded if the individual was surprised, disappointed, or disgusted by
the revelation of the accused's sexual orientation. Indeed, the accused's failure
to reveal her sexual orientation prior to the allegations may be interpreted as
indicative of a lack of integrity. Persons who might have otherwise provided
extremely positive information about the accused's parenting style may start
questioning whether they really knew the accused at all. Others may view the
sexual orientation itself as a fatal flaw which renders the accused per se unfit
to be in the company of her own child. Still others may seek to distance them-
selves from the accused based on fear of guilt by association with a gay or
lesbian individual and/or with an accused child sexual abuser.
Accordingly, rampant homophobia and the guilty-until-proven-innocent
aspect of child sexual abuse allegations may significantly distort the informa-
tion provided by fact witnesses to the expert. Any expert who fails to demon-
strate a high degree of awareness of the potential for such distortion as she
ascertains the "facts" on which to base her expert opinion should not be al-
lowed to offer those opinions at trial.
In addition, the expert's technique in interviewing the fact witnesses can
suffer from the same defects which distort the interview of the child.492
Thus, the expert should be thoroughly examined regarding the content of these
interviews.
5. Conclusions Regarding the Expert's Sources of Factual Data
Experts must exercise discretion and judgment in determining which facts
should inform their expert opinions. Nothing in this article is intended to sug-
gest that the judge should attempt to re-evaluate every credibility determina-
tion made by an expert in a particular case. On the other hand, a court does
not adequately perform its gatekeeping function regarding expert testimony
unless it closely assesses the sources of the expert's factual information and
the methodology used by the expert to elicit that information, especially when
the source is the child. And in cases where the "facts" on which the expert
relies are-as in the Hertzler case-provided by individuals with demonstrated
anti-gay bias and a child who has been repeatedly coached by the accuser, any
ed for the crimes).
491. S.V. v. R.V., No. 94-0856, 1996 Tex. LEXIS 30, at *51 (Tex. March 14, 1996) (citations
omitted).
492. See generally Stephan Landsman, Reforming Adversary Procedure: A Proposal Concern-
ing the Psychiatry of Memory and the Testimony of Disinterested Witnesses, 45 U. Prr. L. REV.
547 (1984) (discussing various problems involving distortions of witness recollections).
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expert opinion based thereon fails to pass the threshold test for reliability.
Accordingly, the witness who forms opinions based on unreliable factual infor-
mation should not be qualified as an expert.
C. Heightened Scrutiny of the Expert's Interpretation of the Factual Data
Experts presented with the same factual basis for child sexual abuse alle-
gations in a particular instance offer a wide range of opinions as to the proba-
bility of child sexual abuse.493 This reality mandates that courts adopt "an
extremely cautious stance toward expert interpretation of material generated
by the fact-finding process,"494 even if the process itself is deemed compe-
tent.
Obviously, an expert's "interpretation" of factual data is inextricably inter-
twined with the expert's method of gathering data. One need look no further
than the Hertzler case where Mr. Rhodes disregarded the children's exculpato-
ry statements and selectively relied upon their inconsistent inculpatory state-
ments as verification of an interconnection between data gathering and inter-
pretation of that data.
Nonetheless, scrutiny of an expert's interpretation of data is necessary to
screen for anti-gay bias and to assure the proper evidentiary standards of trust-
worthiness as demanded by Frye and Daubert. Caution is required because
"[d]eterminations of whether a child has been sexually abused can be flawed
not only by mental health professionals' biases or assumptions, but also by
their use of unreliable assessment procedures. This leads them to misinterpret
their findings, which clearly can have significant repercussions for everyone
involved."495
Pursuant to Daubert, careful screening of the expert's assessment proce-
dures "entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodol-
ogy underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and whether it can be ap-
plied to the facts at issue."'  As the attorney who argued the Daubert
plaintiffs' case before the Supreme Court deduced, "the Daubert opinion re-
quires that the focus in determining reliability be on the methodology em-
ployed by experts, not the conclusions they have reached."497 In Frye par-
lance, the court must make sure that the expert's selection of a methodology
and ensuing application follow the generally accepted practices in the relevant
discipline.
Methodologies with the greatest potential for abuse due to the expert's
preconceived, subjective view of the allegations of sexual abuse, include in-
appropriate interviewing techniques and use of anatomically correct dolls, both
discussed previously.498 The use of expert testimony regarding a child's ve-
493. Homer & Guyer H, supra note 5, at 402.
494. Id. (emphasis in original).
495. Schultz, supra note 14, at 1.
496. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
497. Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert: The "Prestige"
Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867, 869 (1994).
498. For a discussion of the interviewing process, see supra Part IV.B.I.a. For a discussion of
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racity, reliance on psychological "syndromes" as a method for diagnosing
child sexual abuse, and the use of a personality "profile" to determine an
accused's guilt or innocence deserve additional attention.'
1. Expert Opinion of a Child's Veracity
When the child testifies, experts are sometimes offered to evaluate child-
ren's ability and propensity for telling the truth.s"e An exhaustive analysis of
the issues surrounding the testimony of the child5"' is outside the scope of
this article, but a brief discussion is provided below regarding expert testimony
concerning the child's veracity.
Expert opinions on the veracity of any witness's statements are suspect,
inter alia, because they invade the province of the finder of fact-whether it
be the judge or the jury-to independently assess the credibility of each
witness.5" Some argue that courts' reluctance to allow an expert to opine on
children's veracity is firmly (but misguidedly) based in the archaic rule that
witnesses could not testify on the "ultimate issue" in a case."' in civil cases,
Federal Rule of Evidence 704 and many state rules expressly reject this posi-
tion and provide that "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference other-
wise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to
be decided by the trier of fact.' '""s
Under modern rules of evidence, an experts' testimony regarding chil-
dren's propensity for truthfulness might be admissible if the expert relied upon
a methodology that had attained general acceptance in the relevant social sci-
ence community, and if the testimony otherwise satisfied any required eviden-
tiary standards in the particular jurisdiction. The "if' part of this scenario
cannot be satisfied at present, since "there is as yet no widespread agreement
among researchers that an empirically valid test exists for determining the
truthfulness of a particular child.""5 5
Evidentiary reliability is particularly suspect when children's statements
regarding sexual abuse are being evaluated."°6 However, a set of protocols
known as "statement validity assessment" (SVA) is showing some degree of
reliability for evaluation of children's statements of sexual abuse."° 7
the use of anatomically correct dolls, see supra Part IV.B.I.b.
499. For a comprehensive analysis of the complications inherent in applying the Daubert stan-
dards to psychological syndromes, see Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 10 n.3.
500. See generally McGOUGH, supra note 451, at 233-67.
501. The multitude of evidentiary problems surrounding the admissibility and credibility of a
child's testimony in sexual abuse and other cases are exhaustively addressed in McGOUGH, supra
note 451, at 23-188 and in MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WITNESS (Maria S. Zaragoza
et al. eds., 1995). For an extensive collection of publications addressing the legal and psychologi-
cal issues associated with children's testimony, see generally CHILD WITNESSES BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Tarlton Legal Bibliography Series No. 38, Kristin A. Cheney ed., 1993).
502. MCGOUGH, supra note 451, at 239; see Gallet, supra note 24, at 483 & n.15; United
States v. Whitted, II F.3d 782, 785-86 (8th Cir. 1993).
503. MCGOUGH, supra note 451, at 236-40.
504. FED. R. EVID. 704; see also Whirred, 11 F.3d at 785 (stating that expert's opinion is not
inadmissible merely because it contains conclusions on the ultimate issue).
505. McGOuGH, supra note 451, at 249-50.
506. Id. at 250-52.
507. Id. at 252. The precursor of SVA, Statement Reality Analysis, was used in Germany for
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"Statement analysis is based on the premise that descriptions of events
that were actually experienced differ in content, quality, and expression from
those that are invented.""5 8 SVA involves a three phase analysis of the state-
ments to the interviewer which were made by the alleged victim.5"
In the first phase, the interviewer gathers as much information as possible
about the victim, the accused, the family's history and current situation, and
previous allegations of sexual abuse."' The interviewer uses this information
to develop various hypotheses such as (1) the allegations are basically true; (2)
the allegations are true, but the child has identified the wrong perpetrator; or
(3) the child has been coached by another to make an entirely false accusa-
tions. ' Developing these hypotheses helps avoid "problems of self-fulfilling
expectations that arise when an investigator has only one hypothesis.""5 2 Af-
ter the hypotheses are framed, the "trained and skilled investigative interview-
er"51 3 conducts a videotaped session with the child during which the abuse
issue is explored in a non-suggestive and age-appropriate manner." 4
In phase two, the interviewer performs a "Criteria-Based Content Analy-
sis" (CBCA) from the transcript of the child's statements during the video-
taped interview." 5 The 18 criteria are grouped into three categories: "general
characteristics," such as logical structure of the child's statements and quantity
of details as to time, place and other aspects of the alleged abuse; "specific
contents," including the reproduction of speech-i.e., quoting the ac-
cused-using language not appropriate for a child, unusual but realistic details,
and description of the child's feelings or thoughts during the incident; and
"motivation-related contents," such as spontaneous corrections or additions and
admissions of lack of memory or knowledge. 6
In the third phase, the evaluator systematically addresses each point on a
"Validity Checklist" which is designed to prevent "premature conclusions
based on bias or preconceived notions"5 7 and to foster "a systematic consid-
eration of all necessary and available information that may contribute to a
fully informed and reasoned conclusion." 5 The points which the interviewer
must consider further to validate a child's statements and his own hypothesis
of the case include the cognitive and emotional limits of the child, the child's
years before being imported to the United States and other countries. Raskin & Esplin, supra note
468, at 267.
508. See, e.g., David C. Raskin & John C. Yuille, Problems in Evaluating Interviews of Chil-
dren in Sexual Abuse Cases, in PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY 184, 195 (Stephen C.
Ceci et al. eds., 1989).
509. Raskin & Esplin, supra note 468, at 268; see also Charles R. Honts, Assessing
Children's Credibility: Scientific and Legal Issues in 1994, 70 N.D. L. REV. 879 (1994) (discuss-
ing SVA in light of modern evidentiary concerns).
510. Raskin & Esplin, supra note 468, at 271.
511. Id. at272.
512. Honts, supra note 509, at 889.
513. Raskin & Esplin, supra note 468, at 269.
514. Id. at 270-71, 273-78; Honts, supra note 509, at 889.
515. Raskin & Esplin, supra note 468, at 278.
516. Id. at 279, tbl. 1.
517. Id. at 286.
518. Id.
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affect during the interview, level of suggestibility, motivations for reporting,
influence by others, the quality of the interview itself based on accepted stan-
dards, and contradictory evidence from other sources. 9
The reliability, and hence admissibility, of SVA evidence has been
exhaustively addressed elsewhere and need not be repeated here.52° What is
evident, even from this abbreviated explanation, is that many of the factors
and criteria applied to the child's statements, such as the appropriateness of
the level of detail or the child's general cognitive and emotional states, are not
objectively quantifiable. Thus, despite the laudable goal of SVA to remove
biases and preconceived notions of the evaluator, there is still sufficient room
for subjective interpretations-and thus conclusions-in any given case. At a
minimum, however, SVA provides a useful guide for courts to determine
whether appropriate techniques were used by an expert in interviewing the
child, gathering information from other sources, and analyzing the data.
Additionally, an expert often lacks sufficient information to apply whatev-
er criteria is chosen. As one author explained:
[W]hen a clinician purports to "diagnose" truthfulness, he or she is
often relying on the absence of recantation, inconsistency, or other
obvious hallmarks of falsity during the evaluation session. The expert,
however, usually lacks critical information necessary for a thorough
assessment of the impact of prior suggestive interviewing of the child
or other contaminants of the child's account.52" '
In sum, expert testimony which purports to gauge the truthfulness of a
child's statements of sexual abuse must be carefully screened for trustworthi-
ness as required by Daubert, Frye, and other evidentiary benchmarks. Any
bias in an expert, including anti-gay sentiment, which would compound the
weakness inherent in his testimony must also be exposed through voir dire to
determine whether the partisanship affected his proffered opinion of the child's
veracity.
2. Reliance on Syndromes as a Diagnostic Tool
The proliferation of allegations of sexual abuse in domestic relation dis-
putes has itself been described as a "syndrome., 2 2 But even more frighten-
ing is a display of a phenomena aptly dubbed the "syndrome syndrome," '523
in which a number of characteristics and behaviors of the alleged victim and
the accused have been grouped into various syndromes and disorders which
purportedly prove or disprove that sexual abuse occurred. These include Paren-
tal Alienation Syndrome (PAS),524 Sexually Abused Child Syndrome
519. Id. at 287, tbl. 2.
520. See generally Raskin & Esplin, supra note 468; Honts, supra note 509.
521. McGOUGH, supra note 451, at 250.
522. The phrase coined for such cases is the "Sexual Abuse Allegations in Divorce Cases
Syndrome" or the "SAID Syndrome." See, e.g., Homer & Guyer I, supra note 1, at 219-20 & n.9.
523. See generally David Wallace, The Syndrome Syndrome: Problems Concerning the Ad-
missibility of Expert Testimony on Psychological Profiles, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1035, 1036-37
(1985).
524. Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) is a disorder identified by Richard Gardner, M.D., a
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(SACS)5 25 Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS),526
and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (or Syndrome) (PTSD)"'
A "syndrome" is "a cluster of symptoms that appear together regularly
enough to be considered associated. Unlike diseases, syndromes have no speci-
clinical professor of child psychology. See generally GARDNER, supra note 14. PAS is character-
ized by a child's preoccupation "with deprecation and criticism of a parent... that is unjustified
and/or exaggerated." Id. at 59. The syndrome is the result of "brainwashing" and "programming"
of the child by one parent against the other parent and other situational factors. Id. at 59-60. Alle-
gations of sexual abuse have become "a common addition" in such cases. Id. at 126. As one court
observed, "explicit vilification or criticism of the person charged with wrongdoing is another fac-
tor that can induce a child to believe abuse has occurred" when in fact it has not. State v.
Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1377 (N.J. 1994) (citations omitted). For an interesting discussion of the
difference in admissibility of PAS under Frye as compared to Daubert, see Wood, supra note 488,
at 1394-97.
525. See Schultz, supra note 14, at 7. Child behaviors associated with this syndrome "include
excessive masturbation, fears, depression, pseudomaturity, inappropriate sexual play, sleep distur-
bances, and bed wetting." Id. As Schultz and others point out, "[c]hildren's behavioral symptoms
alone are not sufficient grounds for deciding that they have been sexually abused." Id. (citations
omitted).
526. Dr. Roland Summit defined CSAAS as consisting of five behaviors which, if present,
indicate that a child has been sexually abused: helplessness; secrecy; entrapment and accommoda-
tion; delayed, conflicted and unconvincing disclosure of abuse; and retraction of the disclosure.
Roland C. Summit, M.D., The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 177, 181-88 (1983). Among the many flaws critics find in CSAAS is that it was devel-
oped as a way to provide therapy for children and not as a tool to diagnose sexual abuse. See gen-
erally Rosemary L. Flint, Note, Child Sexual Abuse Accomodation Syndrome: Admissibility Re-
quirements, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 171 (1995); Robert J. Levy, Using "Scientific" Testimony to
Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 383 (1989) (discussing CSAAS and problems with its
use); Myers et al., supra note 39, at 67-69 (same); Schultz, supra note 14, at 7-8 (suggesting that
CSAAS is helpful but only in limited situations and not as a general tool for diagnosing sexual
abuse); Underwager & Wakefield, supra note 79, at 162 (arguing that evidence of CSAAS is inad-
missible under Daubert). See also K.A. Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on Chil-
dren: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies 113 PSYCH. BULL. 164 (1993) (noting
that certain behaviors relied upon for CSAAS are frequently found in nonabused children as well
as abused children); Newman, supra note 414, at 193-97 (describing Dr. Summit's responses to
criticisms of CSAAS). Courts have been hesitant to recognize CSAAS as proof that sexual abuse
occurred. See Kovera et al., supra note 472, at 654; SAGATUN & LEONARD, supra note 150, at
222 (discussing cases in which the syndrome testimony was admitted and rejected); see also Stew-
ard v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 491-97 (Ind. 1995) (discussing the admissibility of CSAAS in vari-
ous jurisdictions). The use of expert testimony based on CSAAS was viewed by an intermediate
appellate court as an independently sufficient reason for reversing the conviction of Margaret
Kelly Michaels, a case discussed supra at notes 452-458 and accompanying text. See generally
Mary Ann Mason, The Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome: The Other Major Issue in State of New
Jersey v. Margaret Kelly Michaels, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 399 (1995).
527. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is the only one of the aforementioned syndromes recog-
nized in DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994) [herein-
after DSM-IV] which is the bible of mental health professionals. "The essential feature of Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder is the development of characteristic symptoms following exposure to an
extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or
threatened death or serious injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity." DSM-IV at 424.
Frequent reexperiencing of the traumatic event, avoidance of stimuli associated with the event and
numbing of general responsiveness, and persistent increased arousal are characteristic symptoms of
this disorder. Id. Children's responses to the event also "must include disorganized or agitated
behavior," id., and may also include repetitive play reenacting the traumatic event. Id. at 426.
Since the diagnostic criteria for PTSD is premised on the knowledge that the traumatic event did
in fact occur, id. at 427, the mere existence of some of the PTSD symptoms cannot be cited to
prove the occurrence of the event. S.V. v. R.V., No. 94-0856, 1996 Tex. LEXIS 30, at *61 (Tex.
Mar. 14, 1996) ("Obviously, a PTSD diagnosis cannot establish the occurrence of a trauma that it
presupposes" or prove who caused it if one did occur.).
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fied temporal course, nor is a pathological nature necessarily clear. Therefore,
syndromes vary in the certainty with which they allow inferences about etiolo-
gy.,
528
By definition, a "syndrome" does not provide information about the cause
of the. symptoms or behaviors comprising the syndrome.529 Grouping a series
of behaviors under the rubric of a "syndrome" may create a helpful tool for
designing an appropriate treatment milieu for a child demonstrating the behav-
iors, but the collection should not be used as a post hoc certification as to the
cause of the behaviors. Accordingly, an expert's testimony that a child's be-
havior is "consistent with" sexual abuse should be a red flag to any lawyer or
judge evaluating syndrome testimony. Simply put, a syndrome-based correla-
tion between a certain behavior and sexual abuse does not mean that sexual
abuse occurred. 3 One commentator offered this apt analogy: "The symptom
of headache is consistent with being hit over the head with a blunt instrument,
but blunt instruments do not cause most people's headaches."53' And, as
New Hampshire's highest court explained in rejecting the use of CSAAS evi-
dence to prove that a child had been abused, "[m]any of the symptoms consid-
ered to be indicators of sexual abuse, such as nightmares, forgetfulness, and
over-eating, could just as easily be the result of some other problem, or simply
may be appearing in the natural course of the children's development." '32
Moreover, the proliferation of syndromes makes any syndrome-based
diagnosis of sexual abuse vulnerable to attack by comparison to a syndrome
not used by the testifying expert. Direct conflicts between certain syndromes
prove especially troublesome. While one syndrome cites a particular symptom
as highly indicative of abuse, another syndrome relies on the same symptom
as evidence that no abuse occurred. For example, an expert making a diagno-
sis based on CSAAS criteria perceives a child's delayed and unconvincing
disclosure of abuse and a subsequent retraction as proof that sexual abuse
occurred; in contrast, an expert relying on PAS syndrome views those same
behaviors as evidence that the accusing parent has brainwashed the child to
make false sexual abuse allegations against the other parent. 33 In short, se-
528. Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 11.
529. "Some judges .... perhaps mislead by testifying experts, persist in calling the syndrome
an accepted diagnosis. And courts in child protective proceedings sometimes allow this testimony
to be used to help prove abuse occurred .... " Newman, supra note 414, at 195 (emphasis in
original).
530. United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785-86 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining numerous
courts' observations regarding the inadmissibility of a physician's diagnosis of sexual abuse).
531. Newman, supra note 414, at 196.
532. State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 700 (N.H. 1993); see also State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d
1116, 1125 (La. 1993) (rejecting CSAAS evidence due to the impossibility of testing its accuracy,
the court opined: "This untestability comes from its very nature as an opinion as to the causes of
human behavior, and the fact that the methods for testing the results of psychoanalysis are rife
with the potential for inaccuracy.").
533. Such conflicting interpretations of behavior permeate other areas of child sexual abuse
evaluations including the physical examination of the child.
For instance, calmness of a child during genital examination is sometimes taken as evi-
dence that he or she is used to having his or her genitals handled, whereas in other cases
a child may struggle during a genital exam, which is sometimes interpreted to mean that
the child has experienced genital trauma through sexual abuse.
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lection of a particular syndrome can dictate the result of whether abuse did or
did not occur.534
An expert's reliance on a cluster of symptoms to support a syndrome
indicating child sexual abuse may also insulate the expert from effective cross
examination. Even if a party discredits several of the "symptoms" relied on by
the expert, the expert "can easily dismiss the critique by saying that her evalu-
ation relies on no one symptom or indicator and that her conclusions still hold
true in light of all the other available factors and her expertise in the
field."
5 35
Another consequence of the geometric growth of psychological syndromes
is that this vast and often conflicting body of scientific evidence allows a
judge to validate expert testimony based on her own personal bias. Commenta-
tors have recently echoed Professor Jasanoff's concern 36 that personal biases
may overtake reasoned conclusions in cases where syndrome evidence takes
center stage:
With new syndromes being offered regularly,. .. the courts have at
times sought refuge in Frye-like general acceptance principles to
create order out of what appears to be a chaotic situation. But court
decisions have also been influenced by strong personal feelings and
opinions, media attention to certain topics, and public opinion about
emotionally loaded charges such as child sexual abuse. 37
The malleability of syndrome evidence thus allows experts and judges to
hide their own "strong personal feelings and opinions" 3' behind a mask of
scientific evidence. The papier-mache like layers of evidence forming the
mask may include significant anti-gay bias. And yet, like papier-mache, the
mask as a whole projects structural integrity established by the expert's appli-
cation of "objective" factual findings to credible scientific theory.
The potential for bias does not mean that all syndrome evidence offered
for any purpose should be rejected. For example, in some cases syndrome
evidence may be helpful to explain to the trier of fact that certain of the
child's behaviors which may seem counterindicative of sexual abuse, such as
failing to reveal the abuse for a long period of time or recanting the allega-
tions, are not unusual for sexually abused children. 39 On the other hand,
syndromes should not be relied upon for rendering an absolute determination
that sexual abuse has or has not occurred."4 Thus, rather than being blindly
Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 13.
534. The actual impact of syndrome evidence on the trier of fact is unknown. Limited experi-
mentation has indicated that jurors are somewhat skeptical about an expert's opinion on alleged
sexual abuse if that opinion is based on syndrome evidence. See Kovera et al., supra note 472, at
664. The experiment did not, however, test the impact of the evidence in a case tried to a judge.
Id.
535. Cressey, 628 A.2d at 701.
536. See Jasanoff, supra note 89, at 82.
537. Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 11.
538. Id.
539. See David McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to
the Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19,
43-44 (1987).
540. Id. at 41 (noting that "research has indicated that children react in incredibly diverse
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accepted or automatically rejected, syndrome evidence, as well as resulting
expert opinions, should be carefully screened to determine whether it meets
the threshold requirements of reliability and trustworthiness as required by
Frye, Daubert, and the most rudimentary rules applicable to all categories of
evidence. Properly done, this screening will reveal any anti-gay bias as well as
scientific shortcomings of syndromes as a diagnostic tool.
The heightened scrutiny of syndrome evidence begins by questioning
whether the "syndrome" actually exists in the scientific arena from which it
purportedly comes. 4' This inquiry is partially answered by the amount of
text (or lack thereof) devoted to the syndrome in scientific journals and
treatises and the content of the texts. The potential error rate associated with
application of the syndrome must also be revealed.542 If the potential for er-
rors (measured by the numbers of false positives and false negatives predict-
ably produced through application of the syndrome) has not or cannot be cal-
culated, the court should seriously question the scientific validity of the evi-
dence.543 Other key questions for testing the validity of a syndrome are
whether the data on which the syndrome is based was "gathered in ways that
allowed researcher preferences to influence the results,"5" and whether there
have "been inadequate replications of the findings""54 compared to a claim of
a syndrome culled from a very narrow data base." Of course, a showing
must also be made that the syndrome has achieved some degree of general
acceptance in the relevant discipline. Most important, courts must be ex-
tremely wary of experts who rely on syndrome evidence as the definitive diag-
nostic tool for determining whether the sexual abuse occurred.
If the court is satisfied that the syndrome itself meets the basic require-
ments for credible scientific evidence, it must further review the expert testi-
mony for potential trouble spots in the application of the syndrome to the facts
of the case at issue. For example, an expert who ignores the presence or the
omission of certain behaviors inconsistent with the syndrome cannot have
made a credible scientific determination based on the syndrome.
3. Expert Opinion Based on Psychological Tests and Profiles
A battery of psychological tests is routinely used by mental health profes-
sionals to ascertain whether an individual suffers from a particular disorder
and to help identify an appropriate course of treatment.547 Like syndrome
evidence, these tests have not been validated as an accurate means of deter-
mining whether a child has been sexually abused or whether the accused was
ways to sexual abuse" and that mental health professionals have been unsuccessful in their efforts
to identify specific reactions common to all sexually abused children).
541. Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 15.
542. This is specifically demanded by Daubert and the general rules of evidence which re-
quire exclusion of untrustworthy evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 594-95 (1993).
543. See generally Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 14-15.
544. Id. at 15.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Schultz, supra note 14, at 5-6.
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the perpetrator. In an article cautioning evaluators charged with determining
the veracity of sexual abuse allegations raised in custody battles, two experts
explained:
When using psychological testing in custody and/or sexual abuse
evaluations, it is essential to recognize their limitations and communi-
cate those limitations to the court or official agency involved. It must
be clearly stated that there is no one-to-one correspondence between
test results and the tendency to commit inappropriate sexual acts. No




Despite such caveats which arguably render expert testimony based on
these tests inadmissible under both the Frye and Daubert standards, some
experts still attempt to rely upon results of tests such as the Multiphasic Sex
Inventory II, the Sexual Abuse Legitimacy Scale, the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI), and even the psychological interpretation of the
alleged victim's art work549 as proof that specific child sexual abuse allega-
tions are true or false.55° In addition, comparisons of personality traits exhib-
ited by the accused to traits associated with pedophiles have also been offered
not only to prove that the abuse occurred but that the accused was or was not
the perpetrator.55' Experts have also claimed that they can use MMPI results
and other data to identify personality traits of persons likely to make false
allegations of sexual abuse. 52
Courts have been appropriately suspicious of expert testimony predicated
on this type of data.555 For example, in State v. Foret,54 the Louisiana Su-
548. Cooke & Cooke, supra note 3, at 59.
549. Schultz, supra note 14, at 5-6.
550. Id. at 5; see also Sandra Morris, From Marital Ruins, Unthinkable Torment for Young
Innocents, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1, 1988, at 16 (written by an attorney who defends the use of
MMPI and profile evidence in childhood sexual abuse cases); S.V. v. R.V., No. 94-0856, 1996
Tex. LEXIS 30, at *37 (Tex. Mar. 14, 1996) (admitting expert testimony regarding MMPI results
of alleged victim of childhood sexual abuse and alleged accuser in repressed memory case).
551. For example, Blush and Ross suggest that personality profiles of the accuser, accused,
and child can help determine the veracity of sexual abuse allegations made in the context of di-
vorce proceedings. See Blush & Ross, supra note 3, at 6-8; see also Catherine M. Brooks &
Madelyn S. Milchman, Child Sexual Abuse Allegations During Custody Litigation: Conflicts Be-
tween Mental Health Expert Witnesses and the Law, 9 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 21, 25 (1991) (reporting
that a psychiatrist who testified that the accused could not have abused his son because he did not
match a pedophile profile was among the seven child sexual abuse experts who testified in one
case); Myers et al., supra note 39, at 127-44 (providing comprehensive discussion of psychiatric
literature and data on pedophiles, psychological methods for assessing and treating sexual offend-
ers, and the largely unsuccessful efforts by prosecutors and others to admit profile evidence to
establish guilt of person accused of sexually abusing a child).
552. Hollida Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Personality Characteristics of Parents Making
False Accusations of Sexual Abuse in Custody Disputes, 2 ISSUES CHILD ABUSE ACCUSATIONS
121, 121-36 (1990).
553. See, e.g., United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that no
judicial decision or scientific treatise had accepted the use of sex offender profile evidence to
determine whether sexual abuse had occurred); State v. Elbert, 831 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Mo. App.
1992) (holding inadmissible the expert evidence proffered by the defendant that he could not be
guilty of child sexual abuse because his MMPI results did not fit the profile of a sex offender);
State v. Cavallo, 443 A.2d 1020, 1026 (N.J. 1982) (excluding expert testimony proffered by crimi-
nal defendant that he did not match the profile of a rapist); Minn v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64
[Vol. 74:1
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS
preme Court applied the Daubert standards to overturn a conviction for at-
tempted molestation of a juvenile. An expert's opinion that the child had been
sexually abused was based on the result of certain unspecified "emotional
tests" done on the daughter and the fit between "dynamics" revealed by the
tests and the factors of CSAAS.555 The Foret court faulted the trial and inter-
mediate appellate courts for failing to consider "the significant problems that
this type of testimony has created in other jurisdictions" '556 due to the "fear
of prejudice resulting from [its] potential inaccuracy" '557 and further cau-
tioned:
[T]he introduction of expert opinion testimony as to the psychological
characteristics of the victim or her testimony is fraught with serious
res nova constitutional and evidentiary problems. While this type of
evidence is absolutely not admissible for some purposes ... but
might be admissible for others, it should be allowed only after careful
study and under strict control by the trial court .... "'
Psychological testing of the accused is especially troubling. A psychologi-
cal profile based on the results of an MMPI, Rorschach and even phallometric
assessment 59 could be offered to bootstrap conclusions not only that abuse
occurred but also that the accused was the perpetrator. Such evidentiary gym-
nastics are highly inappropriate because "[t]he question of determining wheth-
er or not a person has committed a sexual offence is not one that clinical
assessment can address. There are no psychological tests or techniques that
indicate whether someone has engaged in sexual behaviors with chil-
dren ....
Moreover, as is the case with syndrome evidence, virtually any behavior
or personality trait demonstrated by the accused can be interpreted as fitting
the profile of a child molester.5 61 If the accused is tearful and highly emo-
(Minn. 1981) (rejecting evidence based on "battering parent profile").
554. 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993).
555. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1119-24.
556. Id. at 1120-21.
557. Id.
558. Id. at 1121 (quoting concurrence in State v. Brossette, 599 So. 2d 1092 (La. 1992))
(ellipses in original).
559. For a discussion of the psychological and physiological tests used to assess suspected
child molesters and the deficiencies in each, see Judith V. Becker & Vernon L. Quinsey, Assess-
ing Suspected Child Molesters, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 169 (1993). See also S.V., 1996 Tex.
LEXIS 30, at *37-38 (explaining expert testimony based on MMPI, Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory, and penile plethysmograph tests in case focusing on allegedly repressed memory of
childhood sexual abuse).
560. Becker & Quinsey, supra note 559, at 169; see also St. Pierre, 812 F.2d at 417; S.V.,
1996 Tex. LEXIS 30, at *46 (noting that while the accused "had many of the characteristics of a
sex abuser, he did not match a characteristic profile, and even if he had, it would not prove that
he abused" his daughter); McCord, supra note 539, at 55-57 (explaining that profile evidence is
generally prohibited in criminal cases); Myers et al., supra note 39, at 142 ("[T]here is no psycho-
logical test or device that reliably detects persons who have or will sexually abuse children.").
561. See Blush & Ross, supra note 3, at 7-8; S.V., 1996 Tex. LEXIS 30 at *37 (noting that
psychological tests given to defendant "showed traits similar to those of sexual offenders: narcis-
sistic traits like self-centeredness, overvaluation of self, high need for recognition, and a high need
for control; reality distortion; and problems in his ability to express emotions, especially negative
ones").
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tive, for example, those behaviors are judged indicative of guilt; conversely,
the accused's projection of a deep sense of calm throughout the interrogation
may be interpreted as classic denial or sociopathic behavior. 62 In short, psy-
chological "profiles" may be the subject of legitimate curiosity and study in
the mental health field, but they are not sufficiently determinative of child
sexual abuse to meet the legal standards for reliability and general acceptance
required by Frye or Daubert.
4. Conclusions Regarding the Expert's Interpretation of Factual Data
In a perfect world, objectively harvested facts could be fed into a scientif-
ically validated computer program to test the truth of allegations of child sexu-
al abuse and, if necessary, identify the perpetrator. Neither the sciences nor the
law have produced such a system, and the dissonance within the two disci-
plines as well as the conflict between them suggests that infallibility, while a
laudable goal, is unrealistic. Thus, we must operate with the system we have,
being ever alert to its shortcomings and pitfalls.
Another harsh reality is that courts-already overcrowded, possessing mis-
conceptions about child sexual abuse, and possibly retaining bias against gay
or lesbian parents based on long-disproved myths-may resist undertaking the
comprehensive examinations of expert witness evidence suggested in this arti-
cle. Nevertheless, the heightened evidentiary scrutiny proposed herein neither
requires a high degree of scientific sophistication nor poses an unduly onerous
burden on the court, especially when contrasted against the burden on the
accused to prove her innocence. Effective screening merely requires the court
to make the types of determinations already required of it by the rules of evi-
dence governing expert testimony and to apply the standards of justice re-
quired by federal and state constitutions.
Moreover, the court does not shoulder this burden alone. Virtually all
questions concerning an expert's qualifications and methodologies should be
raised by counsel in a motion for summary judgment or motion in limine.563
Thus, the parties' legal counsel play a significant role in educating the court
regarding applicable evidentiary standards and the reasons why the specific ex-
pert evidence at issue meets or falls short of those standards. Other options
available to the court to reduce its burdens when handling expert witness testi-
mony in child sexual abuse cases are presented immediately below."M
562. Richardson et al., supra note 79, at 13.
563. A summary judgment motion filed by the accused, for example, might argue that the
sexual abuse allegations should be rejected as a matter of law because the accuser does not have
sufficient expert testimony to prove the allegations. A motion in limine would similarly challenge
the expert's qualifications and validity of his expert opinions offered in the case. Through these
pretrial vehicles, many of the issues outlined in this article could be resolved prior to trial.
564. Critics of the current practice of using experts retained by litigants have also suggested
that judges with significant expertise in various disciplines should be recruited to preside over
specialized courts, thereby eliminating the need for expert testimony to assist the finder of fact.
See, e.g., Edward V. DiLello, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert Judges at the
Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 473 (1993). While this proposal has many attractive aspects,
one obvious shortcoming is that, unlike the use of "outside" experts who can be voir dired and
cross examined at length, it provides no mechanism for determining the biases and prejudices
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D. The Use of A Court-Appointed Expert
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and analogous state rules empower a court
to appoint an expert witness sua sponte or upon the request of a party. 51 De-
spite the liberal attitude expressed in the rules regarding this procedure, courts
historically have declined to employ this option. Practical reasons for this
reluctance include the courts' perception that parties will not fully cooperate
and that communication between the court and the expert may be strained due
to ex parte concems."6 On a philosophical basis, "[j]udges' devotion to the
adversarial presentation of evidence causes them to reserve this procedure for
those rare cases in which the adversarial system fails to provide information
necessary for a reasoned and principled decision. 567
In the context of a heated custody or visitation dispute, an appointed ex-
pert can be helpful in assessing "the family and [can] provide the courts, the
parents, and the attorneys with objective information and recommenda-
tions."5" Such objective findings are especially useful when the parties' own
experts offer "extreme variation" of opinions and thus do not serve to clarify
complex issues.
5 69
In theory, a court-appointed expert offers objectivity because she ap-
proaches the case from a different perspective than does an expert retained by
a litigant. While the individually retained expert aids the litigant's attorney in
preparing a case for trial and testifying on the litigant's behalf, the court-ap-
pointed expert is, as previously noted, charged with providing an "objective"
report assessing the child's best interests.57 Appointment of an expert is,
however, hardly a guarantee of neutrality. "Truly neutral experts are difficult,
if not impossible, to find; though they will have no commitment to any party,
they do not come to the case free of experience and opinions that will predis-
pose (even if only subconsciously) ... them in some fashion on disputed
which the expert/judge/finder of fact may bring to a particular case.
565. FED. R. EVID. 706 provides that "[tihe court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed
upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection." Rule 706 also re-
quires the court to fully inform the expert as to his specific duties and the expert must advise the
parties of his findings. In civil actions the court determines a reasonable fee for the expert and
apportions the costs to the parties. FED. R. EVID. 706. Appointment of an expert by the court does
not preclude the parties from selecting their own experts. FED. R. EVID. 706(d).
566. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, The Use of Court-Appointed Experts in Federal
Courts, 78 JUDICATURE 41, 46 (1994).
567. Id.
568. Association of Family and Conciliation Courts Model Standards of Practice for Child
Custody Evaluation, 32 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 504, 504 (Jan. 1994) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Standards of Practice].
569. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role for
Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 999-1000, 1010
(1994) [hereinafter Cecil & Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation]. The article also contains
empirical data demonstrating that court appointment of experts is not uncommon and that federal
judges have generally been satisfied with the work of the experts they have appointed. Id. at 1004-
1008.
570. See generally SHUMAN supra note 6, at 13-6, 13-7; Cooke & Cooke, supra note 3, at 56
("The evaluator should be independent and objective and serve as an advocate for the child rather
than for either parent.").
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issues relevant to the case."57'
When a single expert is appointed in lieu of the parties retaining their own
experts, the expert is vested with tremendous power in deciding the fate of the
parties and the child. This awesome responsibility led one mental health expert
to conclude that "[riarely in psychological practice is the potential for harm as
great as in court-ordered custody evaluations. 572
Like any witness, an expert appointed by the court must be examined for
potential bias toward or against a party or a particular issue.573 One commen-
tator suggests that a single court-appointed evaluator is inappropriate in cases
"in which the court is being asked to reach a decision outside the community
norm," because a single expert will not be able to present a fully balanced
view of the situation.5 74 A situation in which a homosexual parent charged
with sexually abusing the child is seeking visitation or custody arguably pres-
ents the paradigm of "outside the community norm." '575 But other than stating
that privately-retained experts "may be helpful in assuaging the judge's or
jury's reaction to a nontraditional result," '576 the commentator offers no fur-
ther rationale for avoiding a court-appointed expert in nontraditional cases.
The potential value of a court-appointed expert should not be readily dis-
missed, even in a case as "nontraditional" as one involving a homosexual
parent charged with child sexual abuse. The advantages are obvious: the child
and parents may be subjected to evaluation by a single source, the expenses
are relatively contained, and the resolution of the litigation is not delayed-as
it was in the Hertzler case-while the litigants retain multiple experts to con-
duct a series of interviews and evaluations.
On the other hand, the "nontraditional" case may involve many issues
about which a single expert may be unqualified to testify.577 For example, a
medical doctor who has conducted hundreds of forensic evaluations of chil-
dren where sexual abuse was suspected578 may not possess the requisite ex-
perience to evaluate a parent's relative parenting skills and may have no famil-
iarity with the general empirical data on gay and lesbian parents. Conversely,
a psychologist competent to testify about the parent's skill and the impact (if
571. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 110 (3d ed. 1995).
572. Deed, supra note 11, at 76.
573. Cecil & Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation, supra note 569, at 1000 (citing Gates
v. United States, 707 F.2d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir. 1983)).
574. SHUMAN, supra note 6, at 13-7.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. The Standards of Practice for Child Custody Evaluation promulgated by the Association
of Family and Conciliation Courts suggests the level of education, training, and knowledge which
should be required of a court-appointed evaluator. See Standards of Practice, supra note 568, at
506. Obviously, more than one expert might need to be appointed to satisfy the requirement that
the evaluator have "an understanding of the many issues, legal, social, familial, and cultural in-
volved in custody and visitation." Id.
578. A physical examination of children would seem the most competent, objective evidence
of sexual abuse; unfortunately, it is often as inconclusive as the psychological evaluations. See
generally EVALUATION OF THE SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILD: A MEDICAL TEXTBOOK AND PHOTO-
GRAPHIC ATLAS (Astrid Heger & S. Jean Emans eds., 1992); Jan E. Paradise, The Medical Evalu-
ation of the Sexually Abused Child, 37 PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 839 (1990).
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any) on the child from the parent's sexual orientation might not be qualified to
conduct a forensic interview or to offer an expert opinion based on the foren-
sic data gathered by others. In a worst-case scenario, a single, court-appointed
expert may be called upon to provide expert evidence on issues outside her
areas of expertise. 79
In addition, appointment of a single evaluator does not necessarily mean
that the work can be completed quickly. Multiple sessions may be required
before a proper rapport is established between the child and evaluator,"' and
additional sessions are required with the adults involved."' Another major
drawback to having a single evaluator is that no other expert is involved to
expose the potential flaws in the court-appointed expert's methodology and
conclusion which may stem from incompetence or the expert's preconceived
notions about gay and lesbian parents.
Due to the multitude of variables inherent in "nontraditional" visitation
and custody disputes, it is impossible to determine the appropriateness of a
court-appointed expert in every case where a homosexual parent is accused of
sexually abusing a child.582
Three general rules, however, are appropriate when a court-appointed
expert is being considered. First, the qualifications of the proposed expert must
be broad enough to encompass all of the issues upon which she will be called
to testify. Second, the parties participating in the evaluation must be informed,
by both the court and the expert, of the expert's role and the relationship be-
tween the expert, the court, and the parties. 83 Third, any hint of anti-gay bi-
as should disqualify the proposed expert from appointment.
The difficulty in finding a single, non-biased expert with sufficiently
broad expertise to address all of the issues raised in cases where a homosexual
parent is charged with child sexual abuse strongly militates in favor of the
team-oriented evaluation approach discussed immediately below.
579. In United States v. Whitted, for example, the court held that a nurse/physician's assistant
and a medical doctor were unqualified to give expert psychiatric testimony regarding child sexual
abuse. II F.3d 782, 782 (8th Cir. 1993).
580. Cooke & Cooke, supra note 3, at 57.
581. id. at 58-60.
582. In the Hertzler case for example, the trial court's denial of Pamela's request for a single,
court-appointed expert resulted in the parties retaining four experts to evaluate the children and
testify at trial. The cost, both financial and emotional, was significant. After the trial, the court
ordered the parties to jointly select yet another expert to counsel the children and report back to
the court. When that expert reported that the children had not been sexually abused, the court re-
jected the expert's conclusion in favor of its own determination of the issue. See supra Part Il1.
Thus, even with the wisdom provided by hindsight, it is very difficult to conclude whether the
initial appointment of a single expert would have resulted in an earlier and more accurate adjudi-
cation of the sexual abuse allegations in the Hertzler case.
583. Parents who agree to the use of a single expert must be informed that they:
lose the right to voluntary choice of psychologist, the right to initiate or to terminate the
relationship with the evaluator, or the right to determine the goals of their involvement
with the psychologist. They also lose their right to determine the direction of the ses-
sions, to explore issues of their choice, or to avoid areas they would rather not discuss.
They also lose, for the duration of their court-ordered involvement, any right to confi-
dentiality between themselves and the court.
Deed, supra note I1, at 76.
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
E. The Value of a Team-Oriented Expert Evaluation
A determination of child sexual abuse generally requires physical and
psychological examinations and it is difficult to find a single expert competent
to perform both aspects of the evaluation. On the other hand, taking a child to
a series of experts-such as Drs. Jenny, Bloom, Brungardt, Moriarty and Mr.
Rhodes in the Hertzler case-involves tremendous repetition of effort and
expense and tremendously increases the stress on the parents and child. In
contrast, utilization of a well-qualified and coordinated team of experts, wheth-
er retained by an individual litigant or appointed by a court, minimizes the
disruption in the child's life while providing important data regarding the
allegations from a variety of disciplines and perspectives.584 The collabora-
tion of several mental health professionals may also help lessen the individual
discomfort experienced by these professionals who are asked to determine the
objective truth when, as therapists, they base their evaluations on the subjec-
tive reality presented to them by their patients.585
One team-oriented model which proved quite viable, for example, consist-
ed of a social worker who interviewed the parents, a child psychologist who
conducted an extensive psychological evaluation of the alleged victim, a pedia-
trician who secured a medical history and conducted a medical examination of
the child, and a nurse, all of whom were associated with a single clinic." 6
The team then rated the likelihood of abuse in each case as "low," "possible,"
"moderate," or "high" based upon their collective findings. '58 7
Due to the ambiguous nature of much of the "evidence" of sexual abuse,
there is no way to gauge whether the team approach resulted in more accurate
diagnoses.88 It is probable, however, that any errors in judgment or evalua-
tion made by individual team members were detected by other team members.
Moreover, the opportunity to fully integrate "the social, psychological, and
medical information needed to make accurate diagnoses" '589 suggests that "a
skilled interdisciplinary assessment is probably the optimal approach to diag-
nosing sexual abuse."5"
The team approach could also help neutralize the impact of any anti-gay
bias held by a single member of the team. It is possible, of course, that most
or even all members of a court-appointed team would possess anti-gay bias,
but appropriate gatekeeping by the trial court to screen proposed experts for
bias should negate such an occurrence.
584. See generally Dubowitz et al., supra note 157, at 689 (discussing the benefits of a team-
oriented evaluation).
585. Underwager et al., supra note 442, at 54-55.
586. Dubowitz et al., supra note 157, at 689.
587. Id. at 690.
588. There is also a concern that the hierarchical nature of the medical profession may drive
team members to defer diagnosis to the individual with the highest credentials, such as a psychia-
trist or other medical doctor, rather than acting independently.
589. Dubowitz et al., supra note 157, at 693.
590. id. at 692.
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F. Allowing Expert Witnesses to Educate the Court Regarding Gay and Les-
bian Parents
It is beyond dispute that "[tlo affect change in a system that treats homo-
sexuals as second-class citizens, counsel for gay and lesbian parents must take
an active role in educating the court, by introducing expert testimony that
rebuts the myths and assumptions made about homosexuals."59' Undoubtedly,
experts play a critical role in educating the trial judge on subjects, such as the
competency of gay and lesbian parents592 and the falsity of stereotypes, on
which the court may have limited or incorrect information. But all of these
evidentiary efforts are for naught if the court will not allow itself to be edu-
cated on these subjects. 93 The courts' selective use of the expert testimony
before them in cases involving gay and lesbian litigants is well-docu-
mented.594
Simply stated, a judge charged with determining a child's best interests is
not free to reject the empirically sound insights offered by competent experts
in favor of a ruling which correlates with the judge's own instincts and predis-
positions. 95 Rather, in addition to carefully screening proffered experts for
competency and credibility, a court must be receptive to the information being
conveyed by the experts, regardless of whether it corresponds with whatever
personal feelings the judge may have about gay and lesbian parents."'
Judges do not satisfy their responsibility for education, however, simply
by being open to the information provided by counsel and experts.597 The
numerous publications cited in this article are readily available to help guide a
court through the complexities of a case involving child sexual abuse allega-
tions.59 Judges should also take advantage of bar association seminars and
591. Fowler, supra note 9, at 373.
592. A comprehensive summary of relevant empirical data with an annotated bibliography has
been published by the American Psychological Association (APA) in LESBIAN AND GAY
PARENTING: A RESOURCE FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS (1995). The APA has also provided amicus curiae
briefs on this topic to numerous courts, as have Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
American Civil Liberties Union, National Center for Lesbian Rights and the state counterparts of
these entities.
593. Nugent, supra note 26, at 58-59; see also Joshua Dressier, Judicial Homophobia: Gay
Rights Biggest Roadblock, 5 Civ. LIB. REv. 19, 26 (1979).
594. See generally Falk, Prevalence of Social Science, supra note 433.
595. See generally Goldstein et al., supra note 142, at 21-31; Nugent, supra note 26, at 40-
41; see also Hertzler v. Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 951 (Wyo. 1995) (holding that the trial judge
erred in allowing his own anti-gay bias to impact his decision); Van Driel v. Van Driel, 525
N.W.2d 37, 39 (S.D. 1994) (recognizing that the evidence of record, rather than the court's
"[plersonal conceptions of morality," must serve as the basis for resolution of a custody dispute).
596. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct directs that "A judge shall perform the duties
of judicial office impartially and diligently," and further states that a judge is prohibited from
manifesting "by words or conduct" bias based on sexual orientation when performing his official
duties. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3, Rule B(5) (1990).
597. A judge's education also includes information received outside of the courtroom. See
Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking and Acting-Part I-Tentative First
Thoughts: How May Judges Learn?, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 539, 540-41 (1994).
598. Many of the medical as well as legal publications cited herein are available on Lexis and
Westlaw. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, A JUDI-
CIAL PRIMER ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (Josephine Bulkley & Claire Sandt eds., 1994) (discussing
judicial treatment of child sexual abuse).
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judicial college courses which spotlight the inherent myths underlying many
biases.'" And, "[iln addition to actively seeking education, judges should.
also perform a self-inventory of potential bias."'  After compiling a mental
list of potential biases, judges must ask themselves, in every case, whether any
of these might affect their decision. 1 As a state judge recently appointed to
the federal bench advises, "[i]f a bias could potentially infect their decision-
making process, they should make a conscious effort to set that bias
aside."W2 If a judge cannot set aside a bias, judicial ethics demand that she
recuse herself from the case. 3
V. CONCLUSION
Cases involving allegations of sexual abuse of a child are incredibly com-
plex due to family dynamics and the inexactness of medical and psychological
techniques for determining whether the abuse occurred and, if so, identifying
the perpetrator. When the sexual orientation of a party is brought to the fore,
the impeccable sense of balance needed to resolve these cases is further dis-
rupted. The suggestions outlined in this article are offered to help re-establish
the balance demanded by fairness, due process, the rules of evidence and de-
rivative case law, and basic respect for human dignity.
"Bias is nearly inevitable, for all psychologists, lawyers and judges have
first been members of families. The challenge is to recognize and to neutralize
bias .... ."o Accordingly, one of the most important steps to assuring accu-
rate adjudication of the sexual abuse allegations is not directly governed by
rules of procedure or evidence. Rather, it requires personal commitments by
judges and experts to examine their own biases regarding gay and lesbian
parents.
To foster the best interests of the child, judges and experts must recognize
and set aside personal prejudices and preconceived notions about gay and
lesbian parents and examine the actual, credible evidence of record. This focus
requires sensitivity to the many insidious ways that anti-gay bias can taint the
gathering and analyzing of information surrounding the many complicated
questions posed by allegations of child sexual abuse. Failure to do this results,
as in the Hertzler case, in a legally-sanctioned form of gay-bashing. In this
instance, however, the blood on the hands of biased experts and judges is not
only that of the accused, but of the children as well.
599. Nugent, supra note 26, at 58.
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. Id. at 58-59. Judge Nugent served as an Ohio common pleas judge for eight years and
Ohio court of appeals judge for three before being elevated to the federal district court in 1995. Id.
at 59 n.2.
603. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucr Canon 3, Rule E(l)(a) (1990) (a judge must dis-
qualify herself where her impartiality may be compromised by "a personal bias or prejudice con-
ceming a party").
604. Deed, supra note 11, at 80.
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How CAN A PLAINTIFF PROVE INTENTIONAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IF SHE CANNOT
EXPLORE THE RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES: THE NEED




The modem discovery process is significant in most litigation,' but argu-
ably even more so in employment discrimination litigation2 under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)', the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA),4 and the post-Civil War statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (§
1981).5
The individual disparate treatment theory based upon circumstantial evi-
dence ("Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment") is the most common
way by which an employer's discrimination is proved.6 Using this theory, the
plaintiff--either the aggrieved individual7 or the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) acting on her behalf pursuant to Title VII or the
ADEA 8-- has no direct evidence of discrimination.9 Rather the plaintiff must
* Associate Professor, Wake Forest School of Law. B.A., University of Montana, 1981;
J.D., Yale University School of Law, 1984. My thanks to Professor J. Wilson Parker, who
provided invaluable advice. Thanks also to my research assistants Neil Day, Ashton Hudson, and
Coe Ramsey.
1. Discovery allows "a party not only to narrow the issues and obtain evidence for use at
the trial, but also to discover information about where and how such evidence could be obtained."
8 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001, at 41 (2d ed.
1994); see also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (noting that
discovery and other pretrial procedures "make a trial less a game of blind-man's bluff and more a
fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent").
2. See infra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
4. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
5. Section 1981 had its genesis in the Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
6. Ryther v. KARE 11, 84 F.3d 1074, 1080 n.6 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[l]ntentional discrimina-
tion will frequently be proven by circumstantial evidence ....") (citing United States Postal Serv.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)); see also Hollander v. American Cyana-
mid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[E]mployers rarely leave a paper trail-or 'smoking
gun'-attesting to a discriminatory intent ....").
7. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
9. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors, 460 U.S. at 716 ("There will seldom be
'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes.").
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prove her case to the factfinder" solely through inferences of discriminat-
ion." The assessment of such circumstantial evidence is "generally speaking,
most competently and appropriately made by the trier of fact."' 2
The United States Supreme Court, in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks,3 undoubtedly increased the quantum of circumstantial evidence re-
quired to guarantee a plaintiff's victory on a claim of Circumstantial Individu-
al Disparate Treatment. 4 Given the Hicks decision and the very nature of a
Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment claim, federal district courts 5
should exercise their discretion 6 to allow a plaintiff broad workforce and
temporal scope in the discovery process.
Part II of this article discusses the substantive law of Circumstantial Indi-
vidual Disparate Treatment. It observes that in formulating the Circumstantial
Individual Disparate Treatment theory, the United States Supreme Court as-
sumed that the plaintiff would be allowed ample discovery. The article then
considers the Hicks decision and its likely effect upon the discovery process.
Part III of the article offers an overview of the relevant discovery provi-
sions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It also discusses the crucial role
of, and great discretion exercised by, district judges and magistrate judges in
the discovery process.
In Part IV, the article addresses the special discovery needs of a Circum-
stantial Individual Disparate Treatment plaintiff, particularly as to workforce
data beyond that of the aggrieved individual herself. It also considers three
crucial types of workforce data that the plaintiff typically seeks.
Part V of the article analyzes the appropriate workforce scope of discov-
ery, concluding that the plaintiff should not be restricted to discovery within
the unit or location at which the aggrieved individual worked.
Part VI of the article similarly analyzes the appropriate temporal scope of
discovery, concluding that the plaintiff should be allowed to take discovery of
events several years prior to and after the adverse employment action at issue.
10. Jury trials have long been allowed in § 1981 litigation. Novack Inv. Co. v. Setser, 454
U.S. 1064, 1064 (1981) (noting lower courts' uniformity that § 1981 "liability should be decided
by a jury") (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). Since its enactment, the ADEA also
has allowed jury trials "of any issue of fact." 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2). According to the 1991 amen-
dments to Title VII, a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial where she "cannot recover" under § 1981
and "seeks compensatory or punitive damages" under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1977A(a)(1), (c)(l).
11. Hollander, 895 F.2d at 85 ("[D]isparate treatment plaintiffs often must build their cases
from pieces of circumstantial evidence which cumulatively undercut the credibility of the various
explanations offered by the employer.").
12. Id.
13. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
14. See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
15. Title VII claims, ADEA claims, and § 1981 claims may be tried in state court. Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) (noting concurrent subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over ADEA claims); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821 (1990) (noting
concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction over Title VII claims); Keating v. Rhode Island, 785 F.
Supp. 1094, 1099 (D.R.I. 1992) (noting concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction over § 1981 claims).
However, this article focuses exclusively on the litigation of those claims in federal court under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
16. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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Finally, in Part VII, the article recommends that, consistent with the Cir-
cumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment theory and with discovery princi-
ples, district judges and magistrate judges should exercise their considerable
discretion to accord a plaintiff wide latitude in both the workforce and tempo-
ral parameters of discovery. Part VII argues that in the absence of such dis-
covery, the goals of the anti-discrimination statutes cannot be fulfilled.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE
TREATMENT
The mission of the anti-discrimination statutes is "to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate... discriminatory practices and
devices."' 7 Title VII prohibits employers'" from discriminating against indi-
viduals on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' The
ADEA prohibits employers" from discriminating against individuals at or
over forty years of age.' Section 1981 prohibits employers22 from discrimi-
17. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (addressing a Title VII
claim); see also 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (stating that the purpose of the ADEA includes prohibiting
"arbitrary age discrimination in employment"); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 461 (1975) (noting that § 1981 is "directed to most of the same ends" as Title VII).
18. Title VII applies to private employers of 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
Title VII's coverage extends to federal, state, and local government employers. 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e(a), 2000e-16. Title VII also prohibits discrimination by employment agencies, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(b), and labor organizations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c), which will not be discussed in this
article.
19. Section 703(a) of Title VII protects both applicants and employees:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indivi-
dual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
20. The ADEA covers employers of 20 or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
21. Section 4(a) of the ADEA protects both applicants and employees:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this Chap-
ter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a). Section 12(a) limits the ADEA to "individuals who are at least 40 years of
age." Subsections (b) and (c) of § 4 prohibit discrimination by employment agencies and labor
organizations respectively; such discrimination is not addressed in this article. 29 U.S.C. § 623(b)
& (c).
22. Section 1981 does not address the size of an employing entity. Michael Reiss, Requiem
for An "Independent Remedy": The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 as Remedies for Employ-
ment Discrimination, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 961, 974 (1977) ("Section 1981 contains no statutory
minimum" but "clearly does extend its protection to millions of workers... not covered by Title
VII."). Section 1981 has applied to private employers for over two decades. Johnson v. Railway
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nating against persons on the basis of race or ethnicity.23 The EEOC may sue
on the aggrieved individual's behalf under Title VII and the ADEA,24 and the
aggrieved individual has a private right of action under all three of these anti-
discrimination statutes.
25
There are several theories by which a plaintiff can prove a violation of
one or more of these anti-discrimination statutes. The first major division is
between disparate treatment, which requires proof of intentional discrimina-
tion,26 and disparate impact, which requires proof that an employer's neutral
practice adversely affected a protected class.27 Disparate treatment is "the
most easily understood type" of discrimination, where an "employer simply
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1975). Section 1981 also applies to labor organiza-
tions, General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982), and protects
various non-employment contractual interests, such as the use of recreation clubs, Olzman v. Lake
Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974).
23. Section 1981 does not use the word "race," but rather provides:
(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by
white citizens....
(b) For purposes of this section, the term " make and enforce contracts" includes
the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment
of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b) (1994).
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1981's ban on racial discrimination broadly, to pro-
tect persons on account of ethnicity and ancestry. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S.
604 (1987) (holding that Arabs are a protected race under § 1981); cf. Shaare Tefila Congregation
v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (holding that Jews are a protected race under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, a
companion statute to § 1981).
24. Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII provides that the EEOC "may bring a civil action against
any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the
charge," where the EEOC has attempted and failed in conciliation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). The
section further provides that the Attorney General of the United States may bring suit against a
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision. Id. Section 7(b) of the ADEA similarly
provides that the EEOC may bring suit against an employer, where the EEOC has attempted and
failed in achieving the employer's voluntary compliance. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
25. Section 706(0(1) of Title VII provides that where neither the EEOC nor the Attorney
General has pursued suit against the employer, and where there is no conciliation agreement, "the
person claiming to be aggrieved" may file suit "within ninety days after" the EEOC has given
such notice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Section 7(e) of the ADEA similarly provides that the
"person aggrieved" may bring suit "within 90 days after the receipt of [a) notice" that the EEOC
has terminated its investigatory proceedings. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e).
Individuals must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within a certain number of
days from the date of the adverse employment action; the time period is 180 days in a non-defer-
ral state and 300 days in a deferral state. Title VII § 706(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); ADEA
§ 7(d), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). The EEOC retains administrative jurisdiction of a Title VII charge for
a minimum of 180 days and an ADEA charge for a minimum of 60 days before the individual can
file suit. Title VII § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); ADEA § 7(d), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).
Section 1981 contains no procedures for administrative actions. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460
("Further, it has been noted that the filing of a Title VII charge and resort to Title VII's admin-
istrative machinery are not prerequisites for the institution of a § 1981 action."); see also MARK
A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.36 (1994) ("The absence of the Title VII require-
ments of administrative exhaustion also simplifies a claim under § 1981.").
26. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (stating "[piroof of discriminatory
motive is critical" in cases of disparate treatment) (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)).
27. Id. (finding "[plroof of discriminatory motive is ... not required under a disparate-im-
pact theory") (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15).
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treats some people less favorably than others because of' their protected sta-
tus.28
The disparate treatment theory further divides into systemic and individual
cases. Systemic disparate treatment, also known as "pattern or practice," oc-
curs where an employer intentionally discriminates against a protected class as
a whole.2 9 Individual disparate treatment, in contrast, focuses upon the ad-
verse employment action suffered by one or a few aggrieved individuals with-
in the protected class.3" The individual disparate treatment theory further sub-
divides into cases based upon direct evidence3 and cases based upon circum-
stantial evidence; the latter are the most common, for "'[e]mployers are rarely
so cooperative as to include a notation in the personnel file' that the firing is
for a reason expressly forbidden by law."32 In relying on circumstantial evi-
dence, the plaintiff essentially proves the employer's intent "by process of
elimination.""
Although not every theory is available pursuant to every one of these
three anti-discrimination statutes,34 it is clear that the courts apply the Cir-
cumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment theory identically for Title VII, the
ADEA, and § 1981. 5
28. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15.
29. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (addressing system-wide
discrimination in not hiring black teachers); International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 324
(discussing system-wide discrimination in placing blacks and Spanish-surnamed persons in less
desirable jobs).
30. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 876 (1984) (noting that "[t]he inquiry
regarding an individual's claim is the reason for a particular employment decision").
31. Where there is direct evidence of employment discrimination and the factfinder believes
the evidence, the plaintiff prevails. Where the plaintiff proves direct evidence of employment dis-
crimination and the employer proves that it would have taken the same adverse employment ac-
tion in the absence of the discrimination, a separate "mixed motive" analysis codified in Title VII
is used. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
274 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Although neither the ADEA nor § 1981 contains such
mixed motive language, courts have adopted the mixed motive theory in cases arising under those
statutes. E.g., Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming
district court's decision to give a mixed motive jury instruction in ADEA case); Williams v.
Fermenta Animal Health Co., 984 F.2d 261, 265 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming district court's mixed
motive jury instruction in a Title VII and § 1981 case).
32. Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting
Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also
supra notes 6, 9.
33. Marzano v. Computer Sciences Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 508 (3d Cir. 1996).
34. For example, the disparate impact theory does not apply in § 1981 cases. General Bldg.
Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) ("[S]ection 1981 can be violat-
ed only by intentional discrimination."). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has yet to recognize a
disparate impact claim brought under the ADEA. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610
(1993).
35. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609 (stating that "[t]he disparate treatment theo-
ry is of course available under the ADEA"); Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d
1328, 1332 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Although McDonnell Douglas is a Title VII case, the framework
it establishes applies with equal force to claims under the ADEA."); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil
Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Although the ADEA was enacted by Congress as a
separate statute, we nevertheless apply the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework within the
ADEA context."); Smith v. Cook County, 74 F.3d 829, 831 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying the McDon-
nel Douglas-Burdine burden shifting framework in a § 1981 case); Melendez v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 79 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The substantive standards governing liability for § 1981
claims and Title VII disparate treatment claims are identical."); Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, 69
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In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green36 and Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine,37 the United States Supreme Court propounded a
tripartite analysis for claims of Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment,
to fulfill the goals of the anti-discrimination law." Under this tripartite analy-
sis, the plaintiff first bears the burden of proving a prima facie case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.39 The prima facie case typically requires the
plaintiff to prove the following four elements: that the aggrieved individual
belongs to a class protected by the relevant anti-discrimination statute; that she
was qualified for the position she sought or held; that she suffered an adverse
employment action; and that the employer continued to seek to fill the posi-
tion.' Establishing a prima facie case is "not onerous."'"
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production
shifts to the employer to articulate, through admissible evidence, a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 2 The employer
F.3d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[Wle apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting frame-
work originally devised in the Title VII context [in a § 1981 case]."); Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d
1270, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("A plaintiff may establish a violation of [§ 1981] using the same
three-step framework of proof used to establish racial discrimination under Title VII."); Mitchell v.
Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992) ("The McDonnell Douglas... formula is the
evidentiary framework applicable not only to claims brought under Title VII, but also to claims
under ADEA ... and ... under 42 U.S.C. § 1981."); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417,
1420 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The shifting burden of proof applied to a Title VII discrimination claim
also applies to claims arising under ADEA."); Johnson v. Legal Servs., Inc., 813 F.2d 893, 896
(8th Cir. 1987) ("[The Title VII framework] is used for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.").
36. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
37. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
38. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
39. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
40. Id. The McDonnel Douglas Court also noted that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary in
Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from [plaintiff] is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
Regarding the fourth element, the Supreme Court has ruled that an ADEA plaintiff need
not prove that her replacement was outside the protected class. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996) ("[T]he fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by
someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case."). The Supreme Court has made no such ruling with respect to a Title VII plaintiff. St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 528 n.1 (1993) ("This Court has not directly addressed
the question whether the personal characteristics of someone chosen to replace a Title VII plaintiff
are material, and that issue is not before us today.") (Souter, J., dissenting). Both prior and subse-
quent to O'Connor, some circuit courts found the identity of the plaintiff's replacement to be
irrelevant to the establishment of a prima facie case. E.g., Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82
F.3d 157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[A Title VII employee] may be able to show that his race or
another characteristic that the law places off limits tipped the scales against him, without regard to
the demographic characteristics of his replacement."); Cumpiano v. Banco Santader, 902 F.2d 148,
155 (lst Cir. 1990) ("[Wle have never held that the fourth element of a prima facie discharge case
can be fulfilled only if the complainant shows that she was replaced by someone outside the pro-
tected group.").
When the adverse employment action is a workforce reduction, the plaintiff cannot prove
the fourth element of a prima facie case, for the employer does not hire any replacement. Instead,
the plaintiff often must provide additional evidence that others outside the protected class were
treated more favorably. E.g., Smith v. Cook County, 74 F.3d 829, 831 (7th Cir. 1996); Wallis v.
J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 1994).
41. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
42. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
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need not persuade the trier of fact, but simply must "raise[] a genuine issue of
fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff."43
Third, if the employer carries its intermediate burden of production, the
plaintiff is afforded "a full and fair opportunity"" to prove, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the employer's proffered reason was a pretext for
discrimination.45 For over twenty years, the Burdine Court's description of
pretext guided the lower courts:
[The plaintiff] now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the
proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She
may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirect-
ly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy
of credence.'
Thus, the burden of proof in a Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treat-
ment case remains at all times upon the plaintiff.47 The Burdine Court be-
lieved that its allocation of proof and production would not "unduly hinder the
plaintiff' for several reasons, one of which was based upon the plaintiff's
opportunity to conduct discovery:
[T]he liberal discovery rules applicable to any civil suit in federal
court are supplemented in a Title VII suit by the plaintiff's access to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's investigatory files
concerning her complaint. Given these factors, we are unpersuaded
that the plaintiff will find it particularly difficult to prove that a prof-
fered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext. We remain con-
fident that the McDonnell Douglas framework permits the plaintiff
meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination.'
In 1993, in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks49 a bare majority of the
Court, purportedly relying on United States Postal Service Board of Governors
v. Aikens,5" increased the plaintiff's burden of proving pretext by holding that
Burdine's "or" language was dicta." The Hicks Court stated:
43. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
44. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
45. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
46. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 258 (citation omitted). Interestingly, years later in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989), the Supreme Court reiterated its view of employment discrimi-
nation discovery to justify increasing the plaintiff's burden in a disparate impact case: "Some will
complain that this specific causation requirement is unduly burdensome on Title VII plaintiffs. But
liberal civil discovery rules give plaintiffs broad access to employers' records in an effort to docu-
ment their claims." Id.
49. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
50. 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983) (quoting Burdine's "or" language for proof of pretext, but
describing the ultimate issue as "discrimination vel non").
51. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515.
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Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot
prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but
only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse em-
ployment action by reason of [protected status]. That the employer's
proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does
not necessarily establish that the plaintiff's proffered reason ... is
correct.
52
It is certain from the above language that the Hicks Court rejected a pure
"pretext-only" definition previously adopted by some circuit courts." Under
the pure "pretext-only" approach, the plaintiff's discrediting of the employer's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was the "equivalent to a finding that the
employer intentionally discriminated" against the plaintiff.54
It is less certain, however, what alternate definition of pretext the Court
did adopt, and lower courts are struggling to interpret and apply the Hicks
decision." Indeed, two circuit courts have required en banc review to deter-
mine the current definition of pretext.56
The Hicks language quoted above might be viewed as adopting a strict
"pretext-plus" approach, which would require "both a showing that the
employer's reasons are false and direct evidence that the employer's real rea-
sons were discriminatory."" Justice Souter's dissent in Hicks interprets the
decision in precisely that way: "The majority's chosen method of proving
52. Id. at 523-24.
53. E.g Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1334 ("The [Hicks] Court thus rejected the pretext-only posi-
tion."); Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1086 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming district
court's grant of summary judgment for employer and rejecting plaintiff's argument that under
Hicks she could "prevail ... simply by discrediting the defendant's articulated non-discriminatory
reasons"); Felker v. Pepsi-Cola Co., No. 95-9012, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 5836, at *5 (2d Cir.
Mar. 28, 1996) (affirming judgment for employer because under Hicks, "[tlhe District Court, as
the finder of fact, was permitted to accept the premise that reasons other than those articulated by
defendant were the basis of the discharge, but nevertheless finding in favor of defendants on the
ultimate question of whether plaintiff proved discrimination"); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock
Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1994) ("The [Hicks] Court "rejected the 'pretext only'
position."); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1994) ("It is clear
that the Court rejected the 'pretext-only' rule."). See also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 512-13, for a discus-
sion of the previous split among the circuit courts.
54. Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir. 1984).
55. E.g. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (finding
it "unclear" whether the Court "intended that in all such cases in which an inference of discrimi-
nation is permitted a verdict of discrimination is necessarily supported by sufficient evidence");
Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123 (finding it is "less clear" as to whether the court adopted the "pretext-
only" rule or the "pretext-plus" rule). The Second Circuit, however, deems any confusion over
Hicks "ill-founded." Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164 (1994).
56. Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc);
Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993.
57. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123 (emphasis added). Judge Joseph E. Irenas of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey is reported to have determined that the quoted "pas-
sage gave rise to the pretext-plus approach that proof that the defendant's proffered reason is
wrong is insufficient for a plaintiff to avoid summary judgment for the defendant and additional
evidence is needed to support a finding of discriminatory animus." Discrimination: Courts Strug-
gle with Summary Judgment in Disparate Treatment Cases, Judge Says, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 45, at D-32 (Mar. 7, 1996) [hereinafter Courts Struggle].
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'pretext for discrimination' changes Burdine's 'either ... or' into a 'both...
and."' 58 However, the Seventh Circuit treats the above Hicks language as dic-
ta, just as the Hicks Court considered Burdine's "or" language as dicta."
The Hicks opinion also contains more moderate language regarding the
plaintiff's burden of proving pretext for discrimination:
[T]he trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether
plaintiff has proven "that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against [him]" because of his race. The factfinder's disbelief of the
reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is ac-
companied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the ele-
ments of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimina-
tion. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimina-
tion .... But the Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff dis-
regards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption
does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admoni-
tion that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the "ultimate burden
of persuasion. '"60
In light of this more moderate language, some lower courts have found that
Hicks created a "modified pretext-only" standard: "[Ihf the employer offers a
pretext-a phony reason-for why it fired the employee, then the trier of fact
is permitted, although not compelled, to infer that the real reason was [the
employee's membership in a protected class]."' The EEOC also has inter-
preted the Hicks decision in this manner.62
58. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 531 n.7.
59. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124 n.3. The Anderson court stated:
As the dissent in Hicks points out, there is language in the Court's opinion that could
support a finding that additional evidence of discrimination besides establishment of a
prima facie case and rejection of the employer's proffered reasons for the plaintiff's
discharge is required to prove intentional discrimination. However, such language is
dicta. In rejecting application of this language, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's
admonishment that it is "generally undesirable, where holdings of the Court are not at
issue to dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as though they were the Unit-
ed States Code."
td. (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515).
60. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Surprisingly, Judge
Joseph E. Irenas of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, is quoted as
finding this language to be "the basis of the pretext-only approach." Courts Struggle, supra note
57.
61. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123. Furthermore, "it appears that the [Hicks] Court adopted this
circuit's version of the 'pretext-only' rule." Id.; see also Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1328 ("The [Hicks]
Court, however, also rejected the pretext-plus position."); Dickens v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., No.
94-2494, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3853, at *8 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996) ("The plaintiff, at all times,
retains the burden of proving intentional discrimination, which may be accomplished by showing
that the reasons proffered by the employer for its actions are pretextual."); Randle v. City of Auro-
ra, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[Al showing of pretext is evidence which allows a jury to
infer discriminatory intent."); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th
Cir. 1994) (finding that the Hicks Court "also rejected the 'pretext plus' position").
62. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 1994 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 70, at D2 (April 12, 1994) ("In most cases, before and after Hicks, if the evi-
dence shows that the respondent's articulated reasons are untrue, it can be assumed that the em-
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Whether Hicks is read as adopting a "pretext-plus" approach or as adopt-
ing a "modified pretext-only" approach, it is beyond doubt that the decision
increased the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving pretext from the burden
explained in Burdine.63 Until Hicks is modified by the Court or is legislative-
ly overruled,64 a "plaintiff might be well advised to present additional evi-
dence of discrimination, because the factfinder is not required to find in her
favor simply because she establishes a prima facie case and shows that the
employer's proffered reasons are false."
The Hicks definition of pretext undoubtedly makes the plaintiff's discov-
ery process more important, especially to survive the employer's virtually
inevitable motion for summary judgment.' Management lawyers, citing
Hicks, will argue that "a plaintiff cannot defeat an employer's motion for sum-
mary judgment simply by stating a prima facie case[,]" and that "if a plaintiff
can produce no evidence beyond a bare prima facie case and a subjective be-
ployer is trying to cover up discrimination, and hence, that a finding of 'cause' is appropriate.
Although Hicks clearly holds that a showing that an employer's articulated reason is untrue does
not compel a finding of liability, it is also clear that such a finding is permitted.").
63. Christopher R. Hedican & Timothy D. Loudon, The 1993 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Their Anticipated Impact on Employment Litigation, 28 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 997, 1015 (June 1995) [hereinafter Hedican & Loudon] ("After the Supreme Court's recent
ruling in Hicks, the plaintiff now arguably has a heavier burden in establishing pretext in order to
prove a claim of discrimination."). This prediction was borne out when the Hicks case was re-
manded to the district court, which concluded that although the employer's reasons for terminating
the plaintiff were false, the plaintiff had not proven intentional discrimination. The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment for the employer. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 90 F.3d
285 (8th Cir. 1996).
64. In 1993, Senator Howard Metzenbaum introduced S. 1776, 103d Cong. (1993), and Rep-
resentative Major Owens introduced H.R. 3680, 103d Cong. (1993), to restore the McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine proof structure for intentional disparate treatment. These bills did not sur-
vive committee hearings. See Congressional Index 28,368 and 35,066 (recording bill transfer to
committee and subsequent non-passage).
65. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124.
66. Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An employer's motion for summary judg-
ment typically is not entertained until the parties have conducted some discovery. Evans v. Tech-
nologies Applications & Serv., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996) ("As a general rule, summary
judgment is appropriate only after 'adequate time for discovery."') (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
In response to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff might seek further discovery
pursuant to Rule 56(f) which provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affi-
davits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
FED. R. Clv. P. 56(0. To succeed on a Rule 56(f) motion, the plaintiff "must (1) articulate a plau-
sible basis for the belief that discoverable materials exist which would raise a trialworthy issue,
and (2) 'demonstrate good cause for failure to have conducted the discovery earlier."' Price v.
General Motors Corp., 931 F.2d 162, 164 (lst Cir. 1991) (quoting Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mas-
sachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 988 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also Evans, 80 F.3d
at 961-62 (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment for employer, where plaintiff
"never filed any discovery requests, moved for a continuance so she could conduct discovery, or
filed an affidavit as required by Rule 56(f)").
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lief that she was the victim of discrimination, summary judgment is appropri-
ate.
, 67
As Justice Souter explained in his dissent from Hicks, because the
factfinder's inquiry is no longer limited to the plaintiff disproving the
employer's reason, "pretrial discovery will become more extensive and wide-
ranging (if the plaintiff can afford it)--for a much wider set of facts could
prove to be both relevant and important at trial." r
The EEOC also has recognized the need for greater discovery in the post-
Hicks Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment cases that it files on be-
half of aggrieved individuals:
In discovery, it will be more important to develop contextual or, if
possible, direct evidence that supports the inference from a showing
of pretext. Employers will likely rely on contextual factors (e.g., a
sterling record of minority hiring; a minority decision-maker, etc.)
which (they'll argue) make it less likely that they would have dis-
criminated, even if the fact-finder doesn't believe the proffered rea-
son.... We may need to develop a contrary picture of the
employer's overall record. More generally, as Justice Souter suggest-
ed, the scope of permissible discovery now appears to be much wid-
er; much information will be relevant to persuading the jury to draw
the permitted inference, which would not have been relevant to the
mere showing of pretext. Previously, discovery requests relating to
other employment decisions might have been viewed as only margin-
ally relevant, and often overly burdensome. At the least, Hicks in-
creases the relevance of such materials, and in some cases-where
the employer explicitly attempts to paint a broad, favorable picture of
itself-they may now be very important.'
Similarly, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law opines that a
plaintiff "will have to focus, more intensely than ever before, on discovery to
pierce [the employer's] lies."7
67. Hedican & Loudon, supra note 63, at 1008-09 & nn.70-72.
68. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 538 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter also stated that "[tihe majority's scheme, therefore, will promote longer trials and more
pre-trial discovery, threatening increased expense and delay in Title VII litigation for both plain-
tiffs and defendants, and increased burdens on the judiciary." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 538.
69. James R. Neely, Jr., General Counsel's Memorandum on Supreme Court's Hicks Deci-
sion, Aug. 3, 1993, available in Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 405:7151, 7154 (March 1994).
70. Life After Hicks: Strategy and Tactics for Plaintiffs and their Counsel, 7 Civ. RTS. ACT
AND EEO NEws 4, 5 (Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Employment Discrimina-
tion Project) (July 1, 1993). The passage continues:
A plaintiff can protect against the danger of having to disprove a panorama of possible
"nondiscriminatory reasons" "vaguely suggested" by the record by using all of the tools
of issue-narrowing available under the Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 16 pretrial confer-
ence orders setting out the issues, Rule 33 interrogatories enquiring as to all reasons,
Rule 34 requests for production demanding all documents bearing on the reasons and
their past application or failure of application to other employees, Rule 36 requests for
admissions pinning down the exclusivity of the reasons (with Rule 33 and Rule 34 dis-
covery requests triggered by any failure to admit), pretrial orders setting forth the issues,
and motions in limine to exclude evidence of any other reason.
Id. at 5.
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III. OVERVIEW OF DISCOVERY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37 govern the discovery
process for employment discrimination cases brought in the federal courts.7
These discovery rules "allow the parties to develop fully and crystallize con-
cise factual issues for trial. 72 They are to be broadly and liberally con-
strued.73 This liberal construction, however, can lead to abuse by the parties,
with one commentator noting that discovery "now tends to dominate the litiga-
tion and inflict disproportionate costs and burdens. 74
A. The Role of District Judges and Magistrate Judges
Federal district judges and magistrate judges have great control over the
discovery process in employment discrimination litigation, with relatively little
appellate law to guide them.75 Appellate courts "normally do not become in-
volved with 'nitty gritty' rulings on discovery matters," such as analyzing
specific discovery requests and objections.7 6
A district judge may refer any civil case, including one involving a Cir-
cumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment claim, to a magistrate judge77 for
resolution of discovery matters. 8 The district judge will affirm the magistrate
judge's discovery rulings unless they are "clearly erroneous or contrary to
71. For a discussion of specific rules, see infra Parts II.B.-III.D.
72. Bums v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1973).
73. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("[D]iscovery rules are to be accorded a
broad and liberal treatment."); see also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964).
74. William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Re-
form, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 703, 703 (1989).
75. Burns, 483 F.2d at 304-05. The Burns court stated:
Because discovery matters are committed almost exclusively to the sound discretion of
the trial Judge, appellate rulings delineating the bounds of discovery under the Rules are
rare. But the Judge's discovery rulings, like his other procedural determinations, are not
entirely sacrosanct. If he fails to adhere to the liberal spirit of the Rules, we must re-
verse.
Id.
76. Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 733 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Mack v. Great
At. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 186 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Circumstances warranting appellate
intervention in garden-variety pretrial discovery are infrequent.").
77. The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1994)) established a system of magistrates to assist district
court judges.
78. Rule 73(a) provides:
When specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by local rule or order of the
district court and when all parties consent thereto, a magistrate judge may exercise the
authority provided by Title 28, U.S.C. § 636(c) and may conduct any or all proceedings,
including a jury or nonjury trial, in a civil case.
FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a). The Federal Magistrates Act provides:
Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate or a part-time Unit-
ed States magistrate who serves as a full-time judicial officer may conduct any or all
proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case,
when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he
serves.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
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law."79 A magistrate judge's ruling is clearly erroneous only when, despite
"evidence to support it," the district judge "is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.""s For example, a district
judge cannot affirm a magistrate judge's ruling where the magistrate judge has
failed to provide enough explanation for adequate review.' In many cases,
however, district judges view the clearly erroneous standard as granting magis-
trate judges "broad discretion, which will be overruled only if abused."82
Once a district judge has made a discovery ruling, whether in the first in-
stance or by reviewing the magistrate judge's initial ruling, the standard of
review on appeal to the circuit court is abuse of discretion, 3 which "occurs
only when the [district] court bases its decision on an erroneous ruling of law
or when there is no rational basis in the evidence for the ruling." 4 Some cir-
cuits also require that the district court's abuse of discretion result in "sub-
stantial prejudice."85
79. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A) (1994). The Federal Magistrates Act provides:
[A] judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending
before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for
summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the de-
fendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of
a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
and to involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial
matter under this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate's order
is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. /
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 154 F.R.D. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (applying the "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard).
80. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
81. E.g., Pisacane v. Enichem Am., Inc., No. 94 Civ 7843, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9755
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (remanding magistrate judge's discovery order because the district court "cannot
determine whether those determinations constitute an abuse of discretion").
82. Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 372, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Frank
v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 623 (D.N.J. 1996) ("Where, as here, the magistrate has
ruled on a non-dispositive matter such as a discovery motion, his ruling is entitled to great defer-
ence and is reversible only for abuse of discretion."); Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworksi, L.L.P., 164
F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (stating that nothing in FED. R. Civ. P. 72(a) "forbids applica-
tion" of abuse of discretion standard to magistrate judge's ruling).
83. See, e.g., Sempier, 45 F.3d at 774 (stating that "district courts have broad discretion to
manage discovery"); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that district
courts "have substantial discretion to make such decisions to curtail the expense and intrusiveness
of discovery and trial"); Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1497 (10th Cir. 1992) (reviewing
orders relating to discovery "for an abuse of discretion"); Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907
F.2d 1077, 1085 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (reviewing district court's discovery order on "abuse of discre-
tion"); Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that the district court is
"customarily accorded wide discretion in handling discovery matters"); Sanchez v. City of Santa
Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying abuse of discretion standard); Hollander v.
American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that "management of discovery
lies within the discretion of the district court"; thus, "an appellate court ordinarily will not disturb
a district court's ruling of a discovery request absent an abuse of discretion").
84. Heward v. Western Elec. Co., 35 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 807, 811 (10th Cir. 19-
84).
85. E.g., Scales v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 925 F.2d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 1991) ("In reviewing
the district court's decision to limit discovery, this court will intervene only if it was an abuse of
discretion resulting in substantial prejudice."); Mack, 871 F.2d at 186 ("We will intervene in such
[discovery) matters only upon a clear showing of manifest injustice, that is, where the lower cou-
rt's discovery order was plainly wrong and resulted in substantial prejudice to the aggrieved par-
ty.").
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Occasionally a circuit court must reverse a district court's discovery rul-
ing, usually for restricting discovery rather than for allowing too much: "If
[the district judge] fails to adhere to the liberal spirit of the Rules, we must
reverse." 6 The district court must "examine each interrogatory" and must
fully review the magistrate judge's earlier ruling, if any. 7 The district court
certainly "overstep[s] the bounds of discretion" if it "decline[s] to state any
reasons for his order limiting the scope of discovery.""8
The circuit court's reversal of a district court's discovery ruling might
well result in reversal of a summary judgment grant for the employer 9 or
reversal of a trial judgment for the employer.'
B. Initial Disclosures Preceding Formal Discovery
To augment the traditional, formal discovery methods triggered by a
party's requests, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) provides that each
party disclose to the other certain core information soon after the case is
filed.9 This initial disclosure provision, however, appears to have had mini-
86. Bums v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Coughlin,
946 F.2d at 1159 (noting that the circuit court must reverse district court's discovery ruling which
"results in fundamental unfairness at trial"); cf. Sempier, 45 F.3d at 734 (finding that the district
court "far exceeded the outermost limits on its discretion" by denying the plaintiffs motion to
compel answers to specific interrogatories and instead ordering the employer to answer court-
drafted "Bill of Particulars"); Ardrey v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 1986)
(stating that, "[allthough it is 'unusual to find an abuse of discretion in discovery matters,' ... a
district court may not, through discovery restrictiohs, prevent a plaintiff from pursuing a theory or
entire cause of action") (quoting Sanders v. Shell Oil Co., 678 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1982)).
87. Sempier, 45 F.3d at 735.
88. Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 406 (5th Cir. 1983).
89. E.g., Sempier, 45 F.3d at 736 (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment for
employer, where district court substituted its own vague and general Bill of Particulars for the
plaintiff's specific interrogatories); Parrish v. Ford Motor Co., No. 91-5300, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3361, at *18 (6th Cir. 1992) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment for
employer because "we are inclined to believe that further discovery is in order"); Hollander, 895
F.2d at 84 (vacating summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge claim "as this restriction
upon [plaintiff's] discovery unduly limited his ability to establish his argument that [the employe-
r's] discharge of him was pretextual"); Diaz v. American Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 1364 (9th
Cir. 1985) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment for employer "because [plaintiff]
was improperly denied the opportunity to discover material that is relevant to the only bases on
which summary judgment could have been granted"); Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655,
656 (11 th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment where plaintiff was
prevented from obtaining necessary statistical information); Trevino, 701 F.2d at 405-06 (reversing
district court's grant of summary judgment where plaintiff "was effectively hamstrung by the
district court's order limiting discovery").
90. E.g., Weahkee v. Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1083-84 (10th Cir. 1980) (reversing district
court's trial judgment for employer and remanding "to permit ... additional discovery"); Rich v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 349 (10th Cir. 1975) (reversing district court's trial judg-
ment for employer and ordering district court on remand "to reconsider plaintiffs' request for
discovery"); Burns, 483 F.2d at 302-03 (reversing district court's trial judgment for employer and
remanding so that the district court could make information available to plaintiff).
91. Rule 26(a)(1) provides:
Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order or local rule, a party shall,
without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties;
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual
likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particu-
larity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the information;
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mal effect on the course of litigation, including that under the Circumstantial
Individual Disparate Treatment theory.
First, a great many district courts have opted out of the initial disclosure
provision, as expressly allowed by the Rule.92 Second, in many districts, the
parties themselves can opt out of initial disclosures by stipulation or local
rule.93 Third, given the prevalence of notice pleading, few complaints and
answers involving the Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment theory
contain many "disputed facts alleged with particularity," required to trigger
meaningful initial disclosures.94 Indeed, the plaintiff's complaint may even
contain allegations for which the plaintiff has no evidence, so long as those
allegations "are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportuni-
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, data
compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party that
are relevant to the disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party,
making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other
evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such compu-
tation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered;
and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under
which an person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part of all of
a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for pay-
ments made to satisfy the judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). There are 94 federal judicial districts, 45 of which have imple-
mented the initial disclosure rule as written and six of which have implemented the rule "with a
significant revision." 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGrr, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(Supp. 1995) (reporting on a March 24, 1995 survey by the Research Division of the Federal Ju-
dicial Center). Of the 49 remaining districts that have not implemented disclosure, five require
initial disclosure under local rules or plans, and 15 give district judges discretion to require initial
disclosure in specific cases. Id. The remaining 28 districts have no disclosure requirements. Id.
93. In May of 1995, the FEDERAL DISCOVERY NEWS reported:
Never mind that the district has opted into Rule 26(a)(1). Embedded in the local rules is
a clause that allows attorneys to stipulate out of the Rule when they submit a report to
the court.... [A] recent survey ... showed that 10 of 19 judges surveyed in the district
reported that in 50% or more of their cases that the parties were stipulating out of
26(a)(1).
Beltway Attorneys Agree to Ignore Rule 26(a)(1), FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, May 1995.
94. Gerald G. MacDonald, Hesiod, Agesilaus, and Rule 26: A Proposal for a More Effective
Mandatory Initial Disclosure Procedure, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 819, 838 (1993) (explaining
that Rule 26(a) "insures its own ineffectiveness by creating an escape device which will allow
parties to avoid the mandatory disclosure requirements in the largest segment of civil litiga-
tion--those cases pleaded pursuant to the 'notice pleading' provisions of Rule 8(a)"). Rule 8(a)
provides that a pleading, such as the plaintiff's complaint, need contain only:
(1) [a] short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction de-
pends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of
jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader
seeks.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). At least one magistrate judge, however, has seen a return to more fact-spe-
cific pleadings. Kansas Magistrate Praises Effectiveness of New Rules, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS,
Oct. 1995 (discussing Magistrate Judge Gerald L. Rushfelt, who has published a "litany of discov-
ery orders" reports "seeing more specificity in the pleadings"). According to Judge Rushfelt: "[the
pleadings have] become longer and more detailed. That started happening even before the amend-
ment. What the new rules have done is accelerate that pattern." id.
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ty for further investigation or discovery."95 Accordingly, a plaintiff suing un-
der the Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment theory continues to rely
on traditional, formal discovery procedures to obtain additional information
about her case.
C. The Forms, Limits, and Timing of Discovery
The parties in litigation typically begin formal discovery after they have
met and conferred to establish a discovery plan.96 Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), the parties are entitled to take discovery "regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action.""
The party seeking discovery must show that the information sought is
relevant;98 this showing is not difficult, as relevancy "has been construed bro-
adly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to
other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.'"
Relevancy extends beyond the issues presented in the pleadings, "for discovery
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(3).
96. Rule 26(d) provides: "Except when authorized under these rules or by local rule, order,
or agreement of the parties, a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties
have met and conferred as required by subdivision (f)." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d). Rule 26(f) pro-
vides:
Except in actions exempted by local rule or when otherwise ordered, the parties shall, as
soon as practicable and in any event at least 14 days before a scheduling conference is
held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b), meet to discuss the nature and basis
of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of
the case, to make or arrange for the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(l), and to
develop a proposed discovery plan.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
97. Rule 26(b)(1) provides that the discovery is relevant:
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim
or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, con-
dition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incorporate common-law privileges, with the attor-
ney-client privilege being the most important in employment discrimination litigation. See, e.g.,
Curcio v. Chinn Enters., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 9, 10-11 (N.D. I11. 1996) (holding that
attomey-client privilege protects questionnaires used at employer's sexual harassment training
seminars conducted by employer's attorneys).
Rule 26(b)(3) offers a more limited protection for an attomey's work product, mandating
production of:
documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable ... and prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representa-
tive, .... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Rule 26(b)(5) further requires that any party claiming privilege or work-
product protection: "shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the docu-
ments, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing
information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the
privilege or protection." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). This article addresses only those discovery
requests by the plaintiff which are non-privileged and do not constitute work product.
98. McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53, 57 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
99. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
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itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues.""'° The parties' re-
quested information "need not be admissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."'' Thus, discovery should be allowed "if there is any possibility
that the information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the ac-
tion."
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(5) lists the traditional, formal meth-
ods of discovery available to the parties: depositions upon oral examination or
written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents and things
or permission to enter upon land or other property; physical and mental exami-
nations; and requests for admission.0 3 The methods may be used in any or-
der." 4
The district court can restrict or prohibit the use of any method of discov-
ery if:
(i) [t]he discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,
or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has
had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the infor-
mation sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discov-
ery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance
of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the pro-
posed discovery in resolving the issues.0 5
Additionally, there are presumptive numerical limitations on two discovery
methods. Each party typically is restricted to no more than ten depositions,
100. Id.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Pisacane v. Enichem Am., Inc., No. 94 Civ. 7843,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9755, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1996) (contrasting district court's admis-
sion of evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 with "a determination of relevance
under the much broader standard" in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1); Clarke v. Mellon
Bank, N.A., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1176, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (refusing to bar broad
discovery request though it yielded "some evidence that is not admissible," so long as it was "cal-
culated ... to lead to the production of relevant matter in view of [plaintiff's allegations)");
Flanagan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 F.R.D. 42, 46 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that "relevance, for
purposes of Rule 26, cannot be equated with admissibility at trial or ultimate probativeness").
102. Nelson v. Telecable of Overland Park, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 859, 859 (D.
Kan. 1996) (quoting Smith v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 137 F.R.D. 25, 27 (D. Kan. 1991)).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5).
104. Rule 26(d) provides:
Unless the court, upon motion, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in
the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any se-
quence, and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or oth-
erwise, shall not operate to delay another party's discovery.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
whether upon oral or written questions."9 Further, each party typically is
limited to twenty-five interrogatories, "including all discrete subparts."' 7
D. Discovery Disputes
The parties to litigation invariably have disputes about the appropriate
scope of discovery. Assuming that one party has not waived its objection to
the discovery,"~ or that the parties have been unable to reach a compro-
mise,"9 the parties will resort to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37
to protect their positions.
1. Motions for Protective Orders
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) allows the party from whom dis-
covery is sought to move for a protective order from the district court, but
only after that party "has conferred or attempted to confer with other affected
parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action."" If there is
"good cause shown" for a protective order, the district court "may make any
order which justice requires to protect [the party] from annoyance, embarrass-
ment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.."" The party moving for a
protective order "must make a specific demonstration of facts in support of the
request as opposed to conclusory or speculative statements about the need for
106. Rule 30(a)(2) provides:
A party must obtain leave of court, which shall be granted to the extent consistent with
the principles stated in Rule 26(b)(2), if... without written stipulation of the parties,
(A) a proposed deposition would result in more than ten depositions being taken under
this rule or Rule 31 by the plaintiffs, or by the defendants, or by third-party defendants.
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a). Rule 33(a) provides: "Without leave of court or written stipula-
tion, any party may serve upon any other party written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in num-
ber including all discrete subparts .... Leave to serve additional interrogatories shall be granted to
the extent consistent with the principles of Rule 26(b)(2)." FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a); see also McMe-
namin v. M & P Trucking Co., No. 93-6888, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4549, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7,
1994) ("The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I assume after careful consideration,
concluded that in the usual civil lawsuit, after self-executing discovery, a limit of twenty-five
interrogatories, subject to discretionary expansion of the quantity in appropriate cases, is reason-
able.").
108. E.g., Scarfo v. Cabletron Sys. Inc., 153 F.R.D. 9, 11 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that an em-
ployer must abide by its initial agreement to provide plaintiff with certain discovery, even though
it later objected to the scope of that discovery).
109. For example, the parties may reach a stipulated protective order to preserve the confiden-
tiality of material. See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). District courts take seriously the requirement that parties attempt
to meet and confer prior to filing discovery motions. See, e.g., Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC,
157 F.R.D. 3, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Attempts to agree on what should be done item-by-item should
precede requests for blanket sweeping rules by the Magistrate Judge followed by filing of objec-
tions to the Magistrate Judge's rulings.").
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). These options include:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had; (2) that the disclosure or discovery may
be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or
place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that
selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or
that the scope of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters.
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a protective order and the harm which will be suffered without one.""' 2 The
party prevailing on the motion for a protective order may recover its fees and
costs.' 1
3
In Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment litigation, the "undue
burden or expense" language is often cited by the employer in its attempt to
avoid the plaintiff's discovery."4 The employer cannot prevail on a motion
for a protective order merely by arguing that an otherwise legitimate discovery
request is burdensome or expensive, for "[tlhe production of discovery materi-
als in litigation is often a costly and burdensome enterprise" requiring "many
hours of labor unrelated to any other business purpose."'" Rather, the em-
ployer must show that the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive."6
In assessing burden and expense, the district court must take into account "the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the pro-
posed discovery in resolving the issues.""' 7
Nor can the employer prevail on its motion for a protective order merely
by arguing that it would be forced to prepare an extensive list of information,
for the generation of such lists is not always unduly burdensome or expen-
sive."' Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(d), the
employer resisting discovery has the right, under certain situations, to produce
its business records in lieu of a narrative answer or list."9 If the employer
112. Wendt v. Walden Univ., Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1542, 1543 (D. Minn.
1996).
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (referring to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) and its pro-
visions relating to the award of expenses).
114. See infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
115. Orbovich v. Macalester College, 119 F.R.D. 411, 416 (D. Minn. 1988).
116. See, e.g., Clarke v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1176, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(holding that in order to avoid complying with a discovery request, the party must show that com-
pliance would be unduly burdensome) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)); see also Ladson v. Ulltra
E. Parking Corp., 164 F.R.D. 376, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Defendants do not however, claim that
production of the files would be more burdensome than supplying the information that they have
already offered instead."); Orbovich, 119 F.R.D. at 416 ("The resistance to discovery for those
reasons will not be sustained, however, unless the discovery sought is found to be unreasonably
burdensome.").
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
118. See Bums v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1973) ("Of course, the
extensive listing of information required to fully answer the interrogatories is somewhat cumberso-
me. But... the fact that an interrogatory calls for a list does not make it improper.").
119. Rule 33(d) provides:
Where the answer to an interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the business
records of the party upon whom the interrogatory has been served or from an examina-
tion, audit or inspection of such business records, including a compilation, abstract or
summary thereof, and the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially
the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party served, it is a sufficient
answer to such interrogatory to specify the records from which the answer may be de-
rived or ascertained and to afford the party serving the interrogatory reasonable opportu-
nity to examine, audit or inspect such records and to make copies, compilations, ab-
stracts or summaries. A specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the interrogat-
ing party to locate and to identify, as readily as can the party served, the records from
which the answer may be ascertained.
FED. R. Civ. P. 33(d).
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cannot segregate the requested information, however, "it may be required to
provide broader" information. 2 '
2. Motions to Compel
The party who has propounded discovery and has not received a full re-
sponse may file a motion "for an order compelling.. . discovery" under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(2)(B). 2' The motion to compel, like the
motion for a protective order, "must include a certification that the movant has
in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing
to make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or material with-
out court action."' 2 The party prevailing on the motion to compel may re-
cover its costs and fees.
23
Just as the party seeking a protective order must show good cause, the
party opposing a motion to compel "bears the burden of establishing lack of
relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery either does not come
within the broad scope of relevance ... or is of such marginal relevance that
the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary pre-
sumption in favor of broad disclosure."' 24
3. Failure to Comply with a Court's Discovery Order
Once a district court has ruled on a motion for a protective order or a mo-
tion to compel, the losing party must comply with the ruling or risk a variety
of severe sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b).'25 Sanctions
include allowing the winning party additional discovery,'26 establishing facts
against the losing party,"' entering default judgment against the defen-
dant, "'28 and dismissing the plaintiff's claims.'29 The court might give the
120. Rifkinson v. CBS Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 98, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2)(A); see also Ballou v. University of Kan. Ctr., 159 F.R.D. 558,
560 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's single letter to opposing counsel prior to filing motion
to compel was inadequate, where letter reiterated disclosure request, but did not indicate plaintiff's
intent to file a motion).
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A).
124. Aramburu v. Boeing Co., No. 93-4064-SAC, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20675, at *4 (D.
Kan. Sept. 22, 1994); see also Willis v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1451, 1454 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) ("The Court has ordered similar discovery in other discrimination
cases and the defendant has offered no convincing reason that the same discovery should not be
allowed in the present case."). But see Hicks v. Arthur, 159 F.R.D. 468, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(denying plaintiffs' motion to compel and placing the burden on plaintiffs to show relevance).
125. Nonetheless, the sanctions in FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) are not without limits. See Sempier
v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 735 (3d Cir.) (stating that "none of the weapons in [Rule
37's] formidable arsenal include the wholesale substitution of court-engineered discovery").
126. Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 469 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming district court's
discovery sanctions of "a continuance and an open run at further discovery").
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A); cf Hedican & Loudon, supra note 63, at 1015-16 ("If an
employer fails to provide critical information in a disclosure, and the jury is instructed that the
employer failed to do so despite its obligation to produce that information, this certainly could be
viewed as evidence that the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext.").
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
129. Id.; see also Spiller v. U.S.V. Lab., Inc., 842 F.2d 535, (1st Cir. 1988) (affirming district
court's dismissal of complaint for plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery order).
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non-complying party a warning prior to such sanctions, but need not always
do so. 30 The court also may order the non-complying party to pay the op-
posing counsel's fees 3' and may fine the non-complying party. 32
IV. THE SPECIAL DISCOVERY NEEDS OF A PLAINTIFF IN CIRCUMSTANTIAL
INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT LITIGATION
The courts routinely state that discovery in employment discrimination
litigation is special.'33 An individual plaintiff suing "a huge industrial em-
ployer" creates a "modem day David and Goliath confrontation .... She
needs ample discovery, because "the nature of the proofs required to demon-
strate unlawful discrimination may often be indirect or circumstantial."'35
The anti-discrimination statutes are broad, and remedial,'36 and therefore the
130. E.g., Willis, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1454 (granting plaintiff's motion to com-
pel answers to interrogatories and stating that the court "will not tolerate further delays by the
defendant in discovery and if any additional motions to compel are filed by the plaintiff, the Court
will seriously consider imposing sanctions under... Rule 37").
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b); see also Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 323-24 (5th Cir.
1993) (affirming district court's award of attorneys fees against party who violated court order
regarding discovery).
132. Grimes v. City of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming magistrate
judge's fine of $500 per day for party's non-compliance with court order).
133. See, e.g., Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 734 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Nonetheless,
the district court's discretion has boundaries, and in particular, we frown upon unnecessary discov-
ery limitations in Title VII, and hence ADEA, cases."); Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d
655, 658 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[W]e note that liberal discovery rules are applied in Title VII litiga-
tion."); Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 405-06 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The imposition of
unnecessary limitations on discovery is especially frowned upon in Title VII cases."); Rich v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 343-44 (10th Cir. 1975) ("It is plain that the scope of dis-
covery through interrogatories and requests for production of documents is limited only by rele-
vance and burdensomeness, and in an EEOC case the discovery scope is extensive.... It cannot
be said, therefore, that the policy of this court has been to narrowly circumscribe discovery in
EEOC cases."); Wilson v. Martin County Hosp. Dist., 149 F.R.D. 553, 555 (W.D. Tex. 1993)
("The imposition of unnecessary limitations on discovery is especially frowned upon in Title VU
cases."); Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 60, 62 (D. Del. 1993) ("Discovery requests in dis-
crimination cases have received particularly liberal treatment by the courts."); Flanagan v. Travel-
ers Ins. Co., 111 F.R.D. 42, 46 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 is] not to
be interpreted so as 'to deprive a party of discovery that is reasonably necessary to afford a fair
opportunity to develop and prepare the case.' . . . This is particularly true in Title VII cases where
the imposition of unnecessary discovery limitations is to be avoided.") (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26
advisory note); Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502, 506 (N.D. I11. 1986)
("The scope of discovery is especially broad in Title VII cases.").
Occasionally, courts will state that discovery in employment discrimination litigation is to
be treated no differently than discovery in other types of cases. E.g., Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture
Leasing Co., 76 F.R.D. 386, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (noting that Title VII actions have been granted
liberal discovery, but all requests still must follow "traditional discovery notions of relevancy and
must not impose an undue burden upon the responding party"); see also Robbins v. Camden City
Bd. of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49, 55 (D.N.J. 1985) (stating that "[tihe responses sought must comport
with the traditional notions of relevancy and must not impose an undue burden on the responding
party"); Hardrick v. Legal Servs. Corp., 96 F.R.D. 617, 618 (D.D.C. 1983) (noting concern "about
'fishing expeditions,' discovery abuse and inordinate expense involved in overbroad and far-rang-
ing discovery requests").
134. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Corp., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969).
135. Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 117, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1994); see also Marshall v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1978) ("A plaintiff who must shoulder the
burden of proving that the reasons given for his discharge are pretextual should not normally be
denied the information necessary to establish that claim.").
136. See Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 1996) ("It has long been
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courts should not "allow procedural technicalities to impede the full vindica-
tion of guaranteed rights."' 
37
The discovery accorded a private individual in her Circumstantial Individ-
ual Disparate Treatment case should be as broad as the discovery accorded the
EEOC in its litigation; the individual, in vindicating her rights under an anti-
discrimination statute, essentially serves as a private attorney-general for other
potentially aggrieved individuals.'38 As the Tenth Circuit stated in the semi-
nal case Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp.,'39 whether the plaintiff is an indi-
vidual or the EEOC, "[iut is plain that the scope of discovery... is limited
only by relevance and burdensomeness."' 40
A. The Relevance of Workforce Data
The Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment plaintiff undoubtedly
needs discovery beyond the bounds of the facts upon which her claim is
based. 4' The courts should not assume that the plaintiff brings a "highly in-
dividualized claim[]."42 Rather, because the employer's discrimination
against the plaintiff, as a member of a protected group, "is by definition class
discrimination,"'43 the plaintiff is entitled to data about other persons work-
recognized that Title VII is a remedial statute with a broad sweep."); Mardell v. Harleysville Life
Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1235 (3d Cir. 1994) ("We also bear in mind that, as remedial statutes,
Title VII and ADEA should be liberally construed to advance their beneficent purposes."); Marti-
nez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Title VII 'is a remedial statute to be liberally
construed in favor of victims of discrimination."') (quoting Davis v. Valley Distrib. Co., 522 F.2d
827, 832 (9th Cir. 1975)); Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 634-35 (1st Cir. 1983)
("Title VII was considered a generally remedial statute, and the prevailing majority in Congress
intended to give it broad effect."); Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir.
1969) ("Title VII ... should not be construed narrowly.").
137. Bums v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1973).
138. Id. ("Any information relevant-in a discovery sense-to an EEOC investigation is like-
wise relevant to the private attomey-general, either in his individual role or in his capacity as the
claimed representative of a class.").
139. 522 F.2d 333, 343 (10th Cir. 1975).
140. Rich, 522 F.2d at 343.
141. See Clarke v. Mellon Bank, N.A., No. 92-CV-4823, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6680, at *7
(E.D. Pa. May 11, 1993) ("The needs of the individual plaintiff to information ... requires that
the parameters of discovery be broader than the specific, individual facts upon which the claim is
based."); Robbins, 105 F.R.D. at 55 ("Nonetheless, the applicable discovery parameters must be
broader than the specific, individualized facts upon which her claims are based because of the
nature of the proofs required to demonstrate unlawful discrimination, which may often be indirect
or circumstantial.").
142. Hardrick, 96 F.R.D. at 619.
143. Blue Bell Boots, 418 F.2d at 358; see also Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32-
33 (5th Cir. 1968) ("The suit is ... more than a private claim" of discrimination on the basis of
the individual's protected class, rather "the suit is perforce a sort of class action for fellow em-
ployees similarly situated."); Robbins, 105 F.R.D. at 58 ("Discrimination on the basis of race is by
definition class discrimination and the existence of a pattern of racial discrimination in a job cate-




ing for that employer.'" In fact, she is entitled to much of the same informa-
tion as in a systemic disparate treatment case.
45
Moreover, the plaintiff in a Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment
case, whether the individual or the EEOC,' should be entitled to the same
expansive definition of relevance as accorded the EEOC when it investigates
the underlying charge of discrimination 47 and requires court enforcement of
an administrative subpoena to obtain data from the employer."
The plaintiff may need workforce discovery to bolster her prima facie
case, especially as to the qualifications of the competing employees or appli-
144. There may be related employers, such as parents and subsidiaries. See Chambers v. Capi-
tal Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 429, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing as "to what extent, when and
how information relating to personnel practices of related entities may be obtained by plaintiff").
This article focuses on a single employing entity.
145. See Gomez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995) ("It is well
settled that in a Title VII suit, an employer's general practices are relevant even when a plaintiff is
asserting an individual claim for disparate treatment."); Burns, 483 F.2d at 306 ("The importance
of obtaining an overall statistical picture of an employer's practices with regard to both Black and
White employees does not depend on the presence of an alleged 'pattern or practice' or a valid
charge of class discrimination or class action."); Flanagan, 111 F.R.D. at 46-47 ("Although plain-
tiff has alleged individual disparate treatment... such claims, of necessity, require discovery of
and comparison with the treatment accorded other employees .... Comparative information is
necessary to afford plaintiff a fair opportunity to develop her case and may be relevant to establish
the pretextual nature of defendant's conduct.").
A few courts have adopted a stricter approach. According to the Middle District of Geor-
gia: "Plaintiffs do not point to a policy or an institution-wide practice. Instead, they direct their
grievances toward particular supervisors .... Furthermore, other than counsel's belief that Defen-
dant's database may verify a class-wide discriminatory animus, Plaintiffs have set forth no show-
ing that further discovery will substantiate the class action." Lumpkin v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 161 F.R.D. 480, 482 (M.D. Ga. 1995). The Lumpkin court granted an employer's motion
for a protective order limiting the scope of discovery in the absence of a class action. Id.; see also
Prouty v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 99 F.R.D. 545, 547 (D.D.C. 1983) ("Because this is an
individual suit rather than a class action and plaintiff has not shown a sufficiently particularized
need for this information, the Court will limit discovery.").
146. The Tenth Circuit explained why individuals and the EEOC should be treated the same:
The fact that these cases had to do with discovery efforts by the EEOC itself rather than
by individuals cannot serve as a point of departure. The Act's purposes in each instance
are the same. Whether, then, the action is by a plaintiff or by the government, the object
is 'the elimination of employment discrimination, whether practiced knowingly or
unconsciously.'... Information relevant in an EEOC inquiry is equally relevant in a
private action.
Rich, 522 F.2d at 344 (citations omitted).
147. The EEOC investigates charges of discrimination brought under Title VII and the
ADEA. Section 709(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1994), provides that the EEOC "shall
at all reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any
evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful employ-
ment practices ... and is relevant to the charge under investigation." Section 7(a) of the ADEA,
29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (1994), provides for similar EEOC investigations, "in accordance with the
powers and procedures in sections 209 and 211 [of the Fair Labor Standards Act]."
148. If an employer does not comply with the EEOC's request for information, the EEOC can
petition the district court for enforcement. Title VII § 710(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (1994) (provid-
ing that section II of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1994), will apply to
EEOC investigations); ADEA § 7(a), 29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (1994) (incorporating section 9 of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 209 (1994), which incorporates sections 9 and 10 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1994), which provides for subpoena power).
In enforcing the EEOC subpoena, "courts have generously construed the term 'relevant'
and have afforded the Commission access to virtually any material that might cast light on the
allegations against the employer." EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1984).
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cants and as to the employer's subsequent efforts in filling the position.'49 It
is clear that the plaintiff "does not have to prove a prima facie case to justify
a request which appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence."' 50
The plaintiff also may need workforce discovery to prove pretext. Even
prior to Hicks' more onerous definition of pretext, courts realized the necessity
of "[c]areful review of discovery requests" once an employer has produced
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse action, "because the
plaintiff 'must take the extra step of presenting evidence to show that the
reasons given [by the employer] are an attempt to cover up the employer's
alleged real discriminatory motive.'""
Additionally, the plaintiff may need workforce discovery to prove her
entitlement to remedies such as lost wages and benefits,' injunctive re-
lief,"'53 and liquidated or punitive damages. '54
Three types of workforce data are particularly important for the plaintiff
to discover, typically through interrogatories or requests for production of
documents: a statistical profile of employees, personnel files of employees,
and records of charges or complaints filed by employees.
149. See Parrish v. Ford Motor Co., No. 91-5300, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 3361, at *16 (6th
Cir. Feb. 7, 1992) (stating discovery of other employees' personnel files "is clearly necessary for
[plaintiff] to establish a prima facie case of discrimination"); Weahkee v. Norton, 621 F.2d 1080,
1082 (10th Cir. 1980) (reversing trial judgment for employer where plaintiff was denied discovery
of personnel files because "[tihe qualifications and job performance of these employees in com-
parison with the plaintiff's qualifications and performance is at the heart of this controversy");
Davis v. Pyramid Prods., Inc., No. 93-CV-72174-DT, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11761, at *17 (E.D.
Mich. June 6, 1994) (comparing the plaintiff's employment record with his competitor and con-
cluding that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case).
150. Nelson v. Telecable of Overland Park Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 859, 860 (D.
Kan. 1996).
151. Parrish, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 3361, at *17-18 (quoting Irvin v. Airco Carbide, 837
F.2d 724, 726 (6th Cir. 1987)) (alteration in original).
152. See Blue Bell Boors, 418 F.2d at 358 ("Moreover, evidence concerning employment
practices other than those specifically charged by complainants may properly be considered by the
Commission in framing a remedy.").
153. See EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1087 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming district
court's entry of company-wide injunction in an ADEA individual disparate treatment case brought
by the EEOC); Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1136 (11th Cir. 1984)
(stating that in a Title VII individual disparate treatment case, "injunctive relief may benefit indi-
viduals not party to the action, and that classwide injunctive relief may be appropriate in an indi-
vidual action," so long as the plaintiff "would benefit personally from the relief requested") (citing
Evans v. Hartnett County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1982), and Meyer v. Brown
& Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1981)); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 554 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that ADEA cases "establish that a nationwide or
companywide injunction is appropriate only when the facts indicate a company policy or practice
in violation of the statute").
154. Section 7(b) of the ADEA provides that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to liquidated
damages for an employer's "willful violation[]" of the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994). In an
ADEA case, the District of Delaware stated, "[i]f plaintiff establishes any prior adverse legal ac-
tions in ADEA matters, the existence of such rulings would shed light on the issue of wilfulness if
the fact-finder first determines an ADEA violation occurred." Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 149 F.R.D.
60, 63 (D. Del. 1993). By analogy to Finch, discovery of workforce data in a Title VII case would
be relevant to an award of punitive damages, which are allowed against a non-governmental em-
ployer if the plaintiff proves that the employer acted "with malice or with reckless indifference" to
an aggrieved individual's rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1977A(b)(1) (1994).
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1. Statistical Profile of Employees
A Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment plaintiff is entitled to
discover the statistical profile of other employees. For example, a plaintiff
alleging age discrimination in transfers and promotions should be able to dis-
cover the percentage of employees in the protected class who received trans-
fers and promotions, compared with the percentage of all employees in that
protected class.'55 The courts cannot per se reject the use of statistics in an
individual case.
56
Some courts allow this statistical evidence to buttress the plaintiff's prima
facie case, even though such evidence does not fit squarely within any of the
four prima facie elements.'57
The more important use of statistical evidence, however, is at the pretext
stage. The McDonnell Douglas Court observed that "statistics as to [the
employer's] policy and practice may be helpful" in determining pretext,'58
although generalized statistics "may not be in and of themselves controlling"
in an individual's case.'59
Workforce statistical profiles may effectively rebut the legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason articulated by the employer." The profiles also relate to
155. Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 767 (3d Cir. 1989).
156. See Cross v. City of Ontario, No. 95-55437, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24417, at *13 (9th
Cir. Sept. 16, 1996) (reversing district court's determination that "statistical evidence was invalid
as a matter of law"); cf. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 698 (7th Cir. 1987) ("All evidence
is probabilistic-statistical evidence merely explicitly so.").
157. See, e.g., Smith v. Homer, 839 F.2d 1530, 1536 n.8 (l1th Cir. 1988) (finding statistical
information "'relevant and important"' in an "individual case of disparate treatment") (quoting
Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1131 (1 1th Cir. 1984)); Ardrey v. United
Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 684 (4th Cir. 1986) (suggesting "such evidence may help establish a
prima facie case"); Diaz v. American Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding
statistical information "helpful in establishing a prima facie case 'despite the fact that [it] may not
be directly probative of any of the four specific elements set forth by McDonnell Douglas"') (qu-
oting Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1989)) (alteration in
original); Minority Employees at NASA v. Beggs, 723 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (allowing
statistical evidence to "'establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination in an individual
case' even though such data is generally used in class action cases to show a pattern or practice of
discrimination") (quoting Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); Weahkee v.
Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir. 1980) (ruling that "statistical evidence may be used to
establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination").
158. McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973) (alteration in original).
159. Id. at 805 n.19; see also Carmichael, 738 F.2d at 1131 ("[S]tatistics alone cannot make a
case of individual disparate treatment.").
160. See Cross, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24417, at *13-14 (approving use of statistical evi-
dence "to show that defendants' stated reasons for rejecting [plaintiff's] promotion were
pretextual"); Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding it
"well-settled that an individual disparate treatment plaintiff may use statistical evidence regarding
an employer's general practices at the pretext stage to help rebut the employer's purported nondis-
criminatory explanation"); MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 1988)
(describing statistical evidence as "surely the kind of fact which could cause a reasonable trier of
fact to raise an eyebrow, and proceed to assess the employer's explanation for this outcome");
Weahkee, 621 F.2d at 1083 (holding that, after an employer "has come forward with legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for the action contested, a plaintiff may rely on statistics to discredit the
reasons the employer presented for its action"); Finch, 149 F.R.D. at 63 (stating "[lt follows that
information on this potentially discriminatory conduct could be used by a plaintiff to ... rebut
any non-discriminatory reason offered by a defendant").
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the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination, as required by Hicks: "Such a
discriminatory pattern is probative of motive and can therefore create an infer-
ence of discriminatory intent with respect to the individual employment deci-
sion at issue.''
The plaintiff is entitled to discover the raw statistical data about fellow
employees even though the comparisons she draws ultimately may lack in
weight or relevance. 62 Moreover, if she has other evidence to discredit the
employer's articulated reason, her "quantitative [statistical] evidence does not
need to reach the degree of certainty required of plaintiffs who present no
proof of discrimination besides a statistical pattern."'63
2. Personnel Files of Employees
The Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment plaintiff frequently un-
covers key evidence in other employees' personnel files, which are, of course,
in "the exclusive control" of the employer." This evidence may be used in
161. Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1363; see also Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d
509, 542 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating "statistical evidence of an employer's pattern and practice with
respect to minority employment may be relevant to a showing of pretext"); Ardrey, 798 F.2d at
684 (noting that "[sluch evidence ... is often crucial for the plaintiff's attempt to establish an
inference of discrimination"); Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655, 658 (1 1th Cir. 1983)
(finding "[sitatistical information concerning an employer's general policy and practice concerning
minority employment possibly relevant to a showing of pretext, even in a case alleging an individ-
ual instance of discrimination rather than a 'pattern and practice' of discrimination"); Clarke, 25
Fed. R. Serv. 3d at 1177 (noting such evidence "may reveal patterns of discrimination against a
group of employees; increasing the likelihood that an employer's offered explanation for an em-
ployment decision regarding a particular individual masks a discriminatory motive"). The Eastern
District of Pennsylvania explained:
In order to prove any discriminatory intent, plaintiff contends that company-wide statis-
tical evidence regarding the progress of blacks in the workforce would support his posi-
tion that [defendant] declared the labor surplus as a pretext to remove [plaintiff] from his
position because of [the plaintiff's] race, and replace him with a white employee. In-
deed, statistical analysis might well be the only means by which plaintiff could prove an
alleged pattern or practice of racial discrimination.
Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 117, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1994); see also Jackson v. Kenney, 762 F.
Supp. 863, 866 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (allowing plaintiff to prove pretext by "present[ing] statistical
proof-defendant's answers to interrogatories-which shows that the number of females in the
[defendant's] workforce is lower thanthe percentage of females holding similar positions in the
private sector").
Cases brought by the EEOC are to the same effect. For example, the Fourth Circuit stated
that:
the EEOC's request for job classifications, hire dates, and placement information is all
highly relevant and material to a charge alleging the existence of a discriminatory pro-
motion policy and classification of jobs by race. [The individual's] charge alleges the
existence of at least plant-wide policies and the requested information would seem to
contain very direct evidence of the existence or non-existence of such policies.
Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 41-42 (4th Cir. 1971); see also Elaine W. Shoben, The
Use of Statistics to Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination, 46 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
221, 237-42 (1983) (discussing how discriminatory intent may be inferred from statistical evi-
dence).
162. E.g., MacDissi, 856 F.2d at 1059 (entitling the district court to "give the most weight" to
statistics from plaintiff's own department); Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113
F.R.D. 502, 507 (N.D. Il. 1986) (finding statistics from other locations with lower percentages of
minority employees went "to the weight, not the relevancy of the evidence").
163. MacDissi, 856 F.2d at 1058.
164. Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991).
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the prima facie case, to establish the qualifications for the position in ques-
tion."6 It also may be used to discredit the employer's reason for its adverse
action and to infer intentional discrimination."' Additionally, it is relevant
for damages calculations.'67 Even without "a particularly broad definition of
'relevance,"' there should be "wide discovery. ' '
A prudent plaintiff should not request the employees' entire personnel
files, recognizing that they may contain irrelevant "personal and family mat-
ters. , , Instead, she should request all portions of the personnel files relating
to specific issues such as performance evaluations and disciplinary actions, 7 '
which certainly are or "might be" relevant. 7' The plaintiff undoubtedly re-
quires personnel documents for all employees in her protected class and/or
implicated in a similar adverse employment action.' Moreover, she must
165. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
166. See Coughlin, 946 F.2d at 1159 (finding evidence in personnel files of repeated disparity
in punishment "clearly relevant in considering pretext"); Wilson v. Martin County Hosp. Dist.,
149 F.R.D. 553, 555 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (finding "all or parts of these personnel files [could] be
central to plaintiff's effort to prove pretext and are therefore subject to disclosure"); Flanagan,
111 F.R.D. at 47 (viewing comparative information as "necessary to afford plaintiff a fair opportu-
nity to develop her case" and possibly "relevant to establish the pretextual nature of defendant's
conduct"); Jackson v. Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 839 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(granting bulk of plaintiff's motion to compel "personnel files of numerous employees who were
either 'terminated as part of defendant's [alleged] pattern or practice of terminating older employ-
ees, had [allegedly] been otherwise discriminated against on account of age, or had been [alleged-
ly] preferentially retained by the defendant company in the department in which plaintiff worked,"
even in the face of defendant's objection "that those people held jobs that the plaintiff was not
qualified to perform and therefore the information is irrelevant" because "this information could
be relevant to the plaintiff's case if these employees were retained for reasons having to do with
age") (alterations in original).
167. See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
168. Coughlin, 946 F.2d at 1159.
169. Sosky v. International Mill Serv. Inc., No. 94-2833, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8507, at
*13-14 (E.D. Pa. 1995); see also EEOC v. Avco New Idea Div., 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
736, 741 (N.D. Ohio 1978) ("[While] there no doubt is much that is irrelevant to this action con-
tained in such persons' personnel files, those files might reasonably be expected to yield probative
evidence of plaintiff's claims.").
170. United States v. Board of Educ. Caddo Parish, No. 94-0155, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10740, at *1 (W.D. La. June 13, 1995). The court continued:
Plaintiff justifies Request [for Production of Documents] by arguing that 'the contents of
a personnel file invariably contain relevant information.' . . . Plaintiff has requested the
pond so that it may go fishing. The rules require that plaintiff request the individual fish
themselves. Plaintiff must request documents by specific relevant categories. If those
documents are found in the personnel files, they must then be produced.
Id.; see also Sosky, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8507, at * 14 (finding the plaintiff not entitled to entire
personnel files, but could, "within the time limits set for discovery, recast his request to demand
disclosure of relevant documents in those files, i.e. transfers, evaluation reports, salary informa-
tion, job disposition, complaints about any type of discrimination, discipline, etc.").
171. Ladson v. Ulltra E. Parking Corp., 164 F.R.D. 376, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The court also
stated that it was "at a loss to see why current employees' files might not provide information
about hiring and promotion that could be relevant or could lead to the discovery of relevant evi-
dence." Id.; see also Willis v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 56 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1451, 1454
(E.D. Tenn. 1991) (finding personnel files generally relevant).
172. Jackson v. Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 839 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(granting bulk of plaintiff's motion to compel "personnel files of numerous employees who were
either 'terminated as part of defendant's [alleged] pattern or practice of terminating older employ-
ees, had [allegedly] been otherwise discriminated against on account of age, or had been [alleged-
ly] preferentially retained by the defendant company in the department in which plaintiff worked")
(alteration in original); see also Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112, 115 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (sub-
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have access to personnel documents of the supervisors and managers who
rendered the adverse employment decision.'73 The employer must identify by
name those employees, supervisors, and managers, for such identification is
essential to the plaintiff's follow-up discovery.'
Occasionally employers erroneously refuse to produce such personnel files
on the grounds of privilege. Under federal law, applied to the plaintiff's claims
under a federal anti-discrimination statute,' no true privilege exists.'76
Employers also might refuse to produce the documents by challenging the
information as private or confidential.'7 Some courts agree with the employ-
er and deny the plaintiff discovery.' 8 Other courts order the discovery to
jecting employment information regarding a competing candidate in an employment discrimination
case to discovery"); cf Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district
court's discovery limitations on personnel files because the circumstances of the co-employees
whose personnel files plaintiff sought "were not close enough to [plaintiffs] to make comparisons
productive").
173. See Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 4, 4 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (granting
plaintiffs motion to compel "personnel, appraisal and discipline files" of three managerial em-
ployees involved in plaintiff's termination); EEOC v. County of San Benito, 818 F. Supp. 289,
291 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (enforcing EEOC subpoena to obtain personnel record of supervisor of char-
ging party); In Avco New Idea Div., the court stated:
The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that unequal standards were applied to women
in the defendant company's classification and discharge policies. If such unequal treat-
ment did exist, it necessarily was carried out by the defendant company's supervisory
personnel. While there no doubt is much that is irrelevant to this action contained in
such persons' personnel files, those files might reasonably be expected to yield probative
evidence of plaintiff's claims.
Avco New Idea Div., 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 741.
174. But see Prouty v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 99 F.R.D. 545, 549 (D.D.C. 1983)
(denying the plaintiff's motion to compel the employer to identify relevant employees by name
and stating, "[t]he Court finds that the names of [defendant employees are not relevant to plain-
tiff's suit").
175. See Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991) ("When considering a federal
claim, federal courts apply federal common law, rather than state law, to determine the existence
and scope of a privilege."); Horizon of Hope Ministry v. Clark County, 115 F.R.D. 1, 6 (S.D.
Ohio 1986) ("However, in a federal civil rights action, federal law applies to the determination of
what evidence is privileged.").
176. See University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (refusing to grant employer
privilege from producing peer review materials); Horizon of Hope Ministry, 115 F.R.D. at 6 (stat-
ing that, "[u]nder federal law, there is no privilege for personnel files").
177. Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112, 115-16 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The Miles court stated:
I am requiring defendant to show good cause for any and all confidential designations.
As revised the order shall require defendant to designate information as confidential
pending either an agreement to that effect with Plaintiff or the decision on a motion to
that effect made by defendant within ten days of such designation. This system does not
allow misuse of the confidential designation and places the burden of proving such con-
fidentiality squarely upon defendant as is required by Rule 26(c) and the First
Amendment.... To allow information to become presumptively confidential without
affording Plaintiff an opportunity to disagree with that designation and then to bear the
burden of mounting a challenge would run afoul of the basic burden-shifting approach
mandated by Rule 26(c).
Id.
178. E.g., Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's
limitation on discovery of personnel files, where "[t]uming over the files ... would invade the
privacy of the other employees"). It is unclear what authority supports wholesale denial of per-
sonnel files on privacy grounds. Rule 26(c)(7) protects privacy only in the context of a "trade




proceed forthwith, apparently unconcerned with the issue of privacy in the
face of a compelling Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment claim. 7 9
The most appropriate course of action is for the court to allow the discovery
pursuant to a protective court order, drafted either by the parties' or by the
court.
179. E.g., Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 110 F.R.D. 660, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[F-
lull disclosure [of personnel files] is most strongly warranted where a case is based on alleged
violations of federally-protected civil rights.").
180. E.g., Ladson, 164 F.R.D. at 377 n.2 ("Legitimate privacy concerns exist with regard to
personnel files. Such concerns, however, can be addressed by means short of restricting the scope
of discovery. The Court has signed a protective order.., applicable to all documents produced in
the course of this litigation that the supplying party designates 'confidential."'); Clarke v. Mellon
Bank, N.A., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1176, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Defendant's concern
regarding the privacy interests of the employees on the document has already been met by virtue
of a Stipulated Protective Order .... The protective order is broad in its scope and limits disclo-
sure of all documents during any phase or aspect of discovery."); Willis v. Golden Rule Ins. Co.,
56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1451, 1454 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) ("The privacy of any individual
and the confidentiality of the files may be protected by an appropriate protective order."); Flana-
gan, I I 1 F.R.D. at 48 ("The parties are free to fashion an appropriate confidentiality order" to
protect privacy rights.).
181. Miles, 154 F.R.D. at 116. Miles provides a typical protective order.
AND NOW, this 2nd day of March, 1994, after careful consideration of defendant's
Motion for Protective Order, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is
GRANTED subject to the restrictions and procedures set forth in the attached Memoran-
dum.
Confidential Documents shall be used solely for the purposes of this litigation
captioned as Miles v. Boeing, Civil Action No. 93-3063, which is currentiy pending in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and shall be
disclosed only to the following persons:
a. counsel for any party engaged in the litigation of this action and profes-
sional, clerical, secretarial and other support personnel of such counsel;
b. specifically named parties to this litigation;
c. experts retained to assist counsel for any party to this litigation;
d. witnesses in the course of deposition or at trial, in the good faith belief
of counsel that examination with respect to Confidential Document is
necessary for legitimate discovery purposes;
e. this Court and its employees, the triers of fact and court reporters tran-
scribing testimony herein (whether during the course of deposition or
trial testimony) and notarizing officers.
Prior to the disclosure of Confidential Documents to any person described in the
preceding paragraphs, counsel for Miles shall provide such person with a copy of this
Order and shall advise them that the disclosure of Confidential Documents is subject to
its terms. Confidential Documents shall be disclosed to an expert only after the expert
has signed a Commitment to Comply With and Be Bound by Confidentiality Order.
Counsel for Miles shall retain copies of the undertakings she receives from persons to
whom she provides Confidential Documents in accordance with this Order. On request
of counsel for Boeing, counsel for Miles shall certify that she has complied with the
provisions of this paragraph.
At the conclusion of the lawsuit, all Confidential Documents, including originals,
copies, abstracts or summaries thereof, shall be returned to counsel for Boeing, and no
copies thereof shall be retained by any other person; provided, however, that counsel for
Miles may keep one copy of any part of the Confidential Documents that have become
part of the official record of this litigation. Such copy shall remain subject to the terms
of this Stipulation.
In any case that Confidential Documents are furnished to a testifying or con-
sulting expert retained by counsel for Miles, counsel for Miles shall have the responsi-
bility of ensuring that all such Confidential Documents, including abstracts and summa-
ries thereof, are returned to Boeing.
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3. Charges or Complaints Filed by Employees
The Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment plaintiff often seeks to
discover whether other employees have filed charges of discrimination with
the EEOC or have filed discrimination suits in the courts. Certainly, charges or
complaints involving the same protected class and a similar adverse action are
relevant to show "general patterns of discrimination by an employer."' 82
A charge of Title VII or ADEA discrimination is filed by an aggrieved
individual with the EEOC or with a comparable state agency. 8 3 During in-
vestigation and conciliation, the EEOC must keep the charge confidential and
cannot release it,' but arguably an employer is free to release8 5 the copy
of the charge it has received from the EEOC.'86
The employer may object to producing charges of discrimination on
grounds of privacy or confidentiality.'87 Some courts have adopted a strict
rule against production of the charges because "disclosure might inhibit em-
Counsel for Miles may retain abstracts or summaries of Confidential Documents
which contain counsel's mental impressions or opinions. Such abstracts or summaries
shall, however, remain subject to the terms of this Stipulation.
Id.
182. As to the relevancy of charges, see Nelson v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., 70 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 859, 862 (D. Kan. 1996) (stating "identities of persons who have filed
complaints with the EEOC appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence"); Rodger v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 155 F.R.D. 537, 541 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (finding
administrative complaints filed by other employees "highly relevant to evaluate the defendant's
employment practices as a whole and provide evidence regarding intent and willfulness"); Abel v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., 91 Civ. 6261 (RPP), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4,
1993) (granting plaintiff's motion to compel employer's production of age discrimination charges
involving the same RIF because such charges "may well lead to discovery of admissible evidence
tending to show a pattern and practice of discrimination against older employees"); Flanagan, 111
F.R.D. at 48 (granting plaintiffs motion to compel "information regarding gender or age discrimi-
nation complaints filed.., with any governmental agency ... charging [the employer] with gen-
der or age discrimination"); Jackson v. Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 838
(N.D. Ga. 1984) (granting plaintiff's discovery request to gather "information in order to accumu-
late statistical evidence. .. which is relevant to [the] charge of age discrimination").
As to the relevancy of complaints, see Flanagan, 111 F.R.D. at 48-49 (granting plaintiffs
motion to compel information "with respect to any civil action filed against [defendant] alleging
age discrimination"); Jackson, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 838 (rejecting employer's argu-
ment that other age discrimination complaints filed against it were irrelevant). But see Prouty, 99
F.R.D. at 549 (denying the plaintiff's motion to compel lawsuits filed against [employer] for dis-
charge during two months of 1981 and in stating, "[tihe Court finds that issues raised in other
lawsuits are not relevant to this case"). The holding of Prouty, however, was expressly rejected in
Rodger, 155 F.R.D. at 541 n.l.
183. Title VII § 706(a)-(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(e) (1994); ADEA § 7(d) , 29 U.S.C. §
626(d) (1994).
184. Section 706(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(b) (1994), provides, "Charges shall not
be made public by the Commission." The Southern District of New York, in Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1213, at *13, applied this Title VII language to the EEOC's control of ADEA charges.
185. Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *13 (declining to extend the prohibition on dis-
closure "beyond the EEOC").
186. Section 706(b) of Title VII provides that the EEOC shall provide the employer a copy of
the charge "within ten days." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994). Section 7(d) of the ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994), provides that the EEOC "shall promptly notify" the employer of the
charge. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994).
187. See Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *14 (rejecting employer's argument that pro-
duction of charges would result in "undue prejudice" and holding such argument "goes to the ad-
missibility" of the charges at trial and is "not ground for objection to discovery").
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ployees from bringing such charges and employers from entering into the
conciliation process."' Other courts reject any notion of privacy. 8 9 The
middle view is to compel production of the charges, subject to a protective or-
der." Once an employee has filed a discrimination suit with a court, howev-
er, "the process becomes a public one"'' and the employer certainly cannot
object to the production of the complaints on privacy grounds. 92
B. When Production of Employment Data Becomes Unduly Burdensome or
Expensive
To avoid responding to the plaintiff's discovery requests for statistical
data, personnel files, and charges or complaints filed by other employees, the
employer cannot argue merely that the requests are burdensome.'93 As the
Tenth Circuit stated in Rich, "[i]f the information sought promises to be par-
ticularly cogent to the case, the [employer] must be required to shoulder
[some] burden."' 94 Rather, to avoid the discovery, the employer must specifi-
cally demonstrate 93 that the plaintiff's discovery requests are "unduly bur-
densome or expensive."" 9 In most cases it cannot prove such a high degree
of burden, especially where much of the data might be accessible from com-
188. E.g., Johnson v. Southern Ry. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 714, 720 (N.D. Ga.
1977); see also Prouty, 99 F.R.D. at 553 (denying plaintiff's motion to compel production of
claims filed with EEOC and other agencies because it "would be an invasion of privacy" and
"could very well inhibit other employees from bringing such charges").
189. See, e.g., Jackson v. Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 838 (N.D.
Ga. 1984) (granting plaintiffs motion to compel production of all age discrimination charges filed
against employer); Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 708, 710 (N.D. Ga.
1978) (ordering employer to produce information on government investigations, despite employ-
er's argument that production would discourage voluntary compliance with anti-discrimination
statutes); Gray v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1075, 1078
(D.D.C. 1975) (granting plaintiff's motion to compel production of all race discrimination charges
in the D.C. area).
190. E.g., Flanagan, 111 F.R.D. at 48 ("Any information discovered during the course of
these proceedings should only be utilized in connection with this litigation and not disseminated in
any manner. The parties are free to fashion an appropriate protective confidentiality order if this is
necessary."); see also supra note 181 (providing sample protective order).
191. Johnson, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 720 (granting plaintiff's motion to compel produc-
tion answer of interrogatory "as it relates to Title VII hiring discrimination suits already filed in
court").
192. Flanagan, 1 I I F.R.D. at 48-49 (ordering defendant to respond in full because "the infor-
mation sought by plaintiff is a matter of public record"); see also Jackson, 37 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 839 (rejecting employer's argument that age complaints and lawsuits filed against it
were privileged).
193. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
194. Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 343 (10th Cir. 1975).
195. For example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated:
Defendant has not demonstrated an undue burden here. For one, the Court has not been
told that these records are maintained at various locations, rather than at one central
location. Even if the records are maintained at several places the Court has no evidence
to suggest that defendant and its agents cannot quickly and efficiently search the files to
uncover the necessary information.
Clarke v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1176, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993); see
also Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502, 506 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("[The
defendant] must show that the discovery requests are unduly burdensome.").
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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puters'97 and where it could produce documents in lieu of generating narra-
tive answers to interrogatories.' The employer certainly cannot claim an
undue burden where it is required to review the same material for its own case
preparation.' Nor can it claim undue burden where it has created other dis-
covery impediments for the plaintiff.2"
Thus, the courts rarely should find that the employer has proven such
undue burden or expense as to avoid otherwise relevant discovery propounded
by the plaintiff. The Tenth Circuit in Rich offered a workable solution-order
the discovery to proceed and allow the employer its attorneys fees and costs
"if the [plaintiffs discovery] effort fizzles."' '2
197. In EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the court justified the EEOC's request for informa-
tion on a computer filing system by stating:
[T]he EEOC, armed with the preliminary information it seeks, can frame its subsequent
requests with greater specificity and with a greater likelihood of obtaining all the person-
nel information to which it is entitled. Similarly, the ability to frame more precise re-
quests will help limit the possibility that irrelevant or unnecessary material will be pro-
duced for the EEOC to review.
EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Corp. Aero & Naval Sys., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1457, 1458
(D. Md. 1996).
198. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. In Jackson v. Alterman Foods, the court
stated:
The defendant also argues that these requests are burdensome and that, because the
burden of gleaning this information would be substantially the same on both parties, the
defendant should only be required to produce the records from which this information
may be ascertained. This Court holds that the defendant may proceed in this manner but
should the plaintiff be able to prove that the defendant could have produced this infor-
mation in a simple and reasonable manner, he is at liberty to file a motion with this
Court to recover the expenses incurred by looking through the defendant's records.
Jackson v. Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 838 (N.D. Ga. 1984); see also
Halder v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 75 F.R.D. 657, 658 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding plaintiff's
interrogatories for various emp!oyee information to be unduly burdensome, because, "'even though
the requested information is in defendant's control, he should not be forced to engage in extensive
research and compilation').
199. Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 708, 709-10 (N.D. Ga. 1978)
(granting plaintiff's motion to compel the employer to identify "all documents or other physical
evidence which reflect any information requested in other interrogatories" and rejecting the
employer's argument of undue burden because the employer "will likely have to review it in order
to answer the interrogatories").
200. The court in Abel granted plaintiff's motion to compel and stated:
Due to the size of the defendant and the extent to which the defendant's record-keeping
system has provided impediments to Plaintiff's obtaining discovery thus far, Plaintiff has
yet to obtain basic statistical data as to the ages of employees terminated firm-wide.
Plaintiff is consequently unable to narrow the scope of her inquiry into other charges of
age discrimination by department or time.
Abel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 91 Civ. 6261, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
4, 1993).
201. Rich, 522 F.2d at 343. However, a court should not punish the plaintiff simply for pro-
pounding the discovery. But see Rodger v. Electronic Data Sys. Inc., 155 F.R.D. 537, 542 (E.D.N-
.C. 1994) (denying the plaintiffs motion to compel in part and finding "it appropriate to tax the
cost of production of the above specified materials to Plaintiffs" so as to "encourage Plaintiffs to
narrowly tailor their discovery requests").
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V. THE APPROPRIATE WORKFORCE SCOPE OF PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY IN
CIRCUMSTANTIAL INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT LITIGATION
As explained in Part IV above, the plaintiff in a Circumstantial Individual
Disparate Treatment case must discover certain workforce data in order to
bolster her prima facie case, to prove pretext, and to prove her entitlement to
various remedies. The employer often resists the discovery by claiming that
the plaintiff has requested "information regarding other discrimination claims
for unrelated facilities of a defendant employer, or even unrelated divi-
sions."2 2 The employer will interpret the plaintiff's complaint in a light most
beneficial to the employer by asserting that "unless a pattern or practice is al-
leged ... the plaintiff has not established the requisite particularity that would
justify discovery on the issue."2 3 Thus, a prudent plaintiff, although entitled
to notice pleading,2" is well advised to allege in her complaint any belief
she has as to system-wide discrimination that contributed to her own adverse
employment action.0 5
A. Similarly Situated Employees
The plaintiff is entitled to workforce discovery of "similarly situated em-
ployees,"2"u a term defined and applied inconsistently by the courts. The
term "should not be used to create arbitrary limitations on discovery," 207 and
202. Hedican & Loudon, supra note 63, at 1011.
203. Id. The article continues, "[i]n fact, defense attorneys may be able to use the particularity
provision as a vehicle for limiting the scope of discovery in general. The argument would be that
the provision states a congressional preference for tying discovery only to issues apparent in the
pleadings." Id.
204. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
205. See Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178, 182 (10th Cir. 1973) ("Nothing in
[the] charge or the pleadings suggested company-wide hiring and firing policies and practices.");
Hinton v. Entex Inc., 93 F.R.D. 336, 337 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (restricting plaintiff's scope of discov-
ery because "the Plaintiff has not made any specific factual allegations of discrimination that per-
tain to any facility of [defendant] other than the one located at Jacksonville"). Of course, such
allegations must be consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in that they are "warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument" for a change in the law, "have evidentiary sup-
port" or "are likely to have evidentiary support," and are not "presented for any improper pur-
pose." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b).
206. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 26 F.3d 44, 47-48 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting
plaintiff's claim could not be adjudicated "without deciding whether she was in fact situated simi-
larly to men who were promoted"); Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1041 (2d
Cir. 1993) (presenting a comparison of "similarly situated employees"); Hicks v. Arthur, 159
F.R.D. 468, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (requiring plaintiffs to show "members of non-protected classes,
similarly situated, were treated differently than they were" in making out disparate treatment
claim); Rifkinson v. CBS Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 98, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (suggest-
ing probative comparative evidence "must relate to employees who are similarly situated to [plain-
tiff]" and noting that, "[w]hile this principle should not be used to create arbitrary limitations on
discovery, the categories suggested by [defendant] appear at this time to be reasonable"); Flanaga-
n, 111 F.R.D. at 47 (restricting discovery requests generally to "similar employees"); Jackson v.
Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 840 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (granting plaintiff's
motion to compel discovery of "potentially similarly situated employees").
The plaintiff also needs evidence regarding those supervisors and managers who made the
adverse employment decision. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
207. Rifkinson, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 98.
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several factors must be examined to determine whether other employees are
indeed "similarly situated."
1. The Protected Class
The plaintiff usually must restrict her discovery to comparative workforce
data involving the protected class of which she is a member and upon which
her complaint is based."' Thus, if she alleges sex discrimination, she is enti-
tled to workforce data broken down by gender, but not by race or national
origin.
2. The Positions Held
The plaintiff should not be limited to a definition of "similarly situated"
that encompasses only those employees who held the same positions as she
did. First, there may very few, if any, other employees in identical jobs.2"
Second, because Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment often arises
from an employer's overall practices, broader "comparative evaluation ... is
obviously essential."2 °
The plaintiff must make some minimal showing as to why the positions
held by other employees are comparable enough to warrant discovery,2' but
this should not be a heavy burden. She should be entitled to data for all em-
208. See General Ins. Co. of Am. v. EEOC, 491 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding EEO-
C's administrative subpoena was overbroad in "demand[ing] evidence going to forms of discrimi-
nation not even charged or alleged"); Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 60, 63 n.3 (D. Del.
1993) (determining that plaintiff had "correctly withdrawn his requests for information relevant to
types of discrimination other than age"); Robbins v. Camden City Bd. of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49,
57-58 (D.N.J. 1985) (stating that where complaint alleges race and age discrimination, discovery is
limited to those protected categories); Prouty v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 99 F.R.D. 545,
546 (D.D.C. 1983) (refusing to allow plaintiff discovery of information pertaining to race because
fie alleged only age discrimination); McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53, 63 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (indicating that "[w]hether [the employer] discriminates against employees on the basis of
religion, creed, gender or national origin is wholly irrelevant to his present claim"). The plaintiff's
complaint generally cannot expand upon the types of discrimination alleged in, or investigated
pursuant to, the underlying charge of discrimination. See Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431
F.2d 455, 465-67 (5th Cir. 1970).
209. E.g., Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462, 468 (5th CIr. 1969) ("The EEOC can-
not reasonably be expected to discern such discrimination by examining data relating to two indi-
viduals.").
210. Id. (affirming district court's allowance of discovery of all nonsupervisory personnel);
see also Holley v. Pansophic Sys., Inc., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 366, 368 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(stating that "[e]vidence of discrimination against women at the highest management levels ...
would lend credibility to plaintiffs' allegations of similar discrimination at the middle management
level").
211. See Nelson v. Telecable of Overland Park, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 859, 861 (D.
Kan. 1996) (denying plaintiff's motion to compel "information about all employees, without re-
gard to their circumstances of employment which might make information about their employment
relevant to this action" because "[tihe parties ... have given no guidance" as to which employees
are similarly situated); Hicks v. Arthur, 159 F.R.D. 468, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying plaintiffs'
motion to compel employer answer to interrogatory requesting identifying data on employees in
various jobs because plaintiffs "have not demonstrated how [employees holding certain job titles
they never held] are similarly situated to them"); Robbins, 105 F.R.D. at 62 (noting that plaintiff
was employed by defendant "exclusively as a teacher" and had "failed to demonstrate the rele-
vance of information on job categories other than teachers").
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ployees holding equivalent ranks or grades,2 2 in the same or related depart-
ments,1 3 or performing related work." 4
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Clarke v. Mellon Bank, N.A.2 5
took the sensible and fair approach in granting the plaintiff's motion to compel
all documents regarding the employer's decision to reorganize a department. It
rejected the employer's argument that the request involved "information con-
cerning literally hundreds of employees from departments/divisions other than
Plaintiff's department/division, and did not share the same or similar title,
salary grade or duties as plaintiff. '2 6 The court considered the information
essential to the plaintiff's opportunity to prove her case: "[tihus, this Court's
refusal to compel production ... could well deprive this plaintiff of evidence
potentially helpful to her attempt to assemble such a quantum of circumstantial




3. The Adverse Employment Action Suffered
The plaintiff also should restrict her discovery to similar types of adverse
employment actions which she suffered.2 8 For example, where a plaintiff
alleges discrimination in tenure and some forms of harassment, she typically
cannot discover information on hiring, promotion, transfer, or discharge.2 9
It must be remembered, however, that many types of adverse employment
actions, most notably reductions in force (RIFs), may affect employees at all
212. Parrish v. Ford Motor Co., No. 91-5300, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 3361, at *18 (6th Cir.
Feb. 7, 1992) ("[Wie are inclined to believe that further discovery is in order. Accordingly, we
strongly suggest that the district court permit discovery of all the personnel files of grade 12 or 13
Ford employees who were promoted or transferred.").
213. See Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1993) (restricting
plaintiff's discovery to specific departments); Flanagan, 111 F.R.D. at 47 (restricting plaintiff's
discovery to claims employees).
214. See Rifkinson v. CBS Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 98, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (re-
stricting plaintiff's discovery to "employees categorized as operations producers or unit managers,
but not with respect to clerical or executive personnel" because plaintiff "was a mid-level manager
who did not perform creative, technical, 'on-air,' or executive responsibilities and did not seek
such positions"); Duncan v. Maryland, 78 F.R.D. 88, 94 (D. Md. 1978) (denying plaintiff's motion
to compel discovery of faculty employees, but allowing discovery of staff employees).
215. 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
216. Clarke, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) at 1178.
217. Id. at 1178-79; see also Abel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 91 Civ. 6261 (RPP), 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1993) (rejecting, at the discovery stage, employer's
argument that "statistics regarding the overall entity are meaningless where individual employment
decisions were made at a local level") (citing Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746, 750 (2d. Cir. 1984)
and Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 1984)).
218. See Lute v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 394, 395
(N.D. Ind. 1992) (limiting discovery to specific terminal when plaintiff complained of sexist con-
duct by one terminal manager). In Hardrick v. Legal Services. Corp, the court denied plaintiff's
motion to compel discovery, stating:
[the motion to compel] discovery concerning the entire scope of the defendant's person-
nel practices and procedures for the entire corporation ... [is denied because there is)
no indication that plaintiff's claim in any way involves how applicants are treated, the
corporation's hiring practices, the administering of tests for hiring or promotions, the
pay rates established and how they are administered, or other practices and procedures
which are the subjects of many of the interrogatories at issue.
Hardrick v. Legal Servs. Corp., 96 F.R.D. 617, 618 (D.D.C. 1983).
219. E.g., Robbins v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49, 62 (D.N.J. 1985).
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levels and locations of the employer."' Furthermore, some employment prac-
tices are intertwined, such as promotions and seniority.22
4. The Supervisory Chain of Command
Yet another argument posited by employers in opposition to the plaintiff's
discovery of workforce data is that only those employees reporting to the same
supervisor or manager are similarly situated.222 For example, in Aramburu v.
Boeing Co.,223 the District of Kansas limited the plaintiff's discovery to "the
work histories of the thirty employees who worked under [his supervisor] at
the same time the plaintiff did," believing that "'disciplinary measures under-
taken by different supervisors may not be comparable for purposes of Title
VII analysis."' 224 The court did acknowledge that the personnel files of other
employees "may contain some information relevant to evaluating the statistics
regarding [the employer's allegedly discriminatory] attendance policies," but
found them to be "of limited or negligible value." '225
Such a restriction on the plaintiff's discovery is unjustified. Rarely does
the immediate supervisor or manager alone make such an adverse employment
decision as suspension or termination; it is far more likely that the decision is
made only after consulting other corporate officers or the human resources
department regarding written procedures or unwritten customs.226
220. See Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *1-2 (allowing company-wide discovery of
employer's demographic analysis, where employer argued that the plaintiff "was terminated as part
of a company-wide reduction in work force"); Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture Leasing Co., 76 F.R.D.
386, 390-91 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (allowing company-wide discovery because certain decisions were
made at a central office); cf Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir.
1996) (rejecting the employer's argument that its RIF was limited to only one unit, where that unit
was "independent in name only").
221. Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 708, 709 (N.D. Ga. 1978)
(refusing "to preclude discovery into related [employer] policies concerning promotion, seniority,
pregnancy, and testing").
222. See Duncan v. Maryland, .78 F.R.D. 88, 94 (D. Md. 1978). In Duncan, the district court
denied plaintiff's motion to compel answers to deposition questions and other discovery regarding
faculty and associate staff at other campuses. However, the court noted plaintiff's "personal com-
plaint and the examples of discrimination against others proffered by him" did not "involve prac-
tices of general scope" but, rather, "only the specific employment decision affecting him and
them." Under these circumstances, "the general pattern of decision by the person or persons who
fired plaintiff [wa]s highly probative, relevant, and discoverable." Id.
223. 885 F. Supp. 1434 (D. Kan. 1995).
224. Aramburu, 885 F. Supp. at 1442 (quoting Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11 th
Cir. 1989)); see also Rodger v. Electronic Data Sys., Corp., 155 F.R.D. 537, 540 (E.D.N.C. 1994)
("The only similarly situated employees to Plaintiffs in this case are those ... whose employment
situations, like Plaintiffs', were supervised by the President of the State Operations Division.").
225. Arumburu, 885 F. Supp. at 1444. The court did, however, leave open the possibility for
further discovery: "At least at this point in time, the information provided by the defendant should
be sufficient for the plaintiff to make, at the very least, a preliminary determination as to...
disparate treatment in the enforcement of [defendant's] attendance policies." id.
226. See Suspension Instead of Immediate Discharge Can Solve Numerous Problems, MINNE-
SOTA EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER, March 1995, at 4. ("The human resources department or upper
management can then make the decision [between discharge and lesser discipline] after careful
investigation and complete consideration of all the facts."); To Suspend or Not to Suspend: That is
the Question, PENNSYLVANIA EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER, August 1995, at 3 ("The human resources
department or senior management can then make an informed decision [between discharge and
lesser discipline] based on a complete set of facts."). Courts agree with this analysis as well. See
Kitchen v. Dial Page, Inc., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 482, 484 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (granting
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Even if the immediate supervisor does have independent authority to make
the adverse employment decision, more extensive discovery by the plaintiff
could establish a discriminatory pattern throughout the employer. The Ninth
Circuit recognized this possibility in Diaz v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph.227 The court rejected the employer's arguments for limiting discovery-
-that "promotions outside of Tucson were made by decision makers other
than the Operations Manager who made the challenged promotion decision-
,,22s and presented a compelling justification for greater discovery:
[T]he underlying purpose of statistic al information [is] to provide
otherwise unavailable indications of an employer's conscious or un-
conscious motives. [Plaintiff] contends that his employer ... engages
in a region-wide policy of discrimination. The existence of a pattern
of racial disparity in [defendant's] employment decisions would allow
for an inference about its motives. This would bolster [plaintiff's]
prima facie case and would support his contention that the articulated
reason for [defendant's] failure to promote [plaintiff] is
pretextual .... One way of reaching conclusions about an employer's
motives is by ascertaining whether the employer's explicit or implicit
policies encourage or permit discriminatory employment decisions by
its supervisory personnel.229
The plaintiff's access to such information is made all the more crucial by
Hicks' narrow definition of pretext.20 Because the plaintiff can no longer
prove pretext merely by discrediting the employer's reason, she must search
throughout the employer's records for relevant evidence from which an intent
to discriminate can be inferred.
plaintiff's motion to compel company-wide discovery in part because of human resource
manager's input regarding "the company guideline and the company standing on the decision");
Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture Leasing Co., 76 F.R.D. 386, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (finding nationwide
discovery relevant where "there is some evidence that salary records are centrally held ... and
that the Atlanta facility is responsible for appointing managers of the outlying stores"); Foster v.
Boise-Cascade, Inc., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1287, 1289-90 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (noting that
"many of the hiring decisions made at the Houston plant are the result of consultation with...
[the] district manager" in St. Louis, and that "transfer of managerial personnel between
defendant's plants in Texas ... reinforce[d] the named plaintiff's contention that defendant's
employment practices operate on at least a state-wide basis").
227. 752 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985).
228. Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1363.
229. Id. at 1363-64; see also Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502
(N.D. Ill. 1986). In Henderson, the plaintiff sued for Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treat-
ment on account of race and sought discovery regarding all employee violations of certain rules
nationwide for a five-year period. The employer argued that discovery should be limited to those
employees subject to the same hearing officer. The court rejected the employer's argument, stating
that "[Ilimiting the geographical scope of discovery ... and the time to only those investigations
conducted by [the hearing officer], attempt[s] to limit the plaintiff's cause of action and theory of
discrimination. [Defendant's] attempt, at this stage, to limit the theory of plaintiff's case and con-
sequent need for proof is improper." Id. at 507.
230. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
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B. Geographic Scope
After determining which employees are "similarly situated" to the plain-
tiff, courts must determine the proper geographic scope of the plaintiff's
workforce discovery, as there may be similarly situated employees in many of
the employer's work sites. Two frequently cited circuit court cases have inap-
propriately narrowed the geographic scope of such workforce discovery. To
make matters worse, certain later court opinions have misconstrued the cases.
In Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC,23 the EEOC sought enforcement of
a subpoena for information regarding six of the employer's stores. The Tenth
Circuit, affirming the district court, limited the EEOC's subpoena to the store
at which the aggrieved individual had worked.23 The court justified its limi-
tation because the single store "maintain[ed] its own separate personnel re-
cords and there [were] no central employment records,"23 3 and because "[i]t
was not shown that there were any hiring or firing practices and procedures
applicable to all of the stores. ' The court essentially "permit[ted] an infer-
ence that each of the ... stores was a separate employing unit.''23.
In Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,2"6 the Fifth Circuit made
even more bold and damaging assumptions about the geographic scope of the
plaintiff's workforce discovery. The Secretary of Labor, as the plaintiff, sought
information concerning all employees terminated within a particular division
of the employer, which "would strengthen his claim by showing a pattern or
practice."237 The court, relying on McDonnell Douglas, observed that "the
type of statistical evidence ... sought through the discovery order was rele-
vant to [the plaintiff's] individual case" and that "[a] plaintiff who must shoul-
der the burden of proving that the reasons given for his discharge are pretex-
tual should not normally be denied the information necessary to establish that
claim. '238 N6netheless the court, apparently concerned that the plaintiff could
use such broad discovery to "go fishing," '39 ruled that "in the context of in-
vestigating an individual complaint the most natural focus is upon the source
of the complained of discrimination[-]the employing unit- or work unit.""
231. 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973).
232. Joslin Dry Good, 483 F.2d at 184.
233. Id. at 182.
234. Id. at 184.
235. Id. at 183-84 (emphasis added).
236. 576 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1978).
237. Westinghouse, 576 F.2d at 592.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. (citing EEOC v. Packard Elec. Div., 569 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1978)). In Packard, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of an EEOC administrative subpoena for
"workforce breakouts" at all facilities at which charging parties worked. EEOC v. Packard Elec.
Div., 569 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1978). The district court had limited discovery to the depart-
ments in which the charging parties had worked. Id. The circuit court held:
In the context of an investigation of an individual complaint, it might well be most natu-
ral to focus on that employing unit or work unit from which came the decision of which
the individual complainant complains; within such a unit the EEOC might well need a
wide spectrum of statistical data in order to illuminate the general policies bearing on
the complaint's situation. But in the absence of some showing by the EEOC to the con-
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It then stated that "[t]o move beyond that focus the plaintiff and the EEOC
must show a more particularized need and relevance.2 4 '
The Joslin and Westinghouse presumptions have been cited by various
courts to unnecessarily restrict the geographic scope of discovery to a single
unit of the employer and to a single physical location.242 One clear example
of the misuse of these presumptions is Earley v. Champion International
Corp.,243 where the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery of the potential age discrimination
implications of the employer's nationwide RIF. The court conceded that the
RIF "was initiated at the national level," but then relied upon the fact that
"each plant was given considerable autonomy in drawing up its own RIF mas-
ter plan."'2' The court concluded that the RIF decisions were in essence
"made locally" and ruled that "discovery on intent may be limited to the em-
ploying unit.'2 45 It rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the structure of the
RIF itself was discriminatory: "A vague possibility that loose and sweeping
discovery might turn up something suggesting that the structuring of the RIF
was discriminatorily motivated does not show particularized need and likely
relevance that would require moving discovery beyond the natural focus of the
inquiry."2" Other courts have been similarly draconian in limiting the plaint-
iff's discovery of a nationwide or region-wide adverse employment action,
believing the employer's representation that the "real decision" was made at a
lower level.247
trary, it is not immediately evident that this unit need be or is in this case the entire
facility or that an entire facility-wide workforce breakout bears on the subject matter of
these individual complaints.
Packard, 569 F.2d at 318 (citations omitted).
241. Westinghouse, 576 F.2d at 592.
242. E.g., Scales v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 925 F.2d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 1991); Earley v. Cham-
pion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1084-85 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Heward v. Western Elec. Co., 35 Fair.
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 807, 812 (10th Cir. 1984); Rodger v. Electronic Data Sys., Corp., 155
F.R.D. 537, 540 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 104 F.R.D. 398, 399 (D. Md.
1984); Prouty v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 99 F.R.D. 545, 547 (D.D.C. 1983); Hinton v.
Entex, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 336, 337 (E.D. Tex. 1981); McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53,
60 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
243. 907 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir. 1990).
244. Early, 907 F.2d at 1084.
245. Id. Nonetheless the court recognized that the plaintiff was entitled to "nationwide discov-
ery on the availability of other positions with [the employer] at the time of discharge, including
documentation regarding its nationwide efforts to find jobs within the company for employees
affected by the restructuring." Id. at 1084 n.6.
246. Id. at 1085.
247. E.g., Spurling v. Philips Consumer Elec. Co., No. 3:93-cv-296 (E.D Tenn. May 9, 1995),
annotated in 4 Empl. Discrimination Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 684 (limiting plaintiff's discovery to
a single facility "[iun light of the defendant's representation that the actual employment decisions
affecting the plaintiff were made locally"); Cisko v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 67 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1630, 1631 (N.D. III. 1995) (limiting plaintiff's discovery to single facility
where "[tihe defendant asserts that the decision to terminate the plaintiff was made entirely at the
local level). In Cisko the court limited plaintiff's discovery "[b]ecause the plaintiff has produced
no evidence which would indicate that the decision to terminate him had its origins elsewhere, the
scope of the plaintiff's requests will be restricted to the North Chicago office." Cisko, 67 Fair.
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1631.
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There are several reasons why the Joslin and Westinghouse presumptions
should not stand, especially in light of Hicks' more onerous definition of pre-
text. First, the courts must realize that such broad, sweeping decisions as RIFs
or other restructurings typically are made, or at least approved, at a high cor-
porate level.2" The court in Finch v. Hercules, Inc.,249 took the correct ap-
proach where RIF decisions were initially made by "each individual work
unit," but were ultimately approved by a "policy compliance committee."25
That court held that "[iun light of the two-step process, discrimination could
have occurred either when the individual work unit proposed names, or when
the Committee exercised its approval power."'"
Second, so long as the plaintiff can present some colorable allegation
about plant-wide, region-wide, or nationwide discrimination, the courts should
honor her allegation to the fullest extent possible in the discovery process."
Where she contends that systemic discrimination influenced her individual
disparate treatment, she "ought to be able to work with something more than
the smallest geographical unit of the company.""
Some courts initially limit the plaintiff to the smallest unit, with the prom-
ise that she might be allowed to broaden her discovery "[a]t some future date,
if [she] is able to make more a particularized showing ...."" This is a vir-
tually empty promise. In order to determine the relevance of detailed nation-
wide or region-wide employment data, the plaintiff obviously must be allowed
nationwide or region-wide discovery as to how the employer made the rele-
vant employment decisions.255
248. See Abel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 91 Civ. 6261 (RPP), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1993) (department heads identified employees for possible termination
and submitted information to the human resources department which, in turn, prepared a report for
the senior human resources counsel); Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 60, 62 (D. Del. 1993)
("To accomplish the reduction in force, defendant issued 'operational guidelines' which establi-
shed a 'Policy Compliance Committee' to 'monitor corporate downsiiing."').
249. 149 F.R.D. 60 (D. Del. 1993).
250. Finch, 149 F.R.D. at 64.
251. Id.
252. For example, the Fourth Circuit noted:
Even had [the plaintiff] limited his charge to allegations of personal discrimination or
departmental discrimination [instead of plant-wide discrimination) we would hesitate to
characterize the desired information as irrelevant and immaterial. Evidence of plant-wide
discrimination seems most relevant to a charge that a particular department adheres to a
discriminatory policy or that particular action was racially motivated.
Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 42 (4th Cir. 1971). But see Hinton, 93 F.R.D. at 337-38
(denying the plaintiff state-wide discovery even though the plaintiff claimed state-wide discrimina-
tion and even though the plaintiff's "argument is not without some merit").
253. Johnson v. Southern Ry. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 714, 719 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(applying same discovery scope to class action and to a claim of Circumstantial Individual Dispa-
rate Treatment).
254. Cisko, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1631; see also Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp.
1434, 1444-45 (D. Kan. 1995) ("If the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration or modification dem-
onstrates that additional discovery is appropriate, the court will then determine an appropriate
discovery order.").
255. See Goeth v. Gulf Oil Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1710, 1711 (S.D. Tex.
1979) ("Plaintiff may, however, serve interrogatories upon the Defendant attempting to develop
information to contradict this affidavit and show a lack of autonomy among the individual plants
insofar as employment practices are concerned."); Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture Leasing Co., 76
F.R.D. 386, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1976) ("At a minimum, the E.E.O.C. should be entitled to conduct
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Third, limiting the plaintiff to the smallest possible work unit could well
prevent her from making a valid statistical analysis. Although "[tihere is no
minimum sample size prescribed either in federal law or in statistical theo-
11256
ry, some courts "have consistently rejected [certain] statistical samples as
too small to be meaningful."257 Thus, the courts should allow the plaintiff a
greater scope of discovery in order to generate valid statistical profiles.258
For example, in Minority Employees at NASA v. Beggs, 9 the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed a district court order limiting the plaintiff's discov-
ery in a race discrimination case to "a department at NASA Headquarters
which had fewer than ten employees during the relevant time period. ' '260 The
circuit court held that the plaintiff was entitled to discovery outside her depart-
ment to prove that NASA's reason for failing to promote her-a hiring
freeze-was pretextual. 26' The court stated that if the employer had "promot-
ed white employees without promotion potential or during the hiring freeze,
this information would be highly relevant to [the plaintiff's] claim of inten-
tional discrimination. 262 Indeed, in some cases of Circumstantial Individual
Disparate Treatment, "statistical analysis might well be the only means by
which plaintiff could prove an alleged pattern or practice of racial discrimina-
tion. 263
Fourth, even if the plaintiff chooses not to prepare a formal statistical
analysis, she still needs discovery beyond the smallest unit to assist her in
proving pretext. For example, in Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co.,
2 4
discovery so as to be in a position to controvert defendant's 'no central policy making' allega-
tion.").
256. MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating "the
adequacy of numerical comparisons within small sets of data depends on the degree of certainty
the factfinder requires, as well as the type of inference the statistics are meant to demonstrate");
see also Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1556-57 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (discuss-
ing statistical analysis).
257. Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1451 (2d Cir. 1995).
258. See Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *18 (granting the plaintiff's motion to compel
discovery beyond her department in light of the plaintiff's allegation "that her department is too
small a sample from which to ascertain patterns in rehiring"); Flanagan v. Travelers Ins. Co, 111
F.R.D. 42, 46 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (allowing discovery beyond those employees holding plaintiff's
job title because "[I]imitation of discovery to the classification of Claim Representative Group
Claims office would be tantamount to no discovery at all"). But see Prouty, 99 F.R.D. at 548
(denying the plaintiff nationwide discovery and stating that "[allthough plaintiff contends that
headquarters-wide information is needed because this case involves a headquarters-wide discharge,
the Court does not consider this sufficient evidence of a 'particularized need').
259. 723 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
260. Beggs, 723 at 962.
261. Id. at 962-63.
262. Id.
263. Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 117, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The court continued:
In order to prove any discriminatory intent, plaintiff contends that company-wide statisti-
cal evidence regarding the progress of blacks in the workforce would support his posi-
tion that [defendant] declared the labor surplus as a pretext to remove [plaintiff] from his
position because of [the plaintiff's] race, and replace him with a white employee. In-
deed .... limiting discovery to just the absorber shop, as [defendant] suggests, would be
too narrow since plaintiff has worked at several .. .jobs at the ... facility. However,
production of documents shall be limited to promotions at the ... facility.
Id.
264. Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1990).
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the Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of an age discrimination
plaintiff's motion to compel "identification of all management employees
terminated since January 1, 1983 and who were over 40 at time of termina-
tion." '265 The circuit court noted that the suit
turns on the sincerity of [the employer's] claim that [the plaintiff's]
abrasive personality justified his discharge, notwithstanding what [the
plaintiff] depicts as [the employer's] prior fickle attitude towards this
dimension of [the plaintiff's] job performance and the inability of a
company supervisor to detail instances in which such problems im-
peded productivity.26
The court concluded that discovery of "company-wide practices may reveal
patterns of discrimination against a group of employees, increasing the likeli-
hood that an employer's offered explanation for an employment decision
regarding a particular individual masks a discriminatory motive.2 67
Fifth, the Joslin and Westinghouse presumptions contain the implicit sus-
picion that a plaintiff always will overreach in the discovery process. How-
ever, many times the plaintiff does not seek the broadest discovery possi-
ble. 6  In Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp.,'69 a case often viewed as granting
liberal discovery, the plaintiff sought only "information [as to] ... hiring,
promotion, demotion, and layoff practices within individual departments on a
plant-wide level."27 Even if the plaintiff initially does overreach, she may be
willing to compromise with the employer for some information beyond her
own employing unit." '
Sixth, before restricting in any manner the scope of the plaintiffs discov-
ery, the courts should require substantial, corroborated evidence from the em-
ployer regarding alleged irrelevance and undue burdensomeness or expense.
265. Hollander, 895 F.2d at 84.
266. Id. at 84.
267. Id. The Eastern District of Tennessee similarly reasoned:
The plaintiff has alleged a pattern and practice of age discrimination throughout the
defendant corporation in regard to the hiring, promotion, and termination of Regional
Marketing Directors and Brokerage Managers. Clearly, the information sought by the
plaintiff would be relevant to building a statistical case. In addition, the identity of per-
sons who could have filed age discrimination claims might lead to discoverable evidence
relevant both to the plaintiffs pattern and practice claim and to her own discrimination
claim. The production of certain personnel files merely further serves these same eviden-
tiary issues.
Willis v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1451, 1454 (E.D. Tenn. 1991).
268. E.g., Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950, 954 (N.D. Ga. 1968) ("The parties
are in agreement that the Atlanta area is a proper limitation geographically."), affd, 412 F.2d 462
(5th Cir. 1969).
269. 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
270. Rich, 522 F.2d at 343 (emphasis added).
271. Cisko, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1630 (involving plaintiff seeking personnel
charts for all employees or "[in) the alternative ... information on all employees [in specific
units]"); Flanagan, 111 F.R.D. at 47 n.2 (stating that "[ulpon completion of further discovery, the
parties may be able to agree on an appropriate alternative regional area within which to conduct
meaningful discovery"); Johnson v. Southern Ry. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 714, 719
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (resulting in plaintiff not pursuing original request for "the employment practices
for [defendant's] entire system" and instead compromising on "the total Piedmont Division,"
which the district court found "both reasonable and justifiable").
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The courts should not simply assume that "[a]s the scope of the employees
involved in the statistical probe widens .... the burden posed on the defendant
increases and the direct relevance of the information to the plaintiff's claim
decreases." '272
As to its argument that discovery beyond the plaintiff's employing unit is
irrelevant, the employer must "demonstrate [I ... that decisions affecting the
plaintiff were made at a facility level, rather than on a centralized basis."273
Regarding the employer's claim of undue burden or expense, the district court
should not simply accept the employer's recitation that discovery of hundreds
or thousands of employees would be unduly burdensome.274 Nor should the
court presume that the distance between work units creates an undue burden
on the employer. 75 Moreover, on review, the circuit court should not strain
to find any "plausibl[e]" explanation for the district court's finding of burden-
276 Rather, the employer must introduce, at a minimum, a "detailed affidavit
demonstrating the burden connected with producing the material.2 77
VI. THE APPROPRIATE TEMPORAL SCOPE OF PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY IN
CIRCUMSTANTIAL INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT LITIGATION
Once the plaintiff in a Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment case
has determined which employees are similarly situated to her and has estab-
lished the geographical boundaries for her discovery requests, she must set a
time period for those requests.278 The plaintiff is entitled to take discovery
for each period of her employment in which she claims discrimination,279 but
272. Cisko, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1631.
273. Robbins v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49, 63 (D.N.J. 1985); see also Witten v.
A.H. Smith & Co., 104 F.R.D. 398, 400 (D. Md. 1984) (allowing discovery where employer failed
to submit deposition testimony and affidavits showing "that the decisions regarding the conduct of
which the plaintiff complains are made by the superintendents of each facility"). But see James v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 582 (10th Cir. 1979) (affirming limitation on the
plaintiff's "discovery to accounting/credit department" so as to "not cause the defendant to expend
an inordinate amount of time producing material that was not really relevant to the issues in the
case").
274. See Cisko, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1631-32.
275. Mack v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 187 n.7 (1st Cir. 1989) (basing a
finding of "decentralized nature of managerial decisionmaking" by measuring distances between
employer's stores).
276. ld.'at 187 (noting that the district court "could possibly have allowed" plaintiff's compa-
ny-wide discovery, but affirming district court's denial of said discovery because it "could plau-
sibly have been viewed as 'unduly burdensome"').
277. Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *20 (ordering employer "to provide Plaintiff with
a sworn statement by a person with personal knowledge identifying which of the requested records
do not exist and explaining why their production would be unduly burdensome"); see also Flana-
gan, Il1 F.R.D. at 46 (granting in part the plaintiffs motion to compel because the employer "has
introduced no detailed affidavit demonstrating the burden connected with producing the material").
But see Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1084-85 (11 th Ci. 1990) (affirming dis-
trict court's limitation on plaintiff's discovery with no elaboration beyond--"the district court ap-
parently found this request to be unduly burdensome on defendant").
278. See Robbins v. Camden City Bd. of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49, 58 (D.N.J. 1985) (denying the
plaintiff's motion to compel answers to interrogatories which "contain[ed] no limitations as to
time," but allowing the plaintiff to "propound new interrogatories").
279. E.g., Hicks v. Arthur, 159 F.R.D. 468, 471 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (allowing discovery for the
entire period during each plaintiff's tenure, where plaintiffs alleged "both discrimination in termi-
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some courts mistakenly restrict her discovery only to that period, which may
be relatively short.28 Consistent with the goals of the anti-discrimination
statutes and with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff must be
able to take discovery of events both prior and subsequent to her own adverse
treatment.
A. Prior to the Adverse Employment Action
The plaintiff can use evidence of the employer's past employment practic-
es to establish pretext; those practices "may be relevant to show motive and
intent as to a present practice."28' Some plaintiffs request only one or two
years of discovery, which the courts should honor.282 Other plaintiffs require
more years of discovery, and the courts regularly should allow this greater
time scope.
Some courts err in restricting the time scope of the plaintiff's discovery to
the limitations period in which the underlying charge of discrimination must
have been filed. a Such a restriction ignores Supreme Court precedent that
"[a] discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge...
may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the
status of a current practice is at issue."2 4 Thus the courts should extend, as
needed, the time scope of discovery beyond the applicable statute of limita-
nation and discrimination during the time of their employment in the denial of the 'opportunity to
enjoy the benefits and emoluments which they had earned through their contracts of employ-
ment"'); Robbins, 105 F.R.D. at 62 (holding that where plaintiff alleged harassment and denial of
tenure, the entire time period of her employment was relevant); see also Abrams v. Baylor Col-
lege of Med., 805 F.2d 528, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1986) (allowing plaintiff to allege a continuing vio-
lation "[wihere the unlawful employment practice manifests itself over time, rather than as a series
of discrete acts").
280. E.g., Hardrick v. Legal Servs. Corp., 96 F.R.D. 617, 618 (D.D.C. 1983) (denying plaint-
iff's motion to compel discovery for the years 1976-1979 because "[iln this case plaintiff has
alleged disparate treatment in the terms and conditions of her employment in 1980 and 1981 and
with respect to her termination on April 1, 1981").
281. Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502, 506 (N.D. 111. 1986); see
also Jackson v. Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 838 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (al-
lowing discovery of prior employment practices because "the defendant's treatment of its other
employees outside of the pool of employees from which the defendant decided to fire the plaintiff
could be relevant to many of the potential issues in this case," including "a showing of pretext");
Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 117, 119-20 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (granting plaintiff's motion to com-
pel discovery in the two years preceding the alleged discrimination). In Miles, the court reasoned:
[tlhis request is not overly broad and is relevant to show any change in [the employer's]
labor needs during the alleged discrimination and shortly before and after it. This evi-
dence is likely to lead to the discovery of information that [the employer's] stated reason
for rejecting plaintiff was a pretext.
Miles, 154 F.R.D. at 119-20.
282. E.g., Miles, 154 F.R.D. at 119-20 (granting plaintiff's motion to compel discovery "for a
period just over two years from the date of plaintiff's alleged discrimination"); Kenney v. Shaw
Indus., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1501, 1502 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (allowing plaintiff discovery from Novem-
ber 1987 through June 1988); Robbins, 105 F.R.D. at 63 (allowing plaintiff discovery two years
prior to adverse employment action).
283. Regarding the limitations period for filing a charge, see supra note 25. For an unneces-
sarily restrictive time period for discovery, see Parrish v. Ford Motor Co., 953 F.2d 1384 (6th Cir.
1992) (restricting temporal scope to 300-day limitations period prior to plaintiff's filing of a
charge of discrimination).
284. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
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tions. ss Nor should the courts uniformly restrict the plaintiff's discovery to a
two-year period prior to the filing of the charge, for that time period affects
only the calculation of the back pay to which the plaintiff might be enti-
tled.
2 6
Of course, at some point a plaintiff's proposed time scope may become
excessive,287 and the court must set a limit. A sensible approach to drawing
temporal boundaries was offered by the Western District of Louisiana in
Cormier v. PPG Industries, Inc." The court allowed the plaintiff a five-year
period, which was "admittedly arbitrary," but which was "reasonable in the
absence of special circumstances that would warrant a longer period.""2 9 The
court explained:
If there have been any discriminatory acts within the past five (5)
years, such acts would certainly provide sufficient statistical back-
ground information in these proceedings. If there have been no acts
of discrimination in the preceding (5) years, acts which occurred prior
to that period would not appear to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.2 '
A four-to-five year period for discovery prior to the adverse employment
action is common and appropriate.29' The courts should guard against any
narrower time scope,292 in the absence of the plaintiff's agreement.
B. Subsequent to the Adverse Employment Action
The plaintiff also must discover information occurring within a reasonable
time after the adverse employment action, but she should avoid routinely seek-
285. See Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 405 (5th Cir. 1983); Mathewson v. Na-
tional Automatic Tool Co., 807 F.2d 87, 91 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[E]vidence of earlier discriminatory
conduct by an employer that is time-barred is nevertheless entirely appropriate evidence to help
prove a timely claim based on subsequent discriminatory conduct."); Cormier v. PPG Indus., 452
F. Supp. 594, 595 (W.D. La. 1978) ("There is no question that plaintiffs are entitled to secure
discovery of acts prior to the effective date of their claims.").
286. Section 706(g)(1) of Title VII provides that "[black pay liability shall not accrue from a
date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g). In Flanagan v. Travelers Ins. Co., the court examined the provision's legislative histo-
ry and ruled that it "in no way indicates that this damage provision was intended to limit the
scope of discovery or proof at trial." Flanagan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 F.R.D. 42, 47 (W.D.N.Y.
1986).
287. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. EEOC, 491 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that
EEOC's administrative subpoena was overbroad in "reach[ing] back in time nearly eight years").
288. 452 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. La. 1978).
289. Cormier, 452 F. Supp. at 596.
290. Id. (following Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950, 954 (N.D. Ga. 1968)).
But see Finch v. Hercules Inc., 149 F.R.D. 60 (D. Del. 1993), where the district court unneces-
sarily narrowed the Cormier approach. The court assumed that, even though the employer may
have been downsizing for a period of six years, any discrimination beyond two years created such
a "weak inference" of discrimination that it "does not warrant subjecting defendant to the necessi-
ty of searching its records." Id. at 65.
291. See Georgia Power Co., 412 F.2d at 465; Henderson, 113 F.R.D. at 507; Flanagan, 111
F.R.D. at 47-48; McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1979); cf Brown v.
Ford Motor Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 708, 709 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
292. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 26 F.3d 44, 45 (6th Cir. 1994) (enforcing
EEOC administrative subpoena for "three years plus 300 days preceding" the charge).
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ing information to "the present." '293 She needs access to her replacement's
personnel file to assess the requisite qualifications as part of her prima facie
case.2 94 She must examine the personnel files of similarly situated employees
and statistical workforce data in an effort to establish pretext, as in Abel v.
Merrill Lynch & Co.295 In Abel, the Southern District of New York granted
the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery of the ages of those employees
rehired after a RIF, to determine if the employer rehired "younger employ-
ees ... at the expense of older employees.9
296
Moreover, information following the adverse employment action can be
highly relevant for damages, "indicat[ing] the amount of salary the plaintiff
could have earned had she continued to be employed by defendant. g2 9 7 As
with the discovery time scope prior to the adverse action, the courts cannot
always precisely delineate the proper post-action time scope. Nonetheless they
should use their discretion to allow the plaintiff several years of discovery.
298
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court expressly adopted the Circumstantial Individual Dis-
parate Treatment theory because rarely will the plaintiff have "smoking gun"
evidence of discrimination.299 She must prove her case inferentially, by com-
paring her treatment with the treatment of similarly situated employees both in
and outside of her protected class."m According to Hicks, she must disprove
whatever legitimate, non-discriminatory reason the employer has advanced,
and, to guarantee victory, she also must prove that the real reason for her
treatment was her protected class."0 ' Obviously, she needs ample discovery
to carry this burden of proof.
Given the very nature of a circumstantial test, and the increased post-
Hicks burden of proving pretext, the courts should reject the presumption that
the plaintiff's own work unit is the only relevant source of workforce discov-
293. Spurling v. Philips Consumer Elec. Co., No. 3:93-cv-296 (E.D. Tenn. May 9, 1995),
annotated in 4 Empl. Discrimination Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 684 (disallowing interrogatories re-
garding other employees terminated in a RIF which extended to "the present" and setting a "rea-
sonable and relevant time period").
294. E.g., Clarke v. Mellon Bank, N.A., No. 92-CV-4823, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6680, at
*7-8 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("At the very least, the information sought would have bearing on whether
the named employees were qualified for the positions which they were offered.").
295. 91 Civ. 6261 (RPP), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
296. Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *18.
297. Clarke, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6680, at *8; see also Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213,
at *22 (allowing plaintiff post-RIF discovery of wage data for her grade level and the grade level
she sought for damages calculations "whether Plaintiff would have been promoted had she not
been terminated").
298. See James v. Newspaper Agency Corp, 591 F.2d 579, 582 (10th Cir. 1979) (allowing
plaintiff discovery two years following the adverse employment action of not being promoted);
Hicks, 159 F.R.D. at 471 (regarding two years after the tenure of the plaintiffs as "a reasonable
time frame in which to conduct discovery"); Willis, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1454 (three
years after); Milner v. National Sch. of Health Tech., 73 F.R.D. 628 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (two years
after); Robbins, 105 F.R.D. at 63 (two years after).
299. See supra notes 6, 9 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 206-271 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 74:1
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISCOVERY
ery. Courts need not allow nationwide discovery in all cases, but should honor
the plaintiff's request for such discovery whenever the plaintiff has alleged a
broad-based discriminatory pattern. In doing so, they give the plaintiff a full
and fair opportunity to buttress her prima facie case, to obtain a statistically
valid sample to prove pretext, to obtain anecdotal evidence regarding pretext,
and to prove her entitlement to remedies.
In like manner, the courts should eschew any narrow restriction on the
time period for which the plaintiff seeks discovery. Events occurring years
before and years after the plaintiff's adverse employment action are relevant to
both liability and damages.
Finally, before restricting this extremely relevant workforce discovery as
unduly burdensome or expensive, the courts should require the employer to
show, through verifiable documentation, precisely the harm that it would suf-
fer in responding to the discovery.
If the courts define relevance and undue burdensomeness in this proposed
manner, which is fully consistent with the discovery provisions of the Federal
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THOMAS MORE: What would you do? Cut a great road through the
law to get after the Devil?
ROPER: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
MORE: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned
round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat?
This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast--man's
laws, not God's-and if you cut them down... d'you really think
you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?'
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the changes associated with the New Deal is the replacement of
state private law with federal statutory and administrative law as the
preeminent source of public law in the United States.2 Before the New Deal,
private lawsuits provided the predominant mechanism for governmental
regulation of individual conduct, the economy, and private welfare. One
commentator explains that before the New Deal,
the vast majority of regulatory functions were undertaken by the
common law courts, which elaborated the basic principles of property,
tort, and contract. Public and private interactions were controlled
largely through those principles. Governance was largely dependent
on the states .... [Jiudges performed the basic regulatory functions
that might otherwise have been carried out by bureaucrats:
To be sure, state courts structured private law to achieve certain public
objectives.' State courts were nevertheless generally unwilling to expand the
range of common law jurisprudence beyond traditional doctrines of tort,
property, and contract law.' They were similarly reluctant to allow state
1. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 39 (Heinemann Educational Exchange 1960)
(play based on the life of Sir Thomas More, Chancellor of England from 1529-1532, during the
reign of Henry VIII).
2. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 17-21 (1990).
3. Id. at 18-19. Of course the regulatory nature of these judicial interventions was not al-
ways appreciated. Professor Sunstein explains:
By the late nineteenth century common law principles came to be treated as largely
neutral and prepolitical, and indeed as purely facilitative-rather than constitutive-of
private arrangements. These principles ultimately embodied much of the structure of
laissez-faire, and they gave the nation a definitive albeit misleading sense of stateless-
ness.
Id. at 18.
4. See, e.g., id. For example, otherwise valid contracts were not enforceable if they bound a
party to commit an illegal act. Similarly, the "Fellow Servant" doctrine and the related doctrine of
contributory negligence precluded suits against railroads and other nineteenth century industries.
This was consistent with a philosophy that favored industrial expansion over social welfare. See
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 301-02 (2d ed. 1985).
5. See, e.g., Main H. Belsky, Environmental Policy Law in the 1980's: Shifting Back the
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legislatures to disturb common law ordering.6 The resulting legal regime is
aptly characterized as "a system of public law that was built directly on
private law principles."7
Advocates for the New Deal possessed a substantial and ultimately
compelling arsenal of arguments challenging the hegemony of state courts!8
Rather than relying solely on private lawsuits to regulate conduct, New Deal
legislation established federal regulatory programs. These were often
administered by federal agencies with the resources, authority, and mandate to
develop and implement public policy in many fields of law.9 As a part of the
New Deal and the federal administrative state it initiated, there are now federal
laws and agencies addressing most areas of public policy in the United
States."
The federal administrative state, however, leaves much of state private law
intact. Even where federal programs constitute the predominant source of
public law within a field, private law almost always retains some relevance.
Congress often seems unwilling to preempt all state private law from a
field." Courts are similarly reluctant to find that federal public law is the sole
Burden of Proof, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5-9 (1984). In his article, Professor Belsky explains that
courts were unwilling to expand traditional tort law to allow claims by private individuals harmed
by pollution, thereby necessitating the rise of environmental regulation enforced by administrative
entities. Id.
6. "[F]or the first fifty years of modem, urban-industrial society in the United States,
judicial review directly limited national and state legislative regulation of the economy to a
material degree." JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 32
(1950).
The most important organizing principle for interpretation was that regulatory statutes
should be construed narrowly-so as to harmonize as much as possible with principles
of private markets and private rights. This approach grew out of the idea that courts
should narrowly construe statutes in derogation of the common law.
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 408
(1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes].
7. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 20.
8. For instance, they demonstrated that many forms of conduct could not be adequately
regulated within the context of private party lawsuits. They also pointed out that common law
courts were neither sufficiently representative of the population nor politically accountable to
adequately interject public concerns into private lawsuits. Common law judges were, after all,
generally chosen from a very narrow and generally conservative segment of the population. See,
e.g., infra note 114. Furthermore, they argued that many of the matters requiring regulatory atten-
tion in a modem industrial democracy should be addressed by federal, rather than state authorities.
These and other criticisms of the common law legal regime are discussed at infra Part III.A.2.
9. To be sure, in some instances, these statutes provide the basis for private legal actions
either against individuals, corporations, or the government itself. Such lawsuits provide an impor-
tant mechanism for courts-especially federal courts-to continue participating in both the imple-
mentation and development of public policy. A thorough treatment of their place in the modern
federal administrative state can be found in Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Pro-
grams and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982). This article points out that these "pri-
vate correctives" were rarely, if ever, created to replace state private law preempted by federal
statutes. See infra Part III.D.2.
10. One commentator refers to the "orgy of statute making." GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF
AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977).
11. Presumably, out of deference to state institutions, Congress is reluctant to become the
exclusive source of law in a field by making its work product the sole source of both public and
private law. The Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1994) is an example of such exclusive remedies. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. v. Deadeaux, 481 U.S.
41 (1987) (holding that the private remedies established by ERISA are the exclusive civil enforce-
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source of law within a field. 2 One important source of commentary on
judicial federalism captures the nature of this state of affairs:
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies a
legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal
systems of the states. This was plainly true in the beginning when the
federal legislative product (including the Constitution) was extremely
small. It is significantly true today, despite the volume of
Congressional enactments, even within areas where Congress has
been very active. Federal legislation, on the whole, has been
conceived and drafted on an ad hoc basis to accomplish limited
objectives. It builds upon legal relationships established by the
states . .
The presence of state private law within fields of law heavily influenced
by federal statutes presents courts with three choices: (1) to preempt some or
all of the state private law within the field; 4 (2) to allow state private law to
ment remedies in the field). This "deference" has created problems in preemption jurisprudence
because courts are then left to determine whether and to what extent state law may be applied
within the field. Another problem arises when federal legislation precedes the development of
private law within a field. This issue is addressed at infra Part IV.A.2.
12. Part of the reticence on the part of federal courts to find that state private law is
completely preempted may be the recognition that private law occupies an essential, if implicit,
place in the legal culture of the United States and its Constitution. As one commentator points
out: "[Alt base the Anglo-American tradition makes an assumption that is captured by the
reference to the 'background' nature of common law. That is, there are rights and duties that exist
notwithstanding the lack of action by a legislative body with respect to the area in question."
Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1985).
Justice Thurgood Marshall recognized this principle in his concurrence in Pruneyard Shopping
Cr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 89 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). He wrote that "[tlhe
constitutional terms 'life, liberty, and property' do not derive their meaning solely from the
provisions of positive law." Id. at 93. He pointed out that this is demonstrated by the fact that
"[q]uite serious constitutional questions might be raised if a legislature attempted to abolish certain
categories of common-law rights in some general way." Id. at 93-94. Marshall cautioned, however,
that this argument should not be read to favor "a return to the era of [Lochner v. New York], when
common law rights were also found immune from revision by State or Federal Government." Id.
at 93. As Justice Marshall recognized, it is impossible to perceive these rules as static and
unchanging; nevertheless, it is equally impossible to perceive of the Anglo-American judicial
system functioning without such rules. Chief Justice John Marshall also saw such private rights as
a fundamental part of our federal legal system: "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists
in the right of every individual to claim the protection of law whenever he receives an injury. One
of the first duties of govemment is to afford that protection." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137, 162 (1803).
13. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 533 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
14. Courts frequently refer to a field of law being "occupied" to the exclusion of state law
when they employ this basis for excluding state law. See cases cited infra notes 80-94. The prin-
ciple of "field occupation" accompanied the development of broad federal regulatory authority and
a judicial philosophy that was quite supportive of federal authority. See infra section II.B. Al-
though references to "field occupation" have fallen out of favor, the recent rise of references to
congressional "delicate balancing" as a basis for preemption (to prevent state law from disturbing
such "balancing") means that state law is still subject to being preempted from entire fields. In-
deed, one commentator argues that these tests are "functionally indistinguishable." Paul Wolfson,
Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 69, 71 (1988). Before the
twentieth century expansion of federal regulatory authority, courts were relatively unconcerned
with the extent of the regulatory field occupied by federal statutes. Instead, they directed their
inquiry to the question of whether a specific state law could be applied without interfering with
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"operate of its own force" notwithstanding the presence or influence of federal
legislation; or (3) to employ common law process to integrate private law
principles into the federal regime in a manner that does minimal damage to
either these principles or federal objectives.' 6 Courts generally assert that in-
dicia of "congressional intent" control their choice of these options." Stat-
utory language is rarely so explicit, however, that it completely removes judi-
cial discretion from this choice.' In this respect, federal preemption is one of
federal laws or policies. Courts often stated that they were pursuing this inquiry to determine
whether there was a "collision" between state law and federal policies. As discussed further infra
at notes 64-66 and accompanying text, this approach to preemption reflected a desire to preserve
state lawmaking authority. Falling somewhere in between "field" preemption or "delicate balanc-
ing" and "collision" is the approach that considers whether state law "stands as an obstacle" to
federal policies. Although this inquiry is generally sensitive to federal policies, it often stops short
of preempting entire fields from the activities of state lawmakers. See infra Part III.D.I.
15. According to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, both state and
federal courts must apply federal law rather than contrary state law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For
the text of the Supremacy Clause, see infra note 30. The tests applying this principle, however,
define the extent of the putative "conflict" and/or the requisite congressional "intent" to supersede
state law that must exist before state law is displaced. By requiring a direct "conflict" or explicit
congressional direction before preempting state law, courts easily find state law "operating of its
own force" even within heavily federalized fields of law. See, e.g., the cases discussed infra note
276. Although there are a number of criticisms of this phrase, it helps distinguish between state
law that has been incorporated into federal law versus state law that exists in a federalized field
because there is insufficient federalization for it to be preempted or to call for the creation of a
distinct federal rule. For criticism of the this term, see Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is
There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 389 n.226 (1980), and
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881,
973-77 (1986). In some instances, courts create only the appearance that state law is operating of
its own force. In these instances, courts allow state law to apply to the extent that it does not
interfere with federal objectives. I argue that this approach covertly "federalizes" state common
law and that it is more accurate to characterize this as a form of federal common law. See infra
Section IV.B.
16. Professor Field explains that the creation of such "federal common law" is generally
limited to instances where a federal court (or state court applying federal law) first establishes the
"threshold" determination that the legal question at issue is of sufficient federal interest to warrant
a federal rule of law that is not explicitly provided by a statute. For her discussion and insightful
criticism of this "two-pronged" approach, see Field, supra note 15, at 950-53.
17. Typical of the Supreme Court's pronouncements concerning preemption is its statement
in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 417 U.S. 724, 738 (1985), that "[i]n deciding
whether a federal law pre-empts a state statute, our task is to ascertain Congress' intent in enact-
ing the federal statute at issue." After a thorough review of the cases and commentary addressing
federal preemption, the author believes that the best description of judicial reliance on
congressional intent was made by then-Solicitor General of the United States Archibald Cox, who
wrote: "More often than not Congress says nothing about the effect that federal legislation should
have upon state laws, thus leaving the question to the Supreme Court, which under the
conventional formula repays the compliment by divining the intent of Congress." Archibald Cox,
The Supreme Court and the Federal System, 50 CAL L. REV. 800, 808 (1962). The reasons that
congressional intent is of limited value for determining the preemptive scope of federal law are
discussed further at infra notes 50, 270 and accompanying text.
18. As Professor Sunstein explains:
The meaning of a statute inevitably depends on the precepts with which interpreters
approach its text. Statutes do not have pre-interpretative meanings, and the process of
interpretation requires courts to draw on background principles. These principles are not
"in" any authoritative enactment but instead are drawn from the particular context and,
more generally, from the legal culture. Disagreements about meaning often turn not on
the statutory terms "themselves," but instead on the appropriate interpretive principles.
Courts sometimes make the goveming norms explicit, but frequently they leave them
unarticulated and latent. The principles are often misdirected or at least controversial.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 6, at 411-12.
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a number of contexts where courts can resolve a choice between federal and
state authority only by applying "background assumptions"' 9 concerning the
appropriate balance of power between federal and state authority." These
assumptions foster federal authority when "nationalist" premises are employed
by judges to support the view that Congress intends, if only by implication, to
preempt state laws that may "stand as an obstacle" to federal programs."
Conversely, "federalist" assumptions often preserve state law by supporting the
argument that a direct conflict between federal and state laws or the express
intent of Congress must be demonstrated before state law is preempted."
Many of the criticisms directed at contemporary preemption juris-
prudence23 can be attributed to these background assumptions. First, these
assumptions are often implicit, making preemption decisions hard to predict
and supporting the view that preemption is devoid of guiding principles. 4
Second, the conflict between nationalist and federalist assumptions ties
preemption analysis to "rhetorical excesses and its attendant contradictions,"
resulting in "destabilizing swings between the Nationalist and Federalist
extremes."" Finally, because courts and commentators approach federal
preemption as a choice between federal and state authority, they tend to
minimize or disregard the less obvious but equally significant questions of
whether and how federal preemption should be employed to preserve private
law within federalized fields of law.
This article addresses each of these concerns. First, it reviews the
background assumptions that serve as the basis for many preemption decisions.
Although these assumptions were initially solicitous of state authority, the rise
of the federal administrative state required the development of preemption
doctrines that removed state regulation from fields of law "occupied" by
federal programs. Where state law constitutes a competing administrative
regime, it is often appropriate to employ preemption as an "all or nothing"
19. In discussing the relevance of these "background assumptions," I primarily rely on the
work of Professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of
Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141 (1988); see also Professor Sunstein's discussion of
"background principles," supra note 18.
20. Hart and Wechsler explained that the relative authority and jurisdiction of state and fed-
eral courts must be explored as "an aspect of the distribution of power between the states and the
federal government. Federal jurisdiction, as [this] subject is usually called, would surely be a
sterile topic were it not explored in this perspective," Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Herbert Wechsler,
Preface to the First Edition of PAUL M. BATOR Er AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM at xi (1953). Preemption, which determines whether courts
will apply state or federal law, must also be explored as a significant element in the division of
authority in our federal system.
21. See, e.g., the discussion accompanying infra notes 80-100.
22. See, e.g., infra note 72 and accompanying text.
23. An American Bar Association report synthesizes much of the criticism by writing: "Im-
plied preemption doctrines coexist uneasily with Supreme Court preemption cases requiring clear
legislative intent." Kenneth Starr et al., The Law Of Preemption: A Report of the Appellate Judges
Conference, 1991 A.B.A. REP. 55 [hereinafter Law of Preemption].
24. "When [preemption cases] presenting similar issues are decided unanimously, yet with
opposite results, there is a flaw either in the rule or its application." Wolfson, supra note 14 (re-
ferring to Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S.
461 (1984); Hayfield N. R.R. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 467 U.S 622 (1984)).
25. Fallon, supra note 19, at 1124.
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choice between federal and state regulation.26 By contrast, where state private
law is concerned it is often more consistent with our federalism27 for federal
courts to incorporate principles of state private law into federal law through
the creation of federal common law, rather than preempting state law.2" This
article demonstrates that federal common law may provide a middle ground
between preempting state private law (in instances where it might interfere
with federal objectives) or leaving state law undisturbed (even though it might
interfere with federal objectives).
The most prevalent criticisms of any proposal emphasizing the common
law29 authority of federal courts are either that it usurps policy-making
authority that properly belongs to the states (a federalism based criticism) or
the authority of other branches of the federal government (a separation-of-
26. Furthermore, some areas of public policy are inherently federal and state law should be
excluded or assumed to be preempted within these fields. See discussion infra Part IV.A.I. Ex-
amples of these fields include international relations, federal Indian policy, interstate controversies,
and maritime law.
27. See supra note 12 and the materials cited therein for a discussion of the place of private
law in our federal structure.
28. This principle is especially applicable in circumstances where federal preemption might
otherwise preclude the assertion of private rights that are traditionally defined by state law. Private
causes of action are based on the longstanding principle in Anglo-American jurisprudence that a
person injured by the illegal conduct of another can bring a lawsuit against the person who caused
that harm. See, e.g., Ezra R. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REV. 317
(1914). The federalization of some fields of law, however, has resulted in the preemption of such
state defined rights. See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. For example, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 500 U.S. 504 (1992), the Supreme Court found a number of state private tort claims to be
preempted. Even assuming that some applications of these state actions might interfere with some
federal objectives, the Court's "all or nothing" approach threatens to leave some areas without
"private law" even though there is no evidence that Congress ever intended (or even considered)
this result. This case is addressed further infra notes 253-72 and accompanying text.
29. In a 1985 article, Professor Field used the term federal common law "to refer to any rule
of federal law created by a court (usually but not invariably a federal court) when the substance of
that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or congressional." Field,
supra note 15, at 890. Accompanying this sentence in Professor Field's article is a footnote point-
ing out that state courts are able to "create" federal common law to the same extent as federal
courts whenever they possess concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts. Id. at n.30. When a state
court decision is based on federal law, rather than an adequate and independent state law ground,
the United States Supreme Court possesses the authority to review those portions of the opinion
based on federal law. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945). As a result, the Supreme
Court may review state court decisions that seek to create, expand, or apply principles of federal
common law. Of course this definition provides more of a context for determining what consti-
tutes federal common law rather than an objective test. This follows from the fact that the defini-
tion still leaves open the question of what constitutes a "clear" suggestion of federal law. Never-
theless, Professor Field's definition allows for the possibility that federal common law is legiti-
mate. Another commentator states that "the central difficulty in any account of federal common
law [is defining when) legitimate textual interpretation stop[s] and illegitimate judicial 'lawmak-
ing' begin[s]." Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 23 (1985). Comparing these statements demonstrates that the authority of a federal court
to go beyond what it understood as "statutory interpretation" has not been resolved. Generally,
criticisms of federal common law are based on the premise that federal courts have intruded in an
area properly reserved to another branch of the federal government or within the authority of the
individual states. See generally id. As discussed throughout this article, neither federalism nor
separation-of-powers concerns are implicated when federal common law is employed to "reform"
state law instead of preempting state private law that Congress did not intend to preempt. See
infra Part III.D.l (federalism); infra Part III.D.2 (separation of powers).
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powers based criticism). This article anticipates and attempts to respond to
such criticisms.
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
A. The Relevance of Background Assumptions to Preemption Jurisprudence
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law
constitutes the "supreme law of the land."3 This provides courts with a
uniform rule to apply to putative conflicts between state and federal laws.3 It
does not, however, provide standards for determining whether state law is
preempted by federal law.
Preemption is not the only context where courts are left with the task of
defining the relative spheres of federal and state authority without explicit
textual guidance. Ambiguity is inherent in the American political system as a
result of the federal structure of the Constitution, which recognizes the politi-
cal authority of both the federal government and state governments32 without
explicitly defining the division of authority between the two.33 Courts,
especially federal courts, are generally the institution that must determine
whether federal authority has been exercised in a manner that displaces state
authority.34 Courts are frequently unable to resolve these disputes by relying
solely on direct or explicit evidence of whether the relevant federal actors
30. The Supremacy Clause reads:
The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the Unit-
ed States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
31. The Supremacy Clause specifically binds courts, both state and federal, to apply federal
law rather than contrary state laws. The Constitutional Convention discussed and rejected several
proposals that would have provided Congress with the responsibility to determine which state laws
were contrary to federal policies. See infra note 122 and materials cited therein.
32. Indian tribes, of course, constitute a third domestic sovereign entity recognized by, but
predating, the U.S. Constitution. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831),
describes the constitutional status of Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations." The scope of
this article is the preemption of state law by federal law. For that reason, this article does not
address the political relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government. For a cogent
discussion of the lessons that the relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government
may have for our federal structure, see Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes,
States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989). The field of federal Indian law is,
as the name implies, a uniquely federalized field where state law has little, if any, relevance. This
aspect of the field of federal Indian law and its implications for state law operating in this field is
discussed at infra notes 147 and 185.
33. The Constitution is said to establish "a series of balanced but often ambiguous power
relationships between the branches of the [federal] government and between those branches and
their sovereign constituency. The term federalism has been characteristically used to describe this
solution, but the term has difficulties." G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERiCAN JUDICIAL TRADmON
17 (1988). This ambiguity has provided a means to expand and contract state and federal authority
in response to the exigent needs of each era of United States history.
34. To be sure, with respect to questions of preemption as well as other forms of statutory
and constitutional interpretation, any ruling by the courts may be overridden by the subsequent
actions of the elected branches of the federal government or by constitutional amendment. Never-
theless, courts must determine whether to interpret existing law as displacing state authority.
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intended to displace state law. Instead, they have come to rely on certain
"background assumptions" or understandings of how the government is
functioning or is intended to function.35
In a 1988 article, Professor Richard H. Fallon, Jr. surveyed the field of
judicial federalism, analyzing the assumptions that judges and commentators
employ to resolve the questions caused by the ambiguity in our federal
structure.36 He demonstrates that two competing models of federalism provide
the basis for resolving the ambiguity inherent in our federalism: one favoring
the power of the national (federal) government-the nationalist model-and
the other seeking to preserve state authority in their sphere as separate
sovereigns-the federalist model. As a result:
When a Federalist vision of the original [Constitutional] text and
history provides the interpretative framework ... states emerge as
sovereign entities against which federal courts should exercise only
limited powers. . . . In cases of doubt the Court commonly reasons
that Congress would have intended to respect state interests associated
with the performance of traditional sovereign functions . . ..
By contrast, "[a] Nationalist model of judicial federalism furnishes a plausible
set of assumptions to guide court decisions ... [and] its power is attested in
leading Supreme Court cases that reason from its premises that state
sovereignty interests must yield to the vindication of federal rights .... 38
Courts employ the assumptions underlying these models to determine whether
federal actors "intended" to supersede state authority or sovereignty.39
For example, the Eleventh Amendment' can be read narrowly to
preclude only those suits against states based on party status.4' It has also
35. For a general discussion of such background assumptions see Fallon, supra note 19.
36. Many of the "classic" questions in the field of federal court jurisprudence or judicial
federalism are considered in Fallon, supra note 19, and addressed more comprehensively in HART
& WECHSLER, supra note 13. Some of these issues include: whether Congress has the authority to
waive the sovereign immunity of states; whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions constitute an exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283; whether state judicial forums must be available to
litigate federal questions; and the extent to which the Eleventh Amendment constitutes a bar to
suits against states and their officials.
37. Fallon, supra note 19, at 1143-44.
38. Id. at 1145.
39. Some of the competing assumptions underlying the federalist and nationalist models
include: whether the sovereign prerogatives retained by the states generally take precedence over
the assertion of federal policies and whether state and federal courts are generally fungible or
whether federal courts have a distinct role and responsibility to protect federal rights and policies.
Id. at 1151-61.
40. The Eleventh Amendment's text reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
41. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment bars only those suits based on state-diversity of citi-
zenship and not those based on federal question jurisdiction). The case credited with creating the
"shock of surprise" that resulted in the Eleventh Amendment's adoption is Chisholm v. Georgia,
43 U.S. (1 Dall.) 234, 260 (1793). Indeed, nearly all of the cases interpreting the Eleventh Amend-
ment before the Civil War were based on diversity jurisdiction. This is not surprising in light of
the fact that the general subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts was not established until 1875.
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 1159-60. It is worth noting that in his dissent in Chisholm,
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been interpreted to preclude federal courts from hearing almost any suit in
which an unconsenting state is a party, including those suits based on federal
question .jurisdiction.42  Professor Fallon points out that "[n]early all
commentators who have studied this agree that the historical evidence is
mixed and that the textual language could support either conclusion. 43
According to Professor Fallon, courts and commentators are able to choose
between competing interpretations of ambiguous constitutional and statutory
provisions by analyzing these questions in terms of their background
assumptions of how our government functions or was intended to function."
As he explains, "it is accepted practice to test the plausibility of conclusions,
and thus indirectly the persuasiveness of evidence itself, by their fit with stable
theories or assumptions about the surrounding legal universe."'45 Thus, where
courts and commentators analyze the Eleventh Amendment with the
(federalist) presumption that state immunity may only be overcome by a
Constitutional provision that unmistakably negates such immunity, its text is
insufficient to overcome that presumption.' By those who assume that the
Constitution was written or amended to allow for a strong national
government, however, that same text is read to allow suits against states in all
instances except those explicitly precluded. Because the Constitution's text
does not resolve the question," proponents of either interpretation rely on
"background assumptions" to demonstrate the basis for and veracity of their
positions. Although this allows courts to resolve the ambiguous questions
inherent in our federalism, it has not yielded consistent or predictable results,
creating "destabilizing swings between the Nationalist and Federalist ex-
tremes."
49
Justice Iredell "conceded that the outcome might differ in a suit arising under federal law." Id. at
1159 (internal references omitted).
42. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh Amend-
ment prohibits Congress from waiving state sovereign immunity, even in a field of law reserved to
the federal government). The Eleventh Amendment has not been interpreted to preclude suits by
one state against another or suits brought by the United States. HART & WECHSLER, supra note
13, at 1166.
43. Fallon, supra note 19, at 1147; see also infra note 48.
44. Professor Fallon explains that "[blecause bits of historical evidence cannot be assessed
except-against a broader background, much of the power of the Federalist and Nationalistic
models lies in their capacity to provide a general theory of the historical nature of judicial
federalism." Fallon, supra note 19, at 1148.
45. Id. at 1147. "[M~any federal courts issues are vague or point in conflicting directions. In
such cases, it is virtually impossible to test the persuasiveness of competing evidence, arguments,
and interpretations without at least an informal understanding of the generally prevailing [feder-
alist and nationalist] systemic norms." Id. at 1157.
46. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125-28, 1131-32.
47. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 1145-85
(Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 247; see also
William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construc-
tion of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983).
48. As Dean Nichol, Jr. explains, "[tihe content of the Eleventh Amendment limitation of
judicial authority cannot be ascertained by either logic or examination of the constitutional text."
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REv. 959 (1987).
49. Fallon, supra note 19, at 1224. Recall Professor Sunstein's statement that
"[d]isagreements about meaning often turn not on statutory terms 'themselves,' but instead on the
appropriate interpretive principles." Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 6, at 411-12.
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Nevertheless, background assumptions are necessary because courts must
apply statutes and the Constitution to matters that their authors did not or
could not consider."' Yet, just as courts and commentators call upon
Congress to provide greater detail in its enactments to reduce the necessity of
such judicial "judgment calls,"'" it is entirely appropriate that courts should
explicate their background assumptions. This will provide greater clarity to
this field, and greater guidance to practitioners and legislators-both federal
and state-seeking to predict the outcome of preemption cases or influence the
drafting of legislation.
The lack of explicit constitutional standards regarding the inconsistencies
between state and federal law, 2 as well as Congressional inability to
explicitly address all potential conflicts,53  means that the same or
"functionally indistinguishable" '54 background assumptions are relevant in the
50. One example where specific applications of a federal rule on state authority were not
considered by its legislative drafters is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Also known as Section One of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 or the Ku Klux Klan Act, § 1983 establishes a cause of action in
federal court for plaintiffs asserting that their federally recognized rights were denied under color
of local law. See generally Nichol, supra note 48. Dean Nichol explains that § 1983's legislative
history reveals ample evidence that Congress enacted this provision to provide federal judges with
"an extremely intrusive tool" for ensuring that state officials, including state courts, did not
interfere with or actively suppress federal rights. Id. at 985. Yet the range of interests recognized
as federal rights when the statute was enacted was exceedingly narrow. With the incorporation of
much of the Bill of Rights as federal rights applicable to state action, the range of constitutional
and other federal rights is now so broad that it could conceivably provide federal courts with
"complete supervision over state courts" Id. at 987. Dean Nichol explains that "[ilf the section is
applied with the full intrusive force that its drafters envisioned, complications that the framers
would perhaps have rejected, or at least did not contemplate, arise." Id. As a result, courts are
faced with a dilemma. It would usurp legislative authority for courts to ignore the plain language
of the statute and pick and choose which rights they wish to protect. Yet "construing [§ 1983] in
line with the framers' intent could threaten a dual judicial system." Id. at 985. Background
assumptions allow courts to avoid this dilemma by providing a means of applying statutes to new
circumstances, without producing absurd results that might interfere with the fundamental
assumptions shared by the statute's authors and contemporary society. Thus, the statute can be
applied to protect an expanded range of federal interest*s, yet its implementation is tempered by a
recognition-or application of the background principle-that its authors did not "intend" to
eliminate or obviate the existence of separate state judicial systems. Analyzing this issue based on
these background assumptions harmonizes the seemingly contradictory results reached in Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971) (finding that traditional notions of comity and federalism
generally preclude federal courts from enjoining proceedings in state court, even where federal
rights protected by § 1983 are at issue), and Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972)
(holding that § 1983 might, in some circumstances, allow federal courts to enjoin state
proceedings notwithstanding the historic and statutory prohibition against enjoining state court
actions).
51. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 30 (text of the Supremacy Clause). To be sure, the Supremacy Clause
may be read along with other provisions of th Constitution to guide judicial analysis of preemp-
tion. For example, certain fields of law have apparently been federalized by the Constitution's ex-
plicit commitment of these fields to one or more branches of the federal government. In the fields
of federal Indian law, disputes between states, and, to some extent, foreign policy, state laws are
not often incorporated as federal rules of decision and are rarely found to operate of their own
force in these fields. See infra Part IV.A.I. In most instances, however, courts are left with little
textual guidance from either the Constitution or federal statutes on what it means to be "bound"
by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.
53. See, e.g., supra note 50; infra note 270 and accompanying text.
54. Paul Wolfson employs this phrase in his argument that "delicate balancing" provides
more distinction than difference from "field preemption." See supra note 14. A similar observation
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field of federal preemption. Courts compensate for insufficient evidence of
congressional "intent" by applying these background assumptions.5 These
principles are often subsumed within the rubric of canons of construction,
presumptions in favor of either state or federal authority, or descriptions of
how our federal structure functions or is intended to function.56 Because
contemporary preemption analysis generally ignores the possibility of
incorporating state private law into federalized fields, courts generally
approach preemption as an "all or nothing" choice of either preserving or
preempting state law. This approach means that preemption is susceptible to
destabilizing swings as federalist or nationalist thinking gains primacy.
To be sure, with respect to all ambiguous questions of federalism, there
are courts and commentators who argue that their position is the only plausible
reading of the relevant text or the only interpretation that is consistent with
our federal structure. For example, some argue that state law should only be
preempted by federal enactments in instances where Congress both provides
evidence that it actually considered and explicitly directed this result.57 While
this position is marked by widespread contemporary acceptance and is
advanced by noted judges and commentators," it is not, as some imply, the
only principled approach to federal preemption. In fact, it represents only one
end of a continuum of valid interpretations of the Supremacy Clause. At the
other end of the continuum are those who argue that the Supremacy Clause
requires the preemption of any state law that might interfere with federal
policies.59 Indeed, background assumptions represent such a critical part of
judicial consideration of preemption questions that even where Congress does
explicitly address preemption, judges tend to implement Congressional "intent"
in a manner consistent with prevailing judicial views.'
Over time, trends in preemption jurisprudence emerge as the implicit
assumptions applied to other constitutionally ambiguous matters influence
preemption analysis. By analyzing these trends, this article demonstrates that
applies to the background assumption employed in the preemption and the "classical" questions of
federal preemption jurisprudence listed in supra note 36.
55. This observation is demonstrated by the dramatic changes in preemption jurisprudence
discussed infra at Part ll.B.
56. Professor Fallon writes that "[i]f the [federalist and nationalist] models have one function
that is more important than the others, it is that of reflecting recurring rhetorical structures; the
models capture the rhetoric of many federal courts debates." Fallon, supra note 19, at 1150. For
discussions addressing how these assumptions are interjected (often subtly) into judicial reasoning
and argument, see, e.g., Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 6; see also Note, Intent, Clear
Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L.
REV. 892 (1982). The author of this note points out that "judicial imagery and rhetoric are forms
of argument that seek to persuade their 'listeners' of the legitimacy of particular uses of power by
evoking implicit assumptions about the constitutional order." Id. at 894 n.17 (citing R. PARKER,
POLITICAL VISION IN CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT (Feb. 1979) (unpublished manuscript)).
57. See, e.g., Law of Preemption, supra note 23, at 55. But see infra note 122 and the
materials cited therein.
58. Law of Preemption, supra note 23, at 55. But see sources cited infra note 122.
59. See, e.g., infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text. As discussed further infra notes
122-23, the Constitutional Convention left the courts, not Congress, with the authority to deter-
mine which state laws were compatible with federal programs.
60. See, e.g., infra notes 253-72 and accompanying text (discussing Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 500 U.S. 504 (1992)).
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judicial philosophy concerning the appropriate balance of power between the
branches of the federal government and state governments is a significant (if
implicit) factor in shaping the extent of federal preemption of state law. Gratu-
itous references to "congressional intent" within preemption decisions down-
play the importance of judicial discretion.
Exposing the extent of judicial discretion within the preemption context is
relevant to this article's inquiry for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that
any formulation of preemption analysis rests upon implicit assumptions of how
the government is intended to function, rather than on the explicit text of
either statutes or the Constitution. Second, it tends to rebut the assertion that
federal preemption is the most deferential means of integrating state law
within federalized fields.62 Because federal preemption can rarely be resolved
by textual references alone, it is necessary to engage in a more instrumental
consideration of how courts should address questions of preemption in our
federalism. 63 This article does this and ultimately demonstrates that the
postNew Deal reliance on federal preemption, at the expense of federal
common law, is inconsistent with the place of private rights in our federal
system.
B. Federal Preemption: From Conflict to Field Occupation
The Supreme Court has expanded and contracted federal preemption in
order to accommodate philosophical developments in federalism.' For
example, until the New Deal, the federal government generally concentrated
its efforts in those few areas where its authority was explicitly conferred by
the Constitution. 65  Since states were the primary policy-makers, courts
structured preemption jurisprudence to prevent federal law from interfering
with state laws. The Law Of Preemption: A Report of the Appellate Judges
Conference American Bar Association provides a helpful overview of the early
history of Supremacy Clause jurisprudence. It states that "the early cases
61. See supra note 17 (referencing comment by Solicitor General Cox).
62. For an example of federal preemption eviscerating state-based rights, see infra notes 247-
50 and accompanying text. Some courts and commentators assert that federal preemption consti-
tutes a relatively benign mechanism for addressing the extent to which state law retains its rele-
vance within federalized fields. A thorough review of the history of preemption reveals, by con-
trast, that it has been employed as an important judicial means to control, direct, or influence the
balance of power between states and the federal government, often to the detriment of state law.
In some instances, federal common law may narrow the scope of state private law that is preempt-
ed.
63. In this respect, this article responds to Professor Fallon's call for "models] of thought
and discourse that more adequately capture the complexity and richness of American federalism
and that check the destabilizing swings between the Nationalist and Federalist extremes." Fallon,
supra note 19, at 1224.
64. See, e.g., Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975) [hereinafter The Preemption Doctrine] (arguing that
the Burger Court shifted its preemption analysis to allow for greater state participation in other-
wise federalized fields); see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemption,
5 CONST. COMMENTARY 311, 312 (1988) ("A careful analysis of the current cases offers strong
evidence that the trend of the law is increasingly moving away from preemption.").
. 65. See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES
97-105 (1977).
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strongly suggest a Court solicitous toward state power; they contain a
considerable body of comment to the effect that an actual, manifest collision
between federal and state statutes, such as that in Gibbons v. Ogden, was
required in order for the laws of the state to be displaced." Courts also
prevented federal legislation from interfering with state common law by
applying the principle that statutes were to be interpreted in order to minimally
disrupt common law principles.67 The simultaneous application of both of
these limitations resulted in a potent constraint on federal authority.
A survey of preemption cases from the first part of this century reveals
that the idea of "field occupation" developed concurrently with and in aid of
federal regulatory authority. In the early twentieth century, when the Court
determined whether a federal law was to be construed as having a broader or
narrower preemptive impact, it almost uniformly decided that federal law
preempted only a narrow range of state laws. For example, in Savage v.
Jones,' the Court addressed the scope of a federal food and drug purity act.
The federal act only required packages to disclose the presence of certain
substances, including morphine, opium, and cocaine. An Indiana statute
required complete disclosure of the product's contents. A manufacturer sought
to prove that the federal statute defined its disclosure requirement to the
exclusion of the more comprehensive Indiana requirement. The Court flatly
rejected the argument that the federal law should be construed as the sole
source of public regulation on the topic: "The intent to supersede the exercise
by the state of its police power as to matters not covered by the Federal
legislation is not to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit
to circumscribe its regulation and occupy a limited field."
A number of considerations weigh in favor of the analysis employed in
Savage. First, it is solicitous of state authority, comporting with the view that
states are the primary source of law, especially laws that concern the "police
power."7 Furthermore, restricting the preemptive effect of federal legislation
creates more accurate "feedback" mechanisms to Congress, which has the
authority to remedy an incorrect decision by a court.7 This follows from the
66. The Law of Preemption, supra note 23, at 13; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824) (finding that a New York statute granting a monopoly to the ferries of one owner "collid-
ed" with federal law authorizing a competitor to enter the state's waters).
67. HURST, supra note 6, at 186-87.
68. 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
69. Savage, 225 U.S. at 533.
70. The notion that state laws enacted as part of a state's authority and responsibility to
protect the health and welfare of its citizens should only be displaced where there is a clear indi-
cation that Congress intended this result still retains at least rhetorical application. See, e.g.,
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 717 (1985) (referring to the
"presumption that state or local regulation of matters related to health and safety is not invalidated
under the Supremacy Clause"). Nevertheless, this principle has not been consistently applied. See,
e.g., infra notes 80-100 and cases cited therein.
71. As one commentator noted:
This is a wise distribution of power. The Congress cannot foresee in advance all the
possible interaction between state and federal law in future situations. The courts can
deal with the problems as actual controversies develop. The Congress retains the power
to reverse the judicial determination if it proves contrary to the legislative will.
Cox, supra note 17, at 809.
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fact that Congress would be more likely to notice and correct a ruling that
incorrectly preempted a smaller field than a ruling that preempted a broader
field than Congress intended. In the former case, state law would interfere
with the Congressional plan, bringing the anomaly to Congress's attention. In
the latter case, states would be inconvenienced by the absence of regulation
and would be faced with convincing Congress that the situation was worthy of
its corrective attention. Finally, because states were (at least until the New
Deal) the primary sources of public policy in the United States, it was
assumed that they would act first to address any interstices between federal
and state regulation. Thus, the Court would not wish to define preemption
jurisprudence in a way that would preclude states (the primary policy-makers)
from responding to new circumstances or issues that were not addressed by
federal legislation. Courts assumed that any gaps in the federal legislative
scheme were the domain of state lawmakers. In order to implement this
objective, courts required a conflict between state and federal enactments
before state law was preempted.72
A change in federal preemption resulted as Congress began to broaden the
range of areas regulated by the federal government, a process that can
generally be traced to the Progressive Era, but which was carried out in
earnest as a part of the New Deal.73 Congressional delegation of extensive
regulatory and policy-making authority to federal regulators reversed the
presumption that federal activity was constrained to narrow, easily defined
ranges that left unaddressed issues to state lawmakers. Courts could instead-
assume that Congress would err on the side of providing adequate regulatory
"space" for these agencies to function, even if this might remove state
authority without federal authority immediately fulfilling the functions
formerly provided by state law.74 Given the number of state laws and unique
circumstances where they might interfere with federal programs, Congress
could at best only provide general guidance regarding the way it intended
federal and state law to interact. 75 Courts could search in vain for explicit
72. Law Of Preemption, supra note 23.
73. Professor Richard Hofstadter explains:
In the years 1933-38 the New Deal sponsored a series of legislative changes that made
the enactments of the Progressive era seem timid by comparison, changes that, in their
totality, carried the politics and administration of the United States farther from the
conditions of 1914 than those had been from the conditions of 1880.
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 300 (1955). Changes in judicial philosophy allowed
for this dramatic increase in federal administrative authority. See generally Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes, supra note 6.
74. See, e.g., infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
75. Kenneth L. Hirsh, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 LAw F. 515, 543
(1972). The limits on congressional analysis of which state laws are subject to preemption by
federal law are discussed infra at text accompanying note 270. One dynamic worth highlighting at
this point concerns instances where federal legislation precedes the development of private law in
a field. Obviously this makes federal legislative pronouncements about the extent of preemption
highly speculative. Nevertheless, even in these instances, some courts and commentators fault
Congress for failing to adequately address the scope of preemption "intended" by its legislation.
Such an interpretation fails to recognize that the Supremacy Clause makes courts, not Congress,
the entity responsible for determining which laws have preemptive effect. This interpretation of
the Supremacy Clause is addressed at infra notes 122-23.
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congressional guidance regarding the point where state laws impinge on
federal objectives. Congress might also allow federal regulators to determine
the rate at which they would begin to regulate different areas within a field of
law. This left administrators with some ability to define both the rate and
extent of federal preemption. Thus, while Congress would federalize a field,
the Court might look to the agency for help in defining either the extent of the
field federalized by Congress or the extent that federal regulation currently
occupies that field.76 Rather than continually returning to the question of
whether state or federal regulators should prevail, courts began to assume that
if Congress established a regulatory regime, it intended to preempt all
competing state regulation."
As federal regulatory authority gained primacy, courts could assume that
federal administrators, rather than state courts, could react most quickly to fill
gaps within the field. Hence, one incentive for structuring preemption analysis
in favor of state lawmakers was removed."8 At the same time, the notion that
narrow preemption rulings would act as a feedback mechanism to Congress
grew less tenable because Congress dramatically increased the number of
fields competing for its attention.79 These changes in institutional interaction
and purpose changed the "background assumptions" supporting an approach to
preemption that was solicitous of state law. As courts began to apply different
assumptions to their analysis of preemption questions, the entire approach to
preemption changed.
The shift in preemption jurisprudence towards a model favoring the
application of federal authority, even at the expense of state laws, is apparent
in Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. 0 Relying on the broad grant of authority
conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the Napier Court
essentially came to the opposite conclusion of the Court in Savage. In Savage,
the court concluded that the federal law established only the minimum level of
regulation or the regulatory "floor." As a result, a state could demand
compliance with additional requirements, thereby defining a higher "ceiling"
76. See, e.g., Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933). The Court addressed an alleged con-
flict between a federal quarantine law and New York state inspection requirement. New York law
required certification by an official of the exporting state that the herd of origin was free from
specified disease. The federal law allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to establish quarantine dis-
tricts. The Court found that the alleged conflict between the laws to be "groundless." In addition,
the Court stated that "[miuch weight is to be given to the practical interpretation of the act by the
federal department through its acquiescence in the enforcement of state measures." Id. at 351; see
also Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713 ("We have repeatedly held that state laws can be pre-
empted by federal regulations as well as federal statutes.") (citations omitted). For a criticism of
this principle, see Wolfson, supra note 14, at 110. Wolfson writes that "[p]reemption is not a
technical matter in which administrative agencies have particular expertise. If an agency cannot
provide a reasonable explanation for the necessity of preemption, the agency's decision should be
vacated." Id.
77. See infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
78. This and other factors supporting the rise of federal administrative authority are discu-
ssed at infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
79. The "congressional veto" constituted one method for allowing Congress to respond to
federal administrative authority. Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (determining that some
applications of the legislative veto were unconstitutional).
80. 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
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of regulation without interfering with federal objectives.8 In Napier, federal
law was found to be the sole source of public law in the subject
field-essentially both the "floor" and the "ceiling" of regulation. Justice
Brandeis first framed the question before the Court by stating: "[t]he main
question ... is whether the Boiler Inspection Act has occupied the field of
regulating locomotive equipment used on a highway of interstate commerce,
so as to preclude state legislation." 2 He then rejected the requirement that a
conflict must exist in order for federal laws to preempt state law. "It may be
assumed ... that there is no physical conflict between the devices required by
the state and those specifically prescribed by Congress or the [ICC]." 83 The
basis for preemption was not, therefore, an incompatibility between state and
federal regulations, which had been the test for determining whether state law
was preempted. Simultaneous compliance with a federal regulatory "floor" and
a state "ceiling" was possible. Justice Brandeis explained:
We hold that state legislation is precluded, because the [Act], as we
construe it, was intended to occupy the field. The broad scope of the
authority conferred upon the Commission leads to that conclusion.
Because the standard set by the Commission must prevail,
requirements by the states are precluded, however commendable or
however different their purpose.84
Without doubt, what is being preserved by the preemption of state law in
Napier is not only the operation of federal law, per se, but the authority of
federal administrators to exercise the authority granted to them by the relevant
federal statute. 5
The reformulated preemption analysis that favored federal law did not
immediately interfere with private ordering based on common law principles
because the Supreme Court was initially concerned with areas of law that were
not heavily influenced by common law or with cases that did not involve a
conflict between federal regulation and state common law.86 As a result, the
Court did not need to address the fact that invalidating state law would leave
an area of private conduct without private law principles to guide conduct. 7
81. Contemporary applications of the "floor, not ceiling" dichotomy are addressed in
Wolfson, supra note 14, at 83-88.
82. Napier, 272 U.S. at 607.
83. Id.at610-11.
84. Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
85. Indeed, in the last paragraph of the opinion, Justice Brandeis emphasized this point by
stating that "[ilf the protection now afforded by the [ICC's] rules is deemed inadequate, applica-
tion for relief must be made to it." Id.
86. As discussed at supra note 75, in a number of cases federal statutory regulation preceded
any common law work-product.
87. In some areas, especially interstate commerce, Congress would codify a common law
rule in order to provide national uniformity. This process established national uniformity through
the use of common law rules and processes. Thus, it did not remove private law from a field, but
merely provided a single federally mandated private law rule. See, e.g., Charleston & W. Carolina
Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture, 237 U.S. 597 (1915) (recognizing that federal law imposed liability
for goods damaged in interstate commerce on the initial carrier). The desire to achieve such uni-
formity in common law rules was one basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Swift v. Tyson,
237 U.S. (1 Pet.) 597 (1842), which provided that federal courts were not required to follow the
"general" common law of states courts. This case and the decision overruling it are discussed infra
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Often the state regulatory regimes were themselves quite new and the
Court was only concerned with whether state or federal administrators would
have regulatory dominion over a particular area. For example, in H.P. Welch
v. New Hampshire,"8 the Court addressed competing federal and state
registration schemes intended to limit the number of hours truck drivers could
work.89 The Court was not concerned with the fact that finding state law
preempted would leave this issue unregulated until federal regulation was in
effect. "The sole question is whether Congress intended that from the time of
the federal enactment until effective action by the Commission, there should
be no regulation . . . ." These cases did not involve a conflict with state
common law, which would have been raised if, for example, the case involved
a tort claim against a truck driver and his defense included an assertion that
federal law defined the extent of his duty to the exclusion of state negligence
principles. Such a case would have required the Court to address the extent to
which the federal regime preempted state private law principles."'
The ascendancy of this solicitous approach towards federal regulatory
authority is clear in the Supreme Court's decision in Cloverleaf Butter Co. v.
Patterson.92 The Court acknowledged that the case before it did not present
an irreconcilable conflict between state and federal policies. Indeed, the federal
and state agencies were cooperating in their efforts to ensure the purity of
renovated butter. 3 Nevertheless, the Court looked beyond the specific facts
before it in order to preserve the regulatory authority of the federal govern-
ment within this sphere. The Court justified this approach by describing the
objective that preemption jurisprudence must fulfill in the modern regulatory
era:
Our duty to deal with contradictory functions of state and nation on
any occasion ... calls for the utmost effort to avoid conclusions
which interfere with the governmental operations of either. Nothing
could be more fertile for discord, however, than a failure to define
the boundaries of authority. Clashes may and should be minimized by
mutual tolerance but they are much less likely to happen when each
knows the limits of its responsibility. And, it is only reasonable to
assume that the theory of denying inconsistent powers to a state is
based largely upon the benefits to the regulated industry of freedom
from inconsistencies.94
Part III.C.
88. 306 U.S. 79 (1939).
89. Welch, 306 U.S. at 83.
90. Id. at 84.
91. See infra notes 279-83 (discussing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (19-
84)).
92. 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
93. Cloverleaf Butter Co., 315 U.S. at 169.
94. Id. (emphasis added). For another example of the extent to which state law was to give
way to federal authority, see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (recognizing
that a state law regulating grain elevators was preempted even though the state regulatory regime
was more comprehensive). But cf. Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947) (companion case
to Santa Fe Elevator Corp.) (holding that Congress did not preclude state regulation which sup-
plements the federal scheme and that any claim of supersedure was premature until the state adop-
[Vol. 74:1
THE CASE FOR FEDERAL COMMON LAW
It is important to note that in Mintz,95 Napier,96 Welch,97 Patterson,9"
and other seminal preemption rulings such as Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp.,99 the Court was addressing the relative authority of competing federal
and state administrative regimes. There is much to recommend such an
approach when defining regulatory spheres of influence."u The same, or
similarly broad approaches to preemption were, however, also applied to state
private law within federalized fields. Part of the explanation and justification
for the use of preemption doctrines developed in the regulatory context to
address the preemption of state private law can be traced to the New Deal
policy of replacing state common law with federal administrative authority.
III. THE RISE OF FEDERAL REGULATION AND THE PREEMPTION OF STATE
PRIVATE LAW
A. Common Law and the Modern Administrative State
The creation of the federal regulatory state may be characterized, in large
measure, as an attempt to undermine the regulatory regime based on state
common law."°' Opponents of the private law legal regime combined
philosophical and practical criticisms of common law rules and methodology.
1. Philosophical Criticisms of Private Law
Common law judging was associated with the "oracular" theory of
judging, which traces its origins to America's colonial era and "the
predominant jurisprudential assumption that judges merely 'found' the law,
mechanically applying existing rules to new situations. This assumption
fostered an image of judges as oracles who could discover the law's technical
mysteries but who could not influence the content of the law itself."' 2
ted specific rules).
95. Discussed supra note 76.
96. Discussed supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
97. Discussed supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
98. Discussed supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
99. Discussed supra note 94.
100. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
101. "For the New Deal reformers ... the common law was hardly neutral or prepolitical, but
instead reflected a set of explicit regulatory decisions." SuNsTEIN, supra note 2, at 20. Opponents
of state common law challenged its stranglehold on public policy, its conservatism, and its failure
to address a number of areas of policy. Id.
102. WHITE, supra note 33, at 7-8. Professor Sunstein explains:
Seeing the common law status quo as prelegal and neutral, judges (and many others) did
not recognize its principles as a part of a regulatory system at all, but regarded them
instead as the state of nature. Ideas of this sort underlay a number of constitutional deci-
sions which saw departures from common law principles as constitutionally suspect.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 19. Professor White points out that although this approach threatened
to "divorce 'law' from community values," Chief Justice Marshall "developed a technique of
decision-making that retained the oracular style but grounded decisions on appeals to first princi-
ples of American civilization." WHITE, supra note 33, at 9. The oracular theory in its "purer" form
retained a significant relevance. It enjoyed a special prevalence under the direction of Justice
Stephen Field. "With Field and those who shared his perspectives.., came an apparent de-em-
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Although the idea that judges somehow "found" and applied rules of natural
law has always had detractors,' 3 the early twentieth century saw the rise of
legal realism,"° which was exceptionally successful in challenging the notion
that common law rules of decision were somehow "neutral" or
prepolitical."5
Legal realists showed that common law rules were often subtly but
purposefully constructed to achieve certain policy objectives." This
observation challenged the notion that common law rules should be insulated
from political review." 7 Legal realists pointed out that all rules of law
implicate public interests, even if they only provided the legal rules and basis
for state policing of private agreements.' This perspective legitimized
attempts by the legislative branches of government, both federal and state, to
reformulate or supplant common law rules."°
2. Substantive Criticisms of Private Law
The substantive criticisms of the common law regime challenged the
content of common law rules. Furthermore, the opponents of the existing legal
regime argued that enforcing legal rights or administrating complex matters
phasis on policy considerations and a professed return to immutable guiding axioms of the law,
axioms that the judges merely applied to the facts before him to reach a sound result" Id. at 107.
103. The tension between natural law and positive law can be traced to the divergent premises
underlying the Declaration of Independence, with its notion of inherent rights, and the constitu-
tional notion that political power derives from explicit choices made by representative institutions.
Chief Justice Marshall is largely credited (or criticized) with interjecting the notion that the judi-
cial branch of the federal government possesses the authority and responsibility to ground its deci-
sions in "first principles" which may not always be found in explicit provisions of positive law.
See, e.g., supra note 12.
104. Professor Friedman explains that legal realism was
ultimately associated with a group of writers in the 1930's, notably Jerome Frank and
Karl Llewellyn. Realism was, in fact, less a philosophy than an attitude. It rejected the
mind-set of judges and scholars of the late nineteenth century who had emphasized legal
logic and purity of concept .... Realist judges and writers were openly instrumental;
they asked: what use is this doctrine or rule?
FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 688.
105. See infra note 137 and accompanying text. One basis for the preeminent position of
common law was the view that it occupied a unique and important place in the constitutional
order. Common law "was thought to be both distinct and insulated from the public law system of
electoral representation and legislation." Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1232; see also supra
note 12.
106. As Professor Hurst explains, economics constituted the predominant philosophical un-
derpinning for most of the common law work product of state courts. See generally JAMES W.
HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM (1956) [hereinafter HURST, COND IONS OF
FREEDOM]. It would be facile to characterize the economic considerations underlying eighteenth,
nineteenth, and early twentieth century common law as laissez faire. As he points out, "[w]here
legal regulation or compulsion might promote greater release of individual or group energies, we
had no hesitancy in making affirmative use of law." Id. at 7. Nevertheless, the free market was a
significant, if not the primary, component of this law.
107. See supra note 102.
108. Professor Hurst explains that much of the legislation during the early twentieth century
sought to improve the administration of private rights defined by state courts, rather than modify-
ing the substance of the rights themselves. To Professor Hurst, this "represented a broader recog-
nition that there was in many of these private controversies a good deal more of the public interest
than the nineteenth century had realized." HURST, supra note 6, at 72.
109. See infra Part III.A.2.
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through two-party lawsuits was an inefficient and inadequate method for
resolving the controversies that arose in a modem industrial democracy.
Professors Stewart and Sunstein address this argument in a 1982 article."0
They point out that "[w]hen the Republic was created, private law defined a
system of private economic ordering, regulated by the courts.""' Their
article provides a helpful summary of some of the most significant
justifications for moving from a legal regime based on common law regulation
to a system that emphasizes federal administrative authority. They explain that
"the rise of an urban industrial economy has, for several reasons, undermined
the capacity of the common law system to vindicate ... rights.""' 2 For
example,
[c]ommon law rules of exchange, designed for face-to-face
transactions, are increasingly inadequate when applied to mass
markets dominated by large firms. Such markets may create acute
disparities in information and bargaining power.
Second, modem industrial society taxes the common law's ability
to define private entitlements. Direct transgressions proscribed by the
common law of trespass give way to complex and collective harms,
such as pollution. The content of common law entitlements must be
redefined, but the task of redefinition is often beyond the capacity of
judges involved in case-by-case decisionmaking.
Third, new types of harms typically affect large numbers of
individuals simultaneously; the impact is large in the aggregate but
small for any individual. Because the costs of litigation are likely to
exceed any individual's expected recovery, private damage actions no
longer deter socially undesirable actions or provide compensation for
violations of entitlements. The alternative-the prophylactic
deployment of injunctive relief-presents courts with discouraging
managerial complexities.
Fourth, it is difficult to ensure uniform treatment of similarly
situated individuals through decentralized private litigation. Such
uniformity became important in the late nineteenth century, when
monopolies such as railroads discriminated among consumers, and is
important today because of heightened concern with race and sex
discrimination.' 13
Even those who did not support the wholesale replacement of state
common law with federal regulation recognized that existing institutions could
not address many of the economic, social, and political conditions in a modem
industrial state." 4 "The failure of the common law to effectively protect entit-
110. See generally Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9.
111. Id. at 1232.
112. Id. at 1235.
113. Id. at 1235-36.
114. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER (1957) (chroni-
cling the rise of the New Deal). In his autobiography, Theodore Roosevelt explains such a devel-
opment in his understanding of the role of courts in an industrial society. In his capacity as a
member of the New York State Legislature, Mr. Roosevelt investigated the conditions surrounding
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lements created a morally based, politically effective demand for the creation
of regulatory agencies to safeguard personal security and dignity under
industrial conditions."
' 5
B. The Rise of the Federal Administrative State
The federal administrative state forged in response to these concerns did
not conform with Madisonian notions that legislative, executive, and judicial
functions should be separated among three branches of government. 6 and
between state and federal authority." 7 Federal administrators were provided
with quasi-legislative authority to develop policies and quasi-judicial authority
to apply these policies to specific cases. As a result, authority that had been
confined largely to state judiciaries, and less often to federal and state legisla-
tures, was concentrated in a single federal administrative entity."
8
There were, however, limits to the transformation of governmental
institutions initiated by the New Deal. As noted above, even in many
federalized fields of law, states retain the authority to establish much of the
private law that defines the rights and obligations of individuals."9 While
this ensures that state policymakers will retain their place as an important
component of our federalism, 2 ' it does not resolve the question of which
the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses. Although he was initially opposed to legislation
banning such manufacturing, he reversed his position after he was exposed to the working and
living conditions of those who produce such cigars. The New York Court of Appeals subsequently
declared the law unconstitutional.
It was this case which first waked me to a dim and partial understanding of the fact that
the courts were not necessarily the best judges of what should be done to better social
and industrial conditions. The judges who rendered this decision were well meaning
men. They knew nothing whatever of tenement-house conditions; they new nothing
whatever of the needs, or of the life and labor, of three-fourths of their fellow-citizens in
great cities. They new legalism, but not life.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 81 (Charles Scribner's Sons, The Outlook Company
1926) (1913).
115. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1236.
116. This vision of separation of powers is generally associated with James Madison's writing
and advocacy on behalf of the Constitution in the debate over its ratification. "The accumulation
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands ... whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST
No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
117. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
118. As Professors Stewart and Sunstein point out, allowing judges to review the decisions
reached by administrators or supervise (for example through mandate or injunction) the activities
of federal agencies undermines many of the results that were to be achieved through these entities.
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9. Nevertheless, they point out that it is contrary to many of the
principles underlying our federalist system to rely exclusively on bureaucratic decisions for the
assertion and protection of important or fundamental individual rights. As they explain, the cre-
ation and expansion of "private correctives" must be balanced to achieve the benefits of both
modem administration and historic notions of individual rights. Id.
119. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Furthermore, as discussed infra notes 175-80
and accompanying text, courts employed the principles of private rights to ensure that individuals
were not totally at the mercy of federal bureaucracies for the enforcement of important personal
liberties and rights.
120. For a discussion of the continued relevance of federalism, see Richard B. Stewart, Feder-
alism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REv. 917 (1985) [hereinafter Federalism and Rights].
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state laws are preempted and which are preserved. Although courts can often
determine whether competing state regulatory regimes interfere with federal
regulation,' Congress can, at best, provide only general guidance about the
extent that private law might interfere with federal objectives.'
As the volume and breadth of federal administrative authority grew, the
Supreme Court was left to decide whether to create bodies of federal common
law, allow state law to exist within federalized fields of law, or preempt state
law within federalized fields. Often, the Supreme Court opted to broadly
preempt state law, sometimes from entire fields of law.'23 The absence of
greater use of federal common law within federalized fields of law is
perplexing. 24 To be sure, in comparison with federal administrative entities,
common law courts (especially state courts) were found to be inadequate
mechanisms for regulating conduct and the economy. While this comparison
121. See, e.g., text accompanying infra notes 229-37 (discussing state labor relations laws di-
rected at the same ends as federal labor laws); 253-72 and accompanying text (discussing federal
acts preemption of state "direct" regulation of cigarette warning labels).
122. See supra notes 71-75, infra note 270, and accompanying text. Indeed, the Constitutional
Convention considered and explicitly rejected the idea of providing Congress with the authority to
determine which state laws were compatible with federal programs. Instead, the Supremacy
Clause, leaves courts with the task of developing a methodology for determining which state laws
are incompatible with federal law. Various formulations of the Supremacy Clause that would have
provided Congress with the authority to pass on state laws were considered and rejected. See, e.g.,
Law of Preemption, supra note 23, at 5-8. Generally, these proposals were considered too broad if
they provided Congress with the authority "to negative all [state] laws which to them shall appear
improper." I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 162 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1937) (1911) (quoting a proposal proffered by Charles Pickney and James Madison). Con-
versely, they were considered problematic and subject to abuse if the power was only extended to
"such laws only as will encroach on the national government." Id. at 169. Entrusting courts rather
than Congress with the authority to determine whether state law is preempted is significant for
two reasons. First, the Constitution left state courts, which were much more numerous, with the
primary opportunity to resolve questions of preemption. Second, in the late eighteenth century, the
executive and legislative branches of the federal government were seen as the greatest threat to
state authority. As noted above, some members of the Constitutional Convention believed that
Congress might abuse the power to preempt state laws by employing it to resolve minute policy
disputes. Placing this authority in the hands of judges offered the best opportunity to resolve pre-
emption questions in a forum that was less likely to be in direct competition with state policy-
makers. It also left questions of preemption unresolved until the litigation of actual matters that
Congress may have been tempted to proactively resolve in its favor if it possessed the authority to
declare state law invalid. These factors make it clear that the Supremacy Clause was intended to
balance the need to make federal law supreme with a desire to constrain congressional authority to
preempt state law. For these reasons, an approach to preemption that seeks to empower courts to
preserve state law is more consistent with the history and text of the Supremacy Clause than pro-
posals that seek to make preemption solely a question of Congressional intent. A variant of this
argument is made by Wolfson, supra note 14. See infra note 123. The text of the Supremacy
Clause is set out supra note 30.
123. As one commentator points out, this effectively provides Congress with the ability to
declare an entire field of law federalized. See Wolfson, supra note 14. This constitutes an expan-
sive congressional authority that the Constitutional Convention explicitly chose not to confer upon
Congress. "The [proposed] congressional veto would have permitted Congress to strike down, af-
ter the fact, particular laws passed by the states. [Modem p]reemption permits Congress to block
off whole area of legislation and say to the states, 'Here you shall not enter."' Id. at 90.
124. As Professors Stewart and Sunstein explain, at one point during this century, the rise of
federal common law seemed assured. Yet, "[tlhe 'mid-twentieth century type of federal common
law' celebrated by Judge Friendly seems rapidly headed for oblivion." Stewart & Sunstein, supra
note 9, at 1223. Judge Friendly's views concerning federal common law are discussed in the next
section.
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explains the rise of federal administrative authority, it does not fully explain
why federal preemption, rather than federal common law, was employed to
integrate state private law within federalized fields of law.'"
This choice can only be understood in light of changes in the background
assumptions concerning the inherent value of common law and its place in our
constitutional structure along with a reassessment of the authority of federal
courts to participate in the formulation of such common law. The next sections
explain how these developments coincided with the rise of the federal
administrative state and profoundly affected the development of federal
common law in federalized fields of law.
C. The Re-evaluation of Federal Common Law
This section does not seek to comprehensively address the role of
common law in our federal system. When faced with a potential conflict
between federal statutes and state private law, however, federal courts will
generally analyze the matter solely to determine whether the private law is
preempted. Seeking to preserve private law by creating federal common law is
rare. The absence of federal common law may be traced to two sources: (1)
the rise of federal administrative authority, which sought to eliminate the
"system of public law built directly on private law principles" and (2)
prevailing "federalist" interpretation of Erie v. Tompkins,'26 which found
federal common law to be constitutionally questionable use of federal judicial
authority. This section addresses both of these factors and explains why they
should not preclude the use of federal common law as a means of integrating
private law within federalized fields of law.
As professor Field points out, the Supreme Court's decision in Erie is
"widely understood as the case first setting out our modern understanding of
the proper scope of federal common law."'27 This makes Erie the appropriate
starting point for analyzing the relationship between common law and federal
preemption.
In Erie, the Supreme Court reconsidered and reversed its 1842 decision
Swift v. Tyson.'25 The Court in Swift had ruled that neither the Rules of
Decision Act'29 nor federal deference to state courts required federal courts
125. Both federal common law and federal preemption can be structured to recognize that
federal administrators have the primary responsibility and authority to establish policy. The pri-
mary difference between these t% o options concerns the background assumptions concerning rele-
vance of private law in our federalism. See infra Part III.C.
126. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
127. Field, supra note 15, at 902.
128. 41 U.S. (I Pet.) 1 (1842).
129. The Rules of Decision Act provides that "[tlhe laws of the several states, except where
the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as the rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in
cases where they apply." Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994)). Professor Field points out that "[tlhis text is the version of the act as it
read at the time of Erie. The phrase 'trials at common law' was changed in 1948 to 'civil ac-
tions."' Field, supra note 15, at 902 n.93 (citing Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62
Stat. 869, 944).
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to follow the "general" private law defined by state courts.130 Swift,
therefore, allowed federal courts to define principles of "general" private law
even if they differed from those applied by local tribunals where the federal
court sat. 3' Of course the magnitude of their common law work-product was
limited by the narrow range of federal court jurisdiction,' congressional
authority to define federal court jurisdiction,'33 and a host of self-imposed
restraints, 34 including the Supreme Court's eventual reluctance to address
matters of common law. 33 Nevertheless, the Swift Court did not find a basis
in federal statutes, constitutional mandate, or policy considerations that
required federal courts to apply the "general" common law rules derived by
their state counterparts.'
130. Swift divided state law into the categories of "general" and "local" law, and held that
federal courts were obliged to follow and apply all state statutes and "local" laws. Swift, 41 U.S.
at 18-19. In matters of "general" law, however, federal courts were not required to apply those
rules of decision announced by state courts in the jurisdiction where they sat. Id. Swift's author,
Justice Story, apparently believed that the scope of this "general" federal common law would be
very narrow. See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 762-
64 (1941). The distinction between local and general law proved quite elusive, and even nearly
100 years later, the rule of Swift was susceptible to the criticism that courts had still not developed
"a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law and that of local law."
Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
131. Allowing federal courts to chart their own course in this manner raised the obvious criti-
cism that a party could not be aware of what rules of law would be applied to her conduct until
she knew whether she was sued in federal or state court. Professor Field explains that Justice
Story
[aipparently . . . assumed that state courts generally would follow federal decisional law
announced by federal courts ... . [He] was not suggesting that states be required to
follow federal decisional law; he was relying on the persuasive force of federal decisions
on common law issues. Part of his assumption may have rested upon a conception, later
the subject of a famous criticism by [Justice] Holmes, of common law as one system of
rules, "a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within
it unless and until changed by statute."
Field, supra note 15, at 900-01 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 278 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
132. Even when federal courts enjoyed broad authority to announce principles of federal com-
mon law, the Constitution limited their jurisdiction to cases "arising under" federal law or cases
involving parties of diverse state citizenship. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 13-18. Fur-
thermore, attempts were made to preclude the "manufacture" diversity of citizenship in order to
create the basis for federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 1688-95.
133. For a discussion of congressional authority to define the jurisdiction of federal courts,
see generally MARTIN H. REDISH, TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 7-52 (2d
ed. 1990).
134. For example, federal courts continued to assiduously follow and apply each state's prop-
erty law doctrines. As the Supreme Court wrote in Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel, "even
when federal common law was in its heyday under the teachings of [Swift] an exception was
carved out for local law of real property." 429 U.S. 363, 379 (1977) (citing United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973)).
135. Field, supra note 15, at 901.
136. The Court's ruling in Swift was informed and guided by the notion that there was no
difference between state and federal courts with respect to their authority and duty to define such
common law. Thus, the Swift Court referred to "state tribunals ... called upon to perform the like
functions as ourselves." Swift, 41 U.S. at 18. The Court stated that federal courts must be free to
announce common law principles, at least in the context of what it referred to as "the general
principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence." Id. As Professor Field explains, allowing
federal courts to develop common law was viewed by some as a means of establishing national
uniformity in common law rules, especially those addressing commercial matters:
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Swift was largely a product of the "oracular" theory of judging and the
belief that the common law was a body of neutral principles that facilitated,
without defining, public and private conduct.'37 This perception of law was
an application of the nineteenth century notion that the existence of an
independent judiciary was an inherent part of our constitutional order and that
judges merely deciphered immutable legal principles to apply them to specific
cases.'38 From this perspective, common law rules lacked the imprimatur of
positive law. As discussed above, legal realists challenged the notion that
common law rules constituted inherent, transcendent, or immutable
principles.' As Professor Amar explains, "the [legal] realists had shown
that the common law of tort had to be made, not found, and ... the
Progressives and New Dealers had demonstrated that the particular choices
made by federal judges in common law tort cases were politically
controversial . ".'. .
Erie embraced one of legal realism's cardinal principles: common law
rules are positive law, just like state statutes. By itself, this may have provid-
eda sufficient basis for the Erie Court to overturn Swift.' 4' Yet Erie did not
When Justice Story, writing for the Supreme Court in [Swift v. Tyson], first announced
this system, he apparently thought it would achieve uniformity and that the system he
rejected- [federal courts] following state decisional law in diversity cases-created too
much variation by state. In practice, however, Swift did not result in uniformity. As Erie
discussed, a principal criticism of the Swift system was that under it two different sets of
rules governed primary behavior.
Field, supra note 15, at 900.
137. See supra notes 102-05. As Professor Sunstein writes, these rules were considered "pure-
ly facilitative-rather than constitutive--of private arrangements." SU'STEIN, supra note 2, at 18,
138. See supra notes 3, 12. Professor Richard E. Ellis provides helpful insights into the ori-
gins of this perception of the place of courts in the government of the United States when he
writes:
Coming as it did during the formative era of American law, the moderate triumph on the
state level in the struggle over judicial reform had far-reaching consequences. It meant,
just as it had on the national level, the establishment in many states of judiciaries which
were both bipartisan and nonpartisan.
RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC
249 (1971).
139. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
140. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARv. L. REV. 688, 695 (1989) (reviewing HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 13).
141. For the reasons discussed at supra notes 87 and 130-31, the rule of Swift had been seri-
ously questioned by the time Erie was decided. Indeed, when the Court decided Erie, federal
courts were already reducing the number of legal issues in which they failed to follow state deci-
sional law. Judge Clark, for example, referred to the Swift rule as "an ancient doctrine, already
tending towards decay and death." Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brood-
ing Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 295-96 (1946). Also, Justice Brandeis
relied on Professor Charles Warren's research concerning a former draft of the text of the Rules of
Decision Act. Professor Warren pointed out that the original directive was for courts to follow
"the Statute law of the several States in force for the time being and their unwritten and common
law now in use, whether by adoption from the common law of England, the ancient statutes of the
same, or otherwise." Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 389 (1964) (quoting Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Feder-
al Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51-52, 81-88 (1923)). By contrast, the final ver-
sion used the phrase "[t]he laws of the several States." Id. As Judge Friendly said: "Warren argued
that the abbreviation was only stylistic." Taken as a whole, the growing erosion of the Swift doc-
trine, the rise of legal realism, and Professor Warren's research may have provided a sufficient
basis for overturning Swift. There are reasons to believe that the Court did not feel comfortable
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stop at redefining the term "laws" as it was employed by the Rules of
Decision Act. Erie also addressed the federal government's role in the creation
of private law. More accurately, it is necessary to separate what Erie "says"
from what it has been taken to mean. Just as ambiguous phrases in the
Constitution provide a Rorschach test of an observer's views on
federalism,'42 the Erie decision may be interpreted from either a nationalist
or federalist perspective. From a federalist perspective, Erie was an attempt by
the Supreme Court to preclude the federal judiciary from addressing matters
constitutionally reserved to states.'43 Furthermore, federalists would argue
that Erie accomplished this objective by establishing a general prohibition on
the creation of federal common law, which would be overcome only upon
evidence that Congress intended or directed federal courts to create common
law.'"
From a nationalist perspective, Erie recognizes that although private law
is positive law, it generally addresses matters that can easily be left to
states.' 5 Further, it does no more than eradicate Swift's artificial division
between local and general common law." To bolster this claim, advocates
of this perspective point out that Erie does not even consider what areas may
basing its ruling solely on a reinterpretation of the Rules Act.
[Sitatutory reinterpretation was vulnerable on other grounds. The policy reasons the
Court saw for favoring the change were susceptible to an argument that Swift's statutory
interpretation was so established by the time of Erie that it had become part of the stat-
ute through the passage of time; any change based on statute should therefore come
from Congress, not the courts.
Field, supra note 15, at 904 (citing Friendly, supra, at 390-91). This may explain why the Erie
Court felt compelled to consider the constitutional implications of Swift's interpretation of the
Rules of Decision Act and then base at least part of its ruling on those implications.
142. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text (discussing this phenomenon).
143. Much of Erie's treatment of the constitutional basis for its ruling evidences a very nar-
row characterization of federal authority to establish private law, by either federal courts or Con-
gress. For example, the Erie Court stated that under Swift, "federal courts assumed ... the power
to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes."
Erie, 304 U.S. at 72. Erie also states: "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a state whether they be ... commercial law or a part of the law of
torts." Id. at 78.
144. For cases applying the federalist approach to common law, see supra note 134 and infra
note 161.
145. Federal court jurisdiction in Erie was based on diversity of citizenship. Erie, 304 U.S. at
71. It was not concerned with "matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Con-
gress." Id. at 78. Indeed, one commentator wrote in 1941: "It is undoubtedly the fact that even
before this decision was rendered, the federal courts generally tried to discover and apply the
common law of some particular state rather than the common law of all of the states at once. In
most cases they did not see fit to assert or apply [Justice] Story's [Swift] doctrine." Corbin, supra
note 130, at 764.
146. Viewed from this light, Justice Brandeis's famous statement, "[tihere is no general feder-
al common law," means nothing more than that there is no distinction between local law that
federal courts must follow pursuant to the Rules of Decision Act versus general private law that
federal courts may fashion. Simply eliminating this distinction does not begin to consider the
perimeters of federal court authority to establish federal common law based on some federal inter-
est. Recall that the Rules of Decision Act directs federal courts to follow state law "except where
the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide." The feder-
alist interpretation of Erie is susceptible to the criticism that it reads too much into a decision
which does not begin to consider the breadth of this important exception. See Field, supra note
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be of sufficient national concern to justify the creation of federal common
law.
47
The federalist interpretation of Erie has come to dominate
jurisprudence." Nevertheless, the nationalist perspective enjoys a number of
advocates who rely on a significant quantity of evidence favoring a narrower
interpretation of Erie. Judge Henry Friendly is one of the most articulate
proponents of the nationalist perspective. Judge Friendly points out that the
Erie Court clearly assumed that federal courts were limited in the number of
areas where they would establish common law.'49 However, Erie never
sought to define those limits; certainly Erie did not intend to establish the
sweeping limit on federal common law that the case has come to stand
for.5° The conventional federalist interpretation of Erie is a straightjacket
limiting the ability of federal courts to create federal common law, even
withinfederalized fields of law. As a result, federal courts rely primarily on
preemption to resolve almost all putative conflicts between private law and
federal statutes.' 5'
The absence of federal common law is not, however, due solely to the
dominance of the federalist interpretation of Erie. Advocates of greater federal
authority often viewed the common law as an impediment to their
objectives.'52 Rather than wait for common law to develop as they would
147. For example, on the day it ruled in Erie, the Supreme Court also handed down a deci-
sion pursuant to its original jurisdiction, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
304 U.S. 92 (1938), where it applied principles of federal common law to an interstate dispute.
This demonstrates the widespread acceptance, that some areas of law, such as interstate disputes,
are inherently federal and state law has no place within such fields except as incorporated rules of
decision. These federal "enclaves" include the enforcement of contracts with the federal govern-
ment, see, e.g., Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); international relations, see
infra notes 187-203 and accompanying text; and federal Indian law, see, e.g., Johnson v. Mc-
Intosh, 21 U.S. (I Wheat.) 543 (1823). Professor Charles F. Wilkinson describes the Supreme
Court's decision in Johnson v. McIntosh, as "true" federal common law. CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAw 142 n.29 (1987). He also argues that in the field of
Indian law, "the federal laws often hold out so little guidance that courts have been forced to look
to such diverse sources of authority that they might as well be making common law." Id. at 12.
The enclaves approach to the authority of federal courts to create federal common law is discussed
and criticized in Field, supra note 15, at 911-15. Similarly, the field of implied rights of action for
the violation of some federal rights has been largely unaffected by the federalist interpretation of
Erie. The federalization of such fields is generally, but not exclusively, constitutional in origin. Id.
148. "The 'mid-twentieth century type of federal common law' celebrated by Judge Friendly
seems rapidly headed for oblivion." Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1123 (citations omitted).
149. As Judge Friendly points out, "Erie must be appraised ... in the familiar setting of a
Congress of limited powers, with considerable areas of law-making reserved to the states."
Friendly, supra note 141, at 393-94.
150. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law
to be applied in any case is the law of the state .... There is no general federal common law."
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Professor Field persuasively argues that this portion of Erie
is highly ambiguous, and even inconsistent, in the scope it suggests for federal common
law. In large part it suggests that the courts lacked power to act simply because their
action went beyond Congress's power. There is some suggestion, though, that the judi-
ciary lacks power to make federal common law generally. No subsequent case has ex-
plicitly addressed the tension between these two standards, or otherwise delineated the
appropriate limits of federal common law.
Field, supra note 15, at 905 (emphasis in original).
151. See infra notes 229-52 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., supra note 101.
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like, they have sought to establish statutory regimes to displace what they
perceive as conservative and slowly developing common law. Often, the same
proponents of preemption then seek to employ common law to expand the
range of the legislation they favored. In many instances, however, their initial
success in superseding common law successfully "salts the field" and they are
prevented from employing common law to achieve their objectives. For
example, environmentalists were frustrated by attempts to employ common
law processes to protect the quality of natural resources.'53 They turned to
the legislative arena and obtained statutes implementing their concerns. If they
become dissatisfied with the pace of the administrative implementation of their
regulatory programs, they turned to common law litigation, 54 often only to
find their adversaries employing federal preemption to defeat their claims.' 5
On a larger scale, this is the dynamic that resulted when the New Deal
and the Erie doctrine limited the sphere of federal common law. The
proponents of the New Deal were initially ecstatic when private law was
replaced by the federal administrative state.'56 Like Mr. Roper in the
colloquy that opens this article, the New Dealers assumed that the federal
administrative state would obviate the need for private law, at least in
federalized fields of law. Soon, however, it became obvious that both federal
administrative authority and federal common law-making would be necessary
to achieve all of their objectives. By that time it was often, but not always, too
late. ' In this respect, preemption proves to be a double-edged sword: it can
eliminate troublesome pre-existing common law doctrines and rapidly thaw the
sometimes glacial process of establishing public policy through private law.
Coupled with the federalist interpretation of Erie, however, it may also
preclude judicial development of statutory themes.
153. See, e.g., Belsky, supra note 5.
154. See David R. Hodas, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common Law Citizen Suits
for Relief from Environmental Harm, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883 (1989) (arguing that private tort
actions are not inconsistent with federal and state environmental statutes).
155. See id.; see also Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that
the 1972 Clean Water Act displaces state common law). This is not the only dynamic that results
in prohibitions on federal common law. Often opponents of private law simply seize on the feder-
alist interpretation of Erie and field preemption doctrines to preclude judicial work-product. See
Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 145.
156. They opposed the entire common law system as a narrow, conservative means of influ-
encing conduct, largely by protecting individual property rights and relying on market forces. See,
e.g., supra notes 8 (discussing the shortcomings of common law) and 114 and accompanying text
(discussing the perspectives and beliefs of the New Dealers). Given the common law's association
with laissezfaire, see supra note 106, there was no apparent contradiction in making private law
the domain of state institutions (even to the point of explicitly stating that Congress was without
authority to establish private law) and simultaneously ratifying the New Deal's expansion of feder-
al authority. Stated another way, New Dealers saw the common law as a legal system that served
a narrow range of (wealth creation) objectives largely without direct regulation. By contrast, the
New Deal reformers sought to accomplish a completely different set of (social welfare) objectives,
and they had no problem providing federal entities with regulatory authority to impose these ob-
jectives. See generally Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9; supra notes 101-13 and accompanying
text.
157. In some instances, proponents of federal legislation were able to establish federal com-
mon law within the fields to act in concert with federal legislation. See, e.g., Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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The absence of federal common law in federalized fields may be traced to
overzealous attempts to establish federal legislation as the preeminent source
of public law coupled with the prevalence of an imprecise and doctrinaire-
ridden federalist interpretation of Erie. Neither of these factors provides a
legitimate basis for excluding private law from federalized fields of law,
especially where federal legislation is primarily created to establish public law
objectives. The second half of this article explores fields of law federalized by
Congress and demonstrates why private law should generally be integrated
into these fields. Before advocating the expansion of the common law powers
of federal courts, it is necessary to directly address the conventional view that
is contrary to the constitutional values of federalism and separation of powers.
D. Limits on Federal Common Law and the Presence of Private Law in
Federalized Fields of Law
Erie's legacy includes two background principles concerning federal
common law that are especially applicable to the choice between federal
common law and preemption as a means of integrating private law in
federalized fields of law. The first of these principles concerns whether
solicitude to state lawmakers requires federal judges to leave (or appear to
leave) questions of private law to state courts. The second concerns the
question of whether common law has an inherent place in our constitutional
structure.
1. Erie, Federal Common Law, and Federalism
Following Erie's lead, the Supreme Court's consideration of federal
common law authority is sensitive to the possibility that federal common law-
making may be adverse to state authority.' There is, of course, a basis for
such concerns.'59 This article points out, however, that in instances where a
court addresses the preemption of state private law, it should also consider the
possibility of incorporating state private law into a federal common law that
does not interfere with federal legislation. This fine-tuning in the exercise of
federal judicial authority can occur without allowing federal courts to engage
in what Judge Friendly referred to as a "federal [court] poaching on state
preserves. ' ' "W
Indeed, federal courts may enjoy broad common law-making authority in
federalized fields without challenging even the current Supreme Court's
restrictive characterization of federal common law authority 6' and without
158. An exception exists in fields have historically characterized as federalized. See supra
note 147 for a discussion of some of these fields.
159. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
160. Friendly, supra note 141, at 407. Judge Friendly referred to the Swift rule, discussed
supra notes 128-40, which allowed federal courts to create common law rules in areas of law
traditionally understood to be within the competence of state courts.
161. The Supreme Court's restrictive view towards the creation of federal common law is
evidenced by the following cases: Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Universities
Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
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disagreeing with the federalist interpretation of Erie. It is, however, necessary
to question whether restricting the authority of federal courts to define
common law results in greater state participation in the process of defining the
rules of decision employed by federal courts.
Erie was predicated on the assumption that most fields of law would
remain free from the influence of federal legislation.'62 As discussed above,
until the New Deal, judicial limitations and self-restraints kept federal legisla-
tion from interfering with state common law ordering.'63 To employ Judge
Friendly's analogy, although pre-New Deal Congresses did not federalize
"state preserves," Swift allowed federal courts to engage in selective
"poaching." The New Deal and Erie effected a dramatic reversal of this
situation. The Erie decision removed federal judges as a source of legal rules
that routinely displaced state common law, while the New Deal began the
federalization of many fields of laws that were historically reserved to states.
The Erie Court, however, failed to anticipate the growth of federal law as
the predominant source of law in the United States. Because courts must rely
on a unique or significant federal interest before creating federal common
law,"6 they may easily find that state private law is preempted, but they are
routinely unable to employ common law processes to create federal private
law that does not threaten federal objectives.
Allowing federal courts to develop federal common law in those instances
where state law would otherwise be preempted does not, by definition, damage
the sphere of state decisionmaking that Erie is interpreted as protecting. 65
Professor Field explains that it is generally assumed that federal common law
is adverse to state interests:
The supposition on which broad federal common lawmaking powers
are detrimental to the scope of state lawmaking authority is that
federal courts may make law more easily, and more readily, than
Congress will, at least in some situations. Indeed, every instance in
which a federal court does exercise this power to make federal
common law is by definition one in which Congress has not acted, so
(1979). For a discussion of several other methods the Supreme Court currently employs to restrict
the ability of federal courts to vindicate rights, along with a criticism of this trend, see Hon.
Stephen Reinhardt, Limiting Access to the Federal Courts: Round up the Usual Victims, 6 WHrT-
TIER L. REV. 967 (1984).
162. As Judge Friendly points out, "Erie must be appraised... in the familiar setting of a
Congress of limited powers, with considerable areas of law-making reserved to the states ......
Friendly, supra note 141, at 393-94. Judge Friendly assumed that pursuant to Erie, "state courts
must conform to federal decisions in areas where Congress ... has manifested, be it ever so light-
ly, an intention to that end." Id. at 407. (emphasis added). Clearly this is not the case. The "light
tread of Congress" may result in the preemption of state law, but rarely does it result in the cre-
ation of federal common law.
163. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 124, 161.
165. Similarly, as discussed in the next subsection, such federal lawmaking by courts is not
necessarily contrary to congressional authority, except in those rare instances where Congress's
failure to provide a specific rule was the result of its decision that a federal rule was not neces-
sary. See Field, supra note 15, at 925.
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therefore every exercise of federal common lawmaking power takes
away power from the states."
In an accompanying footnote Professor Field points out that "[s]tate power is
not reduced, however, if there would otherwise be federal preemption."' 67 In
those instances where state law would be preempted, federal common law
represents an option that can preserve principles of private law that would
otherwise be preempted.
Private law defines many of the obligations and rights of individuals in
our society."'8 Nevertheless, the principles of field preemption created to
accommodate the rise of federal administrative authority result in the
preemption of entire fields of state law whether or not Congress considered
this result. 69 Often Congressional "intent" to preempt state law is only
"found" by operation to the "background principles" discussed above. 7' As a
result, in many federalized fields, important principles of state common law
are preempted by the combined force of background principles and the as-
sumption that federal common law only advances federal interests. By
contrast, allowing federal courts to incorporate state private law would allow
these principles to continue to have force within federalized fields.
2. Erie, Federal Common Law, and Separation of Powers
The place of common law in our constitutional structure can be addressed
in terms of its implications for separation of powers. To be sure, there is no
indication that the Erie Court considered whether its decision would implicate
the status of federal courts in the constitutional structure.'' Nevertheless,
Erie's ruling that federal courts did not possess the authority to create general
federal common law coincided with rise of the federal administrative state
(with its obvious implications for judicial authority). This created the
possibility that federal courts could literally be relegated to the status of a
"less than equal" branch of the federal government.
72
More that just nostalgic adherence to Madisonian political theory would
be threatened if federal courts did not exist as a coequal branch of
government. The notion that individuals possess personal human rights and
166. Field, supra note 15, at 925-26.
167. Id. at 926 n.201. As discussed further at infra note 304, some areas of law have become
so federalized that federal courts will allow no state private law within the field. In these cases,
courts have created exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule to allow defendants to remove
proceedings from state to federal court based on the defense of "complete" preemption. Certainly
in these cases the creation of federal common law based on state private law principles does not
reduce state authority.
168. See, e.g., supra note 12.
169. See supra notes 73-100 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text; see also supra note 17.
171. Indeed, for a number of years after Erie was decided, commentators were only concerned
with the questions of federalism it raised. "Intent on meeting the Erie charge, Judge Friendly did
not adequately address the equally serious intramural question-the authority of federal courts in
relation to that of Congress." Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1224.
172. "The grant of extensive lawmaking authority to administrative bodies deprived the courts
of much of ,their established dominion, granted vast responsibilities to bureaucratic entities not
anticipated in the Constitution, and undermined the separation of powers." Id. at 1233.
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interests that can not be abrogated by the government or by private individuals
without the opportunity for private judicial redress is an important
philosophical component of our federalism.'73 This belief is at least as
important as the other "background principles" that lie at the heart of much of
the jurisprudence concerning preemption, federal common law, and other
constitutionally ambiguous matters.'74 Furthermore, the existence of a
judiciary with the authority to define, develop, and protect these interests is an
important component of our federalism.
Professors Stewart and Sunstein argue that courts, especially federal
courts, were able to preserve their place within the post-New Deal
Constitutional order by creating or expanding the following remedies: private
rights of action (actions against third parties for violating statutory rules);
private rights of initiation (actions against agencies of the federal government
for failing to exercise the full range of their authority); "new" property rights
hearings (procedural protections for recipients of social programs); and private
rights of defense (actions against federal agencies for overreaching their
constitutional and/or statutory authority). They explain that each of these
"second order" remedies "raises the same basic question of the ability and




The primary motivation, then, for creating these second order
remedies-and consequently, the focus for their justification-is the need to
preserve the values inherent in separation of powers among the branches of
the federal government.7 7 To be sure, these remedies are deeply rooted in
important Anglo-American notions of law, constitutionalism, and equity. For
example, the personal nature of some of these rights requires that the
individual must not be completely at the mercy of bureaucratic decisions over
whether and how these rights will be asserted and protected. To do otherwise,
the professors point out, would be contrary not only to (sometimes implicit)
notions of constitutional order, but also the basic premises of Anglo-American
law. As a result, one significant factor in determining whether private redress
to courts will exist concerns the particular status or type of private interest that
is implicated. For example, Stewart and Sunstein note:
When litigants seek to protect important personal liberties, such as
freedom from discrimination, courts often create both initiation rights
and rights of action. By contrast, when an agency has been granted
broad discretion in an area such as regulation of rates and competitive
practices, courts are likely to deny both private remedies.'77
Nevertheless, "institutional considerations" are the focus of judicial approach
in deciding whether to participate in policymaking through one of the second
order remedies. "' As a result, Stewart and Sunstein write that "basic
173. See supra note 12; infra note 181.
174. The nature of this ambiguity is discussed supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
175. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1198.
176. This observation is explored in greater detail infra Part lV.C.
177. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1217-18.
178. See id. These "institutional considerations" include:
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
conceptions of judicial role and institutional purpose . . . played the central
role in the development of alternative systems of public and private
enforcement."'79 Thus, although federal courts continue to recognize, allow,
and occasionally encourage private parties to bring lawsuits that concern
policy areas addressed by federal regulatory programs, it would be inaccurate
to characterize this as an attempt by federal courts to replace or integrate state
law that has been (or would be) preempted by federal programs. Instead, these
second order remedies are more accurately characterized as attempts by the
federal judiciary to counter-balance congressional and federal administrative
authority.
This article is more concerned with private law within federalized fields
of law than second order remedies created to maintain the status of the judicial
branch of government. (Although in the case of private rights of action it may
be impossible to define an exact dividing line.) Indeed, much of the
Constitutional overtones raised by second order remedies is irrelevant to the
discussion of private law within federalized fields. Professor Field points out
the creation of federal common law "cuts down on congressional power only
if congressional failure to act represents a congressional judgment that no
federal lawmaking should exist.''8 °
IV. CONTRASTING MODELS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN FEDERAL COMMON
LAW, FEDERAL PREEMPTION, AND STATE LAW
Since the rise of the federal administrative state, courts have applied three
mechanisms for integrating private law into federalized fields of law: field
preemption, allowing state law to "operate of its own force," and federalizing
state private law principles. The second half of this article considers each of
these approaches based on the criteria of separation of powers, federalism, and
the "background assumptions" they implicate.
the limited analytic and factfinding capacities of courts, the need for consistency and
coordination in enforcement, and the comparatively greater political accountability of
agencies. Courts have also given varying weights to certain regulatory goals: effective
implementation of administrative programs, compensation of those injured by statutory
violations, and the need to adjust regulatory objectives in light of implementation prob-
lems and changing public attitudes. The variations among judicial decisions during any
given period might be explained by variations in the particular regulatory programs in-
volved and in the particular beneficiary interests asserted. The differences in judicial
approach over time might be understood as a response to shifting judicial perceptions of
the weight to be accorded institutional considerations on the one hand and regulatory
objectives on the other.
Id. at 1218.
179. Id. at 1220 (emphasis added). In the creation of some private causes of action within
federalized fields of law, courts considered whether it would be more appropriate to allow state or
federal courts to define the rights of action. See infra notes 299-305 and accompanying text. Un-
fortunately this approach has not resulted in a recognition that federal courts must be the source of
federal common law in some instances.
180. Field, supra note 15, at 925.
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A. Finding a Field of Law Federalized to the Exclusion of State Law: Field
Preemption
For a number of reasons, federal courts may choose to find that a legal
question is federalized to the exclusion of state law and opt not to create
federal common law to address issues left unresolved in the statutory scheme.
Such a decision may be tailored narrowly, to address only a specific legal
question, or it may encompass a broad field. In some instances, removing state
law from a broad field of law has a constitutional basis. Such decisions are
best viewed in light of the "negative" purposes of the U.S. Constitution. The
view that the Constitution creates a number of "positive" directives to the
federal government to address matters of public policy and social concern
stands in marked contrast with some of the initial perceptions and purposes
behind the Constitution's drafting and adoption. 8 ' An important first
principle for the Constitution was the removal of state interference with
interstate commerce, foreign relations, relations with Indian nations, private
contracts, and related (generally) commercial concerns, without necessarily
creating an active federal involvement in any of these areas.'82 The body of
law known as the "dormant commerce clause,"'8 3 along with a number of
Indian law doctrines, are the most long-standing manifestations of this princi-
ple. ' 4 In such fields of law, the Constitution provides the basis for the
preemption of state law, whether or not Congress has chosen to legislate." 5
Further, in these areas, the argument that state law has a great deal to
contribute often loses much of its force.'86 For this reason, there is
181. One legal historian notes that the U.S. Constitution may be seen as a triumph of those
who wished to divest state governments, which were more susceptible to popular control, of au-
thority that could hinder commercial development: "The vulnerability of the state governments to
popular control was a principal motive behind the movement for a strong national govem-
ment .... The adoption of the Constitution, with its numerous restraints upon the political and
economic activities of the states, was an important victory of the American commercial communi-
ty." EuS, supra note 138, at 270-71.
182. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 17. In a 1967 article, Professor Hill argued that there are at
least four areas where state law is preempted by the force of the Constitution: interstate controver-
sies, admiralty cases, cases involving a proprietary interest of the United States, and international
law. Hill points out that congressional action is not required to federalize these areas of law to the
exclusion of state law. See generally Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts:
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967).
183. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (holding Iowa
statute barring use of trucks longer than 60 feet on interstate highways violative of the Commerce
Clause).
184. In the field of federal Indian law, the inherent sovereignty of tribal govemments also acts
to preempt state law. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
185. The interests of federalism make the Supreme Court decidedly reluctant to find fields of
law inherently federalized. For example, in his dissent in California Coastal Commission v. Gran-
ite Rock, 480 U.S. 572 (1987), Justice Powell argued that as a result of the Property Clause of the
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, preemption should apply with special force on public
lands. California Coastal Comm'n, 480 U.S. at 604 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Instead, the Supreme Court applied "traditional" preemption analysis to conflicts between
federal and state law concerning the public lands. See id. at 594. For a defense of this approach
with respect to public lands other than tribal lands, see Charles F. Wilkinson, Cross-Jurisdictional
Conflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State Interests on Federal and Indian Lands, 2 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 145, 153, 164 (1982) (arguing that state law should not be presumptively
preempted on federal public lands, as it should be on federal tribal lands).
186. See, e.g., the discussion of the presence of state law in the field of foreign affairs infra
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substantially less of a need for federal common law to incorporate state private
law and there may be no basis for state law operating of its own force.
By contrast, because of the importance of common law in providing
background principles, where there is no constitutional basis for such a
decision, such a barrier to state law should only be used sparingly, even within
the context of relatively comprehensive federal statutory schemes.
1. "Field Preemption" in the Constitutional Context
The Court's decision in Hines v. Davidowitz"7 provides a starting point
for this discussion. This case concerned a challenge to a Pennsylvania law
requiring aliens to register with the state and establishing penalties for failing
to do so.' The Court's decision is not grounded in either conflict or field
occupation preemption.'89 Congress had evidenced no intent to occupy this
field." The Court pointed to a number of compelling reasons to limit
federal regulation of this field to the existing federal regime. Not the least of
these reasons concerned the many reciprocal agreements with other countries
promising that any of their citizens "residing in our territory shall not be
singled out for the imposition of discriminatory burdens.""' The Court did
not address how Pennsylvania's law impinged on any particular agreement or
series of agreements. If the Court had decided this case on such "conflict"
grounds, it would have faced a plethora of challenges to state alien registration
laws." State laws struck down for their conflict would be rewritten and
challenged until the state produced a law that could pass the standard
developed by the Supreme Court. This would certainly have absorbed a large
notes 187-203 and accompanying text.
187. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
188. Hines, 312 U.S. at 59-60.
189. Indeed, after reviewing all of the tests employed to analyze preemption, the Court de-
clined to specify which it was applying. Instead, it wrote that "[iln the final analysis, there can be
no one crystal clear test distinctly marked [preemption] formula." Id. at 67.
190. Justice Stone pointed out in his dissent "that Congress was not unaware that some
nineteen states have statutes or ordinances requiring some form of registration for aliens, seven of
them dating from [World War I]." Id. at 79 (Stone, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 69.
192. At several places in its opinion, the Court refers to constitutionally questionable bills
dealing with alien registration which Congress chose not to enact. See, e.g., id. at 71. The Court
was clearly pleased that Congress chose to adopt what it termed a "middle path" and troubled that
state legislatures might fail to be similarly circumspect. By preempting state law from this field,
the Court spared federal courts from having to review the work of state legislatures that would fail
to adopt what the Court considered the appropriate "middle path." As a former elected official, the
opinion's author, Justice Hugo Black, was undoubtedly familiar with the pressure on state legisla-
tors to stray from this path. Id.
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amount of judicial time.93 In an area where state laws have little to
contribute, such an approach is appropriate.
Hines completely swept state law from any involvement in the field of
alien registration.'94 The Court held out no hope that even narrowly drafted
state laws would be exempt from this ruling. This result is entirely appropriate
because there is no need for state law to operate of its own force in this field,
nor is there any need for federal law to incorporate private law principles
within this field. To be sure, if there were some need for distinct common law
principles concerning the subject matter of this field-resident aliens-it
would be appropriate for federal courts to create such common law, perhaps
borrowing from state private law principles. In the absence of the need for a
unique federal common law in this field, broad federal preemption is
appropriate in order to remove state law and to leave the entire field to the
interaction between Congress and federal courts.'95
In Pennsylvania v. Nelson'96 the Court was faced with another situation
where failing to federalize a field of law would produce an avalanche of
conflicting state laws that federal courts would have to sort through to
determine how they could fit within a field where state law has little to
contribute in terms of background principles.'97  Specifically, Nelson
concerned one of the many state sedition laws that grew out of the period of
national hysteria commonly referred to as the "McCarthy Era." In its decision
to prevent states from enforcing laws that prohibited sedition against the
federal government, the Court pointed out:
Forty-two States plus Alaska and Hawaii have statutes which in some
form prohibit advocacy of the violent overthrow of established
government. These statutes are entitled anti-sedition statutes, criminal
anarchy laws, criminal syndicalist laws, etc. Although all of them are
primarily directed against the overthrow of the United States
Government, they are in no sense uniform. . . . Some of these Acts
193. The Supreme Court is appropriately concerned with the question of whether its decisions
will resolve legal questions in a manner that leaves lower courts with principles amenable to con-
sistent application or whether they will require lower courts to continually revisit state compliance
with federal standards. For example, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court held that
the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial magistrate to "promptly" determine whether probable
cause existed when an individual is arrested without a warrant. In County of Riverside v. Mc-
Laughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), the Court adopted a rule that assumes that such determinations
comply with Gerstein if they occur within 48 hours. In defense of this standard the Court wrote,
"[u]nfortunately, as lower court decisions applying Gerstein have demonstrated, it is not enough to
say that probable cause determinations must be 'prompt.' This vague standard simply has not
provided sufficient guidance. Instead, it has led to a flurry of systemic challenges to city and
county practices .... " McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 55-56.
194. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982).
195. Federal court participation in this field is necessary because federal courts may review
federal policies to ensure that they conform with due process and other constitutional consider-
ations.
196. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
197. The decision's failure to fit within existing preemption jurisprudence was immediately
apparent, leaving commentators with the task of attempting to define the source, scope, and justifi-
cation for the Court's decision. See, e.g., Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New
Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 209 (1959).
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are studiously drawn and purport to protect fundamental rights by
appropriate definitions, standards of proof and orderly procedures in
keeping . . . Others are vague and are almost wholly without such
safeguards. ... Should the States be permitted to exercise a
concurrent jurisdiction in this area, federal enforcement would
encounter.. . [administrative inconsistency and] the added conflict
engendered by different criteria of substantive offenses. 9
It is difficult to characterize this decision as an implementation of
congressional will. Congress was aware of the volume of existing sedition
laws. It chose to leave these laws intact."' Nevertheless, the decision may be
easily defended with reference to the same separation of powers, federalism,
and institutional dialogue arguments that justify the decision in Davidowitz.
There is widespread support for the notion that preemption analysis should
favor the unimpeded application of federal law within those fields of law that
are specifically committed to the federal government by the Constitution."
Indeed, even commentators who argue that the Supreme Court has been too
"eager" in its assistance of congressional domination of the policymaking
process,2"' argue that the current approach to preemption "has prompted
courts to give too little preemptive effect to the most important federal inter-
ests"2"2 Furthermore, the notion that some matters of public policy are
uniquely federal comports with the historical notion that the federal govern-
ment has limited powers and the concomitant view that all other areas of
public policy are reserved to the states.2"3
2. "Field Preemption" of State Private Law by Federal Statutes
As described in the first half of this article, the preemption analysis
accompanying the rise of federal administrative authority allowed courts to
remove competing state regulatory regimes from those fields federalized by
congressional programs.2 Federal courts were also faced with state common
law within these federalized fields. By revealing the regulatory nature of state
common law, the legal realists provided one basis for the removal of state
common law.20 5 Yet common law serves a number of purposes in addition to
its regulatory role."3 As a result, it is rarely appropriate to completely
198. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1956).
199. "Congress has not, in any of its statutes relating to sedition, specifically barred the exer-
cise of state power to punish the same Acts under state law." Id. at 512 (Reed, J., dissenting).
200. See generally Hill, supra note 182.
201. Wolfson, supra note 14, at 112.
202. Id. at 103 (referring to DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), which upheld a state law
forbidding the employment of illegal aliens).
203. While this principle was unanimously recognized in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Tran-
sit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), there was significant disagreement among the members of the
Court over the role of the federal judiciary in preserving the sovereign fights of states. Id. at 580
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
204. See supra Part II.B.
205. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
206. For example, Professor Steven Smith persuasively argues that private tort law not only
compensates victims, deters certain conduct, and punishes tortfeasors, but also serves to "reaff-
irm[] those [social] norms that make rational society possible." Steven D. Smith, The Critics and
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eliminate common law from federalized fields, even where federal statutes are
relatively comprehensive.2"'
Where Congress does not consider or explicitly address questions of
private law within federal statutory schemes, courts are unable to trace
preemption decisions to congressional intent.2 8 Evidence of congressional
intent is, of course, not necessary where there is a direct conflict between state
and federal laws.2" Such "direct" conflict, however, is most common where
state legislation creates a competing regulatory regime. When courts are
presented with the hypothetical or attenuated impact of state common law on
federal policies, they must often rely on their own background assumptions to
determine whether there is an adequate basis for preemption."'
The application of background assumptions to preemption analysis and
similar constitutionally ambiguous matters is an inherent and, at least for that
reason, a legitimate exercise of judicial authority. 2" ' Dramatic swings in
preemption analysis occur, however, when these assumptions are applied
within the context of choosing between allowing state law to "operate of its
own force" or completely preempting state private law principles. Jurists that
tend to favor state authority allow state law to operate of its own force,
notwithstanding the impact of this law on federal policies. 22 By contrast,
courts that favor federal authority preempt state law based on the mere
possibility that it will interfere with federal objectives. 3 As a result of this
dynamic, general trends in preemption analysis are discemable, but do not
provide principled guidance for practitioners, courts, commentators, or Con-
gress."4 By choosing between preemption and allowing state law to operate
of its own force, preemption decisions often go too far-when they preempt
state laws based on a mere possibility that they might interfere with federal
policies--or not far enough-where they allow some interference with federal
objectives. Even where state private law seeks to regulate conduct, there is
still a basis for preserving state common law to the extent that some aspects of
the "Crisis": A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 765, 781
(1987). In this respect, Professor Smith shows that tort law not only punishes tortfeasors, but it
also allows society to close ranks with and support those who are harmed when social norms are
violated.
207. "Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised if a legislature attempted to abol-
ish certain categories of common-law rights in some general way." Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 93-94
(Marshall, J., concurring).
208. See supra note 17.
209. The Supremacy Clause has historically been interpreted as preempting at least those state
laws that directly conflict with federal statutes. See, e.g., supra note 66 and accompanying text.
210. The influence of background assumptions in the preemption context is demonstrated by
the Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of state laws limiting the driving privileges of federal-
ly discharged bankrupts who have not compensated the victims of their tortuous conduct. Com-
pare Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, Fin. Responsibility Div., 369 U.S. 153 (1962) (find-
ing that operation of the state's financial responsibility law is not preempted by federal bankruptcy
act) with Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (finding operation of the state's financial re-
sponsibility law preempted by federal bankruptcy act).
211. For a discussion of the pervasive influence of background principles, see supra notes 32-
61 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., infra note 240 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., supra note 94 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., supra note 24.
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the law may be separated and preserved. For example, one of the most
important functions served by state common law-which is rarely addressed
by federal regulatory regimes-concerns the compensation of victims of torts
committed by the entities regulated by federal law.215
The Supreme Court generally employs federal preemption to determine
whether and to what extent state private law may exist within federalized
fields.2 6 Also, the Court often seeks to rely on congressional intent to
determine whether state law is preempted. The resulting jurisprudence often
fails to implement congressional intent because there is rarely any "intent" to
implement.2 7 Where the Court does find that state law is preempted, the
result is often at odds with the long-standing principle that courts will provide
a remedy to redress wrongs and for asserting legal rights."' Finally, where
state law is allowed to "operate of its own force," there is often a question of
the extent to which state law may be applied independent of federal objectives.
This subsection addresses preemption decisions that preempt too great an area
through the use of field preemption or related doctrines. The following
subsection looks at instances where courts appear to allow state laws to
operate of their own force in federalized fields. Part IV.C. then provides
examples of instances where private law has been federalized.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is a case study in the
characterization of New Deal legislation as an attempt to replace common law
ordering with federal regulatory authority.2 9
The course of events that eventuated in the enactment of a
comprehensive national labor law, entrusted for its administration and
development to a centralized, expert agency was the perceived
incapacity of common law courts and state legislatures, acting alone,
to provide an informed and coherent basis for stabilizing labor
relations conflict ....
Without question, Congress federalized the field. Congress did not address the
place of private law within this federalized field.22' The NLRA establishes a
procedure for the negotiation of contracts between union and management
representatives. In order to ensure the consistent interpretation of such
contracts, eliminate common law doctrines that would frustrate federal
objectives, and based on the putative intent of Congress, the Supreme Court
directed courts to create a federal common law for the interpretation of these
215. This is true of the federal programs discussed infra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., infra notes 229-72 (discussing unfair labor practices and cigarette warning
labels).
21' 7. See supra note 17 (quoting Solicitor General Cox).
218. See supra notes 12 and 180 and accompanying text (discussing the principle that private
law will provide such remedies).
219. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
220. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274, 286 (1971).
221. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). As Justice
Frankfurter wrote with respect to federally defined unfair labor practices, "[mI]any of these prob-
lems probably could have not been ... foreseen by the Congress. Others were only dimly per-
ceived and their precise scope only vaguely defined." Id. at 240.
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contracts.222 State courts possess concurrent jurisdiction to interpret and
enforce these contracts." 3 They must apply the same federal common law of
federal labor relations created by federal courts.22 4
The NLRA precludes the use of "unfair labor practices" by unions to
increase membership or by management to prevent the creation or expansion
of unions.225 Many principles of state private law were found to address
matters within the fields of unfair labor practices. In some instances, state laws
were fashioned to address the same concerns that induced Congress to prohibit
unfair labor practices. 226 Even where these state laws sought to accomplish
the same objective as their federal counterparts, they were often preempted
from the field because they constituted competing regulatory regimes. In other
instances, individuals sought judicial enforcement of private rights to either
advance their cause in a labor dispute or in an attempt to assert the private
interests protected by private law doctrines. Where states constructed
analogous regulatory regimes, courts could easily employ the preemption
principles developed to ensure that state regulation would not interfere with
federal primacy.227 Cases involving private law have proved more problemat-
ic.
Instances where individuals assert private rights within federalized fields
are problematic because private law generally serves both a regulatory or
public law purpose as well classical private law objectives. 2 When a court's
approach to this quandary goes no further than determining whether state law
should be preempted, it essentially chooses between retaining the private law
principles inherent in state law, notwithstanding the impact they may have on
federal regulation, or preempting state law and thereby eliminating private law
principles that Congress may have never intended or considered disrupting. To
be sure, in instances where there is a direct conflict between state and federal
laws, reference to congressional intent is unnecessary. Where the impact is
more attenuated, however, this approach requires courts to either err on the
side of preserving state law or federal authority. Such a choice will certainly
be resolved with reference to the background assumptions discussed above.
Rather than approaching this choice purely as a question of preemption,
courts could determine which elements of private law are appropriately
preempted and which can be retained without interfering with federal
objectives or how state private law could be applied with sensitivity to federal
objectives. The result would be a distinct federal common law applying private
law in a manner sensitive to federal labor policy.
222. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
223. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08 (1962).
224. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
225. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). The original LMRA prohibited unfair labor practices by the
management of businesses engaged in interstate commerce. The Act was amended in 1947 to
prohibit specified practices of labor unions. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-196 (1994)).
226. See, e.g., the state statute under consideration infra notes 229-37.
227. See id.
228. See Smith, supra note 206, at 779-83.
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Rather than utilizing a common law methodology, the Supreme Court
employed preemption to determine whether certain categories of state law
would be preempted within the field. This meant that some claims based on
state private law were precluded because of the mere possibility that state law
might interfere with federal objectives. By contrast, relying on federal
common law provided an alternative that would have preserved such claims
without unduly interfering with federal objectives.
Garner v. Teamsters229 and San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon [hereinafter Garmon 11]" are lodestar cases on the integration of
state private law within federalized fields. In these cases the Supreme Court
chose to employ field preemption rather than federal common law methods for
integrating state law. In Garner, the Supreme Court recognized that valuable
reasons exist for distinguishing between public and private law. The Court
considered whether this distinction could be the basis for preserving some
state law within federalized fields. At issue was whether state laws and institu-
tions could address matters that might constitute "unfair labor practices." The
Court noted that the legislative discussion of the NLRA emphasized the
Board's responsibility to "act[] in the public interest and not in vindication of
purely private rights .... " The Court conceded that public rights are "so
distinct and dissimilar from the private right that federal occupancy of one
field does not bar the state from continuing to exercise its conventional equity
powers over the other."23' Yet the Court stated:
such distinction between public and private law is less sharp and
significant in this country, where one system of law courts applies
both, than in the Continental practice which administers public law
through a system of courts separate from that which deals with
private law questions. Perhaps in this country the most usual
differentiation is between the legal rights or duties enforced through
the administrative process and those left to enforcement on private
initiative in the law courts.232
The Garner Court recognizes that there is no obvious functional or
institutional distinction between public and private law. Often a single private
law principle simultaneously serves both public purposes by, for example,
encouraging the use of resources, and private objectives, such as protecting a
single individual's claim to those resources.233
Because state law often serves both private and public law objectives,
courts should be sensitive to the possibility that private law aspects may be
salvaged, even if regulatory aspects must be preempted. Under a common law
approach, a court would employ this analysis to determine which regulatory
elements of state law are preempted by the federal scheme and which private
229. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
230. 359 U.S. 236 (1959) [hereinafter Garmon 11].
231. See Garner, 346 U.S. at 492-93.
232. Id. at 495-96 (citing W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 345 (2d ed. 1949) and RIGHT HON.
SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, BART., A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 95-98 (6th ed. 1929)).
233. See HURST, CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM, supra note 106.
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law elements can be retained. In Garner, however, "neither the statutory
language nor the opinion of the [state] Supreme Court warranted a conclusion
that the [state] statute protected private rights" '234 The state statute plainly
constituted a competing state regulatory regime and not a private law measure.
The state law at issue in Garner raised no question of how state private
law principles were to be integrated within a federalized field.235
Nevertheless, the Garner Court waxed philosophical on the proper relationship
between state private law and federal public law,"' writing that the NLRA,
like other federal law, "has largely developed and expanded as public law"
and that such public law was created to "substitut[e] federal statute law ap-
plied by administrative procedures in the public interest in the place of indi-
vidual suits in courts to enforce common-law doctrines of private right...
[even in instances where an] Act did not expressly abolish the pre-existing
private rights." '237
Six years later, in Garmon 11,238 the Supreme Court continued wrestling
with the question of what methods and principles were appropriately employed
to determine the proper spheres of federal and state authority in this field. In a
thoughtful opinion, Justice Felix Frankfurter acknowledged that those areas
"withdrawn from state power are not susceptible of delimitation by fixed
metes and bounds. 239 The Court's approach, however, was not to address
state private law as if it contained elements of both private and public law.
Instead, the Court treated all state law as public law and divided the field of
unfair labor practices between those areas that could be addressed by both
state and federal law and those regulated solely by federal law. As a result, in
those areas where state law was allowed to operate, its regulatory objectives
were given force notwithstanding any inconsistency with federal policies.
Conversely, state law was preempted even where it might not interfere with
federal law, simply because the area was deemed to be exclusively federal.
State law was excluded even though its private law functions might have been
integrated into the field with or without modification.
From its very inception, the problems with this "all or nothing" approach
were apparent. First, the Supreme' Court left states free to apply tort law
within the field of unfair labor practices "to grant compensation for the
consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by
violence and imminent threats to the public order."2"
234. Garner, 346 U.S. at 497.
235. See id. at 487-91. Furthermore, the Court assumed that the NLRB possessed jurisdiction
over the controversy and that the NLRB would exercise that jurisdiction if it were properly in-
voked. The need to integrate state law was not present in that case for any reason. Id.
236. See id. at 496-99. Indeed, the Court's decision in Garner contains a number of axiomatic
statements regarding the preemption of private causes of action that interfere with federal prog-
rams. There is, of course, no question that state laws must give way when they conflict with fed-
eral policies. Id.
237. Id. at 496-97 (referring to the Interstate Commerce Act). This statement recognizes that
questions of preemption can not be resolved solely upon express congressional statements. Instead,
recourse must be made to the background principles previously discussed. See supra Part l1.A.
238. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
239. Garmon II, 359 U.S. at 240.
240. Id. at 247. The Court justified this ruling "because the compelling state interest, in the
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Having completely opened the gates to these suits, however, the Court
precluded suits based upon any other common law doctrine. The Court readily
conceded that this approach would often prove overly-broad. "It may be that
an award of damages in a particular situation will not, in fact, conflict with the
active assertion of federal authority."24 Significantly, the Court also con-
ceded that there was no statutory basis for allowing all of one type of (tort)
claim, while preempting all other private law causes of action. Four members
of the Court wrote separately to point out that it was more appropriate to
allow private law claims for actions that Congress deemed "unprotected" and
to preempt only those involving protected actions as defined by the
NLRA.242
In Garmon 11 the Supreme Court characterized most state causes of action
for damages as preempted forms of regulation. 43 In Garmon 11, the Court
chose not to distinguish between those elements of state common law that
could be retained by common law methods and those that had to be
preempted. Instead, the Court determined that state and federal laws
concerning the same conduct, even for different purposes, presented too much
risk of conflict.2" As a result, even those elements of state common law that
might have been integrated into the federal scheme were preempted. The Court
wrote that its "governing consideration is that to allow States to control
activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a
danger of conflict with national labor policy.,
245
In the context of unfair labor practices, the Court asserted that in the
absence of explicit congressional guidance concerning preemption, some rule
capable of relatively simple application was required. In Amalgamated
Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge,24 Justice Harlan addressed the choices available to the Court.
The precise extent to which state law must be displaced to achieve
those unifying ends sought by the national legislature has never been
determined by the Congress. This has, quite frankly, left the Court
with few available options. We cannot declare pre-empted all local
regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex
interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions,
obviously much of this is left to the States. Nor can we proceed on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether each particular final judicial
scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence
of clearly expressed congressional direction." Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court has evinced a
reluctance to recognize that state criminal law is preempted. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546 (1973) (holding that the state "record piracy" law was not preempted by federal copy-
right law); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) (holding that a state criminal law was not
preempted by the existence of federal law, even though the federal law defined its penalty as the
"maximum" and the state statute provided for a more severe penalty).
241. Garmon II, 359 U.S. at 247.
242. Id. at 250-51 (Harlan, Clark, Whittaker, and Stewart, J.J., concurring).
243. See id. at 239 (characterizing the Court's decision as such a choice).
244. Id. at 242-43.
245. Id. at 246.
246. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
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pronouncement does or might reasonably be thought to, conflict in
some relevant manner with federal labor policy. This court is
illequipped to play such a role and the federal system dictates that
this problem be solved with a rule capable of relatively easy
application, so that lower courts may largely police themselves in this
regard.247
In application, Justice Harlan's approach was to assume that any legal question
that might address a concern within this area of federal labor law would be
contrary to federal labor policy. As a result, much of the state law that might
"touch or concern" labor relations was indeed preempted. For example,
Lockridge concerned a former union member's claim against a union for
revoking his membership in a manner that violated the express terms of the
union's bylaws. His claim was based on state contract and tort law. It was
possible for a court to recognize Mr. Lockridge's claim based on state tort law
without interfering with federal labor relations law."' State law was
preempted without a clear showing that it posed such a threat to federal
objectives or an attempt to apply common law processes to preserve the basic
private law interest at stake. Furthermore, there is much evidence to contradict
Justice Harlan's view that preemption-based jurisprudence is easier to apply
than the other option addressed by the Court's decision: a "federalized judicial
system."249 Three leading figures in federal labor law write that "[n]o legal
issue in the field of collective bargaining has been presented to the Supreme
Court more frequently in the past thirty years than that of preemption of state
law, and perhaps no other legal issue has been left in quite as much
confusion."25
One explanation for the Court's failure to give greater weight to the
possibility that federal common law could be employed to preserve state
private law was a preoccupation with the need to minimize state interference
with new federal regulatory entities. This was certainly the justification most
commonly employed by the Court.' Another explanation lies in the
assumption, frequently traced to Erie, that by precluding federal courts from
creating federal common law, state courts will enjoy a greater scope of
authority.252 Yet these principles do not inexorably lead to the conclusion
that broad field preemption, rather than the creation of federal common law,
should be a predominant mechanism for the integration of state law in federal-
ized fields of law. As noted above, federal common law is not necessarily
antagonistic to federal administrative authority. Also, where state law is
247. Lockridge, 403 U.S. at 289-90.
248. See id. at 321-22 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 413 to illustrate Congress's
instruction that "fnlothing contained in this title shall limit the rights and remedies of any member
of a labor organization under State or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal, or under
the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization"). Justice White noted that, "far from pre-
empting state law, one of the major thrusts of the LMRDA was to enforce state rights and reme-
dies." Id. at 323.
249. Id. at 288.
250. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 895 (10th ed. 1986).
251. See, e.g., Garmon H, 359 U.S. at 241-44.
252. See supra notes 158-70 and accompanying text.
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preempted, the creation of federal common law does not intrude into an area
where state law would otherwise apply. Nevertheless, the Garmon 1I
characterization of state common law as nothing more than a means of state
regulation still prevails.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.253 is a recent example of the Supreme
Court's attempt to "integrate" state private law within a federalized field using
preemption. The case involves state common law tort claims against a
cigarette manufacturer brought by the estate of a woman who died of lung
cancer.254 The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether and to what
extent the plaintiff's claims were preempted by federal laws enacted in 1965
and 1969 to address cigarette warning labels and advertising. Specifically, the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 ("The 1965 Act")
"mandated warnings on cigarette packages, but barred the [Federal Trade
Commission's] requirement of such warnings in cigarette advertising." '255 The
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 ("The 1969 Act") "strengthened
the warning label, in part by requiring a statement that cigarette smoking 'is
dangerous' rather than it 'may be hazardous.' Second, the 1969 Act banned
cigarette advertising in 'any medium of electronic communication subject to
[FCC] jurisdiction.""56
The defendant asserted that the plaintiff's tort claims based on the state
common law principles of failure to warn, violation of an express warranty,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to defraud, were all preempted by
the 1965 and 1969 Acts, which sought, among other things, to "protect[] the
national economy from the burden imposed by diverse, nonuniform and
confusing cigarette, labeling and advertising regulations." '257 Even though
both statutes explicitly address preemption, the Supreme Court failed to
produce a majority opinion with respect to the preemption of state common
law by the 1969 Act.25
The entire Court agreed that both federal Acts preempt "direct" state
regulation of cigarette advertising and warning labels.259 Seven members of
253. 500 U.S. 504 (1992).
254. Cipollone, 500 U.S. at 509 (noting that Mrs. Cipollone, the original plaintiff, died during
the litigation).
255. Id. at 514 (citing the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat. 282 (1965)).
256. Id. at 515 (citing the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222,
§ 5(b), 84 Stat. 87 (1969)).
257. Id. at 519 (citing the 1965 Act's statement of purpose).
258. Id. at 507. Those portions of Justice Stevens's opinion holding that the 1965 Act did not
preempt state tort law were joined by Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter. See id. at 508-31. However, Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter dissented from the
plurality holding that the 1969 Act preempted some principles of state common law. See id. at
531-44. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented entirely. In their view, both the 1965 and 1969 Acts
preempted the state common law claims at issue. See id. at 544-56.
259. See id. at 508-56. Two Justices found this objective in both the 1965 and 1969 Acts and
found that it applied to both "direct" state regulatory law and to state common law; four Justices
found this with respect to both Acts as they applied to "direct" state regulation and the 1969 Act
as it applied to specific principles of state common law; and three Justices found this with respect
to both Acts as applied to "direct" state regulation, but that neither Act preempted the state com-
mon law principles under review in the suit.
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the Court agreed that the following provision in the 1965 Act worked no
preemption of the plaintiff's state common law claims: "No statement relating
to smoking and health or other than the statement required by ... this Act,
shall be required on any cigarette package [and n]o statement relating to
smoking and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes...
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act."2" In addressing
whether the application of state common law should be preempted as a form
of state "regulation," the Court wrote:
[T]hese provisions merely prohibit state and federal rule-making
bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements ... [and] this
reading is appropriate for several reasons. First .... we must construe
these provisions in light of the presumption against pre-emption of
state police power regulations.... Second, the warning required in
[the 1965 Act] ... does not by its own effect foreclose additional
obligations imposed under state law. That Congress requires a
particular warning label does not automatically pre-empt a regulatory
field. Third, there is no general, inherent conflict between federal
preemption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality
of state common law damage actions."'
The seven Justices who agreed that neither this language nor the operation
of the 1965 Act necessitated the preemption of state common law split
fourthree on the question of whether the 1969 Act sufficiently broadened the
preemptive effect of federal law to result in the preemption of the state
common law doctrines in question. The plurality of four justices wrote that
"the [1969 Act] bars not simply 'statements' but rather 'requirement[s] or
prohibition[s] ... imposed under state law ... [and also] reaches beyond
statements 'in the advertising' to obligations 'with respect to the advertising or
promotion' of cigarettes. 2 62 As a result, the plurality found that the
plaintiff's claims with respect to failure to warn (arising out of notice of health
consequences) and fraudulent misrepresentation (arising out of alleged
attempts to neutralize the federal warnings) were preempted, whereas those
claims based on failure to warn (arising out of testing, research, and sales),
express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation (arising out of alleged failure to
act on medical and scientific information), and alleged conspiracy to defraud
were not preempted.
The four-three split focused on whether the 1969 Act preempted certain
state private causes of action. Relying on Garmon H, the plurality noted that
"[t]he obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a
potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy. 2 63 Based on this
characterization of private law, the plurality determined that all state common
law claims accruing after the effective date of the 1969 Act were preempted if
260. Id. at 514.
261. Id. at 518.
262. Id. at 520.
263. Id. at 521 (quoting Garmon H, 359 U.S. at 247).
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they concerned a "requirement or prohibition ... with respect to...
advertising or promotion [of cigarettes] ' 264
Recognizing that Congress wishes to prevent inconsistent regulation does
not mean that all state law must be preempted. Indeed, the plurality recognized
that private law implicates not only the question of how people will be
warned, but whether the individuals who have been warned will be
compensated when they incur a loss.2 65 With respect to the 1969 Act,
however, the plurality approach sweeps the compensatory element of private
tort law from the field without allowing for the possibility that a claim can be
made out under state law without raising the "ceiling" of federal regulation or
changing the conduct of potentially liable parties.2"
Nothing in the 1969 Act indicates that Congress was concerned with the
compensatory function of state tort law. Therefore, ascribing a particular intent
to Congress in this regard is incorrect.267 The plurality in Cipollone
determined that preemption was appropriate pursuant to the 1969 Act by
applying background principles which "err on the side of' preserving federal
law.2" Because this opinion simply relies on the background assumptions ap-
plied by certain members of the Court to a general preemption clause, it pro-
vides little guidance, if any, to courts trying to apply its analysis to the tort
laws of other states or to other preemption questions."
It is not surprising that courts will often have little explicit congressional
language to guide them as they decide how to integrate private law into
federalized fields of law. As one commentator notes:
When Congress does focus attention on the relation of its acts to state
laws dealing with the same subject matter, it looks to certain existing
264. Id. at 524 (quoting the 1969 Act).
265. The plurality recognized this when it wrote, "there is no general, inherent conflict be-
tween federal pre-emption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state com-
mon law damages actions." Cipollone, 500 U.S. at 518 (citing the Comprehensive Smokeless
Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-252, § 5(b), 100 Stat. 30 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1994))). Furthermore, as Justice Blackmun pointed out, "the question whe-
ther common-law damages actions exert a regulatory effect on manufacturers analogous to positive
enactments-an assumption crucial to the Court's conclusion ... is significantly more complicat-
ed than the Court's brief quotation from [Garmon II] would suggest." Id. at 543 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
266. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his concurring and dissenting opinion, the plurality
treatment of the Smokeless Tobacco Act of 1986 demonstrates that these positions are not at all
incompatible. Id. at 543.
267. The plurality asserted that its consideration of preemption could be resolved solely based
on the congressional intent concerning preemption as explicitly expressed in the 1965 and 1969
Acts. Id.
268. 1 reach this conclusion because both the plurality and the two Justices who joined Justice
Blackmun's concurrence and dissent found that the preemptive scope of the 1965 and 1969 Acts
could be ascertained by their express language. Obviously background principles and legal predis-
positions were applied to reach these opposite results while purporting to rely solely on the same
provisions.
269. Despite their significant differences with respect to the preemption questions raised by
the 1965 and 1969 Acts, the concurring and dissenting opinions agreed on the difficulties lower
courts will face in their attempts to follow the plurality's opinion. Justice Scalia wrote: "Like
Justice Blackmun, 'I can only speculate as to the difficulty lower courts will encounter in attempt-
ing to implement [today's] decision."' Cipollone, 500 U.S. at 555 (quoting Blackmun's dissent at
543-44).
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state laws. It is grotesquely unrealistic to suppose that Congress, in
expressing a general intent to save or to preempt state laws, actively
considered all possible state enactments touching the field of the
federal law. Indeed, Congress probably expressed such an intent
without a comprehensive survey of existing state laws tangentially
affecting the field of federal law, and for good reason. Many potential
relationships between state and federal laws are unforeseeable at the
time the federal act was adopted. The speculative nature of attempting
to anticipate conflicts and difficulties in the prospective operation of a
proposed law has long been recognized by the Court as a reason for
avoiding advisory opinions; the same problems of speculation
confront Congress in providing for preemption of state laws.27
The Cipollone case shows the flaws inherent in the position that courts should
rely solely on "congressional intent" as the basis for analyzing preemption.
The Court ignores the fact that when the 1965 and 1969 Acts became federal
law, private law claims against cigarette manufacturers could not succeed."'
In this situation, determining the preemptive scope intended by Congress is an
entirely contrived exercise. This is not to say that Congress should not address
the question of preemption. Congress has an obvious incentive to make its
views on preemption as clear as possible: this is the best means available to it
to ensure that courts approach questions of preemption with some knowledge
of what Congress intended at the time federal law was enacted.272 When the
1969 Act was enacted, successful suits against tobacco companies were more
than twenty years and a number of developments in tort law in the future.
Because courts will address questions of preemption that were unforeseeable
when federal law was adopted, courts must rely on background assumptions.
By limiting their choices to preempting a common law principle completely or
allowing it to operate within the federalized field, however, courts often err on
the side of eliminating important principles of common law from such fields,
based primarily on the force of background principles, rather than a principled
consideration of whether elements of state private law should be retained
within the federal scheme. This approach to preemption gives greater credence
to the "background assumptions" a judge brings to a case than her reasoned
consideration of whether some aspects of state law can be retained within the
federalized field.
To be sure, there are those who defend the current "dichotomy" approach
to preemption. Its defenders might argue that allowing courts to define unique
270. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 LAw F. 515, 543 (1972).
271. "During the 'first wave' of tobacco litigation [1950s and 1960s], the defendants usually
prevailed because courts and juries felt that the link between smoking and disease was not so
solidly established that the defendants should have known of the danger. Defendants used as-
sumption of risk as a secondary defense." Note, Cipollone v. Ligett Group, Inc.: Supreme Court
Takes Middle Ground in Cigarette Litigation, 67 TuL. L. REV. 787, 802 (1993). Indeed, courts
imposed both of these theories in the same cases, despite the conflict in absolving cigarette manu-
facturers because the dangers of smoking were unknown and simultaneously imposing partial
responsibility on smokers because they assumed the risks inherent in smoking. Id. at 799.
272. If a Congress does not act with sufficient clarity, the best it can hope for is that subse-
quent Congresses will enact new laws to implement its intent.
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federal common law within federalized fields would expand the powers of
federal courts, often at the expense of state lawmakers. As discussed above,
this argument has little force in instances where state law would otherwise be
preempted."' A review of preemption decisions, however, reveals instances
where a court assumed that it was confronted with a choice between
preempting state law or allowing it to operate within the federalized field.274
In some of these instances, the court chose to leave state law undisturbed. 75
There is force to the argument that the Court may not have allowed state law
to remain undisturbed if it believed that it possessed the option of creating
federal common law. Some might argue that this margin of cases justifies the
restrictive approach toward federal common law because it provides the
greatest opportunity for state private law to provide the rule of decision
applied by either federal or state courts. The next section explores situations
where it appears that state law is allowed to "operate of its own force."
B. The Illusion of State Law "Operating of its Own Force" in Highly
Federalized Fields of Law
Federal common law provides one means for preserving the general thrust
of state private laws within highly federalized fields of law. One response to
this proposal is the argument that it is more deferential to states to allow state
law to operate "of its own force" within federalized fields. The Burger Court
preemption decisions of the early 1 970s often recognized that state laws within
federalized fields should not be presumed to interfere with federal
programs.276 Some suggested that these decisions constitute a "mid-course"
correction in preemption jurisprudence or an attempt to restore "balance" to
preemption analysis that is too solicitous to federal interests.277
Understandably, the preservation of state law in federalized fields is more
common when the "preserved" state law is private law, such as a private cause
of action, rather than a form of state regulation.27 It would, however, be
incorrect to assert that state law operates without regard to federal objectives
in federalized fields. Such state law is to a greater or lessor degree federalized
273. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
274. I agree with Professor Field's view that the current "restraint" on the creation of federal
common law is self-imposed. Cf. supra note 146. Thus, courts are precluded from making com-
mon law based largely on whether they believe a common law rule is necessary and appropriate
and whether they believe that their decision might be overturned.
275. See, e.g., the cases discussed infra note 276.
276. See, e.g.. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (denying facial challenge to state law
making it illegal to hire illegal aliens); New York Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,
413, 417, 422 (1973) (finding no preemption of a state statute terminating federal public assistance
of "employable" persons). This trend is discussed in The Law of Preemption, supra note 23.
277. See, e.g., Robert S. Catz & Howard B. Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal Pre-
emption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1977) (noting that recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court regarding problems of federal preemption have sought to balance state and federal
interests); The Law of Preemption, supra note 23.
278. Compare the cases cited supra note 276, with Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151
(1978) (finding that state regulation of oil tanker construction preempted), and Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (finding state regulation of airport traffic preempt-
ed).
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because it is retained only up to the point where it interferes with federal
objectives. Therefore, courts must apply this private law with sensitivity to
federal policies. Some might argue that if this state law "operates of its own
force," it is modified to serve (or at least not interfere with) federal programs.
In some instances, this is carried so far that it is not clear whether state law is
operating of its own force or has been integrated into federal law.
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,279 the Supreme Court considered
whether federal laws regulating the nuclear energy industry preempted a tort
claim by the estate of a nuclear energy worker who was exposed to nuclear
materials. As the Court noted, the legislative history of the pertinent federal
legislation contained "ample evidence that Congress had no intention of
forbidding the State to provide such remedies.""28 The Court also wrote that
"[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all
means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct." '28 While this
approach is arguably deferential to state law, it would not be accurate to
describe the preserved state laws as "operating of their own force." The Court
also stated:
We do not suggest that there could never be an instance in which the
federal law would pre-empt the recovery of damages based on state
law. But insofar as damages for radiation injuries are concerned,
preemption should not be judged on the basis that the Federal
Government has so completely occupied the field of safety that state
remedies are foreclosed but on whether there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the federal and state standards or whether the
imposition of a state standard in a damages action would frustrate the
objectives of the federal law. We perceive no such conflict or
frustration in the circumstances of this case.282
State law therefore still retains force in this highly federalized field, but only
to the extent that it stays within unspecified parameters. As a result, a court
applying state tort law is put on notice that application of its laws in a manner
that "would frustrate the objectives of federal law" will result in an
invalidation of its decision. Certainly this is preferable to preempting state law
based on the possibility that it will interfere with federal objectives. At the
same time, it goes too far to characterize such law as "operating of its own
force." Such state law must be applied with a sensitivity to federal objectives.
For that reason, a state court (or federal court in a diversity case) will
presumably develop specialized principles of law to be applied in this field. To
be sure, such covert federalization of state law adopts much of the substance
of this article's proposal. There are several advantages to a policy of explicitly
identifying the "uniquely federalized" aspects of such state private law. Most
importantly, it will ensure that modified private law principles are not
mistaken for private law principles developed without regard to federal
279. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
280. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
281. Id. (citing United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1954)).
282. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
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objectives. In short, even though Silkwood leaves states free to apply their own
law to these cases, they (or federal courts applying such state law) must create
a specialized type of law in such federalized fields in order to prevent
interference with federal objectives.
In fields of law heavily influenced by federal laws, whatever state law
courts allow to remain will inevitably become federalized. Indeed, it is
sometimes difficult to 'determine whether state law is fulfilling an independent
purpose or only fulfilling federal purposes. "When the Supreme Court decides
to let state law operate [of its own force], it often does not indicate whether
state law is operating of its own force or because it adequately serves federal
purposes.,
28 3
C. Federalizing State Law through the Creation of Private Causes of Action
To the extent that the current approach to preemption precludes state
common law from addressing questions of private law within federalized
fields, federal courts must be free to fashion common law, or the field of law
will be devoid of private law. Through the creation of private causes of action,
federal courts eliminate many of the tensions that result from preemption that
prevents state private law from filling gaps within federal regulatory programs.
Specifically, the Warren and early Burger Courts' jurisprudence on the
question of whether federal courts should recognize "implied rights of
action '2 84 based on federal statutes, effectively federalized principles of
private law that are generally embodied in state common law, thereby
preventing gaps in federalized fields of law, without endangering federal
regulatory regimes.285 However, the Supreme Court has generally created
these private rights of action as supplements to either federal administrative
action or to causes of action explicitly established by the federal statute.286
As such, these rights of action were easily challenged on separation-of-powers
grounds, based upon arguments that they usurped congressional authority.287
283. Field, supra note 15; at n.397 (citing Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977);
United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 356-57 (1966)).
284. This term is described at supra notes 175, 177.
285. The treatment of implied rights of action in HART & WECHSLER demonstrates that the
implication of private rights of action is, at least initially, a choice that requires consideration of
whether state law can be integrated into the federal regime, or whether a uniquely federal remedy
is necessary:
When Congress imposes a duty, it may say nothing about sanctions or remedies in the
event of violation; it may provide criminal sanctions but be silent as to the availability
of civil remedies; or it may specify particular administrative or judicial remedies and say
nothing about others. In each of these instances, the federal courts may be asked to
determine (a) whether, and to what extent, state remedies are available to redress viola-
tions, and (b) whether, and to what extent, the courts should recognize a federal remedy
not expressly authorized by the governing statute.
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 943-44.
286. See supra Part III.D.2.
287. Professors Stewart and Sunstein point out that "courts reacted to perceived inadequacies
in agency enforcement efforts by creating private rights of action .... The [current Supreme]
Court's restrictive approach to private rights of action makes it far less likely that such rights will
be recognized." Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 1217.
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This article argues that private causes of action should be viewed as the
necessary means of maintaining private law within federalized fields of law.
Courts should, of course, refuse to create private causes of action when private
enforcement of these rights would disrupt federal statutory objectives.288 This
article is less concerned with the place of federal common law in our
federalism than with the place of private law within federalized fields of
law.289 Because federal common law is generally approached as a conflict
between judicial and other federal branches or between federal and state
authority, the preservation of private law is rarely addressed.
Analysis of modem federal private rights of action generally begin with
the Supreme Court's decision in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak.29 In Borak, the
Court addressed the question of whether a private cause of action can be
brought by investors alleging injury resulting from a violation of fair dealing
standards established by federal securities laws. Quoting Sola Electric v.
Jefferson Electric Co.,29 the Court stated:
When a federal statute condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and
nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation, though left by
statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless federal questions,
the answers to which are to be derived from the statute and the
federal policy which it has adopted.292
As discussed above, one of the justifications for creating a federal
administrative state was the need to protect public and disparate "private"
interests that appeared unsuitable for resolution within the context of private
lawsuits." These federal programs generally consisted of the creation of
both federal standards and administrative entities charged with the enforcement
and development of these standards. Yet some courts and commentators were
concerned with implications of this development on the continued relevance of
an independent judiciary. As discussed above, many of the "second order
remedies" constitute one judicial response to this circumstance.294
Nothing in its decision demonstrates that the Borak Court was concerned
with the need to incorporate principles of state private law within the federal
securities regulatory regime. The Court was concerned with the need to
provide a uniform tort action against violators, and it feared that such actions
might not exist if the implication of such actions was left to the each state's
laws.295 Private rights of action were not inferred in Borak ',i order to
288. Professors Stewart and Sunstein discuss various circumstances in which these "private
correctives" or "second order remedies" interfere with orderly administration by federal agencies.
Id.
289. Id. See also Field, supra note 15, for a thoughtful discussion of the place of federal
common law in our federalism.
290. 377 U.S. 426, 431-32, 434 (1964).
291. 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
292. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433.
293. See supra Part III.A.
294. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
295. The Court wrote that:
If federal jurisdiction were limited to the granting of declaratory relief, victims of decep-
tive proxy statements would be obliged to go into state courts for remedial relief. And if
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incorporate principles of state private law. The Court wished to provide federal
courts with a mechanism to participate in federal securities regulation. As one
commentator writes, "Borak treats plaintiffs not as victims so much as 'private
attorneys general' to whom damages are paid as a reward for bringing lawsuits
that serve the public purpose of deterring securities violations.""9
The Borak Court saw private lawsuits as a useful mechanism for
supplementing the enforcement of federal securities laws.297 Viewed from
this perspective, the private cause of action implied in Borak is susceptible to
the argument that Congress, rather than the Court, should have determined the
extent to which private enforcement activities were necessary to effectuate the
purposes of federal securities regulation or the companion argument that "this
melding of private enforcement and public goals may be ill-suited to the
regulatory scheme of the securities acts." '298 Both of- these arguments could
be easily overcome if the Court had based its decision on the need to preserve
private law within a federalized field of law. The Court could have pointed out
that as a result of the federalization of the field of securities regulation, it was
unlikely that standards of conduct defined by state law could withstand
preemption scrutiny. By creating a federal common law for this field,
however, federal courts could draw on state law principles to define private
causes of action that integrate state law without interfering with federal
objectives.
The Supreme Court's decision in Cort v. Ash2 provided the basis for
the approach to federal common law advocated by this article. This case
determined whether a stockholder could prosecute a derivative action against a
corporation's directors for their alleged violation of federal election campaign
finance. laws. Three of the four criteria the Court described for determining
whether a private cause of action should be inferred are unremarkable
principles that have long been a part of judicial consideration of whether a
statutory violation creates the basis for private relief. These three criteria allow
for courts to consider legislative' intent and to consider whether a private cause
of action will interfere with the legislative program:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the defendant? Second, is there any indication of
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy
or deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?3"
The fourth criterion announced by the Court is not, by itself, a threat to
the idea that federal causes of action should be created in highly federalized
the law of the State happened to attach no responsibility to the use of misleading proxy
statements, the whole purpose of the section might be frustrated.
Borak, 377 U.S. at 434-35.
296. Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 557 (1981).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. 422 U.S. 66, 69 (1975).
300. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
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fields of law. The Court wrote that a relevant consideration is whether "the
cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically
the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action based solely on federal law.""'' In Cort, there seemed to be little
reason to infer a cause of action based on the federal law. As the Court wrote,
"except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of
directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs
of the corporation." ' 2 Cort's author, Justice Brennan, points out that the case
implicates few (if any) federal concerns. As a result, an appropriate action
could be brought in state court based on state law principles without concern
that the state law would interfere with federal policy.
Justice Brennan recognized, however, that in those fields heavily
influenced by federal law it might be inappropriate to allow states to
determine whether a private cause of action should exist and what standard of
conduct it should enforce. For example, in areas of greater federalization, such
as the right of union members to bring private causes of action based on the
campaign finance statute, the Court noted that the federal interest and
influence in labor law might necessitate the creation of a federal cause of
action.3"3 In light of the fact that a state cause of action against labor union
officials for the same conduct alleged in Cort might easily interfere with a
federal labor policy, it is entirely appropriate that these questions should be
resolved as a question of federal law.
The decision in Cort set the stage for an approach to preemption which
recognized that in federalized fields of law, federal courts should create private
rights of action that are consistent with federal policies. State private law
would, by itself, often be preempted by federal law, leaving the field of law
without any private law. 3" By contrast, in some instances, such as the facts
of Cort, states could be free to apply their own private law without fear that it
would be found to stand as an obstacle to federal policies.
Justice Brennan's invitation to base the creation of a private cause of
action on federalism grounds (i.e. preserving state law)-rather than on a
desire by federal courts to overcome limitations on federal administrative
authority-was ignored. Instead, the definition of private causes of action was
swept up in a judicial "counter-reformation" as the members of the Court
301. Id. at 78.
302. Id. at 84.
303. Id. at 82 n.13.
304. Indeed, some fields of law have become so federalized that an exception to the "well-
pleaded complaint rule" allows defendants to obtain removal to federal court to hear their preemp-
tion defense. As the Court explained in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987):
"One corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule ... is that Congress may so completely pre-
empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this selected group of claims is necessarily
federal in character." Id. at 63-64. Until Metropolitan Life, this exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule was only applied in the context of labor law and the treaty interests of Indian
tribes. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 n.8 (1987). Since Metropolitan Life,
federal courts have expanded the range of areas where they find "complete preemption." These
include areas of federal banking law, M. Nahas & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 930 F.2d 608, 612 (8th
Cir. 1991), and contracts involving Indian gaming, see, e.g., Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey &
Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 545-46 (8th Cir. 1996).
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
working to limit some elements of federal judicial authority successfully
portrayed these remedies as an affront to both separation of powers and
federalism. This development was itself an element of an approach to judicial
authority that characterized courts as simply the implementors of policy
decisions made by the drafters of legislation and the Constitution. 5
Beginning with Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon v. University of
Chicago,3" many members of the Supreme Court began asserting that
congressional intent, as demonstrated by the explicit statutory language, should
generally determine whether a private cause of action should be implied by
federal courts.7' Such an approach would have little effect in instances like
Cort, where state private law will not interfere with the federal regime. In
those cases, relief to vindicate private rights can be had in state courts.0 8
Where a state law private claim is implicated, a tension results: the federal
regulatory regime may not have been constructed to address the full range of
private rights that may have been violated, yet the need to prevent interference
with federal law may result in the preemption of any state private causes of
action. The creation of federal common law resolves this problem: state
private law is prevented from interfering with federal objectives because it is
federalized.
V. CONCLUSION
A number of commentators argue that courts should refrain from
preempting state law in the absence of any indication that Congress "intended"
such a result.3" Proponents of this position assert that it will result in greater
305. One commentator explains:
The Court now invokes a literalist reading of statutory terms as a surrogate for actual
legislative intent. Thus, statutory words themselves are said to "announce [] Congress'
considered judgment," to "embod[y]" a chosen legislative "compromise," to strike a
"balance" between "opposing policy arguments." The Court, then, will not expand literal
words in the process of interpretation, for doing so would amount to "rewriting rules"
enacted by Congress. Hence what Congress enacts is precisely what Congress intends.
Through this congruence of literalism and legislative intent, "strict adherence" to the
statute's chosen words has now become the new touchstone of statutory interpretation.
Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law, supra note 56, at 894-95 (internal citations
omitted).
306. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Powell wrote that
[t]he 'four factor' analysis of [Cort] is an open invitation to federal courts to legislate
causes of action not authorized by Congress. It is an analysis not faithful to constitution-
al principles and should be rejected. Absent the most compelling evidence of affirmative
congressional intent, a federal court should not infer a private cause of action.
Id. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
307. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
308. Of course, where the jurisdiction of a federal court can be invoked based on diversity of
citizenship or through the assertion of the state claim through pendant jurisdiction, such claims
can be brought in federal court and, pursuant to Erie, as discussed above, state law will apply. See
generally supra Part III.C. See also supra note 132 (discussing the general constitutional require-
ments for federal jurisdiction).
309. See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 14, at 71; see also Law of Preemption, supra note 23, at
55 ("In our federal system, Congress has a duty to address clearly whether a federal enactment has
displaced state law."). The Supreme Court's current infatuation with the idea that all questions
relating to a statute's application can be resolved by references to its explicit text is explored in
the materials cited supra notes 12, 17-19.
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certainty in preemption analysis. Yet the Supremacy Clause directs courts, not
Congress, to implement its mandate."0 Also, it is difficult to imagine that
courts would uniformly apply this principle within the context of private
law.3 ' Indeed, even where Congress does explicitly address the preemption
of private law, judges and justices apply preexisting background principles to
such "saving" or "preemption" clauses to obtain the same results that they
would probably reach if Congress had not addressed the matter in the first
place.3 2 This position is itself the product of certain assumptions concerning
federalism, separation of powers, and whether private law should be allowed
to disturb purely private ordering. While these assumptions are legitimate,
alternative assumptions are at least equally so. And these alternative
assumptions do not lead to the conclusion that federal preemption should only
result from express statements. This article argues that courts should instead
consider whether any improvements can be made in the legitimate approaches
to federal preemption.
Thus background principles are applied which find state law preempted
and which do not allow for the creation of federal common law. Various
formulations of preemption analysis accompany these trends. Both of the most
recent trends tend to favor the preemption of state law, although for very
different reasons. During and immediately after the New Deal, preemption of
state private law served to enhance federal authority by preempting competing
state judicial actions. The most recent trend tends to find state law preempted
in order to limit judicial interference with private economic ordering through
judicial development of federal statutes.
Notwithstanding the importance of private law to our federalism, scant
attention has been paid to the question of how private law principles can be
preserved within federalized fields. This article points out that the creation of
federal common law represents one option for "balancing" out the swings that
occur as divergent background principles are applied to determine whether
Congress "intended" to preempt state law. This is not to say that this proposal
is not without its own background assumptions. For example, it assumes that
private law is an important part of our federalism. It assumes that states
should have the preeminent right to define private law principles.
Nevertheless, it assumes that Congress is not able, nor is it required, to
310. The text of the Supremacy Clause is set out supra note 30 and a brief synopsis of its
history is set out supra note 122. Although the Constitutional Convention specified that congres-
sional work-product would take precedence over state laws, it left courts with the responsibility
for implementing this element of federalism. See supra note 122. Courts are required to exercise
their responsibility under the Supremacy Clause whether Congress "intended" to preempt state
law. Courts abdicate their constitutional responsibility if they rely solely on "congressional intent"
to determine whether state law should be preempted.
311. In a number of fields, the Supreme Court or Congress established such a "clear state-
ment" rule, only to subsequently have federal courts create exceptions. For example, the Anti-
Injunction Act prohibits federal courts from granting injunctions except as "expressly authorized."
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). In Mitchum v. Foster, however, the Supreme Court determined that the
federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), constitutes such an exception even though §
1983 does not expressly refer to the Anti-Injunction Act. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
312. The discussion of Cipollone v. Ligett Group, supra notes 253-72 and accompanying text,
demonstrates this observation.
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delineate all state laws that will be preempted by its legislative work product.
As a result, courts will often be called on to determine whether federal statutes
should be interpreted to preempt state laws. Requiring state courts to choose
between preempting state law or allowing state law to operate of its own force
will, in some instances, result in (at least the appearance of) state law being
applied in federalized fields. Sometimes this result would not occur if courts
had the opportunity to create a unique common law for the federalized field.
Nevertheless, even where state law appears to "operate of its own force," it is
covertly federalized. For this reason, it is preferable for courts to explicitly
state whether state law is actually serving federal purposes. Finally, this
proposal assumes that it is preferable for courts to preempt only those portions
of state law that interfere with federal objectives. These objectives and
assumptions are compatible with the creation of federal common law to
integrate state private law within federalized fields of law.
COMMENTARY
HIGHER EDUCATION, HOPWOOD, AND HOMOGENEITY:
PRESERVING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DIVERSITY IN A
SCRUTINIZING SOCIETY
Visitors entering the expansive campus of the University of Texas at
Austin (U.T.) are greeted by a beautiful welcome center nestled in the comer
of the Martin Luther King Boulevard entrance. Named for the first African-
American to be admitted to the School of Law, the Heman Sweatt Campus'
boasts a restored nineteenth-century building converted into a monument to
U.T.'s rich history and heritage.2 Ironically, these tributes to advances in
diversity and racial equality are but a few blocks from one of the nation's
premier law schools 3-an institution that, under a recent Fifth Circuit ruling,
likely will be nearly all white by the turn of the century.4 Despite the hard-
fought and monumental legal victories of Sweatt5 and other civil rights pio-
neers, African-Americans in Texas and other states may once again find them-
selves looking to "separate but equal" schools for a legal education.6
1. Actually part of the U.T. campus, the Sweatt Campus, or "Little Campus," is a dedicated
memorial at the edge of University property, and is not a separate campus. Heman Sweatt was an
African-American who applied to the University of Texas School of Law (U.T. Law) in 1946, and
was rejected solely on the basis of his race. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631 (1950). At that
time, there were no law schools in Texas that admitted African-Americans, and in response to
Sweatt's suit, Texas established a "law school for Negroes." Id. at 631-32. The proposed institu-
tion was to have four members of U.T. Law's faculty who would teach at both schools while
maintaining offices only at U.T. Law. The library was to be less than one-sixth the size of U.T.
Law's, and the unaccredited school was to have no full-time librarian. Id. at 633.
2. The Sweatt campus encompasses two buildings, including a U.T. historical information
and visitor center, and, ironically, an admissions office.
3. See generally America's Best Graduate Schools, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Mar.
20, 1995, at 77, 84 (reviewing top graduate schools in the country, including law schools, and
ranking U.T. Law 17th). The criteria used to evaluate schools in this survey included quality of
the faculty, reputation of the program in the eyes of judges and the academic community, success
of recent alumni in the legal profession, selectivity of the student body, and job placement rates.
Id. at 84-85.
4. Lino A. Graglia, Hopwood v. Texas: Racial Preferences in Higher Education Upheld
and Endorsed, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 79, 79-80 (1995) (indicating that if the school's ordinary ad-
missions standards were applied to all applicants, African-Americans would likely constitute less
than one percent of the student body and Hispanics would constitute between two and three per-
cent). Similarly dire results have been forecast for California, where regents at the University of
California voted to eliminate gender and ethnicity as admissions criteria. Arleen Jacobius, Affirma-
tive Action on Way Out in California, 81 A.B.A. J. 22, 22 (1995).
5. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636 (finding Texas' separate but equal educational systems in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment). Interestingly, the criteria used by the Supreme Court in deter-
mining the inequality of the institutions included library resources, "reputation of the faculty ...
position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions, and prestige." Id. at
633-34. These assets are nearly identical to those widely used to evaluate and rank law schools
today. See supra note 3.
6. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 573 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th
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Federal anti-discrimination law has evolved tremendously over the past
half-century, yet racial equality remains elusive. At the time Sweatt first
applied to U.T. School of Law (U.T. Law), formal segregation remained legal
under the fifty-year-old Plessy v. Ferguson7 decision which held that
separation did "not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race."8
Nonetheless, African-Americans continued to challenge the constitutionality of
such laws, particularly in education. The "separate but equal" approach was
finally rejected9 in Brown v. Board of Education° and Bolling v. Sharpe."
The interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment announced in those cases was
furthered over the next forty years by affirmative action programs 2 designed
to remedy the present effects of past discriminatory practices and prevent the
return of discrimination to American society.
In 1994, four white applicants to U.T. Law challenged the school's
affirmative action admissions program. 3 Originally developed as an attempt
to comply with Title VII, 4 the program gave preference to African-American
and Hispanic candidates."5 Although the district court found the program
unconstitutional, it nonetheless upheld the value of diversity in higher
education as a compelling government interest. 6 On appeal, however, the
Fifth Circuit held the program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and boldly suggested that diversity in higher
education can never justify race-conscious admissions policies. 7 The decision
sent shock waves rippling throughout the nation, and legal scholars quickly
proclaimed the case as the beginning of the end for affirmative action
programs in higher education."' Questions remain whether diversity in higher
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2580, 2581 (1996) [hereinafter Hopwood I] (noting that removing
race-conscious admissions from U.T. Law would, in effect, resegregate U.T. Law by directing
minority students to the traditionally African-American Texas Southern University Law School).
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. In a forward-looking dissent, Justice Harlan argued that "[olur
constitution is color-blind," and thus cannot allow classification among citizens. Id. at 559.
9. While the Court in Sweatt found that U.T. Law's admissions policy had violated the
Equal Protection Clause, it did not explicitly challenge the "separate but equal" doctrine. Instead,
the Court found that the altematve "Negro" institution was inferior to U.T. Law. See Sweatt, 339
U.S. at 633-34.
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
II. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (finding that the District of Columbia's segregated public
education system was unconstitutional).
12. For an explanation of the various forms of affirmative action programs, see generally
John Richard Carrigan & John J. Coleman, III, The Cloudy Future of Affirmative Action, 57 ALA.
LAW. 24, 24 (1996) (outlining several affirmative action concepts and noting their susceptibility to
recent court decisions).
13. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 553.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
15. Hopwood I, 861 F. Supp. at 558-63.
16. Id. at 578. The court found the separate admissions committees and the lack of compara-
tive evaluation between all candidates violated the Equal Protection Clause, holding that the pro-
gram was not "narrowly tailored" to achieve the compelling government interest of diversity. Id.
at 577-79.
17. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580, 2581
(1996) [hereinafter Hopwood Ill.
18. See Krista L. Cosner, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Lessons And Directions
from the Supreme Court, 71 IND. L.J. 1003, 1021 (1996) (stating that the court's application of
strict scrutiny in Hopwood 11 could have "far-reaching and devastating implications" for affirma-
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education is itself a compelling government interest and/or whether it serves
any necessary role in the battle against discrimination.
This paper will examine the Hopwood 11 decision, critique the rationale
used by the Fifth Circuit in overturning the district court, and present
arguments and proposals for protecting diversity in higher education as both a
compelling government interest and the appropriate means of preventing
discrimination. While it is important to understand the historical precedent and
jurisprudence behind the debate over affirmative action and diversity, it is
equally essential to accept the concrete and real-life effects these programs
have upon individuals of all backgrounds. Thus, interspersed within this paper
are several narratives about actual individuals whose lives have been
significantly affected by the affirmative action policy challenged in Hopwood
II.
I. THE HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN AMERICA
William grew up in a small town in East Texas and attended U.T. with the
help of race-based scholarships. A bright, enthusiastic student, he graduated
with a 3.2 grade point average (GPA) in communications in 1987. William
was active in campus activities, and eager to attend law school. His test
scores were average, but as an African-American he received special
consideration under U.T. Law's affirmative action plan. Today he works for a
small civil rights law firm in Houston, and donates many hours of work to
assist indigent and needy minority clients.
"If it weren't for the special consideration I received," William confides,
"I would have never been able to attend U. T. as a law student." He feels that
affirmative action is necessary to remedy the effects of past discrimination as
well as to overcome the institutionalized hurdles that still exist for minorities.
"Growing up in East Texas makes you learn that there is still a long way to
go for African-Americans. Most Anglos don't understand that all African-
Americans still face many forms of discrimination and bias. I challenge
anyone to visit my high school and drive through the rural poverty and
despair that I grew up in and tell me honestly that America is past the point
of discrimination, intentional or not. Without the opportunities I was given, I
might still be there today."1
9
A. Progress and Programs
William's story epitomizes the struggle of many African-Americans,
particularly those in the South. The many benefits he received from racial
tive action programs); see also Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity,
and the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1149-51 (1996) (criti-
cizing Hopwood II as "an extremist version of the color-blind vision" and stating that such an ap-
proach is "a reactionary call to return to the race relations of the nineteenth century").
19. Telephone Interview with anonymous U.T. Law applicant (July 8, 1996). The names of
and other identifying information about the U.T. Law applicants interviewed in this article have
been changed at their request.
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considerations in higher education were precisely what remedial affirmative
action programs were designed to accomplish.
Affirmative action grew from the Reconstruction-era Constitutional
Amendments and the legislation that accompanied the amendments.2 °
Following the Civil War, Congress implemented several programs intended to
assimilate freedmen into society and prevent discrimination.2' While these
programs gave preference to African-Americans on the basis of their race,
they remained constitutionally valid in the context of the legislative intent
behind the Fourteenth Amendment.22 Modem affirmative action emerged in
the 1960s with President Kennedy's order to federal contractors to "promote
and ensure equal opportunity for all qualified persons, without regard to race,"
and use "affirmative action" to implement the order. Congress then
incorporated Executive Order 10,925 into Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,24 prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
national origin in programs receiving federal funds and in places of
employment. In 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11,246 which
prohibited all government contractors from discriminating on the basis of
race. 25
20. After the Civil War, Congress established the Freedman's Bureau to provide relief and
assistance to former slaves. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507. Nine months later, Con-
gress amended the Act by providing educational assistance to former slaves. Act of July 16, 1966,
ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173. Although controversial, the legislation was less than what many called for,
and the programs were quickly dismantled. See CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE:
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP 181-83 (1978). For an in-depth look at
the history of affirmative action within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment and post-Civil
War congressional legislation, see generally Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
21. Herbert 0. Reid, Sr., Assault on Affirmative Action: The Delusion of a Color-Blind
America, 23 How. L.J. 381, 427 (1980); see also KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECON-
STRUCTION 1865-1877 (1965). The debate over affirmative action is primarily between two com-
peting value models: those who see affirmative action as an equalizer, and those who see it as
contrary to the ideal of a color-blind constitutional jurisprudence. The arguments made today bear
an uncanny resemblance to century-old congressional debates over Reconstruction-era remedial
legislation to benefit ex-slaves. Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CON-
STITrrIONAL LAW 256-57 (2d ed. 1996).
22. Carl E. Brody, Jr., A Historical Review of Affirmative Action and the Interpretation of Its
Legislative Intent by the Supreme Court, 29 AKRON L. REV. 291, 292-93 (1996) (arguing that con-
structionist jurisprudence demands a more lenient level of analysis than strict scrutiny when the
legislative intent can be clearly inferred); see also Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 309-16 (1991) (noting that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment also passed race-conscious legislation designed to benefit ex-slaves, and
that race-neutral jurisprudence ignores the original intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment).
Since Congress passed these programs soon after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
seems logical to assume that the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment must have been
compatible with race-conscious remedial measures.
23. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
24. See Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352. 78 Stat. 241
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. (1994)).
25. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1994). The original language of affirmative action orders appear to have been race-
neutral, and thus geared merely toward eliminating discrimination. The Johnson administration,
however, gradually redefined affirmative action as result-oriented hiring plans that gave
preferences to racial minorities. DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 7-8 (Nicolaus Mills, ed., 1994).
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B. The Battle Over the Level of Judicial Scrutiny
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court upheld race-conscious remedies
for past discrimination in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
167Education.6 After that decision, affirmative action plans became common."
In 1980, the Supreme Court upheld a congressionally-mandated federal
affirmative action program for government construction contracts in Fullilove
v. Klutznick."8 In 1989, however, the Court struck down a similar state-
mandated program in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.'9 In both cases,
the Court applied a two-prong test, requiring that a race-based classification be
narrowly tailored" to achieve a compelling government interest.3 The feder-
al program survived the test, while the state program did not. This difference
in result may have been based upon the premise that, as a "co-equal branch,"
Congress is entitled to deference above and beyond that which states should
receive.3  In 1990, the Supreme Court clarified the Fullilove/Croson
distinction in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC.33 Defining diversity as an
important government objective, the Court held that congressionally-mandated
programs should be subject to intermediate scrutiny.34 The Court's ruling
created controversy and drew calls for a uniform standard of review.35 In a
scathing dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the Court should apply strict
scrutiny,36 decrying the "renewed toleration of racial classifications."3
26. 402 U.S. 1, 15-31 (1971) (charging state and local governments with the "affirmative
obligation[]" to take steps necessary to end discrimination, and holding that the remedial power of
courts to remedy past discrimination is broad).
27. See Lara Hudgins, Rethinking Affirmative Action in the 1990s: Tailoring the Cure to
Remedy the Disease, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 815, 816-20 (1995).
28. 448 U.S. 448, 478 (1980) (granting deference to congressional race-based actions when
Congress found a long history of discrimination and intended to combat the present effects of past
discrimination). While the Court did not define the level of review appropriate for evaluating
congressional race-based actions, Justices Burger and Powell stated that even strict scrutiny would
have been satisfied. See id. at 491-92; see also id. at 514-15 (Powell, J., concurring); Jerome R.
Watson & Akinyale Harrison, Government Contracting: Affirmative Action After Adarand, 74
MICH. B.J. 1162, 1162 (Nov. 1995).
29. 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (holding that strict scrutiny is the appropriate test for evaluat-
ing state and local programs that classify on the basis of race). In distinguishing the case from
Fullilove, the Court noted that the deference granted to congressional findings of historical dis-
crimination does not extend to states and municipalities. Id. at 498-511.
30. "Narrowly tailored" has been defined to include several restrictions. A program must be
limited in scope and duration, must not unduly burden third parties, and cannot stand if there
exists a less intrusive alternative. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
31. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506. "Compelling government interests" have rarely been held
to exist outside the realm of remedying the present effects of past discrimination. Id. at 494-506.
32. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472 (noting that Congress is charged specifically with enforcing
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through legislation).
33. 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990) (granting deference to Congress in mandating race-conscious
measures to achieve broadcast diversity, and holding that such federal programs must be evaluated
under "intermediate scrutiny"), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995).
34. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65 (defining intermediate scrutiny as requiring
race-based laws to be substantially related to an important government objective). In general,
intermediate scrutiny has been reserved for gender-based classifications. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976).
35. Watson, supra note 28, at 1162-65 (suggesting Metro Broadcasting highlighted a judicial
inconsistency that the Court was forced to address in Adarand).
36. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 603 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia
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Following the five to four decision in Metro Broadcasting, the Supreme
Court sharply reversed itself in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena."
Adarand involved a congressionally-mandated affirmative action program for
minority business subcontractors. Holding that strict scrutiny analysis applies
to all racial classifications, regardless of the governmental entity that created
them,39 the Court implicitly rejected the idea that the government has an
important interest in bringing about diversity.' Expressly overruling Metro
Broadcasting,4 the Adarand Court reiterated that the level of review should
not depend upon which race is burdened by race-based classifications.42
Attempting to counter the perception that strict scrutiny is "fatal in fact,"
Justice O'Connor expressly noted that affirmative action programs could
conceivably meet the level of review set forth in Adarand.43 In his
concurrence, Justice Thomas criticized minority set-aside programs as "racial
paternalism," which he labelled "as poisonous and pernicious as any other
form of discrimination.""' Hailed as appropriately determining that even
"benign" race-based programs are nonetheless unconstitutional,4' Adarand has
drawn blistering criticism from those who believe affirmative action is still
justifiable as both a remedy for past discrimination 4' and a tool for creating
diversity."7
and Kennedy, J.J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 610. O'Connor suggested that the goal of the affirmative action program devised
by the FCC was to achieve racial balancing rather than diversity, and questioned the "fit" of the
means to achieve the FCC's stated goal. Id. at 625 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
suggested the decision "move[s] us from 'separate but equal' to 'unequal but benign."' Id. at 637-
38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
38. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
39. Id. at 2111 (stating that courts must require "any governmental actor subject to the Con-
stitution [to] justify any racial classification subjecting [people] to unequal treatment under the
strictest judicial scrutiny").
40. Stephen C. Minnich, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena-A Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative
Action, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 279, 280 (1995). In a vigorous dissent, Justice Stevens argued
that diversity can be a compelling government interest because the Adarand opinion overruled
Metro Broadcasting only in the determination of the proper level of scrutiny for racial classifica-
tions. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127.
41. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (stating explicitly that all racial classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny, which requires a narrowly tailored measure that furthers a compelling government
interest).
42. Id. at 2111 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
43. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167, as demonstrating an
appropriately narrowly-tailored measure meeting strict scrutiny).
44. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
45. See Brian C. Eades, The United States Supreme Court Goes Color-Blind: Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 771, 771 (1996) (arguing that despite the deplor-
able problem of racial discrimination in this country, affirmative action is not the solution); see
also Minnich, supra note 40, at 280 (applauding Adarand's rejection of the notion that diversity
can constitute a compelling government interest).
46. See generally E'Vinski Davis, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Turning Back the
Clock on Minority Set-Asides, 23 S.U. L. REV. 79 (1995) (arguing that the Court should have
followed past precedent by granting deference to Congress in matters involving the Fourteenth
Amendment). In his dissent in Adarand, Justice Stevens basically argued the same principle, stat-
ing that the Court had deferred to Congress the past two times it addressed federal affirmative
action programs. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2126-27.
47. See Terrence M. Lewis, Comment, Standard of Review Under the Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection Component: Adarand Expands the Application of Strict Scrutiny, 34 DUQ. L.
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C. Affirmative Action in Higher Education
Katie graduated from U.T. with a marketing degree and immediately
applied to several law schools. She was surprised, however, when she was
denied admission to U.T. Law. Her 3.65 GPA and seventy-fifth percentile
LSAT, combined with many extracurricular achievements, earned her
immediate acceptance at several other top-quality institutions. After a brief but
successful time spent working toward an M.B.A., she applied again, this time
with a ninetieth percentile LSAT score and a graduate school GPA of 3.65.
Again she was denied admission to U.T. Law. Undeterred from a legal career,
she enrolled at Baylor, a private school in Waco, Texas, and graduated in
1994 near the top of her class. Her resumi at Baylor was enviable: she
graded onto Law Review; won top honors in moot court competitions; and,
made the school's nationally-acclaimed appellate team. Had it not been for
financial assistance, however, Katie would have been unable to meet the high
tuition at Baylor. Overall she was forced to spend over twice as much for law
school as she would have at U.T.
As an Anglo applicant, Katie knew all along that she faced a more
difficult admissions process at U. T., but still felt cheated by the fact that she
was unable to enjoy the benefits of low tuition, close proximity to home, and a
legal education at the state's most renowned and prestigious legal
institution." Had she been Hispanic or African-American, she likely would
have been admitted.49 Today she works as a litigator for a large Dallas law
firm. She is successful and happy, but still remains somewhat resentful.
Overall, she feels that she has reaped the benefits of a smaller school, but
acknowledges that "I wish the process had been more merit based, and not
contingent only upon the color of an applicant's skin. It was wrong to deny
admission to those with higher objective credentials."5
Katie's experiences with affirmative action illustrate the myriad problems
arising from affirmative action programs in higher education admissions. In
1973, the Supreme Court directly addressed this issue in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke." Writing for a precariously balanced five
to four majority,52 Justice Powell stated that affirmative action programs in
higher education admissions can be justified under two rationales: 1) creating
diversity53 in student populations; and, 2) remedying the present effects of
REV. 325, 350 (1996) (arguing that the Court ignored current racial disparities, discrimination, and
prejudice, and that the benefits of cultural diversity outweigh any possible harms to white contrac-
tors disadvantaged by the affirmative action program).
48. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 3, at 84 (ranking U.T. law considerably
higher in quality than any other Texas law school).
49. See Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. 557-63 (describing U.T. Law's admissions process and
affirmative action program).
50. Telephone Interview with anonymous U.T. Law applicant (July 10, 1996).
51. 8 U.S. 265 (1978). Although the Court found the particular program at issue to be un-
constitutional, its guidelines for affirmative action legitimized other programs. Id. at 315-20.
52. Donald L. Beschle, "You've Got to Be Carefully Taught": Justifying Affirmative Action
After Croson and Adarand, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1141, 1151-52 (1996) (noting the fragility of Bakke
and the forward-looking diversity rationale of Justice Powell).
53. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15. While Justice Powell found diversity to be a compelling state
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past discrimination.54 Categorizing the preference of one person over another
solely on the basis of race as "discrimination for its own sake,"55 Justice
Powell specifically stated that only documented discrimination at the
institution implementing the program justifies race-based action.56
In 1994, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of race-based minority
scholarships in Podberesky v. Kirwan,57 holding that such programs are not
constitutional without a strong showing of the need for remedial measures to
combat the present effects of past discrimination. 8 In so holding, the court
also determined that "present effects" necessary to justify race-based remedial
action must be clearly tied to past discrimination.59 The court also
distinguished between present societal discrimination and past discrimination
by a university, holding that the "hostile-climate effect" argument' as a
justification for remedial action was insufficient to support a race-conscious
program." In finding poor reputation as insufficient grounds for the
establishment of race-based remedial programs,62 the court acknowledged
Maryland's history of discrimination, yet stated that "mere knowledge of
historical fact" cannot justify race-exclusive remedies.65 The court also
rejected the University's underrepresentation and attrition arguments.'
II. THE HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
Albert grew up in South Texas as the son of impoverished immigrant farm
workers. A bright student, he came to U. T. in 1981, uncertain of his future. He
worked his way through college and graduated with a "B" average in
psychology. As a Hispanic student, Albert was eligible for special
consideration under U.T. Law's admissions process, and was admitted in
interest, no other case since Bakke has accepted that rationale under a strict scrutiny analysis.
54. Id. at 300-12. Using the First Amendment as support for "academic freedom," Justice
Powell cited Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) and Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967). Stating that safeguarding academic freedom is a "national commitment" and
that the nation's future depends upon leaders "trained through wide exposure" to diverse ideas, he
noted the competing interests of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13.
55. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
56. Id. at 310. The Court upheld the application of strict scrutiny for state mandated racial
classifications in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986). In Wygant, the
Court used strict scrutiny to reject race-based layoff plans for teachers to remedy general societal
discrimination. Id. at 280.
57. 38 F.3d 147, 161 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995) (finding the Uni-
versity of Maryland's race-based scholarship program unconstitutional).
58. Id. at 153 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 500, and Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277). At controversy
was a merit-based scholarship program at the University of Maryland limited exclusively to Afri-
can-Americans. Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 152.
59. Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153. The University claimed that there existed four clear effects
of past discrimination: (1) a poor reputation within the African-American community; (2)
underrepresentation of African-Americans in the student body; (3) low retention and graduation
rates for enrolled African-American students; and (4) an environment on campus perceived as
hostile to African-American students. Id. at 152.
60. Id. at 154. The University based much of its argument on the results of a student survey
that demonstrated student perceptions of social segregation and a racist environment. Id.
61. Id. at 153-55.
62. id. at 154.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 156-60.
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1986. He graduated in 1989 with average grades and today works in
immigration law in south-central Texas.
"People don't truly understand the problems facing many Hispanics in
Texas," Albert says, "and while there are some doors open now that never
existed before, there are still terrible obstacles in the way of many Hispanics.
Inadequate public education, a lack of health care, and racist politics
contribute to an environment that keeps Hispanics out of many parts of
society." He attributes his success, in part, to affirmative action programs and
race-based scholarships. "Without these kinds of tools, Hispanics will continue
to remain mired in poverty and illiteracy. We've been in Texas at least as long
as the Anglos. Why do you think we're only now seeing Hispanic elected
officials and businessmen?""5
The Texas educational system in which Albert was educated has long
been rife with racial discrimination and its effects.' While the landmark case
of Sweatt v. Painter67 invalidated the state law prohibiting African-Americans
from attending U.T. Law, it was not until 1983 that the State of Texas agreed
to implement a court-mandated plan to desegregate its higher education
system, including U.T. and U.T. Law.' As late as 1971, U.T. Law did not
have a single African-American student in its entering class.69
In 1977, under court order,7" the United States Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare's (HEW) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) began an
investigation of Texas' statewide higher educational system for discrimination.
In 1980, after a two-year investigation, OCR concluded that the State of
Texas' higher educational system remained segregated, and declared Texas in
violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.' OCR also determined
that there was a severe underrepresentation of Hispanics as well as African-
Americans, and mandated that both categories of students must be included in
goals for a desegregation plan."
Texas submitted an initial desegregation plan shortly thereafter indicating
a commitment to equal educational opportunity and racial desegregation, but
65. Telephone Interview with anonymous U.T. Law applicant (June 28, 1996).
66. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 572 n.63 ("Texas' long history of discrimination against its
black and Hispanic citizens in all areas of public life is not the subject of dispute .... ) (quoting
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 866 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1071 (1994). Historically, a principal part of Southern politics, and those of Texas in
particular, has been the "maintenance of control [of African-Americans] by a white majority."
CHANDLER DAVIDSON, RACE AND CLASS IN TEXAS POLITICS 5 (1990).
67. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
68. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 556.
69. Id. at 558. Despite his monumental legal victory, Heman Sweatt dropped out of U.T.
Law in 1951 after enduring threats, violence, cross-burnings, and humiliation at the hands of stu-
dents and faculty. Id. at 555.
70. Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.), modified and affd, 480 F.2d 1159
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
71. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 555-57.
72. Id. at 555-56. Historically, the population of Texas has been severely segregated along
both geographic and socioeconomic lines. JAMES ANDERSON ET AL., TEXAS POLITICS 27-30 (4th
ed. 1984).
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the OCR rejected it as deficient.73 In 1982, a revised plan again was rejected
as inadequate because it did not mandate specific goals for each institution. 4
In 1983, proceedings began against the State of Texas to enforce the
original judgment, and OCR recommended that Texas adopt a plan including
provisions admitting African-American and Hispanic students to higher
education programs who "demonstrate potential for success but do not
necessarily meet all the traditional admission requirements. 74 In June 1983,
OCR accepted Texas' third plan, the "Texas Plan," which had the stated goal
of having African-American and Hispanic students enter graduate schools at
ratios equal to their percentage of all college graduates within the State of
Texas.75
During this period of litigation concerning Texas' higher educational
system, much of the state's public school system was operating under court-
ordered desegregation plans intended to combat decades of educational
inequality.76 This segregation and discrimination was not limited to African-
Americans; in United States v. Crucial,77 the Fifth Circuit held that Ector
County had "clearly and egregious(ly)" violated the Constitution78 through
continued segregation of both African-Americans and Hispanics.79 At the
same time, the Dallas Independent School District was found to have
intentionally "opposed any student desegregation, no matter how feasible or
how minimal," thus failing to meet the requirements of a court-ordered
desegregation plan.8" Statewide, public school districts remain in
noncompliance with Justice Department requirements, and in many cases
actually have increased segregation of African-American and Hispanic
students. 8'
III. HoPWOOD IH
Kevin applied to U.T. Law in the spring of 1989, unsure about a legal
career but confident in his ability to succeed. Coming from a middle-class
background, his credentials were impressive: a 3.7 GPA in government from
U.T., top-quartile LSAT scores, three years experience with an Austin law
firm, and a "loaded" resume. He had been in countless academic and social
organizations, was president of the school's nationally famous marching band,
73. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 556.
74. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. & n.6. For example, if Afican-Americans had constituted ten percent of all college
graduates, the goal would have been for graduate programs to have entering classes that were ten
percent African-American. Acceptance of minority students was contingent, however, on state
funding for the projects and timely completion of certain activities. Id. at 556.
76. Id. at 554; see also DAVIDSON, supra note 66, at 115 (stating that Texas "inherited the
traditional black-white caste system").
77. 722 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1983).
78. United States v. Crucial, 722 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 1184-85.
80. Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1983).
81. Crucial, 722 F.2d at 1188. Today, "white-flight" has also created a "de-facto
resegregation" in the suburbs of larger Texas cities. DAVIDSON, supra note 66, at 248.
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had worked and paid his way through school, and had glowing letters of
recommendation from professors and attorneys. To his surprise, however, he
received a quick letter of rejection.
After some soul-searching, Kevin looked to teaching as an alternative,
with overwhelming success. In his first year, he was selected Teacher-of-the-
Year for his school, and one year later he was selected as one of the top thirty
high school teachers in the state of Texas. Kevin completed a Master's Degree
in Educational Administration in August, 1996 as the outstanding student in
the graduate school, and currently serves as assistant principal in a small
town near Austin.
Despite his success in teaching, Kevin is still bitter about his rejection
from U.T. Law. Several of his nonwhite friends, all with lower LSAT scores
and GPAs, were admitted to U.T. Law. In particular, Kevin is bothered by the
admittance of a wealthy Hispanic friend who had been through private schools
all his life, yet qualified for U.T. Law under the affirmative action plan. Kevin
understands the need for opening up the School of Law to a more diverse
group of students, but feels that "when you categorize people simply by race
you open up a dangerous can of worms .... for everybody. I'm very happy
with my life today, but I'll never know what might have been."82
Kevin's story is not unusual. Like other Anglo applicants, his credentials
were impressive and diverse, yet inadequate to secure admission to U.T. Law.
In 1992, Cheryl Hopwood and three other Anglo plaintiffs applied for
admission to the University of Texas School of Law.83 The admissions policy
at the school measured all applicants using their "Texas Index," 4 and based
on this index each application was placed in one of three categories: 1)
presumptive admission; 2) discretionary admission; and 3) presumptive
denial."5 All four plaintiffs were placed in the second category. Candidates in
the first category were likely offered admission, those in the latter category
were usually denied admission, and those in the second category were referred
to a three-person committee for review. 6
Under the admissions policy in effect at the time,87 preferred
candidates88 were evaluated under a completely separate system which used
lower presumptive-admit and presumptive-deny "Texas Index" scores than
those used to evaluate non-minority applicants.89 The stated goal of the
program was to admit an entering class which included African-American and
Hispanic students in numbers approximately equal to the proportion they
represented of all Texas college graduates.' In addition, while ordinary
82. Telephone Interview with anonymous U.T. Law applicant (June 28, 1996).
83. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 564.
84. Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 935. The index was a composite formula using the applicant's
undergraduate grade point average and LSAT score. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 935-36.
87. The admissions process at issue was discontinued in 1992. See generally Hopwood 1,
861 F. Supp. at 557-63 (describing the history and evolution of the U.T. Law admissions system).
88. African-Americans and Hispanics were the only preferred candidates. Hopwood 1I, 78
F.3d at 936 n.4.
89. Id. at 936.
90. Id. at 937. In 1992, these percentages were such that approximately eleven percent of the
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candidates placed in the discretionary category were evaluated by one or two
members of a committee, all preferred candidates were extensively evaluated
by a special minority subcommittee which discussed every discretionary
preferred application.9
After being denied admission, plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the
school's affirmative action program violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.92 The district court found part of the school's
program to be unconstitutional, but recognized a compelling state interest in
obtaining diversity and remedying the effects of past discrimination.93
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision, finding the
school's program and use of diversity as grounds for race-conscious
admissions to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.94 Writing for the
court, Judge Smith stated that the "central purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause 'is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between
individuals on the basis of race."'95 Such discrimination, the court stated, is
therefore highly suspect and subject to strict scrutiny." In applying strict
scrutiny, the court found that neither the diversity nor remedial arguments
presented by U.T. constituted a "compelling government interest.
'97
Directly addressing Bakke, the court stated that Justice Powell was
incorrect in determining that there exists a First Amendment right to academic
freedom sufficient to constitute a compelling government interest to use race
as an admissions factor.98 Quoting from Adarand, the court stated that the
"'failure [of] Bakke ... left unresolved the proper analysis for remedial race-
entering class was to be Hispanic and eight percent of the class was to be African-American. Id.
See also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
91. Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 937. In addition to extensively reviewing each discretionary
application, the minority subcommittee also had "virtually final" say in the admissions process. Id.
Preferred students not presumptively admitted or placed in the discretionary category were even
placed on a separate preferred waiting list. Id. at 938.
92. Id. In finding the constitutional violation, the court held that U.T. Law could not use
race as a factor in admissions for the stated purposes of: (1) achieving diversity; (2) combating a
perceived hostile environment toward minorities at the school; (3) alleviating the school's poor
reputation in the minority community; or, (4) remedying the effects of past discrimination by
anyone other than U.T. Law. Id. at 952. The court did not address the possibility of present dis-
crimination by U.T. Law.
93. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 570 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 313 (1973) and United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987)). The court acknowl-
edged the testimony of professors indicating the substantial value of having a diverse student
body. Furthermore, the court noted that had the 1992 admissions process been conducted without
the affirmative action plan, there would have been at most nine African-Americans and 18 Hispan-
ics among the approximately 900 students offered admission. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 563,
573.
94. Hopwood H, 78 F.3d at 934.
95. Id. at 939-40 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993).
96. Hopwood 1I, 78 F.3d at 940 (citing Adarand Construction v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113
(1995) and Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)). The court declared the benign nature of
the U.T. affirmative action program irrelevant in determining the level of scrutiny. Hopwood IH, 78
F.3d at 940 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
97. Hopwood H, 78 F.3d at 945-55.
98. See id. at 944 (arguing that Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent
because, although he announced the opinion, no other Justices joined him in it). Judge Smith
stated that "any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achieving a
diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
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based government action.' The opinion also stated that the only case in
which diversity has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as a compelling
government interest, Metro Broadcasting, was explicitly overturned by
Adarand.'0
After rejecting the diversity argument, the court then addressed the issue
of remedial action as a compelling government interest. First, the court noted
that past decisions allowed for remedial action only in light of "present effects
of past discrimination."'' U.T. Law argued that racial criteria were justified
at U.T. Law to remedy the effects of past discrimination in the state's public
school system, but the court found that it erroneously used the improper unit
for analysis. 2 Under the strict reasoning of Croson and Wygant,0 3 the
court reasoned, the only past discrimination U.T. Law may address is that
which occurred within the law school itself." Stating that there is no
evidence of any existing discrimination, nor effects of past discrimination, the
court suggested that any existing racial tension is likely the product of societal
discrimination.'0 5
The University of Texas appealed to the Supreme Court, and although
many legal experts predicted the case would be accepted, the Court denied
certiorari."° In an unusual concurring opinion, Justices Ginsburg and Souter
acknowledged that the issue of race-conscious admissions policies in higher
education is "of great national importance," but agreed with the denial on the
grounds that because U.T. Law no longer used the challenged policy, the
Court must await "a final judgment on a program genuinely in controversy
before addressing [this] important question."07 While other circuits continue
to follow Bakke, the issue remains clearly unresolved and will undoubtedly
come before the Supreme Court again in a case with a justiciable
controversy.'0 8
99. Id. (quoting Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109).
100. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 944. The effects of past discrimination in Texas society are
incontrovertible. Between whites and minorities, both educational attainment and income vary
tremendously, and the state historically has a great disparity in wealth between whites and minori-
ties. African-Americans and Hispanics are far more likely than whites to be impoverished, under-
educated or unemployed. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 72, at 31-32.
101. Id. at 952 (citing Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995)).
102. See Hopwood H, 78 F.3d at 949-54.
103. The decisions in Croson and Wygant indicate that "racial remedies must be carefully
limited." Id. at 950.
104. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 952. The court presented the potential "slippery-slope" effects of
such remedial action, stating that if higher education can be analogized to affect the entire educa-
tional system, such programs legitimately could be extended to cover "any other state activity that
in some way is affected by the educational attainment of the applicants." Id. at 950.
105. Id. at 953. The court also postulated that current racial preferences actually contribute to
racial tensions rather than help alleviate them. Id.
106. Hopwood v. Texas, 116 S. Ct. 2580, 2581 (1996).
107. Id.
108. See generally Sylvia A. Law, Diversity in Jeopardy as Supreme Court Declines to Re-
view Hopwood, THE EQUALIZER, Aug. 1996, at 1, 4-5 (noting the implications of the denial of
review by the Supreme Court and suggesting that the Fifth Circuit's holding "effectively reverses
a Supreme Court decision" causing shocking effects that have reverberated throughout the nation-
wide academic community). While there are no pending cases before the Supreme Court address-
ing the Hopwood issues, so many law schools and institutions of higher education use affirmative
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF HOPWOOD 1H
In overturning the district court decision, the Fifth Circuit overstepped its
authority by attempting to predict the outcome of a potential Supreme Court
review rather than applying binding law.'" In holding U.T. Law to be the
proper scope for evaluating the validity of remedial action, the court turned a
blind eye to the pervasive and egregious racism present throughout society,
and Texas in particular, as well as the lingering effects of past state-sanctioned
racial discrimination."' The court also failed to recognize possible forms of
present discrimination in higher education based on flawed evaluations of
merit."
Completely disregarding Bakke, Judge Smith declared that Justice
Powell's diversity rationale was inadequate to pass strict scrutiny, and stated
that the only permissible grounds for race-based actions are remedial." 2 This
action policies similar to U.T. Law's program that college administrators and admissions staff are
scrambling to develop response strategies to possible court challenges in other circuits. Id. See
generally Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyl, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (1996)
(discussing the diversity rationale in depth and suggesting that the Supreme Court may choose to
preserve Bakke and the special consideration given to academic freedom). Other scholars have a
less optimistic viewpoint. Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1852
(1996) ("[alffirmative action Armageddon is at hand, and the legal fate of diversity will be the
richest prize at stake").
The ultimate effects on U.T. Law remain unknown. Dean M. Michael Sharlot pessimisti-
cally noted that the Supreme Court's decision "resulted in a great irony." While U.T. Law and
other schools located in the Fifth Circuit remain bound by Hopwood, other schools outside the
region, many of which have little or no history of state-sanctioned discrimination, are free to uti-
lize affirmative action programs. Combined with a recent Texas Attorney General's ruling that
financial aid must be administered in a race-neutral manner, Hopwood threatens to turn U.T. Law
"from being the nation's leading producer of African-American and Mexican-American lawyers to
one that will have very few members of these groups." Dean M. Michael Sharlot, Hopwood Up-
date, TEXAS ALCALDE COLLEGE ROUNDUP, in TEXAS ALCALDE, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 32D; see also
Avrel Seale, Sipping Tea With Bob Berdahl, TEXAS ALCALDE, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 23-24 (inter-
viewing University of Texas President, who notes that "[w]e're [now] at a terrific comparative dis-
advantage and there's no question but that we will have a very palpable, discernible decline in
minority enrollment, especially in certain programs").
109. Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 943-44 (arguing that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is mere
dictum rather than binding law, and suggesting that Powell's diversity argument would not with-
stand strict scrutiny). See generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Day the Quotas Died: Affirmative Action's
Posthumous Life, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 22, 1996, at 21, 24 (labeling Judge Smith's opinion
as "clumsy vote count[ingl" instead of the application of existing law). Furthermore, while it ap-
pears clear that U.T. Law's use of separate admissions committees and singular consideration of
race were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Justice Powell's rationale in Bakke, the
Fifth Circuit went beyond simply holding the specific program unconstitutional and broadly ad-
dressed the general concepts of affirmative action and diversity in all higher education. See also
The Hon. Nathaniel R. Jones, The Harlan Dissent: The Road Not Taken--An American Tragedy,
12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 971 (1996) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood 11 ruling as an
improper attempt to overrule Bakke, and suggesting that the U.T. administration's determination of
discriminatory effects at U.T. Law was made well within the boundaries of administrative compe-
tence).
110. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 554-57.
111. See infra notes 139-156 and accompanying text.
112. Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 944-45 (citing Adarand and Croson). Judge Smith also cited
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting, in which she stated "[mlodem equal protection
has recognized only one [compelling state] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimina-
tion." Id. at 945 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (O'Connor,
[Vol. 74:1
1996] HOPWOOD, HIGHER EDUCATION, AND HOMOGENEITY 279
tortured interpretation ignored part V-C of Bakke,"3 in which Justice Powell
was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun." 4 In effect,
the Fifth Circuit failed to recognize the profound and compelling value of
diversity in higher education in general. Equally erroneous was the court's
failure to recognize the value of diversity in legal education as the necessary
and narrowly-tailored means to serve other compelling government interests.
Among these interests are preventing discrimination, preserving academic
freedom, serving the interests of the community, and creating access to the
law for all people.
A. Remedying Past Institutional Discrimination
The Hopwood 1I court ignored Texas' well-documented arguments about
remedying the present effects of past discrimination as well as the factual
evidence indicating strong lingering effects of past discrimination throughout
the state's educational system. Federal investigators examined the state's
higher education system in the mid-1970s," 5 and found pervasive and
egregious discrimination." 6  Although U.T. Law itself was formally
integrated in 1950, forms of state-sanctioned segregation at the law school
continued well into the 1960s." 7 While a small number of African-
Americans were admitted to U.T. Law during this period, as late as 1971 there
were still some entering classes which had no African-American students."8
Just as there were clear and offensive remnants of segregation twenty-one
years after the court-ordered integration of U.T. Law, equally unequivocal
signs exist today indicating that racial equality has not yet found its way to
many institutions of higher education." 9 The fact that the student body of a
J., dissenting)).
113. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (stating that "the State has a substantial interest that may
legitimately be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive con-
sideration of race and ethnic origin.").
114. Id. at 272 n.4.
115. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 555-56. The investigating agency was the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Id. at 555. The investiga-
tion revealed that Texas had "'failed to eliminate vestiges of its former de jure racially dual sys-
tem of public higher education, a system which segregated blacks and whites."' As a result of the
investigation, Texas submitted a compliance plan called the "Texas Plan." Id. In 1982, Assistant
Secretary of Education Clarence Thomas formally informed Texas governor Bill Clements that the
Texas Plan was insufficient because the numerical goals for African-American and Hispanic grad-
uate school enrollment did not meet the state's commitment to enroll them in proportions equal to
their representation among all graduates of state undergraduate institutions. Id.
116. Id. at 555-56.
117. See id. at 555 (noting that until the mid-1960s Mexican-American students were segre-
gated in on-campus housing, and African-American students were prohibited from living in or
even entering white dormitories).
118. Id. at 558. The district court also noted that in the late 1960s U.T. Law offered race-
based scholarships which, ironically, were for whites only. Id. at 557; see also Robert S. Chang,
Reverse Racism!: Affirmative Action, the Family, and the Dream That Is America, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1115, 1117-19 (1996) (arguing that the use of a "narrow temporal framework" by
opponents of affirmative action to evaluate present effects of past discrimination fails to consider
the broader societal effects of past discriminatory practices).
119. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action For Whom?, 47 STAN L. REV.
855, 877-78 (1995) (noting the wide disparities between African-Americans and Anglos in both
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top-quality law school, in a state where Anglos constitute little more than half
of the population,2" would become nearly all-white if affirmative action
were eliminated from the admissions process 2 ' is ample evidence that there
exists some form of discrimination or lingering effects that go far beyond
formal race-based admissions barriers. Furthermore, the fact that severe racial
segregation still exists today in the nation's educational system'22 is evidence
of the pervasive societal discrimination which evades all attempts to eradicate
it. 1
3
The Fifth Circuit also erred in finding that the proper scope for evaluating
the need for remedial action is U.T. Law itself. Citing Wygant, 24 the court
narrowly held that U.T. Law could not initiate any race-based measures except
those narrowly designed to eliminate the effects of past discrimination within
the institution itself.2 5 By so holding, the court blatantly ignored the
incontrovertible nexus between higher education and society.'26 Although the
link between government construction contracts and societal discrimination
may be ambiguous, higher education-and law in particular-provide society
with leadership, a forum for dissemination of ideas, and a laboratory for
intellectual and political development.2 7 Law, more than any other pro-
fession, is inextricably linked to our social fabric, government, and political
processes. 2 The detrimental effects of segregated law schools have a
tremendous ripple effect reaching into every facet of society.'29
economic and educational success).
120. See Robert M. Berdahl, Understanding Hopwood, TEXAS ALCALDE, July-Aug. 1996, at
16, 17 (U.T. President noting that the State of Texas will have no ethnic majority by the turn of
the century).
121. See Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 573 (stating that, in the absence of race-conscious ad-
missions, the 1992 entering class would have included, at most, nine African-Americans and eigh-
teen Hispanics). In addition, it should be noted that while these twenty-seven students might have
been offered admission to U.T. Law, the number of minorities actually accepting offers might be
much lower. In the absence of affirmative action, the homogenous academic environment could
actually deter qualified minority candidates from accepting spots in the entering class. According
to the Dean of U.T. Law, competition between elite law schools for highly-qualified minority
candidates is "very fierce." Interview with M. Michael Sharlot, Dean of U.T. Law, in Austin,
Texas. (June 19, 1996).
122. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 554 (noting that in Texas alone there are desegregation
lawsuits pending against over 40 school districts, and recognizing Texas' history of intentionally
resisting court-ordered desegregation).
123. See id. at 570-73.
124. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (stating that general soci-
etal discrimination is not grounds for remedial action in a particular arena that does not itself
overtly show the effects of past discrimination). Judge Smith also used Croson, holding that the
scope of remedial action extends only to the governmental actor that had previously discriminated.
Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 954 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 499).
125. See Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 954.
126. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stating that "the
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas .... (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))).
127. See infra notes 157-180.
128. See Mary Kay Lundwall, Increasing Diversity in Law Schools and the Legal Profession:
A New Approach, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 147, 148 (1994) (noting the extraordinary influ-
ence the legal profession has in politics and government).
129. See generally Okechukwu Oko, Laboring in the Vineyards of Equality: Promoting Diver-
sity in Legal Education Through Affirmative Action, 23 S.U. L. REV. 189 (1996) (arguing that
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Moreover, the court passed over the fact that while institutions of higher
education have been formally opened to minorities, minorities are still
tremendously underrepresented in undergraduate and graduate programs
nationwide, including law. 3' Socialized biases 3' that extend far beyond
formal admissions barriers cannot be quantified 3 2 or eliminated by merely
"opening up the doors" to disadvantaged racial minorities; there still exists a
pervasive discriminatory atmosphere in society'33 that disadvantages many,
and thus, justifies race-based remedies.'34 As stated in The Civil Rights
Cases,"' remedial action is justified as long as there are lingering effects of
societal discrimination permeating all areas of society.'36
While optimistic scholars hope for a color-blind society in which race
conscious measures are unnecessary,' 7  pervasive inequities and
racism, both intentional and unintentional, creates invisible but real barriers to African-Americans
that limit their potential for personal and professional development and perpetuates negative per-
ceptions about African-Americans).
130. See generally, Kenneth S. Tollett, Sr., The Case For Black Higher Education & Affir-
mative Action, 10-FEB NBA NAT'L B.A. MAG. Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 13 (discussing the persistent
existence of an African-American "underclass" and recent declines in African-American enroll-
ment at institutions of higher education). In addition, the underrepresentation of minorities in law
can be seen not only by looking at overall social demographics, but also by comparing the per-
centages of minority college graduates to the percentage of minority students enrolled at law
schools. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 558-61 (pointing out that U.T. Law's original percentage
goals for preferred students were approximately equal to their percentages of all Texas college
graduates). While much contemporary legal scholarship has focused upon the plight of African-
Americans, statistics also show that Hispanics in America face equal if not greater challenges.
While this may in part be due to language and educational barriers arising from immigration,
Hispanics as a group are the least educated major ethnic group. While they represent about nine
percent of the U.S. population, only three percent of attorneys and approximately five percent of
first-year law students are Hispanic. Brest, supra note 119, at 883-87.
131. Justice Powell noted the existence of socialized biases in Bakke, stating that the "percep-
tion of racial and ethnic distinctions is rooted in our Nation's constitutional and demographic
history." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
132. See Beschle, supra note 52, at 1142-45 (stating that many opponents of affirmative ac-
tion were the same voices once opposed to removing formal racial barriers, contending that indi-
viduals in society do not begin bias-free, and stating that just as society must constantly strive to
maintain law and order, it must constantly work to eliminate the inherent trait of individuals to
discriminate against those who are least like themselves).
133. See Frank Adams, Jr., Why Brown v. Board of Education and Affirmative Action Can
Save Historically Black Colleges and Universities, 47 ALA. L. REV. 481, 510 (1996) (noting,
among other factors, the severe psychological barriers to racial equality that defy traditional at-
tempts to eradicate racism by "leveling the playing field").
134. See Tollett, supra note 130, at 13 (arguing that the persistently wide gaps in income
levels, educational attainment, life expectancy, incarceration, and political representation are indic-
ative of a continuing racism permeating society).
135. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that while remedial action is not
meant to be permanent, it is justified as long as there is continued discrimination in society).
136. Oko, supra note 129, at 191-94 (arguing that racism presents such a severe threat to the
stability of this nation that the government bears the responsibility of allowing minority represen-
tation in society through affirmative action programs). For a discussion of the continued need for
affirmative action in the face of societal discrimination, see generally Tollett, supra note 130. In
Texas, for example, these lingering effects are especially prominent. For minorities, particularly
African-Americans and Hispanics, assimilation into society has been slow and inconsistent. This
reflects "the effects of centuries of political, social, and economic discrimination that Americans of
darker skins have endured in this society." ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 72, at 98.
137. See generally Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-Exclusive Scholarships: Constitutional Vel Non, 30
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 759 (1995) (arguing that race-neutral jurisprudence is the only way to
achieve nondiscrimination). Other scholars argue that even academic diversity should be entrusted
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discrimination in society illustrate the need for continued race-based measures,
both as a remedy for past discrimination and a vigilant means of achieving the
compelling goal of a nondiscriminatory society. 3 '
B. Challenging the Bias of Merit: The Search For Standards
Opponents of affirmative action contend that such programs unfairly
discriminate against whites who have better qualifications for the desired
positions.'39 In support, they often cite anecdotal evidence of a white student
with higher test scores or grades displaced by a "less qualified" minority."
Such divisive arguments invariably stir deep emotions on both sides of the
debate, but lost in the rhetoric is the silent and erroneous assumption that
higher test scores and grades are incontrovertible measurements of merit. This
has been challenged as perpetuating inherent systemic biases. 4 '
The most common "objective" measurement of law school applicants, the
Law School Admissions Test (LSAT), is generally considered (along with
undergraduate grades) 42 to be an accurate indicator of the ability to succeed
in law school.'43 Critics charge that standardized tests are, in reality, a
"general, but imperfect, indicator of merit" rather than a concrete identifier of
"to the same forces that govern diversity in our private lives." Chen, supra note 108, at 1910.
While noble in principle, such blind trust ignores the inherent human tendency to discriminate
against that which is different or unfamiliar. Beschle, supra note 52, at 1142-45.
138. The compelling government interest in preventing discrimination is unquestionable and
well grounded in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (stating that all discrimination is "poisonous and pernicious") (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,
167 (1987) (finding discriminatory conduct adequate justification for race-based remedies);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (noting "[tihe Court is in agreement
that ... remedying past or present racial discrimination . . . is a sufficiently weighty state interest
to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program") (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)
(stating explicitly that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate discrimination);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 494-95 (citing studies about the adverse effects of discrimina-
tion on students); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("[elqual protection of the laws is
not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities").
139. See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 790-91 (arguing that race-based scholarships and admis-
sions criteria deny higher education opportunities to those with "stronger credentials").
140. See Ken Feagins, 'Wanted-Diversity: White Heterosexual Males Need Not Apply,' 4
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1, 12 (1994) (offering a vignette concerning a white male who was rejected
by three medical schools even though his scores would have been acceptable for admission had he
been a minority applicant); see also Paul D. Carrington, Diversity, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1136
(1992) (arguing that racial classifications ignore individuality while focusing on stereotypes of
"overprivileged white males or underprivileged black females").
141. BARBARA R. BERGMANN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 120-33 (1996).
142. Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 121, 121
& n.3 (1993) (noting that not only is the test universally used, but almost all ABA-approved
schools require it in combination with undergraduate grades). While the use of undergraduate
grades to determine admissions has also been challenged as inaccurate for measuring the ability of
applicants to be successful in the legal profession, this article will limit the examination of the law
school admissions criteria to the LSAT. At U.T. Law, the admissions index combined grades and
LSAT scores, but the LSAT weighed more heavily than grades. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 557.
For a discussion of the inadequacy of using academic measurements as an admissions factor, see
generally C. WOODARD, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION
27 (1983).
143. Espinoza, supra note 142, at 127.
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intellect.'" While researchers consistently attempt to improve the
examination, 45 questions persist" about the ability of standardized tests to
provide an accurate representation of the qualifications or abilities that
potential students bring to law school. 47 The flaws in the LSAT as an
objective measure for screening applicants are threefold: 1) the test itself is
inherently culturally and racially biased such that it inaccurately measures the
"intelligence" of minority students;" 2) the ability of the LSAT to predict
success in law school is statistically weak;'49 and 3) the racially and
culturally biased nature of law schools and the process of legal education is
such that mere academic success in the traditional law school environment
bears little relevance to the ability to succeed as a lawyer.5 '
Moreover, if we dismantle the argument that race-conscious admissions
always' discriminate against whites, 5' we find that a diversity-oriented
selection process which emphasizes an individual's overall potential
contribution to the academic and educational environment cannot possibly
discriminate against "similarly situated" individuals.' Indeed, accepting the
reality that all students with a certain minimum level of qualifications are
adequately suited for law school'53 inevitably leads to the conclusion that
considering additional beneficial characteristics,' including diversity, creates
144. See Berdahl, supra note 120, at 118 (explaining the admissions policies at U.T. and
stating that while test scores may vary between white and preferred candidates, no unqualified stu-
dents are admitted, regardless of race).
145. Espinoza, supra note 142, at 163.
146. Eulius Simien, The Law School Admission Test as a Barrier to Almost Twenty Years of
Affirmative Action, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 359; see also Oko, supra note 129, at 201-03 (dis-
cussing the effects of societal discrimination and poverty on the academic performance of African-
Americans, and concluding that only affirmative action can lead to increased participation by
African-Americans in the legal profession).
147. Simien, supra note 146, at 382-85 (noting various studies that have examined and criti-
cized the ability of the LSAT to predict success in either law school or the legal profession).
148. See Espinoza, supra note 142, at 121-28.
149. Simien, supra note 146, at 382-83; see also Espinoza, supra note 142, at 163-64 (stating
that the use of statistics correlating LSAT scores and academic success in law school is no more
valid than using data showing that family income also correlates well to academic ability, and
suggesting that law schools should show a nexus between standardized tests and the ability to suc-
ceed in the profession of law).
150. See Espinoza, supra note 142, at 127-29 (noting that the law school experience, includ-
ing casebooks, examinations, and traditional legal teaching methods are biased in favor of those
who because of their culture, education, and background are able to identify with and understand
the processes).
151. For an example of this perspective, see Ken Feagins, Affirmative Action or the Same
Sin?, 67 DENY. U. L. REV. 421, 422 (1990) (suggesting that white males are quickly becoming
the most discriminated-against class in America).
152. The general standard for equal protection analysis was set forth in F.S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (noting "the classification must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike") (em-
phasis added). But see Feagins, supra note 140, at 26-29 (arguing that all race-based classifica-
tions increase racial tensions by blindly favoring one group over another).
153. Nevertheless, as long as numerical or "objective" measures are the primary method of
evaluating most candidates there will exist a stigma, attached to minority or disadvantaged stu-
dents, of being inferior or unqualified. See Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical As-
sessment of the Concept of "Diversity", 1993 Wis. L. REV. 105, 145-46.
154. Such characteristics might include ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, superior aca-
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the potential for an ideal educational environment.'55 As stated by Justice
Harry Blackmun, "[iun order to get beyond racism, we must first take account
of race."' 56
C. Preserving Academic Freedom
Despite Judge Smith's dismissal of the diversity argument presented in
Bakke, 5' ample evidence suggests a continued compelling governmental
interest in promoting diversity in higher education. 5 Academic freedom, a
long established prerogative of institutions of higher learning, extends to the
choice of classroom curriculum, the appointment of faculty, and the freedom
to select a student body that best serves the interests of higher education.'59
This choice includes the "four essential freedoms"'" of determining "who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study."'' This "national commitment" '  to protecting such
liberties was emphasized in Keyishian v. Board of Regents163 and United
States v. Associated Press."6 These freedoms determine the very nature of
the nation's future leaders,"6 and the overwhelming First Amendment
interest cannot be overlooked."6 As stated in Sweatt v. Painter, "few
students... would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the
interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is
concerned." 67 Diversity in higher education serves not only as the compel-
demic or other achievements, financial hardship, physical handicap, nationality, life and work
experience, or being the legacy of a financial benefactor.
155. The "best qualified" students may or may not include those with high grades and test
scores. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 578; see also Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring Affirmative
Action Admissions Policies with Federal Judicial Guidelines: A Model for the Twenty-First Centu-
ry, 22 J.C. & U.L. 895, 899 (1996) (arguing that as long as colleges and universities rely on "ob-
jective" criteria for admissions, they will be unable to achieve diversity in their student popula-
tions). While it is true that any consideration of diversity is itself a subjective evaluation, schools
must also recognize that test scores and grades are also subjective criteria, and justify their subjec-
tive choices on pedagogical grounds.
156. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
157. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 944-46.
158. See generally Vince Herron, Increasing the Speech: Diversity, Campus Speech Codes,
and the Pursuit of Truth, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 407 (1994) (identifying many of the virtues of a
diversified educational environment, including the dissemination, discussion, and consideration of
dissimilar ideas and values).
159. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957).
160. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
161. Id.
162. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
163. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (affirming a strong national commitment to "safeguarding
academic freedom," and declaring the nation's future dependent upon having leaders educated
through exposure to a wide range of ideas).
164. 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943) (stating that "right conclusions are more likely to be gath-
ered out of a multitude of tongues").
165. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
166. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (noting that petitioner's argument invoked the idea of a
competing First Amendment interest, and acknowledging the goal of diversity to be "of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of [the educational] mission").
167. 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
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ling interest as stated in Bakke," but also as the necessary and narrowly-
tailored means to safeguarding academic freedom."6
The benefits of such diversity extend to all of the students in the
classroom. 7 ' Just as minority and underprivileged students can benefit from
learning mainstream ideas and values, those students coming from an affluent
background or those without diverse cultural knowledge can better understand
and learn in a diverse environment.' For those unfamiliar with minority
cultures or ideas, it provides the opportunity to interact with and meet those
from different backgrounds and value systems,' an experience all the more
necessary for those entering the legal profession. 7 ' Students of all races and
backgrounds benefit from a diverse student population, for the process of
assimilation, rejection, and modification of a wide range of ideas constitutes
the very definition of higher education.'74
Some scholars, however, reject the value of race-based classifications as a
means of achieving diversity. They contend that such classifications
erroneously assume a consistent viewpoint from all people of the same color
or ethnicity.' This specious argument denies the inherent racism present in
American culture.'76 Racism has consistently transcended economic or class
lines,'77 subjecting even affluent or "undisadvantaged" minorities to violence
or discrimination.'78 While it would be improper to assume a consistent
viewpoint from all minorities,' logic dictates that a different viewpoint can
168. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15.
169. The very nature of academic freedom and the deference to schools to determine their
own needs is such that each institution has different priorities. The appropriate "fit" of diversity in
the role of furthering the compelling interest of academic freedom can best be analyzed by exam-
ining the particular and unique needs of each educational environment.
170. See Foster, supra note 153, at 138-39 (explaining the benefits to all viewpoints from an
exchange of diverse ideas).
171. See Brest, supra note 119, at 862-63 (presenting a comprehensive explanation of the
intellectual and academic value of diversity for both minorities and other students).
172. See Garfield, supra note 155, at 914 (noting the benefits to "innocent third parties"); see
also BERGMANN, supra note 141, at 106.
173. See Simien, supra note 146, at 369.
174. See Berdahl, supra note 120, at 17 (noting "[e]ducation is the process of encountering
that which we are not, that with which we are unfamiliar, that which we do not know").
175. See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 775 (stating that skin color, ethnicity, and gender pro-
vide no "meaningful insight into an individual's mental processes"); see also Carrington, supra
note 140, at 1133-34 (ridiculing the affirmative action presumption that minorities are needed to
express some specific "minority" point of view); Chen, supra note 108, at 1907 (stating that "we
have sacrificed diversity within racial groups in order to accentuate diversity between groups").
176. See Oko, supra note 129, at 190-92 (arguing that racism today is still so pervasive and
damaging to society that it "threatens the very existence of this nation").
177. See Brest, supra note 119, at 878-79 (describing how racism and discriminatory attitudes
by whites affect African-Americans of all economic classes).
178. Although not every minority student is guaranteed to bring a unique viewpoint to the
academic environment, the fact that the overwhelming majority of African-Americans experiences
some degree of racial discrimination justifies the assumption of such a diverse perspective. Simi-
larly, just as the ability to provide a convincing writing sample does not guarantee qualities that
will be useful in law school, schools nonetheless have determined that the likelihood is great
enough to justify their use.
179. See Brest, supra note 119, at 862 (stating that while it cannot be assumed that all mem-
bers of a race have identical ways of thinking, it is likely that members of discriminated-against
minority groups have a viewpoint different from mainstream whites). Accepting the differences in
viewpoint between historically disadvantaged minorities and mainstream Anglos, while rejecting
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safely be assumed for those of ethnic or cultural minorities who have
historically been discriminated against. 8
D. Serving Community and Constituents
Even a pragmatic approach to evaluating the validity of race-conscious
admissions reveals a compelling state interest in protecting the political
interests of a university funded primarily by a state legislature.' From a
practical standpoint, a university must be able to demonstrate to its
constituents that it is an asset worthy of taxpayer support. 2 Just as private
institutions that depend upon alumni donations and endowments are given
great deference in allowing student bodies to include the children of wealthy
benefactors or alumni, 3 state institutions must be allowed the freedom to
include the children of their "benefactors." Courts have even allowed state
institutions the freedom to choose a student population based upon a need to
satisfy alumni who "provide monetary support."' 84 In a university heavily
dependent upon state funding, diversity properly achieves the compelling'
goal of serving the community and the school's constituents by allowing
access to higher education for all segments of society.'86
the "essentialist" theory that impoverished urban African-Americans share a common, monolithic
belief system with middle-class educated African-Americans, is the key to recognizing the impor-
tance of transcendent race lines in America. See Foster, supra note 153, at 139-41.
180. In his concurrence, Judge Weiner wrote that while he disagreed with the majority that
diversity is never a compelling government interest, he concurred in the judgment because he
thought U.T. Law's admissions process was not "narrowly tailored" to achieve diversity. Hopwood
11, 78 F.3d at 962. In particular, he noted. that only African-Americans and Hispanics were given
preferential treatment, rather than all possible groups that could contribute to a desirably diverse
environment. Id. at 966. Quoting Justice Powell in Bakke, he stated that diversity "'encompasses a
far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a sin-
gle though important element."' Id. at 965 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315).
181. See Berdahl, supra note 120, at 17 (stating that by the year 2000, Anglos in Texas will
no longer be a majority of the population, evoking the possibility that the University of Texas will
have to seek funding for a nearly all-white law school from a legislature whose constituents, as a
group, generally cannot be admitted). Such political considerations are significant.
182. Id. There is little dispute about the overwhelming societal benefits created by colleges
and universities. Nonetheless, if the benefits are demographically or geographically disparate,
political support may be difficult to obtain. Much like academic freedom, political considerations
are unique to each school and should be evaluated at the discretion of the individual institution.
See generally Chen, supra note 108, at 1878 (stating that "diversity must be a broad concept" and
that any affirmative action program that utilizes diversity criteria must "confer some tangible ben-
efit" that must "accrue to all constituencies within the academic community").
183. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 946; see also Foster, supra note 153, at 143-44 (observing that
the children of alumni make up significant proportions of the student bodies at many of the
nation's elite colleges and universities, and noting that courts have held preferential treatment in
the admission of legacies, regardless of "objective" qualifications, to be nondiscriminatory).
184. See, e.g., Rosenstock v. Board of Governors, 423 F. Supp. 1321, 1327 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
185. If the alternative to alumni or constituent financial support is budget-cutting, increased
tuition, reduced opportunities for students, and limited enrollment, political considerations are
undoubtedly "compelling" interests for a state institution. See Berdahl, supra note 120, at 17 (not-
ing the reluctance of one state legislator to approve funding for an institution that does not admit
any of his constituents).
186. Critics of affirmative action who bitterly complain about lowered admissions standards
for minorities, fail to address the reality that students admitted under legacy consideration have
combined SAT scores that average thirty-five points below those of other students. Foster, supra
note 153, at 143. Legacy or lineage preferences are commonly used at many colleges and univer-
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E. Creating Access to the Law
The unique nature of law and the concurrent ethical and social
responsibilities imposed upon lawyers are such that adequate representation for
minority clients is of paramount importance.'87 Many of those most
disadvantaged or discriminated against cannot speak English, and an all-white
Bar is unlikely to provide the same aggressive advocacy for such clients as a
legal profession rich in diversity and representative of such values or
culture.' 8 Moreover, in light of past state-sanctioned discrimination against
minorities, there is a need for minority representation in the legal profession
greater than their representation in society at large.'89
Finally, the crucial role lawyers and the legal profession play in politics
and legislation also indicates the critical importance of diversity in the legal
profession as a means of preserving and facilitating access to the law"9 for
all members of society. 9' Such a disproportionately large number of legisla-
tors and politicians come from legal backgrounds, that a homogeneous legal
profession cannot reasonably be expected to represent adequately the values
and ideas of all citizens.'92 Just as the diversity of police departments has
sities, yet criticism of such preferences for the privileged is rare. See generally John Larew, Who's
the Real Affirmative Action Profiteer? THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, June 1991, at 26 (arguing
that children of rich alumni constitute an elite class of individuals who receive significant benefits
based solely upon lineage); see also Chang, supra note 118, at 1123-24 (noting that many of the
University of California regents who recently voted to abolish race and gender preferences in
admissions have used their own influence as regents to help "relatives, friends, and children of
business partners into UCLA," sometimes in favor of "better qualified" applicants); JOHN K. WtL-
SON, THE MYTH OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS: THE CONSERVATIvE ATrACK ON HIGHER EDUCA-
TION 151 (1995) (describing legacies as the "oldest form of affirmative action").
187. See Simien, supra note 146, at 368 (noting a lack of adequate legal services in many
African-American communities); see also Smith, The Role of Primary and Secondary School
Teachers in the Motivation of Black Youths to Become Lawyers, 52 J. NEGRO EDUC. 302, 369
(1983) (noting that while the number of African-Americans in the legal profession proportional to
their overall population has remained relatively constant over the last 60 years, the corresponding
ratio of Anglo lawyers has doubled); see also Simien, supra note 146, at 369.
188. See Simien, supra note 146, at 369 (noting that while the needs of African-Americans
can often be met by non-African-American lawyers, "similar backgrounds and experiences" enable
lawyers to better identify with and represent their clients).
189. See Brest, supra note 119, at 877 (citing statistics showing that while African-Americans
comprise about twelve percent of the general population in the U.S., they constitute only three
percent of all attorneys and approximately eight percent of all first-year law students). In response
to the argument that the eight percent figure indicates progress, it should be noted that attrition
rates for African-American students are significantly higher than for whites. Hopwood I, 861 F.
Supp. at 554 & n.3; see also Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race from Legal Education, 28 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM. 51, 52-54 (1994) (noting that attrition rates for minority students in accred-
ited law schools are more than twice as high as those for non-minority students).
190. A broad interpretation of "the law" includes not only attorneys and legislators, but also
judges, bureaucrats and administrators, government officials, prosecutors, civic leaders, politicians,
law teachers, scholars, and students.
191. See Brest, supra note 119, at 863 (noting that the legal profession possesses tremendous
social and political power); see also David E. Van Zandt, Merit at the Right Tail: Education and
Elite Law School Admissions, 64 TEX. L. REv. 1493, 1494 (1986) (reviewing ROBERT
KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELITES (1985) (noting that selection to "elite" law schools almost invari-
ably opens doors of opportunity and employment greater than those for students at nonelite insti-
tutions)).
192. Lundwall, supra note 128, at 148. In addition to race, economic status plays a critical
role in political participation. Lower socioeconomic status creates difficulties in becoming in-
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been justified as necessary to preserve public confidence in the police
system,193 in order to preserve social stability 94 in an increasingly diverse
nation, there must be a wide range of views and values represented by judges,
prosecutors, and attorneys. 95 In recent years it has become clear that
perceptions and understandings of the law are closely linked to cultural and
social backgrounds. 96 Consequently, a legal profession that reflects the
diversity of culture and ideas is imperative.'97
V. A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE
In order to develop a diversity-based admissions plan that can serve the
interests of all citizens, survive strict judicial scrutiny, and preserve the integri-
ty and quality of our educational system, institutions of higher learning must
begin by reevaluating and reconfiguring the "objective" academic criteria to
reflect a more responsible and unbiased method of evaluating merit. To avoid
the admission of "underqualified" students,9" schools may determine a point
above which a faculty can rest reasonably assured that all students have the
intellectual ability to succeed in the program. 99 By allowing this level of
volved in political campaigns or crusades that may not appear to have immediate, tangible results.
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 72, at 99.
193. See Foster, supra note 153, at 113-15 (arguing that race-conscious government policies
serve "forward-looking" goals of reducing racial tensions and promoting equality); see also
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that police departments could better
serve a community plagued by racial problems with a diverse and racially balanced police force,
and that an integrated public school faculty could provide a better educational environment that
one that is all white).
194. See Simien, supra note 146, at 369 (suggesting that without adequate minority represen-
tation in the legal profession, historically disadvantaged minorities will never have respect for and
confidence in the legal system).
195. See id. at 369-70 (stating that the positions of power and trust held by the legal profes-
sion demand increased representation by African-Americans, thus enabling them to participate in
the active development of society).
196. See Peter M. Shane, Why Are So Many People Unhappy? Habits of Thought and Resis-
tance to Diversity in Legal Education, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1033, 1039-40 (1990) (arguing that inter-
pretations of legal issues are greatly dependent upon "a web of relationships and past experiences"
unique to each individual).
197. See generally Robert L. Bach, Building Community Among Diversity: Legal Services for
Impoverished Immigrants, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 639 (1994) (discussing the role legal servic-
es play in the development and health of poor communities, particularly those with immigrant or
diverse populations).
198. Currently, most applicants to law school, when taking the LSAT, enter a code or codes
indicating school preferences. The grading system of the LSAT or other standardized tests could
be reconfigured to reflect only a form of "pass/fail" results based upon that school's requirements,
or even a more generalized "band" system grouping scores into more general categories than the
raw numerical and percentile score used today. This might prevent the petty argument that one
applicant is more qualified than another based upon a one point difference in the numerical score.
See generally Dannye Holley & Thomas Kleven, Minorities and the Legal Profession: Current
Platitudes, Current Barriers, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 299, 315-16 (1987) (discussing the need
for more accurate testing methods to select law students).
199. Allowing each school's faculty or administration to determine its own "baseline" figures
for academic qualifications would give schools the flexibility to select students according to each
institution's particular needs. Moreover, schools would not be bound to follow a standardized
approach developed by outsiders and would not necessarily be compelled to fall into the trap of
competing for students with higher numbers. In addition, instead of promoting themselves to po-
tential students through the presentation of "objective qualifications" of incoming students, such as
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"competency" to vary depending on the goals, abilities, and needs of the
institution, each institution's faculty would thereby preserve its own academic
freedom and ability to evaluate applicants based on the unique needs of that
particular institution.2"
Once this baseline figure is set, a school would be free to select students
with qualifications at or above that point based upon additional characteristics.
By declaring that all applicants who have met the cutoff requirement are
considered equally qualified with regard to this measurement,"' schools
could eliminate the argument that some candidates are inherently more
qualified than others2"e based solely upon tests scores or grades.0 3 In
addition to limiting the importance of numerical qualifications, 2°  schools
would solicit information from applicants about what qualities, characteristics,
or unique abilities they would bring to the educational environment. To
identify nontraditional or subjective characteristics,2" schools could require
GPA and LSAT scores, schools would better serve their diversity interests by focusing on out-
come-based statistics, such as bar passage rates, job placement figures, and even graduate income
statistics to advertise the quality of their program.
200. While schools known for their academic program and curriculum could focus on students
whose qualifications appear to be matched, schools with a more practical or clinically-based pro-
gram could select an entering class based upon qualities the school perceives to be preferable for
its curriculum.
201. Schools could formally state the general irrelevance (or limited relevance) of academic
numbers above a certain point as valuable to the law school community. In addition to eliminating
applicants' obsession with numerical minutiae, such a plan would also encourage alternative
achievement in areas that could substantially benefit an applicant and the legal community. In
order to preserve the incentive to perform well in traditional forums of evaluation in undergradu-
ate school, schools could also develop a plan for giving limited relevance and consideration to
marginal academic achievement above the requirements. This paper does not suggest a diminished
value for superior academic performance, but only proposes that other equally valuable criteria be
considered.
202. See Simien, supra note 146, at 374 (arguing that today's "objective" admissions stan-
dards subjectively choose among the qualified rather than simply identifying those capable of
succeeding in law or contributing to the profession).
203. This perception may be difficult to overcome, but one possible tool in promoting the
idea of a more holistic admissions system is the process of conducting interviews, no longer used
by many schools because of the cost and the large number of applicants.
204. Some scholars have argued that current GPA and LSAT-based admissions criteria are
faulty, and advocate developing an admissions process that is actually tailored to increase minori-
ty admissions to law schools. Russell L. Jones, The Legal Profession: Can Minorities Succeed?,
12 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 347, 351-53 (1987); see also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Thoughts About
Pursuing Diversity in Legal Education for Pedagogical Rather than Political or Compensatory
Reasons: A Review Essay on Stephen L. Carter's "Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby", 36
How. L.J. 291, 297-98 (1993) (arguing that current admissions criteria cannot measure "an
applicant's commitment to the common good or willingness to serve others," and suggesting that
as long as schools screen out incompetent candidates, nontraditional characteristics should be
considered as beneficial to an application).
205. At this point in the admissions process diversity characteristics assume a key role. See
supra note 154. In addition to looking at "traditional" indicators, such as letters of recommenda-
tion and resumes, committees could accept nontraditional media such as written or videotaped
essays, work products or records, or any other means by which the applicant believes they can
convey a unique contributing quality.
206. While critics of current law school admissions have only recently begun to question the
relevance and value of traditional forms of measurement, other academic disciplines have long
used alternative methods of evaluating applicants. For example, the admissions committee for the
U.T. Graduate Conducting program uses performance videotapes as the primary criteria for evalu-
ating candidates. This method precludes all other standards of merit, skill, or achievement. Such
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each applicant to submit a personal statement about life experiences,
educational aspirations, or career goals." 7
In addition to ethnic, racial, or other personal characteristics, hardship and
economic disadvantage should be taken into account for the purposes of
diversifying student populations. While scholars have suggested this approach
as an alternative 208 to race-conscious measures,209 others argue that such a
policy would fail to accomplish the goal of combating discrimination and
creating equal opportunity 2'0 by failing to distinguish between applicants
whose economic disadvantage is due to discrimination and those whose
methods "invariably tell us things about a candidate's ability to succeed in the profession that
mere grades alone cannot begin to indicate." Telephone Interview with Paula A. Crider, Professor
of Music at U.T. (Aug. 27, 1996). Although previous academic achievement and the abilities it
indicates will always be extremely important in law school, communication, performance, oral,
and interpersonal skills should be adequately recognized as significant in the legal profession. The
logistical difficulties of identifying valuable diversity characteristics are less imposing than they
appear. Current law school admissions policies often require writing samples and other indicators
of background, viewpoints, and unique or valuable skills. Christopher A. Ford, Challenges and
Dilemmas of Racial and Ethnic Identity in American and Post-Apartheid South African Affirmative
Action, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1953, 2022 (1996) (noting that the "raw material is already there" in
the law school admissions process).
207. In addition to providing the admissions committee with a useful writing sample, personal
statements allow applicants to identify what they believe are important abilities or characteristics
that cannot be measured by standardized tests or mere numerical evaluations. By allowing students
to "sell themselves" through these statements and other means, schools not only diversify their
class through their own criteria, but also are exposed to possible qualities and contributions not
previously considered or known by the faculty.
208. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Getting Beyond Racial Preferences: The Class-Based Compro-
mise, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 721, 726-28 (1996) (suggesting that a color-blind jurisprudence could
better address racial inequality by assisting disadvantaged people of all races). This approach,
though admirably principled, ignores the idea that racism and bigotry are inherent human charac-
teristics, and their elimination is not the successful result of a difficult struggle, but rather the goal
of a never-ending fight against human nature. See Beschle, supra note 52, at 1180-81 (stating that
racial prejudice and other biases are inherent and natural human behaviors, and that constant and
flexible corrective action is needed to combat them).
Other scholars suggest that class-based affirmative action should be used to complement
race-conscious measures. Ford, supra note 206, at 2019 (arguing that "class-based affirmative
action is clearly one approach that deserves future study" while stating that it shouldn't be substi-
tuted for effective race-conscious programs); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action
Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1913, 1950-51 (1996) (arguing for econom-
ic-based affirmative action programs but stating that such programs should not "divert attention
from the need for other, more effective public policies to combat both poverty and race-based
disadvantage").
209. Interestingly, while numerous critics of race-based affirmative action programs propose
class-based alternatives, our legal system and jurisprudence have never fully recognized economic
condition as a suspect class for the purposes of equal protection. See United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (upholding mandatory filing fees for bankruptcy); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971) (outlawing fees imposed on poor people filing for divorce); Harper
v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 688 (1966) (stating "[lines drawn on the basis of
wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored."). If conservatives alter affirma-
tive action to be class-based, they will have, in effect, taken the first step in doing what social lib-
erals have unsuccessfully attempted for years. See Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative
Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEx L. REV. 1847, 1847-48 (1996) (pointing out that "the
political irony of class-based affirmative action" is that "legal thinkers on the left have long
sought the legal recognition of economic inequality--or, even better, of 'class'--as a force in
American life and that Adarand is a step in that direction").
210. See Beschle, supra note 52, at 1180-81 (arguing that creating equal opportunity is a
compelling interest that may demand race-conscious measures designed to combat inherent human
biases).
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condition is not." Nonetheless, individuals from various economic
backgrounds can make significant contributions," 2 and in order to create a
true model for diversified higher education admissions, class-based
considerations must play an essential role.
Above all, race and ethnicity as contributing factors must be variable.2 3
Because one of the primary benefits of diversity is the exchange of a wide
range of ideas and values, it follows that an environment rich in certain
viewpoints will gain less from additional "similar" voices," 4 while a
heterogeneous educational institution would stand to benefit from almost any
diversification of viewpoint. By implementing a flexible program for diversity
admissions,2 5 schools can avoid the criticism that they are accepting
"quotas" of minority candidates.2 6 Furthermore, an adaptive definition of
diversity recognizes the dynamic elements of our society and allows for
changes in preferences that reflect the needs of a healthy university
environment.7
CONCLUSION
Despite the apparent setback dealt by the Hopwood H court, affirmative
action in higher education is far from dead in America, and continued
discrimination and bias in society are constant reminders that race-conscious
211. See Brest, supra note 119, at 897-99 (labeling class-based affirmative action programs
inefficient and not conducive to achieving the goals of affirmative action). While middle-class
members of an historically disadvantaged race might be likely to serve as role models or benefi-
ciaries for the minority community, the same might not be true for economically disadvantaged
whites who may or may not have a personal or cultural connection to their original economically
disadvantaged community. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Foster, supra note 153, at 161 (arguing that true diversity is "neither fixed nor final;
rather, it is local and contingent"). This proposal leaves open the possibility that schools could
choose admissions criteria that do not include diversity, and does not suggest that the law man-
dates diversity; rather, that diversity is both a compelling interest in and of itself and the means to
achieving the compelling interest of preventing discrimination. Thus, faculty, legislatures, or
whatever governing body determines the institution's interests would be free to choose what diver-
sity interests are best for them while remaining compliant with constitutional equal protection
rules against racial discrimination.
214. For example, a law school with a majority African-American student population might
have less to gain by preferencing African-American culture than it would by attempting to select
students of Hispanic or Anglo background.
215. These policies and academic values could be developed, within the accepted parameters
of "academic freedom," by the faculty, the administration, or even the legislature.
216. See Feagins, supra note 151, at 448-49 (arguing that preferential treatment of groups
erroneously assumes that each individual within the group has identical characteristics). This
paper's approach eliminates the problem of preferential treatment for groups by focusing instead
on individuals who can contribute separately to the academic and educational environment.
217. While African-Americans have generally been seen as the most victimized and dis-
criminated-against ethnic group, demographic and political changes may occasionally alter the
discriminatory landscape of America. Contemporary political movements and hostilities, such as
against Hispanic immigrants in California, Haitians in Florida, Vietnamese immigrants in Texas,
or even against homosexuals or religious groups may indicate the need for periodic adaptations of
what elements of diversity are desirable. In addition, the availability of a diverse population may
vary. For example, if a school in a state with a large Hispanic population is unable to find an
adequate pool of disadvantaged minority applicants, then less economically disadvantaged Hispan-
ics may present a greater asset to the school than if there were a deeper and more diverse pool of
Hispanic applicants.
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measures are needed.2 By recognizing the continued discrimination present
in society, as well as the far-reaching effects of past state-sanctioned discrimi-
nation and socialized biases, colleges and universities can implement remedial
measures that open the doors of higher education and the legal profession to
those held back by bias or disadvantage. In addition, we must acknowledge
the value of academic freedom and diversity by welcoming into the halls of
higher education viewpoints and ideas of every race, culture, ethnicity, and
individuality. Particularly in the law, we must take heed of the tremendous
ethical and moral responsibilities concomitant with the profession, and insure
that all citizens have access to a legal profession that is both understanding
and representative of all cultures and viewpoints. Diversity in higher
education, law, and society in general is both a compelling end in and of
itself, and the necessary and appropriate means to achieving the
unquestionably compelling goal of preventing discrimination and a return to
"separate but equal" educational systems.
As this country approaches a time where there exists no ethnic or racial
majority, the concept of diversity must be recognized as essential to the
survival of our nation, one in which race and culture are consanguineous with
various political, moral, and philosophical ideologies. We must accept the
inherent human tendency to be fearful of and biased against that which is
different or unknown, and utilize diversity as the single most effective
mechanism for vigilance against discrimination. The utopian vision of a great
potpourri of people, cultures, and ideas can never truly exist without diversity
and the substantial contributions it can make to our nation's future.
Kent Kostka*
218. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir.
1994) to strike down exclusive minority scholarship preferences, is not indicative of the future of
financial assistance for disadvantaged or minority students. Despite the apparently devastating
circuit rulings, the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue, and by applying a flexible diversity
rationale instead of strict racial classifications, scholarship awards could be used in a manner
beneficial to the concept of diversity.
* The author would like to sincerely thank Professor Julie Nice of the University of




THE CRIME OF PROPERTY:
BENNIS V. MICHIGAN AND THE
EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION
Eight years ago, Tina Bennis called the police in a frantic attempt to
locate her husband.' John Bennis had not returned from work to the Michigan
couple's residence in Royal Oak, a relatively secure suburb of Detroit.2 The
next day, Ms. Bennis discovered that her husband was in the custody of
Detroit police and became understandably upset when police informed her that
her husband had solicited a prostitute.' She was even more shocked to find
that the couple's 1977 Pontiac had been taken from them, not by joy-riding
kids or a car-theft ring, but by the state of Michigan.' The Detroit Police
Department had her car, intended to sell it, and might give her nothing in the
process.'
Law enforcement agencies employ forfeiture as a tool to solve a myriad
of social problems, ranging from illegal importation of uncertified car engines
to animal abuse to waste disposal.6 Since 1981, government agencies
instituted more than 200,000 forfeiture actions. Furthermore, the federal
government confiscated cash and property valued at an unprecedented $1.9
billion in 1993.8 Due to the lucrative nature of forfeiture, the prevalent
questionable enforcement tactics seriously compromise individual rights.9
1. Debra Saunders, High Court Takes Low Road on Forfeiture, DEr. FREE PRESS, Mar. 13,
1996, at 9A.
2. Id.
3. Margaret Trimer, Police Begin to Seize Cars in Prostitution Crackdown, DET. FREE
PRESS, Oct. 5, 1988, at 6A (quoting Tina Bennis, "I guess I'm glad to know he's alive ..... Wait
until I pick him up,.... I'll talk to him ... and maybe wring his neck.").
4. Id.
5. Id. (quoting a Michigan official comparing the vehicle forfeiture program to the doctrine
of "caveat emptor" -let the buyer beware).
6. See James E. Beaver et al., Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment After Austin, 19
SEAT-rLE U. L. REV. 1, 9-10 nn.51-52 (1995) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 85.1513(c) (1994) (dealing with
the forfeiture of uncertified engines); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.413(5)(e) (West 1993) (dealing with
the forfeiture of waste disposal equipment); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102.2(B) (West 1986)
(dealing with the forfeiture of abused animals) and a multitude of other federal and state provi-
sions).
7. Sarah N. Welling & .Medrith Lee Hager, Defining Excessiveness: Applying the Eighth
Amendment to Civil Forfeiture After Austin v. United States, 83 Ky. L.J. 835, 837 (1994-95).
8. Terrence G. Reed, On the Importance of Being Civil: Constitutional Limitations on Civil
Forfeiture, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 255, 269 (1994) (citing United States Department of Justice
figures).
9. See id. For example, in 1992, federal, state, and local law enforcement officials raided
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Unfortunately, courts are often powerless to combat such abuse due to the
broad latitude enjoyed by law enforcement entities in pursuing a potential
criminal's property.' °
Traditionally, innocent owners of confiscated property possess ineffective
constitutional ammunition to contest civil forfeitures. Courts grew increasingly
concerned with the plight of innocent property owners, however, as the scope
of civil forfeiture schemes widened. Many forfeitures exceeded traditional
goals of forfeiture," with their intent to punish the property owner, thereby
implicating the Due Process Clause's prohibition against punishment of inno-
cent citizens. In the early 1990's, the Supreme Court took an increasingly
critical approach to this nation's rapidly expanding forfeiture schemes, afford-
ing renewed hope to innocent owners that their property would not be unfairly
confiscated. 2 The Supreme Court reversed this trend, however, in its recent
examination of civil forfeiture in Bennis v. Michigan.3 This Comment ana-
lyzes the Court's decision regarding the forfeiture of Ms. Bennis's car despite
the fact that she committed no crime.
Part I examines the origin of forfeiture and outlines the significant
precedent. Part II summarizes the Bennis decision, paying particular attention
to the critical concurrence authored by Justice Thomas. Part III analyzes the
Bennis decision, arguing that Austin v. United States4 should have controlled
in Bennis because of the punitive nature of Michigan's forfeiture scheme. Part
III then presents varying "excessiveness" tests suggested in the wake of
Austin, concluding that the forfeiture of Tina Bennis's car was
unconstitutionally "excessive." Part IV concludes this Comment by placing the
Bennis decision in contemporary social context. It argues the Supreme Court
the 200 acre California ranch of Donald Scott under the suspicion that Mr. Scott was growing
marijuana. Mr. Scott was shot to death after brandishing a gun to defend his property against the
perceived trespassers. "A district attorney concluded that 'the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to seize and forfeit the ranch for the
government."' Michael Fumento, Hey, That's Mine! Don't Take Property from Innocent Owners,
DE. FREE PRESs, Jan. 30, 1996, at 9A.
10. See Beaver, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing the Scott case, in which the Ventura County
District Attorney's report concluded that no legal impropriety existed as long as the executed
search warrant was supported by probable cause, a relatively easy burden of proof); see Welling &
Hager, supra note 7, at 838 (noting that governments rarely charge the potential claimant with a
crime). "Courts felt unable to control law enforcement agencies, given the permissive language of
the statutes and the presumed inapplicability of most constitutional protections in the civil
context." Id. at 839.
11. See infra notes 27 to 44 and accompanying text.
12. See Robert M. Sondak, The Tide Is Turning: Civil Forfeiture Law Is Becoming More
Accommodating to Innocent Owners and Innocent Mortgagees, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 178
(1994) (predicting that lending institutions will be more likely to receive compensation when
financed property has been confiscated); see, e.g., United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S.
111 (1993) (extending the statutory innocent owner defense to individuals receiving a gratuitous
transfer of criminal proceeds); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43
(1993) (requiring the government to afford notice and an adversarial hearing to a claimant prior to
the seizure of real property under federal drug statute); Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 506
U.S. 80 (1992) (rejecting the government's argument that jurisdiction over confiscated money is
lost once such money is deposited into the U.S. Treasury).
13. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
14. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
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Forfeiture is "a divestiture of specific property without compensation
[which] imposes a loss by the taking away of some preexisting valid right."' 5
Early cultures demanded that items causing death or injury be forfeited and
destroyed.' 6 "[I]f an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be
stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten."'7 Forfeiture grew from the belief that
an object was "morally affected."' 8 In order to "appease God's wrath,"
proceeds of sale from forfeited property benefitted the poor and needy.' 9
English common law eventually adopted the "guilty property" theory of
forfeiture. ° Deodands were values forfeited to the Crown because an object,
in some manner, caused the death of a citizen.2' England abolished deodands
in 1846.22 Until 1870, English common law also required convicted felons to
surrender all real and personal property."
Civil statutory forfeiture endured. Historically, objects used in violation of
customs or revenue laws were subject to statutory, or in rem forfeiture.24
While America never adopted England's deodand and criminal forfeiture
schemes, civil statutory forfeiture survived the American Revolution. 25 State
admiralty courts after the Revolution continued the colonial practice of in rem
proceedings against vessels or cargo engaged in illegal trade or piracy.' The
"guilty property" fiction circumvented the inefficient process of identifying
owners of ships or cargo that resided overseas."' Similarly, giving the object
a legal identity enabled enforcement of the laws without regard for the actual
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990).
16. Susanne H. Bales, Note, Constitutional Law-Fifth Amendment Right to Due
Process--Civil Forfeiture Defendants and Constitutional Protection, 62 TENN. L. REV. 331, 335
(1995).
17. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.17 (1974) (quoting
Exodus 21:28).
18. Steven V. Miller, So What Rights Does a 1972 HMET Mobile Home Have Anyway? In
Austin v. United States, the Supreme Court Applies the Excessive Fines Clause to In Rem Civil
Forfeitures, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 797, 800 (1994) (citing Parker Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54,
55 (Tenn. 1916)).
19. Id. (citations omitted) (inferring that governments often retained the proceeds despite
philanthropic goals).
20. See Bales, supra note 16, at 335 (citations omitted).
21. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81. "Deodand derives from the Latin Deo dandum, to be
'given to God."' Id. at 681 n.17.
22. Bales, supra note 16, at 335. Deodands retreated from view after the emergence of the
wrongful death action. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Miller, supra note 18, at 801 (stating that courts in American colonies often enforced
English statutes through in rem forfeitures).
25. Bales, supra note 16, at 336.
26. Matthew P. Harrington, Rethinking In Rem; The Supreme Court's New (and Misguided)
Approach To Civil Forfeiture, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 281, 292 (1994).
27. Id. at 286.
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guilt of the owner. 8 However, the owner was permitted to appear and contest
the proceedings against the property.29
Generally, three types of property are subject to forfeiture: "contraband,"
or property which is legislatively determined to be illegal to own, export, or
import; 3° "instrumentalities," or property used in furtherance of criminal
activity;3' and "proceeds," or the profits of crime.32 Civil forfeiture actions
ask a court to determine ownership of the property in question, rather than
declare its criminal "guilt."33 An in rem proceeding occurs after a statutory
violation designates the property "guilty" and therefore forfeited.34 In simply
finding that a proper forfeiture had already materialized,35 prosecutors avoid
significant procedural hurdles and obtain absolute title to the property in
question."
B. Forfeiture and The Innocent Owner
In the 1800's, the United States Supreme Court addressed two major
admiralty cases which laid the foundation for American civil forfeiture
jurisprudence. The Palmyra,37 decided in 1827, confirmed that a forfeiture
proceeding was against the property itself." In Harmony v. United States,
39
the Court rejected the "innocent owner" defense for in rem proceedings.' By
reasserting the "guilty property" fiction, the Court found that civil forfeiture
was the best method to immediately redress harmful activity and ensure that
property used in furtherance of a crime would not escape the grasp of law en-
forcement.
Innocent owners have since challenged the seizure of their property on
various grounds.4 The Supreme Court expanded its rationale for rejecting the
28. Id.
29. Id. at 285, 303 (discussing how civil forfeiture classification provides prosecutors with
an often decisive edge over their targets).
30. Bales, supra note 16, at 335. Contraband "includes items such as adulterated food,
sawed-off shotguns, narcotics, and smuggled goods." Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1004
(1996) (Stevens, 1. dissenting).
31. Bales, supra note 16, at 335. Instrumentalities are tools which a "wrongdoer has used in
the commission of a crime," including such things as guns, cars, boats, and fishing nets. Bennis,
116 S. Ct. at 1004-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Bales, supra note 16, at 335. Proceeds traditionally encompassed only stolen property
but has been expanded to include certain earnings of illegal transactions. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at
1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Harrington, supra note 26, at 286-87 (explaining that the in rem process is independent
of an in personam suit).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 303 (noting that in rem actions permit a reduced burden of proof, relaxed rules of
evidence, and extinguish the claims of third party lienholders).
37. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
38. Id. at 14 (holding forfeiture of the vessel proper regardless of the piracy convictions of
the crew).
39. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844) (upholding forfeiture of a vessel even though the ship's
captain acted against the orders of the vessel's owner).
40. Id. at 334.
41. See Beaver, supra note 6, at 12; see, e.g., J. W. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States,
254 U.S. 505 (1921) (holding that the federal tax fraud forfeiture statute in question did not
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innocent owner defense in Van Oster v. Kansas.42 The Van Oster Court held
certain uses of property so undesirable that one relinquishing control of such
property does so at his or her peril.43 Therefore, the law eliminates potential
evasions made possible if collusion between the owner and the user was
required."
Almost a half-century later, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co.,4 the Court upheld the forfeiture of a leased boat upon which one
marijuana cigarette was found.' The Calero-Toledo Court addressed whether
an "innocent" lessor could be sanctioned in this manner. In dictum, the
Court suggested that if a property owner proved that he or she was not
involved in the proscribed activity, had no knowledge the user would engage
in such activity, and had taken all reasonable steps to ensure proper use of the
property, such property was not confiscable.'
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Austin v. United States." In Austin,
the state unsuccessfully attempted to confiscate a mobile home and
commercial garage from which an individual sold cocaine.' The Austin Court
conducted an extensive inquiry into the history of forfeitures in American
jurisprudence." The Court found that forfeitures consistently serve a punitive
purpose," explaining that "innocent" owners are punished for their negligent
entrustment of property."
In reaching this conclusion, the Austin Court analyzed the legislative
history of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.54 The Court's
unprecedented holding that the Eighth Amendment applied to both criminal
and civil proceedings" dismayed some observers.56 The Austin Court's
violate the Fifth Amendment as applied to an innocent owner); Dobbins's Distillery v. United
States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877) (forfeiting leased real estate upon which an illegal distillery was
operated without the knowledge of the lessor).
42. 272 U.S. 465 (1926) (upholding Kansas's seizure of an entrusted vehicle allegedly used
to transport alcohol).
43. Id. at 467. The individual driving the forfeited car was ultimately acquitted of the
Prohibition-era liquor transportation charges. The Van Oster Court recognized this acquittal, but
still denied the innocent owner's claim. Id. at 466.
44. Id. at 467-68. "So here the legislature, to effect a purpose clearly within its power, had
adopted a device consonant with recognized principles and therefore within the limits of due
process." Id. at 468.
45. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
46. Id. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (1974) (suggesting "harsh" law should be
tempered with constitutional protection where the offense appears minor).
47. Id. at 685-87.
48. Id. at 689-90.
49. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
50. Austin, 509 U.S. at 627-28 (holding that the property was not an "instrumentality" of the
offense).
51. Id. at 610-22.
52. Id. at 614-15.
53. Id. at 615.
54. Id. at 608-09. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
55. Austin, 509 U.S. at 607-08.
56. See Harrington, supra note 26, at 332-36 (criticizing the Austin Court's "apparent
disregard of the distinction between forfeitures in rem and those in personam").
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revolutionary reading of the Excessive Fines Clause subjected punitive civil
measures to a proportionality review.57
To some, the Austin decision muddied the waters in forfeiture
proceedings." While recognizing a greater historical basis for a
constitutionally grounded innocent owner defense such as was suggested in
Calero-Toledo,"9 the Austin Court refused to endorse a specific test to
determine whether a forfeiture is "excessive."' This refusal left lower courts
uncertain about the scope of governmental forfeiture power.6 Just three years
later, Tina Bennis's misfortune provided the opportunity for the Court to
clarify this scope.
II. BENNIS V. MICHIGAN
A. Facts and Procedural History
On October 3, 1988, Detroit police officers arrested John Bennis for gross
indecency after observing Mr. Bennis engaged in a sexual act with a
prostitute.62 Mr. Bennis committed this offense in the front seat of the 1977
Pontiac that he co-owned with his wife, Tina Bennis.63 After Mr. Bennis's
misdemeanor conviction, the Wayne County prosecutor filed a complaint
alleging that the 1977 Pontiac was a public nuisance subject to abatement.'
Tina Bennis objected to the abatement proceeding, claiming her interest in the
vehicle was not subject to forfeiture because she lacked any knowledge that
her husband would use the vehicle to solicit a prostitute.65 The trial court
rejected Ms. Bennis's claim, declared the Pontiac a public nuisance, and
abated Ms. Bennis's interest in the car.'
57. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622. "We therefore conclude that forfeiture ... constitutes 'payment
to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,' and, as such, is subject to the limitations of the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause." Id.
58. See Welling & Hager, supra note 7, at 851-90 (analyzing the varying excessiveness tests
employed in state and federal courts).
59. Austin, 509 U.S. at 617-18.
60. Id. at 622-23. "Prudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to consider that question
in the first instance." Id.
61. See Welling & Hager, supra note 7, at 844-85 (indicating that different jurisdictions
restrict the Austin decision to certain types of property and utilize many versions of the excessive-
ness test).
62. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich.
1994), aff d, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
63. Id.
64. Id. Abatement of a nuisance is defined as "[tlhe removal, stoppage, prostration, or
destruction of that which causes a nuisance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (6th ed. 1990).
The applicable Michigan statutes provide in relevant part: "[alny building, vehicle, boat, aircraft,
or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or
kept for the use of prostitutes ... is declared a nuisance ... and all ... nuisances shall be
enjoined and abated." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West Supp. 1996). "If the existence
of the nuisance is established in an action as provided in this chapter,, an order of abatement shall
be entered as a part of the judgment in the case, which order shall direct ... the sale thereof in
the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution . M..." ICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.3825 (West 1996).
65. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
66. Id.
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The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision,67
holding that Ms. Bennis's innocence precluded the abatement of her interest in
the vehicle.' In a 4-3 decision the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's order for abatement.69 The
state supreme court determined that Michigan's failure to provide Ms. Bennis
with an innocent owner defense was without federal constitutional
consequence.7 ° The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari7
and affirmed the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court.72
B. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
The Court framed the issue in this case as whether Michigan's abatement
scheme violated either Tina Bennis's Fourteenth Amendment right of due
process or the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.73 Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that Ms. Bennis could not claim a due process violation based solely on
her alleged lack of involvement in her husband's activity.7" The Court
supported this decision by explaining that Ms. Bennis was afforded both notice
of the abatement and an opportunity to contest such proceeding.75 Relying on
precedent such as The Palmyra and Harmony, the Court outlined the
traditional notion that the offense attaches to the property in question,76
rendering the guilt or innocence of the owner irrelevant.77 Finally, the
majority stated that civil forfeiture is a legal tool too useful and deeply rooted
in American jurisprudence to disturb.78
The Supreme Court stated Ms. Bennis had not made a claim beyond that
expressed by numerous other "innocent" owners to appear before the Court.79
The majority also discounted the innocent owner dicta in Calero-Toledo,
emphasizing that the case's holding supports the majority opinion.'
67. Id.
68. Id. at 486-87.
69. Id. at 486.
70. Id. at 495.
71. Bennis v. Michigan, 115 S. Ct. 2275 (1995).
72. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion in
which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined. Id. Justices Thomas and Ginsburg
filed concurring opinions. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Souter and
Breyer. Justice Kennedy filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 996. Ms. Bennis's petition for
rehearing was denied on April 22, 1996. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 1560 (1996).
73. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997-98.
74. Id. at 998.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401).
78. Id. at 999.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1676 (1994)
for the proposition that "[i]t is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must
attend").
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The Court found the question of whether the proscribed use of the
forfeitable property was its "principal use" immaterial.' However, the Court
reserved the question presented by Justice Stevens regarding whether The
Palmyra and its progeny justify confiscation of "an ocean liner just because
one of its passengers sinned while on board."82
The majority distinguished recent holdings that arguably justify a
culpability requirement in civil forfeitures.83 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that the Austin decision, which held punitive civil forfeitures to be subject to
an Eighth Amendment proportionality review, did not apply to this decision. 4
Specifically, because Michigan's abatement scheme is equitable in nature, the
majority found that its remedial focus precluded any punitive intent. 5
The majority next addressed Ms. Bennis's contention that the abatement
of the 1977 Pontiac was a taking of private property for public use in violation
of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 6 The Court rejected this claim,
arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies the Fifth Amendment
to the states, was not violated 7 because Michigan appropriately acquired the
vehicle through established governmental authority.88
Although the majority recognized the appeal of Ms. Bennis's fairness
argument, it found that Michigan's remedial abatement scheme served
legitimate societal purposes, was supported by historical precedent, and did not
violate Ms. Bennis's constitutional rights. 9
2. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Thomas expressed concern regarding the use of civil forfeiture as
a means to punish those associated with criminal activity.' The Justice noted
that Michigan did not want to prove actual complicity in its abatement
scheme: it wanted instead to punish those directly or even remotely connected
to the criminal activity.9 Justice Thomas recognized the apparent unfairness
in punishing innocent property owners, but felt compelled to agree with the
majority based on the historical acceptance of similar statutes.92 "This case is
81. Id. at 1000 (addressing the question raised by Justice Stevens in his dissent).
82. Id. (quoting Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (discounting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), where the Court determined
that a criminal defendant may not be punished for a crime if found not guilty of the charge).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1001. "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an analysis of recent Fifth Amendment Takings
jurisprudence, see J. Kelly Strader, Taking the Wind out of the Government's Sails?: Forfeitures
and Just Compensation, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 449 (1996).
87. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001. "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
88. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1001-03 (Thomas, J. concurring).
91. Id. at 1001.
92. Id. at 1001-02.
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ultimately a reminder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit
everything that is intensely undesirable." '93
Additionally, Justice Thomas questioned what it means to "use" property
in a manner that might subject the property to forfeit.94 Essentially, Justice
Thomas suggested that, in the case of an innocent owner, the criteria for
determining whether property is an instrumentality should be strictly based on
historical standards.95 He n6ted, however, that Ms. Bennis failed to dispute
Michigan's allegation that the 1977 Pontiac was an "instrumentality" of Mr.
Bennis's offense. 96
Justice Thomas also noted that the majority's characterization of
Michigan's abatement scheme as "remedial," '9 avoided the more difficult
issues regarding the punishment of innocent parties.9" He concluded that it is
primarily a duty of federal and state legislatures to prevent the forfeiture of
innocent parties' property.99
3. Justice Ginsburg's Concurrence
Justice Ginsburg believed the Court's decision rested upon whether Ms.
Bennis had a constitutional right to her share of the abatement proceeds, as
opposesed to a right to the property itself."° Finding no such right, Justice
Ginsburg expressed reluctance to override the Michigan Supreme Court's deci-
sion.'' She concluded that Michigan's forfeiture scheme "deter[s] Johns
from using cars they own (or co-own) to contribute to neighborhood blight,
and that abatement endeavor hardly warrants this Court's disapprobation."'0 2
4. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens recognized the historical prevalence of prostitution and
suggested Michigan's abatement scheme was an "experiment" in curtailing
such practice.'0 3 He believed the majority erroneously relied on unconvincing
precedent, ignored Ms. Bennis's complete innocence, and contradicted the
opinion delivered in Austin.1
4
Justice Stevens focused on the forfeitability of criminal instrumentalities,
or "derivative contraband."'0 5 The Justice determined that the "principal
uses" of the properties in question historically facilitated the offenses
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1002.
95. Id. "[Llimits ... become especially significant when they are the sole restrictions on the
state's ability to take property from those it ... does not even suspect[] of colluding in crime." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (analyzing Michigan's hypothetical appropriation of forfeiture proceeds).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1003.
100. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
101. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasizing the equitable nature of Michigan's forfeiture
scheme).
102. Id. (responding to Justice Stevens' dissent).
103. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1004.
105. Id.
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themselves."° He believed that the 1977 Pontiac was not an instrumentality
in Mr. Bennis's offense, which could have occurred practically anywhere. 7
Justice Stevens's dissent also questioned the Court's characterization of
the Michigan forfeiture scheme as remedial.'" Justice Stevens argued that
Mr. Bennis would not necessarily be deterred by the abatement, which
suggested a punitive-not remedial-motivation for the forfeiture." 9 The
Justice contended the Court's opinion in Austin ciearly indicated the punitive
.nature of civil forfeitures." 0
Furthermore, Justice Stevens concluded, basic notions of fairness prohibit
the punishment of innocent people.' He proposed that civil forfeitures rest
"at bottom, on the notion that the owner has been negligent in allowing his
property to be misused and that he is properly punished for that
negligence."" 2 Justice Stevens urged that culpability is a basic requirement
of due process." 3
Finally, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for contradicting the Austin
decision."' The Justice characterized the forfeiture as a violation of the
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause."5 While refusing to set forth a
specific test for permissible forfeiture of an innocent person's property, he
believed that this case was clearly unconstitutional." 6
5. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
While Justice Kennedy recognized the legitimate purposes that in rem
forfeiture serves in admiralty," 7 he found no such legitimate purpose served
in Ms. Bennis's case.' He asserted that the integrity of The Palmyra line of
cases could be upheld by distinguishing vessels engaged in an unlawful
voyage from automobiles tangentially used in crime. " '
Additionally, Justice Kennedy did not believe the Court eliminated a
culpability requirement in all instances.'2" Justice Kennedy acknowledged
106. Id. at 1005-06 (arguing that prior vehicle forfeiture statutes presented to the Court which
prohibited conduct directly related to the vehicle's locomotive capacity, differed from this case, in
which the Bennis vehicle's power of locomotion was irrelevant).
107. Id. at 1006.
108. Id. at 1006-07.
109. Id. (emphasizing Michigan's apparent admission that the forfeiture was designed to pun-
ish Mr. Bennis and noting that Mr. Bennis allegedly solicited prostitutes in the same area prior to
his arrest without a vehicle, and could easily repeat such behavior).
110. Id. at 1006-07.
111. Id. at 1007 (emphasizing Ms. Bennis' complete lack of involvement in any offense).
112. Id. (quoting Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2808).
113. Id. at 1008.
114. Id. at 1010.
115. Id. (concluding that the punitive nature of the Michigan abatement scheme and Ms.
Bennis's innocence warranted such a characterization).
116. Id.
117. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1011.
119. Id. at 1010-11.
120. Id. at 1011.
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that regardless of the value of Ms. Bennis's ownership interest in the vehicle,
such interest should be protected. 2'
III. ANALYSIS
The Bennis majority denied Ms. Bennis's constitutional claim by
overemphasizing the "guilty property" fiction and then rationalized its holding
by incorrectly characterizing Michigan's abatement scheme as solely remedial.
The Bennis dissenters appropriately declared the forfeiture a violation of
constitutional due process, but reduced their effectiveness by misdirecting their
arguments.
The following Section argues that due to, the punitive nature of
Michigan's abatement scheme, the Austin decision should have controlled the
Bennis holding. The Analysis then discusses whether Ms. Bennis could have
prevailed under the excessiveness review required by Austin.
A. Punitive Nature of Michigan's Abatement Scheme
A punitive statute is one "which creates forfeiture or imposes
penalty."'22 While the guilty property notion coexists with the knowledge
that "[iut is the owner who feels the pain and receives the stigma of the for-
feiture, not the property,"' 23 the Bennis Court engaged in semantics to render
a decision based on the ancient legal fiction. The Austin decision severely
criticized the guilty property fiction, generally declaring civil forfeiture to be
punitive in nature.'24 The current Court, however, continues to mold the legal
meaning of "punishment" to achieve its desired goals. l" One must wonder
whether the Framers of our Constitution similarly understood unjust gov-
ernmental action.'26 Regardless, the Supreme Court certainly contradicted
basic understandings of punishment when it declared Michigan's forfeiture
statutes to be non-punitive in nature.
Michigan admitted that the confiscation and eventual forfeiture of the
Bennis's vehicle served to effectively punish Mr. Bennis for his illicit
121. Id.
122. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990).
123. United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2151 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
124. Austin, 509 U.S. at 614-15.
125. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). Decided just 15 weeks after Bennis, Ursery
addressed the same civil forfeiture statute declared punitive in Austin. The defendant challenged
his criminal prosecution based on double jeopardy grounds because the government had
previously instituted a "punitive" civil forfeiture action against the defendant's home. The Court
distinguished its prior discussions of punishment in Halper and Austin, restricting Austin solely to
an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines analysis and Halper to civil penalty cases under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 2145, 2147. "Forfeitures ... are subject to review for
excessiveness ... after Austin; this does not mean, however, that those forfeitures ... constitute
punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy." Id. at 2147.
126. At oral argument in Ursery, Justice Scalia asked, "I can't understand why somebody
who would write a Constitution would think that a punishment is a punishment for one purpose
but not another. I mean, if it's punishment enough that you can't make it excessive, why isn't it
punishment enough that you shouldn't get it twice?" United States Supreme Court Official Tran-
script at 7, United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996) (No. 95-345, 346).
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behavior.'2 7  The statutes which facilitated the abatement were thus
concededly punitive in nature. 2 The statutes subsequently penalized Ms.
Bennis through the complete forfeiture of a car which she co-owned. The
majority argued that the deterrent aspect of the statute merely reinforces the
remedial effect." 9
Justice Thomas's. concurring opinion illustrates the majority's confusion
over whether a forfeiture scheme is punitive. The Justice recognized "[tihe
State ... says that it wants to punish ... persons who ... may at least have
negligently entrusted their property.""'3 Similarly, the Justice noted such
"punishment" might violate notions of fairness. 3' He then, inexplicably,
followed this apparent admission with a lengthy discussion of why Michigan's
abatement scheme was solely remedial.'32
Next, Justice Thomas cited the Michigan trial court's conclusion that Ms.
Bennis should not be compensated because the proceeds of the vehicle's sale
would not exceed, "by much," the attributable costs.'33 Justice Thomas
inferred that if Michigan retained any portion of the proceeds after all "costs"
had been satisfied, the abatement scheme's remedial nature would probably
not be altered.'34 In fact, if Michigan actually retained any amount of the
proceeds for non-compensatory reasons, the state action was punitive in na-
ture. 
13
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg's conclusion that Michigan's abatement
scheme deters "Johns"' 36 paralleled the Chief Justice's emphasis of the
127. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the plaintiff-appellant's brief).
128. Id. at 1000.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1001
131. Id..
132. Id. at 1002.
133. Id.
134. Id. In finding that issues regarding punishment of innocent persons do not arise in this
case, Justice Thomas wrote:
[tlhis is most obviously true if, in stating that there would be little left over after 'costs,'
the trial judge was referring to the costs of sale. [E]ven if the 'costs' that the trial judge
believed would consume most of the sales proceeds included not simply the expected
costs of sale, but also the State's costs of keeping the car and law enforcement costs
related to this particular proceeding, the State would still have a plausible argument that
using the sales proceeds to pay such costs was 'remedial' action.
Id. at 1002 n.*. Justice Thomas still failed to address the vital question inherent in his argument;
What, if any, portion of the proceeds remained after Michigan satisfied all appropriate costs? See
infra text accompanying note 133.
135. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
"However the theory may be expressed, it seems to me that this taking of lawful property must be
considered, in whole or in part, punitive. Its purpose is not compensatory, to make someone whole
for injury caused by unlawful use of the property." Id. (citations omitted). The Ursery Court
criticized this approach in determining whether a statute was punitive in nature for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause. The Court argued that the second stage of an
Excessive Fines evaluation should determine whether the forfeiture was disproportionate either to
the offense or to the costs incurred by the government as a result of the offense. To make such an
evaluation in the first instance would be repetitive. The Ursery Court did not, however, offer
guidance as to an appropriate method to determine "punishment" within an Excessive Fines
context. See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
136. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
[Vol. 74:1
THE CRIME OF PROPERTY
abatement statute's "deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose."'37
As Justice Stevens pointed out, these statements are puzzling in light of United
States v. Halper,35 in which the Court found deterrence itself to be an aim
of punishment.'39
Justice Ginsburg's allegiance apparently shifted during this case,"4 while
Justice Thomas reluctantly accepted the majority's conclusions. 4' In so
doing, Justices Ginsburg and Thomas lost the chance to cast the decisive votes
in this case and, thereby, uphold due process. Somehow, Justice Thomas ulti-
mately found that "the more severe problems involved in punishing someone
not found to have engaged in wrongdoing of any kind [did] not arise."'
' 42
The Austin Court rejected the argument that the Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings, 43 and
too ambitiously pronounced that all civil forfeitures serve at least partially to
punish the property owner.'" Instead of narrowing the Austin Court's
declarations to apply only to instrumentalities of crime,15 the Court in one
broad stroke eliminated the only protection left to the innocent owner of "of-
fending" property.
Certain property poses a direct threat to the physical and economic
security of society and its members."4 Confiscation of dangerous property,
ensures the safety and stability which is essential to a civilized society.4 7
Under the American system, therefore, civil forfeiture statutes removing con-
traband and proceeds from circulation remedy a situation equally dangerous to
137. Id. at 1000.
138. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
139. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. "[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment . ' d. The Ursery Court, also addressing a double jeopardy claim,
cited Bennis as support for the distinct, non-punitive purpose deterrence serves in civil forfeitures.
Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2149. Justice Stevens uncovered another significant flaw in the majority
opinion. The majority compared the effect of Michigan's forfeiture statute on Ms. Bennis to her
potential liability had Mr. Bennis negligently injured an individual while driving. Bennis, 116 S.
Ct. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This analogy is rendered moot by the Court's decision in
Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), in which it was determined
that the Excessive Fines Clause is confined to measures payable to the government, not private
individuals. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260.
140. David G. Savage, Innocence Punished, 82 A.B.A. J. 47, 48 (1996) (noting Justice
Ginsburg's apparently sympathetic position during oral argument).
141. Id. (noting Justice Thomas' recognition of injustice and inability to prevent the harm
inflicted upon Ms. Bennis).
142. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1002.
143. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
144. Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
145. See Douglas S. Reinhart, Note, Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeitures After
Austin v. United States: Excessiveness and Proportionality, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 235, 245-
50 (1994) (concluding that "[elven without relying on [the guilty property] fiction, the forfeiture
of [proceeds] serves the government's remedial interest in removing contraband from public
circulation").
146. See Harrington, supra note 26, at 348-50 (supporting the "guilty property" fiction for its
usefulness in immediately redressing potentially harmful situations).
147. See id. "Admittedly, even this type of seizure has always seemed to be at least a
technical violation of the Due Process Clause, but courts have countenanced such violations on the
grounds that public health concerns outweigh individual rights in exigent circumstances." Id. at
349.
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each member of society, including the criminal offender."4 Forfeiture of
such property returns society to the state which existed had no crime been
committed in the first instance-a constitutionally supportable goal of forfei-
ture. 49 However, confiscation of lawful property used in crime punishes the
property owner by eliminating the property's future legal use as well as any
potential unlawful use. °
Michigan diligently emphasized the remedial aspects of its forfeiture
scheme. 5' The state arguably improved the health and safety of its citizens
by seizing a vehicle supposedly contributing to "urban blight" and a weakened
local community.'52 The Supreme Court of Michigan also noted that had Mr.
Bennis picked up the prostitute and driven to a less notorious part of Detroit,
the vehicle would not have been subject to forfeit.'53 While Justice Stevens
condemned this result, it best demonstrates Michigan's effort to remedy the
"red light" community's prostitution problem.'54 Intense criticism of valid
remedial results undermined the dissent's credibility and diverted the Court's
attention away from the forfeiture's plainly punitive purposes."'
Tina Bennis contributed to the purchase of the vehicle in which Mr.
Bennis lawfully commuted to work.'56 Common sense dictates that the
deprivation of Ms. Bennis's interest in the vehicle punished Ms. Bennis for an
148. Id. at 348-50. Punishment, in any recognizable sense, is not inflicted when an individual
forfeits property which one never legally owned. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1106 (6th ed.
1990) (defining ownership as the "entirety of the powers of use and disposal allowed by law").
149. See Roger Pilon, Can American Asset Forfeiture Law Be Justified?, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 311, 330-32 (1994) (challenging the "guilty property" fiction based on an individual rights-
based argument). Pilon states:
[Liegitimate or justified remedies are forfeitures: to require a wrongdoer to restore the
status quo by returning what his action has taken is to require him to 'forfeit' those
holdings that are necessary to that end. [F]orfeitures can reach no further than the wrong
they are intended to remedy... [or] they become excessive.
Id. at 330-31.
150. See Reinhart, supra note 145, at 248-50 (arguing that Justice Scalia's "substantial
connection" test should be used when determining whether a forfeiture of facilitating property was
excessive). Under this theory, governments could still immediately confiscate alleged
instrumentalities, and, in many cases, retain the entire proceeds of sale to satisfy their costs.
Innocent owners would be compensated, however, and governments would simply be required to
account for their costs. This Comment argues that any additional "accountability" costs involved
in an excessiveness review are outweighed by the greater interest in protecting citizens from
unjust punishment.
151. Brief for Respondent at 8-9, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
152. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
153. Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 491 n.22 (Mich.
1994), aff d, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
154. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Michigan's
forfeiture scheme creates a potentially disturbing socioeconomic disparity. Criminals apprehended
in less desirable portions of Detroit appear absolutely liable to suffer remedial forfeitures of their
property. However, equally offensive criminals discovered in better maintained communities will
never incur forfeiture costs. See id.
155. See id. at 1007 (arguing that Mr. Bennis's ability to repeat this behavior without a car
indicates the punitive nature of the forfeiture). While the absence of any deterrent value with
regard to Ms. Bennis strengthens the argument that she was punished by the forfeiture, the
argument weakens when applied to Mr. Bennis. Michigan has certainly ensured Mr. Bennis will
never commit another offense in the forfeited vehicle. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
156. Id. at 1008 (suggesting Tina Bennis "is just as blameless as if a thief, rather than her
husband, had used the car in a criminal episode").
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ultimately unwise "investment." 5  While common sense certainly does not
control the action of our nation's highest Court, the Bennis majority reached a
result blatantly contrary to its reasoning.' The Court should have held that
Michigan's forfeiture statute served remedial as well as punitive goals.'59
Finally, Michigan admitted that a few "individuals may be ... harmed by
application of state law under its police powers."'" Austin clearly erected a
constitutional barrier, however, when such harm results from a punitive civil
forfeiture. The Austin Court chose to construct an overreaching theory of civil
forfeiture in a case specifically addressing the confiscation of alleged
instrumentalities of crime. The Bennis Court should have held that a civil
forfeiture of facilitating property that serves legitimate societal purposes is, at
least partially, punitive in nature. By so doing, the Court would have honored
the Austin Court's extensive inquiry into forfeiture jurisprudence but
appropriately limited the Austin holding. A correct evaluation would have
therefore required the Court to determine whether Ms. Bennis's punishment
was constitutionally "excessive."
B. Excessiveness
Ms. Bennis argued to the Court that a property owner should possess a
threshold culpability in forfeiture proceedings. 6' This was a weak argument,
however,'62 because many forfeitures serve solely remedial purposes and do
not warrant an excessiveness evaluation.'63 In Austin, the court considered
potential excessiveness tests and their relative effectiveness regarding innocent
owners.'64  While lower courts have lacked consistency in such
evaluations,'65  the Supreme Court could have provided guidance in
excessiveness reviews.
1. Proportionality Approach
For example, the Court could have employed a "proportionality" test in
measuring excessiveness. This test measures the severity of the underlying
157. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1009 (arguing that the justifications for strict liability in other
settings are inapplicable in this instance). "There is no reason to think that the threat of forfeiture
will deter an individual from buying a car with her husband-or from marrying him in the first
place ... [therefore,] [t]he absence of any deterrent value reinforces the punitive nature of this
forfeiture law." Id. at 123-47.
158. See supra notes 123-46 and accompanying text.
159. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48 (holding a civil penalty may constitute punishment under
the Double Jeopardy Clause). "[C]ivil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial
goals." Id. at 447.
160. Brief for Respondent at 29, Bennis (No. 94-8729).
161. Brief for Petitioner at 13-31, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
162. See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Bennis (No. 94-8729) (relying heavily on the innocent
owner dicta in Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90).
163. Austin, 509 U.S. at 614.
164. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 53, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct.
994 (1996) (No. 94-8729) (accepting oral argument regarding innocent owners and the potentially
applicable culpability standards of "negligent entrustment" and "reasonable steps").
165. See supra note 60.
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offense against the harshness of the forfeiture imposed."6 A property owner
must have engaged in blameworthy conduct.'67 Under this test, Ms. Bennis
suggested the Court apply a "negligent entrustment" standard for owners
claiming innocence."6 Ms. Bennis entrusted the 1977 Pontiac to Mr. Bennis
at the time of purchase, effectively establishing in Mr. Bennis an undeniable
right of control over the vehicle. The negligent entrustment standard is satis-
fied if, upon entrustment, Ms. Bennis neither knew nor had reason to know
Mr. Bennis would use the vehicle illegally.
In contrast, the United States, through an amicus brief to the Court, advo-
cated adoption of the "reasonable steps" test originally suggested in Calero-
Toledo. 69 The "reasonable steps" test would require a greater effort on the
part of co-owners of property to prevent illegal use of the property by extend-
ing reasonable care beyond initial entrustment.' 0 Under this test, if Ms.
Bennis became aware of Mr. Bennis's illegal activity at any time prior to his
arrest, she would have been required to act reasonably to prevent future illegal
uses.
The Court, under either proposed proportionality test, would have
certainly recognized Ms. Bennis's innocence and declared the forfeiture
unconstitutionally excessive. Additionally, Michigan even conceded Ms.
Bennis was wholly innocent in Mr. Bennis's offense. 7'
2. The Austin Instrumentality Approach: A Better Fit
Justice Scalia proposed a more historically sound approach to determine
excessiveness.'72 The Justice's concurring opinion in Austin gave birth to
what is commonly referred to as the "instrumentality" or "substantial connec-
tion" test.' This test suggests that courts compare the relationship between
the property in question and the offense which gave rise to the forfeiture
proceeding.'74 The substantial connection test purportedly ignores the value
of the property in question and the culpability of the owner.' The relevant
question becomes whether the property was used closely enough in the offense
to be appropriately deemed "guilty," and therefore forfeitable.
At first glance, the Bennis vehicle would seem to be a vital element in
Mr. Bennis offense, and properly subject to forfeiture. However, as Justice
166. See Welling & Hager, supra note 7, at 865.
167. Id.
168. Brief for Petitioner at 24-25, Bennis (No. 94-8729).
169. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 53, Bennis (No. 94-8729).
170. Id.
171. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
172. Welling & Hager, supra note 7, at 856.
173. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 623-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment).
174. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
175. See id. "Scales used to measure out unlawful drug sales, for example are confiscable
whether made of the purest gold or the basest metal." Id. at 627. Justice Stevens pointed out that
in Austin, however, the Court held that dramatic variations in the value of forfeitable property
under a statutory scheme undercut the argument that such forfeitures serve remedial purposes.
Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Stevens argued, the vehicle was not an instrumentality of Mr. Bennis's offense
because it was stationary-the offense could have taken place practically
anywhere. 7 6 Justice Scalia's concurrence in Austin lends even more support
to Justice Stevens's observation."7 Recognizing that the guilty property fic-
tion cannot extend indefinitely, the Austin Court unanimously agreed that the
garage in which a single drug sale took place could not be considered an
instrumentality of the relevant offense. 7 s Under this rationale, the Bennis
Court would have concluded that simply because the Bennis's vehicle housed
a single illicit transaction, the vehicle's "culpable" connection to the offense
was inconsequential.
3. Combination Approach
Ms. Bennis could have satisfied Justice Scalia's instrumentality test in
another manner. The common law notion of deodand justified the forfeiture of
only the value of property which caused the death of a citizen.'79 Therefore,
if a cart ran over and killed an individual, the value of the entire cart was for-
feitable to the King. If the driver fell from the cart and was killed by the
wheel, however, the sovereign could only confiscate the value of the "guilty"
wheel.' Similarly, in admiralty a forfeiture was limited to the offending
vessel or cargo."'8
Therefore, the Court should have separately identified Ms. Bennis's
interest in the vehicle and concluded that her interest bore no "substantial
connection" to the offense committed by Mr. Bennis. 2 Mr. Bennis's
undeniable right to control the illicit use of the vehicle is analogous to the
"guilty" wheel or offending cargo in Justice Scalia's traditional forfeiture
approach. Inseparable from the "offending" portion of the property, Ms.
Bennis's interest should have been spared. While Justice Scalia did not include
a culpability requirement in the instrumentality test, the Court could have
fashioned Justice Scalia's instrumentality test to include a proportionality
review.
Thus, the Court would have found in Ms. Bennis's favor under either the
proportionality, instrumentality, or this Comment's "combination" approach
had the Justices appropriately reached such a juncture.
176. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
177. id.
178. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 621.
179. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
180. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 690 n.27. "Our ancestors seem fully to have perceived
the hardship of inflicting such penalty on one who had been guilty of no moral or indeed legal
offense; and in all cases, therefore . . . found that only to be the deodand which by its immediate
contact occasioned death." Id.
181. See Reed, supra note 8, at 258.
182. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (concluding that civil forfeiture is a result of the merger of the deodand tradition and
the belief that wrongdoers could be denied their property).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Bennis court ignored Austin in favor of an outdated doc-
trine that is constitutionally unsound when applied to innocent owners of crim-
inal instrumentalities. Tina Bennis, probably as innocent an owner as had ever
come before the Court, was the victim of flawed legal reasoning. The Bennis
court needlessly infringed upon basic constitutional guarantees by engaging in
semantics.
We may never know what persuaded the Court to revitalize the antiquated
"guilty property" fiction. Perhaps the Court was concerned that its recent
holdings "blurred" traditional notions of civil forfeiture.'83 If so, the Bennis
decision did not quiet critics' voices.'84 Bennis may force the banking indus-
try to refrain from lending to "high risk" borrowers potentially "inclined" to
commit criminal acts."5 Third-party lienholders may be forced to seek
legislative protection whenever a forfeiture scheme is presented. 6 Property
owners may be prosecuted for innocent entrustment. However, since many
forfeiture statutes currently include innocent owner protection, Bennis may
have a minimal practical effect on law enforcement.'87
The endurance of civil forfeiture appears certain. The Supreme Court,
however, must identify the constitutional limits of governmental seizures. The
Court now invites punishment of innocent owners but vaguely protects the
property rights of convicted criminals. Americans' only hope is that their
legislators refuse the Court's invitation. Civil forfeiture has proven somewhat
successful in the "war on drugs," and the resulting litigation provides the
Court with unique opportunities to clarify a difficult field of law. In each case,
the Court must assess the delicate balance between government power and
individual rights. In upholding the Constitution, the Court should have found
an innocent owner exception for Tina Bennis within the Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause. Unfortunately, a misguided adherence to "tradition"
veiled such exception from the current Court's view.
R. Todd Ingram*
183. See Harrington, supra note 26, at 318.
184. See Stephen Chapman, Almost Blind Justice: Sometimes Even the Innocent Are Guilty,
CHm. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1996, at 27; OvermuchlOverzealous Forfeiture Law Overdue for an Overhaul,
HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 6, 1996, at 22.
185. See Steven L. Kessler, Forfeiture and the Innocent Owner, 214 N.Y. L.J. 101 (1995).
186. Id.
187. See Savage, supra note 140, at 48.
* The author would like to thank Lynett Henderson, Karla Robertson, Professors J. Robert
Brown, Jr. and Lawrence P. Tiffany of the University of Denver College of Law, and Colby Grim,
for their generous assistance with this Comment.
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OUT OF MANY, ONE*: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, DIVERSITY,
AND ARIZONA'S ENGLISH-ONLY LAW
INTRODUCTION
The American experiment continues to blend people of countless lands
into a rough democracy. Yet today, social, political, and economic forces
threaten common ground Americans once thought they shared. These forces
fuel a familiar debate about how to maintain a united society. "
Groups such as Arizonans for Official English (AOE)' argue that the best
way to prevent America from splintering is to restrict the use of non-English
languages.' Language restriction proponents assert that, without English as the
official language, America will become fractionalized and politically
unstable.' Opponents, however, argue that language restrictions are
unconstitutional, discriminatory, unnecessary, and un-American.4 Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English (Yniguez IV) 5  presents the conflicting
approaches to maintaining national unity.
Part I of this Note provides the legal and historical setting of Yniguez IV.
Part II summarizes the majority, the concurring, and dissenting opinions in the
case. Part III analyzes the majority's approach to the holding of the case and
presents alternative constitutional analyses. Finally, this Note concludes that
the majority in Yniguez IV reached a just outcome, albeit through an ill-chosen
constitutional rationale.
* E Pluribus Unum, the Latin phrase on some United States currency, is one that could not
be used by public officials under Arizona's English-only constitutional amendment.
1. AOE is a voter group comprised of Arizona citizens attempting to establish English as
the official language of their state's government. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69
F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996) (Yniguez IV).
2. Some commentators and critical race theorists link the movement to establish language
restrictions to fears about increased immigration from Latin America. See, e.g., Michele Arington,
Note, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: The Battle in the States over Language Minority
Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 331 (1991).
In 1990, 43% of all foreign-born persons in the United States were Latinos from Mexico,
Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, PAmPHLET NO. 23-183, HIsPANIc AMERICANS TODAY 6 (1993). In addition, 50.7% of
the nationwide Latino foreign-bom population entered this country between 1980 and 1990. Id.
3. Arington, supra note 2, at 327. This fear is not new. In the early twentieth century, some
predicted that the United States would fall prey to linguistic minorities' attempt to establish their
own states. SIRLEY BRICE HEATH, LANGUAGE IN THE USA 8 (Charles A., Ferguson & Shirley
Brice Heath eds., 1981). Time has proven these predictions untrue.
4. See Arington, supra note 2, at 327-28, 337-51.
5. See 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
I. BACKGROUND
A. History
Since its inception, the United States has tolerated and at times
encouraged the use of foreign languages.6 For example, the Framers of the
United States Constitution did not establish a national language.7 Instead, the
Framers rejected a proposal by John Adams which would have established a
national academy to promote and standardize English as the uniform
language! The Framers rejected the proposal because it ran contrary to their
liberty ideal.9 American settlers spoke their native languages in their new
communities from the Colonial Period through the nineteenth century."
Society encouraged and valued bilingualism for its functional purpose."
American societal attitudes concerning languages took a sharp turn in the
early twentieth century. 2 States began to prohibit the use of languages other
than English. 3 The immigration wave that began in the 1800s in part sparked
these prohibitions. This wave included mostly Southern and Eastern
Europeans who differed ethnically from any prior immigrant group in the
United States.'5 The outbreak of World War I also contributed to a "patriotic
hysteria" that led to the imposition of language restrictions.' 6
In 1923, however, the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska7 struck
down state language restrictions by holding that a state statute prohibiting the
teaching of languages other than English to schoolchildren violated the
Constitution.' Four years later, in Farrington v. Tokushige,9 the Court
declared another statute unconstitutional because it singled out foreign
language schools for stringent government control."0 The Court declared these
English-only laws unconstitutional based on the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process and equal protection guarantees.2
Although both cases relied on substantive due process bases, Meyer and
Farrington remain binding precedent for constitutional challenges to "Official
English" laws.22 Over time, the Supreme Court recharacterized Meyer as a
6. HEATH, supra note 3, at 6-7.
7. Id. at 6.
8. Id.
9. Id.




14. See Arington, supra note 2, at 330.
15. Id.
16. Hiram Puig-Lugo, Freedom to Speak One Language: Free Speech and the English
Language Amendment, 11 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 35, 39 (1991).
17. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
18. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-03.
19. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
20. Farrington, 273 U.S. at 298-99; see also Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 508, 528 (1926)
(holding that a law that prohibited keeping accounting books in any language except English,
Spanish, or another local dialect was unconstitutional).
21. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402; Farrington, 273 U.S. at 299.
22. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 945 n.29 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968);
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First Amendment protection case and viewed it, together with Bartels v.
Iowa," as a precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
doctrine.24
In Meyer, the Supreme Court firmly established that restrictions on private
citizens' use of non-English languages unconstitutionally restrict their personal
liberty.25 Since Meyer and Farrington, courts have rarely examined the
constitutional issue presented when a state attempts to establish English as the
official language.26 In the past ten years, however, efforts to establish English
as the official language have re-emerged." At least twenty-one states and
over forty cities have enacted laws declaring English as their official state
language.28 In addition, the House of Representatives recently passed a bill
establishing English as the official language of the federal government.29
These current laws differ from the law at issue in Meyer because they do not
restrict private citizens' speech.3° Most of these laws are symbolic in that
they proclaim English to be. the official state language without declaring
restrictions on foreign language usage.3 Yet some of these laws do restrict
speech, most notably that of government employees. 2 Regardless of form,
these laws receive intense criticism while simultaneously garnering
considerable popular support.33
Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907)).
23. 262 U.S. 404, 411 (1923) (holding that numerous state statutes mandating that students
be taught in English were unconstitutional).
24. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 948 n.33 (discussing the link between the First Amendment and
the Equal Protection Clause); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
25. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
26. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 923.
27. See Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages,
Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MNN. L. REV. 269, 342 n.407 (1992).
28. Aaron Epstein, English as Official Language Faces High-Court Test, DENVER POST,
March 26, 1996, at 3A.
29. House OKs English-only Legislation, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, August 2, 1996, at IA. The bill
passed on a 259-169 vote, illustrating its overwhelming support. The bill repeals the bilingual
ballot requirements at federal elections. Id. The bill also requires the government to conduct all
business in English with limited exceptions. Id. One stated purpose for the bill is to facilitate
immigrants' acquisition of English. Id. However, throughout history, immigrants have followed a
successful pattern of language acquisition without the existence of English-only laws. See Puig-
Lugo, supra note 16, at 48; see also HEATH, supra note 3, at 469-83.
30. See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 1.
31. See Perea, supra note 27, at 367 (discussing the adverse impact of "symbolic" Official
English laws). California passed one of the many symbolic Official English laws. See CAL.
CONST. art. I1, § 6. The law declares English as the official state language without specifically
prohibiting the use of foreign languages by private citizens or government officials. Id.
32. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924. "English-only" laws are laws which impose speech
restrictions, as opposed to the symbolic "Official English" laws. This Note will focus specifically
on the English-only law passed in Arizona. The legal, political, and societal issues connected to
Official English laws are beyond the scope of this Note.
33. See Perea, supra note 27, at 361-62 (discussing the difference between the popularity
and constitutionality of such laws).
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B. Restrictions on the Speech of Government Employees
The current focus on restricting government employees' speech enjoys
more legal support than the approach that the court used in Meyer. For
example, in O'Conner v. Ortega,34 the Supreme Court established a general
principle that government can restrict the freedoms of its employees more than
those of private citizens. 5 More specifically, in Waters v. Churchill,36 the
Court ruled that government employees are subject to stricter speech
restrictions than private citizens when the government imposes those
restrictions for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency.37
Yet, the Supreme Court uniformly rejected the theory that an employer
may subject public employees to any conditions an employer wishes,
regardless of the constitutionality or reasonableness of those conditions.3"
Nevertheless, the government's power to restrict the speech of its employees
remains substantial. The Waters/Pickering line of cases39 spells out when and
what speech restrictions a government employer may place on its employees.
In the first case of the Waters/Pickering line, Pickering v. Board of
Education,'  a public high school teacher wrote a letter to the editor
criticizing the school board's handling of a bond issue and allocation of
financial resources." The Court held that the teacher's comments were
entitled to First Amendment protection, because the teacher spoke as a private
citizen on a matter of public concern.42
Fifteen years after Pickering, the Supreme Court ruled in Connick v.
Myers43 that when a public employee speaks as a private citizen about an
issue of personal interest, government employers are afforded wide latitude in
deciding whether to allow the speech.' The Connick decision established that
employers may restrict public employee speech when the speech is not based
on matters of public concern.4' The Court suggested that political and social
issues constitute matters of public concern.' Notwithstanding this suggestion,
the Court firmly stated that the "content, form, and context" of a given
34. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
35. See O'Conner, 480 U.S. at 725; see also Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248-49
(1976) (affirming a county's determination that a regulation limiting police officers' hair length
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973) (holding that a regulation of partisan political
activities as applied to federal employees does not violate the First Amendment).
36. 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994) (plurality opinion).
37. See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888.
38. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602-04 (1967).
39. The WaterslPickering line of cases includes United States v. National Treasury Employ-
ees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995); Waters, 114 S. Ct. 1878; Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378
(1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); and Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968).
40. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
41. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.
42. Id. at 574.
43. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
44. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47.
45. Id. at 147.
46. Id. at 146.
[Vol. 74:1
ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH
statement are important when determining if a statement addresses a matter of
public concern.47
In Rankin v. McPherson,' a county employee's statement that she hoped
another presidential assassination attempt would succeed constituted a matter
of public concern.' The Court further determined that the public's interest in
hearing the information should be weighed against the government's interests
of promoting efficiency and effectiveness.' The Court found the comment
commanded First Amendment protection, because the employee's right to
speak on matters of public concern outweighed the government's interests.5'
In Waters, a nurse conveyed unflattering information concerning the
obstetrics department to another nurse considering transferring into the
department. 2 Consequently, the hospital discharged her.53 The nurse alleged
that her speech was protected pursuant to the holding in Connick.54 The Court
affirmed that the state's efficiency interests did not outweigh the government
employee speech that constituted matters of public concern.55
In the most recent case of the series, United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union,56  executive branch employees challenged the
constitutionality of a subsection in the Ethics in Government Act which
prohibited government employees from receiving honoraria.57 The Court ruled
that the employees' activities meriting honoraria were the actions of public
employees speaking as private citizens about matters of public concern and
that as a result the activities were entitled to First Amendment protection."
In summary, the Waters/Pickering line of cases stands for the principle
that when a public employee speaks on a matter of public concern, and the
state interests of promoting efficiency and effectiveness do not outweigh the
speech, the speech commands First Amendment protection. Otherwise, the
government has wide latitude in restricting its employees' speech, especially
when the speech pertains to an internal work or personal matter.
Today, if government employee speech does not fall within the
Waters/Pickering category of protected speech, a plaintiff can successfully
challenge an English-only law based on a wide range of legal theories. These
theories include the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, and the right to vote.
47. Id. at 147-48.
48. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
49. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 381, 386.
50. Id. at 388.
51. Id. at 392.
52. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1882.
53. Id. at 1883.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1884.
56. 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
57. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1009-10.
58. Id. at 1013.
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C. First Amendment Protection of Public Employee Speech
The First Amendment protects the fundamental right to freedom of
speech.59 Because the freedom of speech is a fundamental right, when a state
regulates speech it must do so with extreme caution.' Absent such caution, a
state may carelessly enact an overbroad statute regulating speech protected by
the First Amendment. An overbroad statute attempts to restrict unprotected
speech but erroneously applies to protected speech as well.6 The overbreadth
doctrine permits a plaintiff with constitutional standing to challenge a law's
facial application to others who are not before the court, but whose speech
commands First Amendment protection.62 In addition, the law facing
challenge must be substantially overbroad and a court must not be able to
construe it in such as way as to cure any potentially unconstitutional
applications.63
In Bond v. Floyd,'4 the Court recognized that language restriction laws
that apply to all government employees risk invalidation under the overbreadth
doctrine simply because of their application to legislators' speech.65 Under
Bond, "[t]he central commitment of the First Amendment... requires that
legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of
policy."' In Bond, the Court relied on this principle when it held that legis-
lators should not be subject to stricter speech standards than private citizens.67
Prohibiting restrictions on legislators' speech honors the principle set forth in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' that "debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open."
D. The Right to Vote
English-only laws that restrict legislators' speech potentially violate sec-
tion 2 of the federal Voting Rights Act.7" Congress enacted the original
Voting Rights Act of 1965"' primarily to combat discrimination against
African-American voters.72 The Act intended to "do something about
59. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
60. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrTrUIONAL LAW § 16.8, at 996 (5th
ed. 1995).
61. See id.
62. Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987).
63. See Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (recognizing
established First Amendment law that, when a law is subject to a narrowing construction which
would make it constitutional, the court will uphold the statute); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 615 (1973) (holding that a law is overbroad if its overbreadth is both "real" and "substantial"
when compared to its legitimate sweep). A party may challenge a statute on the same basis when
it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
64. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
65. Bond, 385 U.S. at 135-36.
66. Id. at 136.
67. Id. at 132-33.
68. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
69. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
70. Voting Rights Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b) (1982).
71. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994)).
72. See Note, 'Official English': Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in
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accumulated wrongs and the continuance of the wrongs." ' In 1975, Congress
officially recognized the existence of discrimination against language
minorities by amending the Voting Rights Act to require bilingual voting
materials in specific jurisdictions.74 Congress found a systematic pattern of
discrimination against language minorities in education, voting, and almost
every other facet of life.75 Congress concluded that this discrimination
effectively excluded language minorities from participation in the electoral
process.76 Furthermore, the Senate record suggested that states take steps
beyond prohibiting English-only elections in order to ensure language
minorities access to voting and registration.77 These steps included addressing
the adverse impact of language minorities voting in all-white areas and
minorities' subjection to "law enforcement surveillance. 78
Congress further amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982.7' The Supreme
Court decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden"° broke from precedent, spurring
the 1982 amendments.8 In Mobile, the Court required plaintiffs to prove that
a voting practice intended to deny equal political opportunity and diluted
voting power.82 The amendments restored legal precedent by relaxing the
the States, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1345, 1350 (1987).
73. Cal G. Gonzales, Comment, "Ability to Influence" Claims Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 13 CHICANo-LATINO L. REv. 96, 113 (1993) (quoting Senator Jacob Javits).
74. Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended by Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89
Stat. 400 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b) (1994)). The Voting Rights Act
requires bilingual materials in jurisdictions where: (1) more than five percent of voting age
citizens are members of a single language minority or are Native Americans living on a
reservation and have limited-English proficiency; and (2) the rate of illiteracy of the language
minority group is higher than the national rate. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b)(2) (1994).
75. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 29 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 795-96.
76. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 30 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 796.
77. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 34 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 801.
78. Id.
79. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134. As amended,
42 U.S.C. § 1973 states in relevant part:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen in the United States to
vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in §
1973b(f)(2) of this title as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its
members have less opportunity then other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
Section 1973b(f)(2) states:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right
of any citizen of the United States to vote because he is a member of a language
minority group.
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1994).
80. 466 U.S. 55 (1980).
81. See Mobile, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), affd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
82. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66 (stating that the purpose of legislative apportionments must be to
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Mobile intent standard to the less stringent results standard.83  The
amendments therefore required only that language minorities prove, by the
totality of the circumstances,84 that the practice at issue results in an unequal
opportunity to participate in the political process.85
The Court interpreted the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments for the
first time in Thornburg v. Gingles.s6 In Thornburg, plaintiffs challenged
North Carolina's multi-member, at-large districting system.' The Court
limited its discussion to districting schemes and outlined three conditions that
a plaintiff must meet in order to prevail under section 2 with a multi-member
districting claim. 8
E. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
the government treat similarly situated persons in a similar manner.89 More-
minimize minorities' voting potential).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994).
84. The Senate report on the amendment outlined typical factors which could prove that
plaintiffs do not have "equal opportunit[ies] to participate in the political processes." S. REP. No.
97-417, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206. The Senate report clearly stated
that the factors listed in the report were not necessarily dispositive, not required to be present in
any particular number, and could possibly be replaced by other factors depending on the practice
called into question. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
206-07.
Typical factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision
that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or
otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is
racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election
districts, [or] majority vote requirements ... that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group
have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision
bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office
in the jurisdiction.
Id.
Additional factors ... are:
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to
the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting
qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
Id.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b) (1994).
86. 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986).
87. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 46.
88. Id. at 50-51. The conditions require that a minority group show that: (1) it is "suffi-
ciently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district"; (2)
it is politically cohesive; and (3) the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority
group's preferred candidate. Id.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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over, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees that government classifications
"will not be based upon impermissible criteria or arbitrarily used to burden a
group of individuals."' A plaintiff may therefore challenge an English-only
law under the Equal Protection Clause.
When faced with an equal protection claim, courts apply one of three
standards of review. Laws which specifically apply to suspect classes receive
strict scrutiny, the most heightened level of review." Strict scrutiny requires
that the law in question be narrowly tailored to further a compelling govern-
mental interest.92 The second standard of review is the intermediate test,
which courts have formally employed for gender and illegitimacy
classifications.93 When applying an intermediate review, courts require that
the government show an important interest, and the law at issue substantially
relate to the state's proposed interests.94 When a law does not affect a
fundamental right, and the law applies to a group of people who do not
command special protection, courts employ the third standard of review: the
rationality test.95 Under the rationality test, the court asks whether the law
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government end.96
Language restriction laws will most likely receive either strict scrutiny
review or rationality review, depending on the way in which the reviewing
court chooses to characterize the aggrieved group(s).97 Since a language
classification is not a per se suspect class, a plaintiff may establish that an
English-only law is subject to strict scrutiny by showing that language acts as
a proxy for national origin.9" If the court refuses to accept this proxy, a
90. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 60, § 14.2, at 597.
91. Daniel J. Garfield, Comment, Don't Box Me In: The Unconsitutionality of Amendment 2
and English-Only Amendments, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 690, 706 (1995); see also Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying a strict scrutiny review to racial classifications); United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Suspect classes are classes based
on race, alienage, and national origin. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)
(applying strict scrutiny to a situation involving a suspect class).
92. Garfield, supra note 91, at 706-07.
93. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982) (holding
that a state-funded nursing school policy denying men admission violated the Equal Proiection
Clause because it did not substantially relate to its proposed objective); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259, 275-76 (1978) (holding that a New York illegitimacy statute was constitutional because it
substantially related to state interests). The Court has informally extended intermediate scrutiny to
other areas of the law by not declaring a formal standard of review. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982). This expansion led some to argue that language-based classifications also deserve
heightened scrutiny and should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Note, supra note 72, at 1353-
54 (1987).
In this case, language minorities would be classified as "quasi-suspect" classes. See id. at
1353-56. Courts have rejected "quasi-suspect" class analyses when language minorities sought an
affirmative right to governmental services and information. See, e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler,
717 F.2d 36, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1983). Notwithstanding, the denial of existing government services
based on language presents courts with an opportunity to apply a heightened standard of review
without requiring a proven link between language and national origin.
94. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
95. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 60, § 14.3, at 601.
96. Id.
97. See Arington, supra note 2, at 335-36.
98. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 947-48; see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 486 &
nn.5-6 (1977) (equating the usage of the Spanish language with people with Spanish surnames or
who are Mexican-American).
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plaintiff must argue that the English-only law bears no rational relationship to
a legitimate governmental interest."
II. YNIGUEZ V. ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH
A. Facts
In 1988, a majority of Arizona citizens passed, by ballot initiative, an
amendment to their state constitution proclaiming English as the official
language of Arizona. °° Article XXVIII ("the article" or "the amendment"),
also prohibited the government, with limited exceptions, from using any
language other than English.' The amendment states in part that "[t]his
State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English and in no
other language."'0 2
Maria-Kelley F. Yniguez worked as a government employee in the
Arizona Department of Administration when the amendment passed. 3
Yniguez spoke English and Spanish fluently and used both languages to
process medical malpractice claims for monolingual English and Spanish
speaking claimants prior to the amendment's passage."° Following adoption
of the amendment, Yniguez stopped speaking Spanish at work to avoid
employment sanctions. 5 Shortly thereafter, Yniguez filed suit in federal
district court arguing that the amendment violated her rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution."° The federal
district court did not reach Yniguez's Fourteenth Amendment claim, but held
that the amendment unconstitutionally violated her free speech guarantee under
the First Amendment." The state did not appeal." s Consequently, AOE,
the official sponsors of the amendment, moved to intervene to appeal the
99. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 60, § 14.3 at 601.
100. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, §§ 1-4.
101. ARtz. CONST. art. XXVIU § 3 (allowing the state to act in a non-English language when:
(1) teaching English to non-proficient English speakers; (2) complying with federal laws; (3)
teaching a foreign language course; (4) protecting public health or safety; and (5) protecting
criminal defendants' and crime victims' rights).
102. Id. § 3(l)(a).
103. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924.
104. Id. In addition to Yniguez, the amendment affected tens of thousands of others. The
United States ranks as the fourth largest Spanish speaking country in the world following three
others: Mexico, Spain, and Colombia, all of whose dominant national language is Spanish. Puig-
Lugo, supra note 16, at 47. Approximately 80% of the children enrolled in bilingual programs are
Spanish speakers. Id. Out of the 310 jurisdictions required to provide multilingual ballots, Spanish
speakers are the dominant linguistic majority in 281. Id. at 47-48. Furthermore, 97% of Spanish
speakers are of Latino origin. Id. Arizona claims the fourth largest population of Latino residents
in the United States. See Epstein, supra note 28, at 3A.
Nineteen percent of all Arizona residents are of Latino origin. Id. Relevant demographic
figures are as follows: 18.78% of the Arizona population are of Latino origin, 14.17% are Spanish
speaking, and 50.7% of the nationwide foreign born population entered this country between 1980
and 1990. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PAMPHLET No. 23-183, HISPANIC
AMERICANS TODAY (1993).
105. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924.
106. Yniguez v. Moffard, 730 F. Supp. 309, 310 (D. Ariz. 1990).
107. Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1991) (Yniguez 1).
108. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 926.
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district court's ruling, but the court denied the motion."° The Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's denial of AOE's motion and allowed AOE to
intervene as plaintiffs."'
On appeal, a three-judge panel unanimously affirmed the district court's
decision to strike down the amendment."' The Ninth Circuit reheard the case
en banc and affirmed the previous decision."2 The court rereleased the
unanimous three-judge panel opinion with only minor changes, and reaffirmed
Article XXVIII violated the First Amendment." 3 On March 25, 1996, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari."4 In addition to the
questions set forth in the petition, the Court will consider whether AOE pos-
sesses the requisite standing for the action and whether the action involves a
case or controversy regarding Yniguez. "'
B. Majority Opinion
In striking down Article XXVIII, the Ninth Circuit rested its holding on
the First Amendment." 6 The majority accepted the federal district court's
broad construction of the article and applied an overbreadth analysis.' The
court ruled that a limiting construction would be at odds with the article's
plain meaning and would require performing a "face lift" upon the
amendment. "' The majority also determined that the amendment should be
invalidated as a whole if one part were found unconstitutional, as the article
did not contain a severability clause."9
Once the court determined that the amendment could not be severed, it
proceeded to analyze whether the amendment was unconstitutionally
overbroad. 2 The majority reasoned that Yniguez properly brought an
overbreadth challenge because the amendment potentially restricted the free
speech rights of all public employees and officials. 2' The court also stated
that the article was subject to facial invalidation because it broadly related to a
single subject and was based on a single premise.'22
109. Id.
110. Yniguez 1, 939 F.2d at 740 (additionally allowing the Attorney General to intervene for
the purpose of arguing the merits of the case).
111. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1217, 1243 (9th Cir. 1994)
(unanimous decision).
112. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924.
113. Id.
114. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
115. Id.
116. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924.
117. Id. at 931-32.
118. Id. at 931.
119. Id. at 933 (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 427 U.S. 491, 506 (1985)). A
severability clause is a statutory provision which allows the balance of a statute to remain intact if
one part is declared unconstitutional. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1343 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
saving clause).
120. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 931-32.
121. Id. at 932.
122. id. at 932-33.
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The majority then disposed of two arguments put forth by AOE.'23 AOE
argued that the amendment regulated conduct and consequently did not
implicate free speech protections. 2 4 The court disagreed, stating that because
the meaning of words and phrases vary in different languages, language
rcstrictions compromise the meaning of spoken words.'25 AOE also argued
that Yniguez sought the affirmative right to require that government operate in
foreign languages.'26 The court rejected this argument by differentiating
between an affirmative and a negative right.'27 While acknowledging that
non-English speakers are not affirmatively entitled to government services in
their native languages, the majority concluded that Yniguez did not attempt to
compel the government to provide multilingual information. 2 Instead,
Yniguez rightfully sought to enforce the negative right: to prohibit the gagging
ot governmental employees.'29 Thus, on a basic level, the court distinguished
between requiring government officials to speak in a foreign language and
allowing them to do so.
In its analysis of the potentially unconstitutional restriction on free speech
rights, the court distinguished between public employees and private citizens.
The majority acknowledged that while Arizona has a constitutional right to
impose stricter restrictions on public employees' free speech rights than those
of private citizens,'30 the state cannot arbitrarily impose such restrictions sim-
ply because the government is the employer. 3 ' The court concluded that
Yniguez's speech did not fit into the protected category of speech by a private
citizen on a matter of public concern.'32 Nor did the speech fit into the
category of a public employee's speech on a personal matter.'33 Relying on
the fact that the recipient motivated the foreign language communication, the
court found the speech to be "unquestionably of public import," requiring
analysis under the Waters/Pickering line of cases.'34
The court concluded that public employees' speech interests outweighed
Arizona's alleged state interests of promoting civic unity, encouraging a
common language, and protecting public confidence.'35  Although it
recognized the importance of national unity and democracy, the court relied on
Meyer and Farrington to hold that Article XXVIII was an inappropriate
123. Id. at 934-37.
124. Id. at 934.
125. Id. at 935.
126. Id. at 936.
127. Id. at 936-37.
128. Id. at 936. The majority's analysis of affirmative versus negative rights should not be
read to apply to situations where federal law or the Constitution mandate foreign language
services. For example, criminal defendants, as acknowledged by Article XXVIII itself, are entitled
to the affirmative right of foreign language assistance. See ARiz. CONST. art. XXVII, § 3(2)(e).
129. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 936.
130. Id. at 938 (citing Waters, 114 S. Ct. 1878; Rankin, 483 U.S. 378; Connick, 461 U.S.
138; Pickering, 391 U.S. 563).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 939.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 939-42.
135. Id. at 944-45 (citing National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1015-18, and Rutan v. Republican
Party, 497 U.S. 62, 70 n.4 (1990)).
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approach to promoting these interests. 3 6 In addition, the state's interests in
efficiency and effectiveness were "wholly absent."'37 Based upon this
analysis, the court concluded that Article XXVIII's restriction of public
employees' speech rights rendered it unconstitutionally overbroad. 3
C. Concurring Opinion: Judge Brunetti
Judge Brunetti wrote separately to state that the restriction on an elected
official's speech would, by itself, be a sufficient basis to find that Article
XXVIII was facially overbroad and unconstitutional.'39  Judge Brunetti
reasoned that because "[clommunication between candidates and voters is at
the core of all political action," Article XXVIII's interference with that
communication represented an attempt to manipulate the political process."
Judge Brunetti also argued that Article XXVIII interfered with voting and
political representation and chilled elected officials' speech. 4' Judge Brunetti
cited Bond v. Floyd'42 to support the proposition that Article XXVIII
interfered with incumbent candidates' ability to communicate with voters
during re-election."'
D. Dissenting Opinion: Judge Fernandez
Judge Fernandez began by acknowledging that Article XXVIII was
subject to a broad construction, and that arbitrary conditions cannot be applied
to public employment.'" Judge Fernandez argued that Yniguez's speech
rights were not restricted, because her speech occurred while she performed
official duties. 45 Judge Fernandez agreed with the majority that Yniguez's
situation was not easily characterized as either that of a public employee
speaking out as a citizen on a matter of public concern or as an employee
speaking on matters of personal interest."4 However, Judge Fernandez
asserted that the Yniguez IV case was more like a private concern speech case,
because Yniguez decided for her own private reasons not to obey the state
constitution. 47 Consequently, Judge Fernandez reasoned that Yniguez did not
have a constitutional right to speak Spanish on the job."4
136. See id. at 945 (citing Farrington, 273 U.S. 284 and Meyer, 262 U.S. 390).
137. Id. at 942.
138. Id. at 947.
139. Id. at 950 (Brunetti, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 950-51.
141. Id. at 951.
142. 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (holding that the disqualification of an elected legislator because of
his statements to the media opposing the Vietnam War violated the legislator's right to freedom of
speech under the First Amendment).
143. Yniguez IV, 60 F.3d at 950-51 (Brunetti, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 955 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
145. See id.
146. Id. at 956.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 957.
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For the sake of argument, Judge Fernandez also agreed that choice of
language constituted speech. 49 Judge Fernandez asserted that because the
government has a right to control the messages communicated to the public
and language usage determines what messages are communicated, the
government has a right to disallow foreign language communication.'
E. Dissenting Opinion: Chief Judge Wallace
Chief Judge Wallace joined Judge Fernandez in dissent and wrote
separately to argue that the majority misclassified the choice of language
communication as speech instead of conduct. 5' To support this argument,
the Chief Judge referred to the lack of case authority in the majority opinion
supporting the assertion that language is, in and of itself, speech.'52 Although
he agreed that a percentage of Arizonans would probably prefer to speak
Spanish with a public employee, the Chief Judge rejected this as a valid basis
to evoke First Amendment protections.'53 Chief Judge Wallace also asserted
that the majority ruled contrary to case authority in determining that Yniguez's
on the job communication constituted a matter of public concern."'
F. Dissenting Opinion: Judge Kozinski
Because Judge Kozinski believed the amendment might well be
unconstitutional, his dissent focused on the majority's approach rather than its
conclusion. 55 The judge faulted the majority for using the Waters/Pickering
line of cases where it did not apply.'56 According to Judge Kozinski, Yniguez
IV had nothing in common with the Waters/Pickering cases.' Judge
Kozinski distinguished Yniguez IV by noting that the speech at issue occurred
when public employees performed official duties,' arguing that when an
employee spoke to fulfill an official duty, the employee did not possess an
interest in the speech.'59 Instead, Judge Kozinski suggested that the employee
communicated solely a government message." The judge then predicted that
the Yniguez IV decision will be a costly one, because the courts will be subject
to a flood of litigation by disgruntled public employees who have no grounds
for a constitutional challenge.' Judge Kozinski suggested that an equal
protection challenge would be more successful and appropriate. 62
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 959 (Wallace, C-1., dissenting).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 960.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 963 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).




160. Id. at 961-62.
161. Id. at 963.
162. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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G. Special Concurrence: Judge Reinhardt
In addition to writing the majority opinion, Judge Reinhardt wrote
specially in response to Judge Kozinski's dissenting opinion.'63 The special
concurrence criticized Judge Kozinski's dissent for its mean-spiritedness and
absence of concern for the less fortunate."'6 Additionally, Judge Reinhardt
accused Judge Kozinski of placing government powers beyond constitutional
reach by asserting that the government can require public employees to say
anything in the course of their official duties.'65 Judge Reinhardt warned that
if Judge Kozinski's views became law, government employees would be
forced to relay hateful slogans and messages to non-English speakers.'" At
the same time, non-English speakers would be relegated to second class
citizenship as a result of the deprivation of information necessary to fulfill
basic life functions.' 67
III. ANALYSIS
A. Free Speech: A Just Ruling Based on Shaky Ground
Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize Yniguez IV as a case
of first impression. Instead, as discussed above, the court relied on the
Waters/Pickering series to support its holding that Article XXVIII violated the
First Amendment. The Waters/Pickering line of cases, however, established
First Amendment protections for an entirely different type of speech than that
restricted by Article XXVIII. When the court forced the restricted speech in
Yniguez IV into the Waters/Pickering line, it attempted to put a square peg in a
round hole.
As Judge Fernandez correctly stated in his dissent, the Waters/Pickering
line of cases "look[s] to the content of public employee speech to see whether
it contributes to public debate."'" For example, the most recent case in the
Waters/Pickering line, National Treasury Employees Union found that the
challenged speech deserved constitutional protection because it was "addressed
to a public audience, made outside the workplace, and involved content largely
unrelated to their government employment."'" Moreover, the other cases in
the Waters/Pickering line did not protect speech that occurred as part of an
official duty.' 70 Yet the Ninth Circuit majority insisted on forcing the
restricted speech of Arizona public employees into this category.'
7'
Classifying the speech as "unquestionably of public import" served an
important purpose for the majority. It allowed the majority to base its ruling
163. Id. at 952 (Reinhardt, J., concurring specially).
164. See id. at 952-53.
165. Id. at 953.
166. Id. at 954.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 960 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
169. National Treasury, 115 S. Ct. at 1013.
170. See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
171. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 939.
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on a widely accepted and legally sound body of law addressing public
employee speech restrictions. If the court had correctly described the speech as
a tool to communicate a government message, it would have had little case
law to support its holding.' In addition, the majority admitted that the
government generally can regulate the messages its employees communicate to
the public."' "To say that in most circumstances the government may
regulate content by compelling or prohibiting on-the-job delivery of a
particular message is a truism." '
Unfortunately, forcing public employees' restricted speech into a category
in which it did not belong confused the doctrine of constitutionally protected
public employee speech, downplayed the amendment's egregious impact on
elected officials' First Amendment rights, and subjected the court's just
conclusion to criticism and skepticism. The dissenters presented cogent
arguments that the majority could have defeated by finding the amendment
unconstitutional as it specifically applied to legislators' speech rights.
B. A Just Ruling Based on Solid Ground
The court in Yniguez IV correctly concluded that the amendment was "not
a valid regulation of the speech of public employees and is unconstitutionally
overbroad.""' 5 However, the court erred in the approach it used to reach its
conclusion. While the court properly outlined the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine, it should have declared the amendment unconstitutional
based specifically on its application to legislators' speech rights.
76
The court in Yniguez IV acknowledged that the amendment is the most
restrictive English-only law to date. 77 The majority should have followed
that acknowledgement with an adequate analysis of the article's most clearly
unconstitutional application: the restriction of legislators' speech rights.
Adequate representation requires open communication with constituents
about their needs, desires, and expectations."7' Restricting legislators' speech
rights impairs their ability to fulfill their obligations.' Such restrictions
"undermin[e] the 'public good' by interfering with the rights of the people to
representation in the democratic process."'' 0 One fundamental principle of
172. Id. at 940 (stating that "there are few First Amendment precedents in this area" when
discussing constitutional regulation of employee speech used to convey a government message).
173. Id. at 939-40. See generally Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510,
2518-19 (1995) (recognizing that the government is entitled to regulate government-subsidized
private party speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (recognizing that a government
is entitled to say what it wants through a private party when the private party's speech is
subsidized by the government).
174. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 940 n.24.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., id. at 950 (Brunetti, J., concurring) (writing separately "to emphasize that the
article's unconstitutional effect on Arizona's elected officials would alone be sufficient reason to
strike the provision down.").
177. See id. at 927 (citing Arington, supra note 2, at 337).
178. See Bond, 385 U.S. at 136-37.
179. See id.
180. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 279 (1990) (discussing legislative immunity
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the electoral system is that legislators and constituents should engage in free
and uninhibited political exchange.' Legislators' speech protections exist in
part to "bring about political and social changes desired by the people.' ' 2
Restricting legislators' usage of Spanish, for example, would prevent at least
one notable constituency in Arizona-monolingual Spanish speakers-from
engaging in political debate and communication with their elected
representatives. Therefore, the amendment's overly broad restriction on the
speech of legislators alone should have rendered it unconstitutional.
A holding incorporating the constitutionally protected conduct precedent
would have strengthened the court's position by sufficiently addressing the
concerns raised by Chief Judge Wallace. 3 The majority could and should
have relied on binding authority which states that an overbreadth analysis is
appropriate when constitutionally protected conduct is at issue. 4
C. Article XXVIII's Violation of the Voting Rights Act
1. Restriction of Legislators' Speech Rights
By restricting legislators' speech rights, the amendment compromised
language minorities' political participation and therefore violated section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act. 5 Congress intended the Voting Rights Act to protect
a broad notion of the political process.'86 The legislative history of the
amendment, the cases upon which Congress relied when amending the
from imposition of court sanctions).
181. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931) (finding unconstitutional a
statute which criminally penalized the display of a red flag because the statute infringed upon
"free political discussion"); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that a fundamental principle of our American government is the
fulfillment of the political duty which is to engage in public discussion), overruled on alternative
grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
182. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (discussing freedom of speech and
press).
183. Any holding which invalidated Article XXVIII on First Amendment grounds would be
subject to criticism by Chief Judge Wallace. Chief Judge Wallace argued in dissent that language
restrictions pertain to conduct, not speech, and consequently are not entitled to First Amendment
protection. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 959 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting). The majority inadequately
addressed Wallace's criticism by responding with a circular argument that "[I]anguage is by
definition speech." Id. at 935.
184. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. 601. In Broadrick, the Supreme Court reasserted that a facial
overbreadth claim is appropriate when a statute regulates the "manner of expressive or
communicative conduct." Id. at 612-13; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114
(1972). Communication which creates a "'cognitive content' in the listener" or expresses an idea
qualifies as protected conduct. See Eliot F. Krieger, Protected Expression: Toward a Speaker-
Oriented Theory, 73 DENVER U. L. REV. 69, 73 (1995). Spanish language communication, for
example, creates cognitive content in a monolingual Spanish listener different from that created by
English communication. As demonstrated, language meets the test for expressive conduct.
Therefore, even if Judge Wallace were correct, language still is entitled to First Amendment
protection.
185. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
186. Kathryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Participation and Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 449, 459 (1988).
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Act,' 7 and the references to protections of political participation throughout
the Act itself all illustrate this congressional intent.' s
The restrictions on legislators' speech rights deny language minorities
equal opportunity to be active and influential participants in the political pro-
cess. Of course, the restrictions do not per se prevent a language minority
from casting a ballot. However, government-imposed language barriers do
cause the "disproportionate effect of purging laws on non-English speaking
citizens. '  For example, if a language minority appeared at a PTA,
veterans, or union meeting in order to share opinions and information with a
legislator, the legislator would be prohibited either from responding to
concerns or acknowledging that the constituent's concerns were heard."l
Language minority constituents would be denied opportunities to negotiate
with an incumbent legislator in the days before and following an election,
when voters traditionally vie for recognition of their positions. 9' Language
minorities would also be denied equal opportunity to effectively lobby at the
capitol. These activities, along with countless others, constitute political par-
ticipation. Each activity affects the outcome of legislation and the ability to
make an informed choice at the polls. The restrictions on legislators' speech
would give language majorities an upper hand in influencing legislation and
cause language minorities to arrive at the -polls on unequal footing, if they
arrived at all.
For almost fifteen years the Court has focused on applying § 2 to
districting arrangements. 2 This approach began with Thornburg, the case in
which the Court interpreted the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments for the
first time.'93 An interesting omission from the Thornburg opinion is a
discussion of § 2's application to political participation outside the districting
context. Following Thornburg, the Court continued to abstain from this
discussion.'94 Existing case law, however, does not preclude unique claims
by language minorities. Rather, language minority claims of first impression
present courts with the opportunity to honor legislative intent and recognize
the viability of a § 2 claim outside a districting context.' g'
187. Id. According to Abrams each case Congress relied on-White, 412 U.S. 755; Zimmer,
485 F.2d 1297; Kirksey, 554 F.2d 139--emphasized the importance of political opportunity both
before and after an election. See Abrams, supra note 186, at 459.
188. See supra notes 71-85 and accompanying text. The Senate record states that "[s]ection 2
protects the fight of minority voters to be free from election practices, procedures, or methods,
that deny them the same opportunity to participate in the political process as other citizens enjoy."
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206.
189. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 25 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 791.
190. See Abrams, supra note 186, at 489.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1905 (1996); Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct.
2647, 2651 (1994); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655 (1993). Litigants most often,bring § 2
claims not as individuals but as members of an identifiable group (i.e. race or language minority).
See Abrams, supra note 186, at 453-54. Vote dilution claims under § 2 provide relief when the
voting arrangement at issue makes the votes or political participation of minority group members
less effective. Id. at 454.
193. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 34.
194. See Montero v. Meyer, 13 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 1994).
195. See Su Sun Bai, Comment, Affirmative Pursuit of Political Equality for Asian Pacific
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In context, therefore, the amendment violates the Voting Rights Act. First,
the amendment disproportionately and severely affects language minorities'
opportunities in the electoral process. Second, the restrictions require a lack of
responsiveness by elected officials.
2. Article XXVIII Facially Violates the Voting Rights Act
The amendment specifically proclaimed English to be the official
language of the ballot.'96 Yet the amendment did not specifically allow the
usage of non-English languages in order to comply with the Voting Rights
Act.'97 Therefore, the amendment facially violates the provision of the Act
which requires bilingual voting materials.
The amendment included a disclaimer that a non-English language may be
used to avoid violating federal law.' Yet, at the same time, the amendment
specifically declared English as the official language of the ballot and required
the legislative branch and all of its officials to act only in English.' If the
amendment intended to abide by the Voting Rights Act, it should have specifi-
cally stated this exception along with the four others listed in the amendment.
Without further clarification, the amendment becomes too difficult to apply in
its current form or renders a large part of the amendment obsolete.
Furthermore, because the amendment did not contain a severability clause,
under the overbreadth doctrine it is entirely unconstitutional.2'
Government constructed obstacles to language minorities' political
participation are illegal and unfair. Requiring equal opportunity is not the same
as compelling elected officials to speak foreign languages.2"' Finding the
amendment in violation of the Voting Rights Act does not create an
affirmative right. Instead, it honors the principle that each person deserves an
equal opportunity to participate in the political process.
D. Equal Protection
The court also should have found that Article XXVIII unconstitutionally
violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.' 2 The court
recognized the validity of a Fourteenth Amendment approach when it stated
Americans: Reclaiming the Voting Rights Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 764-65 (1991).
196. See ARiz. CONsT. art. XXVIII, § 1(2).
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
198. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3(2)(b).
199. Id. §§ 1,3.
200. See supra notes. 116-38 and accompanying text.
201. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 937 (explaining that the state could neither order a
government official to speak a foreign language nor preclude an elected official from discussing
official state business to constituents in whatever language she sees fit). A California election
candidate filed suit claiming that the Voting Rights Act violated his First Amendment rights
because he was required to translate his election speech into Spanish before sending it to voters.
Reich v. Larson, 695 F.2d 1147, 1148 (9th Cir. 1983). The trial court dismissed his claim for lack
of jurisdiction and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 1149-51. However, the suit illustrates that
even a candidate's election statement is considered to be a significant component of the political
and electoral process.
202. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 940.
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that Article XXVIII's equal protection ramifications strongly supported its
ruling.20 3 A ruling based upon the equal protection doctrine would have
legally recognized one of the amendment's most unjust applications, its dis-
criminatory impact on national origin groups. In fact, the court stated that the
real issue of the case was that the amendment "drastically affects not only
public employees but also countless Arizonans who need desperately to com-
municate with their government."2 4
Unfortunately, the court's handling of the amendment's equal protection
ramifications was superficial and misguided. The court did not note how the
amendment adversely affected non-English speakers, specifically Latinos, until
their cursory mention in its conclusion.0 5 Furthermore, the court misdirected
its analysis when it discussed the amendment's unconstitutional application to
non-English speaking populations based on the "right to receive" 2" doctrine
instead of the equal protection doctrine.
The premise underlying an equal protection challenge is that language
serves as a proxy for national origin. Courts have sustained equal protection
challenges to language discrimination as a proxy for suspect class
discrimination in various contexts. 7 The language restrictions in the
amendment do not per se denote disparate treatment against a particular group,
because the amendment applies equally to English and non-English
speakers.2' Facially neutral laws are subject to rationality review instead of
strict scrutiny.2' However, the Supreme Court has held that facially neutral
laws command strict scrutiny when: (1) they are sufficiently linked to a
203. See id.
204. Id. at 940 n.24.
205. Id. at 947 (stating that "Article XXVIII's overbreadth is especially egregious because it
is not uniformly spread over the population, but falls almost entirely upon Latinos and other
national origin minorities").
206. Id. at 940 n.24; see also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976) (defining the "right to receive" doctrine as protecting the
communication between a willing speaker and recipient, and further stating that, in the case of a
willing speaker, the source and recipient of the communication are afforded protection as well).
The private entity "right to receive" doctrine had been adapted to the public employment context
only when a public employee speaks on matters of public concern. National Treasury Employees
Union, 115 S. Ct. at 1015.
207, See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363 (1991) (plurality opinion) (examining
language as proxy for race in jury selection process); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500,
524-25 (1926) (holding that Chinese merchants were denied equal protection by a statute allowing
only English and Spanish languages to be used in account books); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (invalidating a language restriction statute in large part because it targeted the state's
German-American community); Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1520-21 (9th Cir. 1986)
(en banc) (stating that people of different ethnic groups "are often distinguished by a foreign
language"), vacated as moot, 484 U.S. 806 (1987). But see Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36,
41 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that Spanish speakers' lack of an affirmative right to Spanish speaking
social security notices did not constitute discrimination against Latinos), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
929 (1984); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act "does not support an. interpretation that equates the language an employee prefers
to use with his national origin"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
208. Garfield, supra note 91, at 706 n.72. Under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
the amendment would be considered a facially neutral law.
209. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (applying rationality review to a
facially neutral ordinance).
[Vol. 74:1
ARIZONANS FOR OFFICIAL ENGLISH
suspect class, and (2) the state decisionmaker in question in part intentionally
acted to discriminate against the suspect class."'
The majority in Yniguez IV recognized that language was, in this case, a
proxy for national origin and that language restrictions can mask national
origin discrimination."' Article XXVIII's ban on non-English
communication between government employees and citizens is easily linked to
discrimination against at least one national origin group, people of Latino ori-
gin. 2 The burden of the article falls exclusively on non-English speakers,
the overwhelming majority of whom are Spanish speakers.2 3 As mentioned
above, not only are most Spanish speakers Latino, but Arizona has the fourth
highest number of Latinos in America.2 4 These objective figures prove the
inextricable link between language and national origin.
Proving that the majority of Arizona voters who approved the amendment
had a discriminatory intent is a more difficult task. Some courts have been
receptive to looking at the totality of the circumstances as proof of discrimina-
tory intent.2 5 It is clear that the amendment would have a disproportionate
impact on monolingual Spanish speakers by preventing them from receiving
vital government information and services and shutting them out of the
political process. In fact, the Amendment passed during a time of a marked
increase in immigration, a fact which may suggest that Arizonans cast votes
with discriminatory motives. 6 Furthermore, the fact that voters approved
Article XXVIII, notwithstanding an Arizona publicity pamphlet stating the
article would potentially create an inefficient and ineffective government,
21 7
shows that Arizona voters did not approve the amendment with the best
interests of their government in mind. The totality of the circumstances shows
that the amendment was passed at least in part due to discriminatory motives.
Consequently, the amendment should have received strict scrutiny."'
210. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)
(noting that discriminatory intent must be at least one motive, not necessarily the sole motive, of a
law's passage); Washington, 426 U.S. at 240 (requiring a showing of discriminatory purpose).
211. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 947-48.
212. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954) (recognizing that Mexicans
constitute a distinct national origin group for the purposes of an equal protection analysis).
213. Puig-Lugo, supra note 16, at 47. As mentioned above, Spanish speakers constitute the
largest group of Arizonan non-English speakers. The group of Native American Speakers, the
second largest group, is approximately one fourth the size of the number of Spanish speakers.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION & HOUSING, 1990, Summary Tape File
3C104P28 (Washington: The Bureau 1992); see supra notes 2, 104.
214. See supra note 104.
215. See Andrew P. Averbach, Note, Language Classifications and the Equal Protection
Clause: When is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 503 (1984).
216. See supra notes 2, 104.
217. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 961 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing the Arizona publici-
ty pamphlet).
218. When a law or classification is subject to strict scrutiny, the court must find that the law
or classification is narrowly tailored to further a compelling or overriding state interest. See, e.g.,
Harper v. Blumenthal, 478 F. Supp. 176, 181 (D.D.C. 1979). It is next to impossible for the
government to meet the burden of proving that discrimination against the suspect class serves a
compelling state interest. See Garfield, supra note 91, at 707 (stating that the Supreme Court has
only upheld two laws to which it applied strict scrutiny, and noting that these laws were enacted
during wartime).
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The amendment did not further a compelling state interest. The litigating
parties stipulated that Yniguez's use of Spanish contributed to a more efficient
and effective workplace." 9 Consequently, the traditional compelling state
interest necessary to justify regulating employee speech is absent in this case.
Furthermore, the majority found an absence of a substantial connection
between a public employee's job performance and the alleged state interests of
encouraging a common language, promoting Americanism and democracy, and
protecting public confidence.22 Therefore, under a strict scrutiny analysis,
Article XXVIII violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Based on case authority and the aforementioned analysis by the Yniguez
IV majority, it is possible that the amendment violates the Equal Protection
Clause even under a rationality review. Although courts give great deference
to state actions when using a rationality review,22 it may be argued that the
amendment does not bear a rational relationship to any legitimate state
objectives. Courts most often uphold language classifications under a mere
rationality review based upon the state's declared interests of efficiency and
safety.222 However, in Yniguez IV, these state interests are absent.223 Also,
the court held that Article XXVII could not lawfully serve the alleged state
interest.22 ' Therefore, even giving great deference to state actions, Article
XXVIII violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
CONCLUSION
The majority arrived at a legally sound and just conclusion: Article
XXVIII is "not a valid regulation of the speech of public employees." '225 The
court's approach to this conclusion, however, was misguided. Instead of appro-
priately analyzing the case as one of first impression, the court erroneously
applied the Waters/Pickering precedents. This approach distorted and confused
precedent while ignoring the amendment's most clearly unconstitutional appli-
cation: the restriction of legislators' speech rights.
By restricting legislators' speech rights and consequently compromising
language minorities' opportunities for political participation, the amendment
also violated the Voting Rights Act. Although the Supreme Court has not
provided direction for language minority plaintiffs alleging § 2 violations, the
legislative history, the language of the Act itself, and case law addressing
political participation provide support for such a claim.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit should be commended for its recognition of
the equal protection issues implicated by the amendment. However, the court
insufficiently analyzed the amendment's discriminatory impact on national
219. Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 924.
220. Id. at 944-45.
221. See Garfield, supra note 91, at 706 n.68.
222. Averbach, supra note 215, at 486-87.
223. See Yniguez IV, 69 F.3d at 942. The litigants supporting the amendment have never
asserted that safety is a legitimate state issue in this case. Id.
224. Id.'at 946.
225. Id. at 947.
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origin groups. The court should have properly recognized language as a proxy
for national origin and acknowledged the amendment's disparate impact on
Latinos and other national origin groups by invalidating the amendment on
equal protection grounds.
Language restrictions are not valid attempts at maintaining a unified
nation. Restrictions on the use of non-English languages act as tools for
discrimination and result in language minorities receiving unequal and unfair
treatment. Gloria Anzaldua, a distinguished advocate for non-English speaking
populations, writes, "[w]ho is to say that robbing a people of its language is
less violent than war?
'2 26
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